Chapter Twenty-Seven - The de Riberas and the Korean War (June 25, 1950 C.E.-July 27, 1953 C.E.)

                                                                       


 

 

 

 


 

 

  

  

  

  

  

  

  

  

  

  

  

  

 

 

 




 

 





 

 

 

 
Thanks to all of those sources provided by the Internet and used in this chapter


 

With this submission of this my last chapter of the family history of the de Ribera’s, Chapter Twenty-Seven - The de Riberas and the Korean War (June 25, 1950 C.E.-July 27, 1953 C.E.) - We fought for the Right reasons, at the Right time, in the Right place, I’m saying good bye to many years of effort and the joy of finding one’s ancestral roots. Like many of the hedonistic children of the 1950s C.E. and 1960s C.E., I gave little thought to my family’s past. I lived in the present and planned for the future. Before this effort the word “family” was just a cliché. The word family now has a markedly different meaning for me.

 

What a gift this work has been. I can now almost feel the presence of those many ancestors I researched. I feel that I know them and have learned to love them. So here, I say “à plus tard,” until later, rather than “Adieu,” to this work. It would only be appropriate to thank Mimi Lozano Holtzman and her husband Win of Somos Primos E-Magazine fame for her kind support and insightful guidance into the world of history and genealogy. I call Mimi “Dearest” because she’s a dear soul! Without her this homage to my Mums family, the de Riberas, would never have been written.

 

Now to the de Riberas and the Korean War!

 

As Chapter Twenty-Seven - The de Riberas and the Korean War (June 25, 1950 C.E.-July 27, 1953 C.E.) is the last chapter of the book of the Family History of the de Riberas of New Mexico, I wish to present some personal insight as to why this Hispano American family fought so willingly for the United States of America (U.S.).

 

Firstly, I would suggest that it was the yearning for “Freedom.” It should be remembered that the de Riberas and many of the other founding families of Nuevo Méjico were Sephardim or Spanish Jews and also Conversos. During the Spanish Period, they had escaped España and its religious and political elite to the safety of the Nuevo Mundo, the Américas. The family made its way ever northward within the Virrey of Nuéva España, until reaching Nuevo Méjico. In that desolate place they found safety as hidden Jews, away for the Inquisición Española. It was there that these Sefardita Jews who immigrated into northern areas of the Virrey of Nuéva España became los Manitos de Nuevo Méjico. They then ventured to south and central Tejas, and later to parts of southern Colorado and beyond. They would eventually be called, Los Tejanos y los Manitos de Nuevo Méjico or The Texans and the brethren of New Mexico. There in what is today the American Southwest the Sephardi Españoles found the freedom they so desperately wanted.

 

The de Ribera blood lines of the North American Continent began when el Imperio Español sent an expedition under Don Juan de Oñate to establish the Spanish provincia de Santa Fé de Nuevo Méjico in 1598 C.E., with a capital founded near Ohkay Oweenge Pueblo, which he called San Juan de los CaballerosDe Oñate later attempted to establish a settlement in Arizona in 1599 C.E., but failed. They turned back due to inclement weather. By 1610 C.E., Santa was founded, making it the oldest capital in U.S. After arriving, these Españoles took what they wanted from the indigenous without regard for their needs and wants.

 

To be sure, during the 17th-Century C.E., they would have heard the news of the de Ribera family in the capital of Nuéva España, Méjico City, having been arrested in connection with the trial of Gabriel de Granada by the Inquisición in Nuéva España, now Méjico. In that trial (1642 C.E.-1645 C.E.) there appeared as "accomplices" in the observance of the Law of Moses and as Judaizing heretics, the names of Doña María, Doña Catalina, Clara, Margarita, Ysabel, and Doña Blanca de Rivera, all of whom seem to have been natives of Sevilla. Another person mentioned in the same connection is Diego López Rivera, one of the Sefarditas from his native Portugués. The name is frequently written "Ribera."

 

The reality of religious intolerance and the fear of the Inquisición Española had never left them. These Sephardic families understood the imperfections of el Imperio Español and the orthodox Católicos of the Church. The threat these powerful entities represented to the precious freedom these Sefardí had sought was palpable.

 

Almost immediately after the 1821 C.E. invasion by the Méjicanos, the Españoles could see the failings of el Imperio Méjicano, and later its replacement governments called the Méjicano Republics. The de Riberas were forced to accept their conquest and repression by a foreign power. This continued until Méjico lost the northern reaches of what had been once the Virrey of Nuéva España to the Américanos in 1846 C.E.

 

By 1846 C.E., the Américanos arrived taking the land and making it part of the U.S. I think that they understood and liked these strong, open, and resourceful Américanos who were driven by their “American Dream.” I believe this is why the de Riberas accepted this new government and became Américanos. Over time, the many generations of the de Ribera family were not unlike other Americans. To be sure, they understood the difficulties of a nation that was ever changing and given to mistakes, but also one which moved ever forward improving itself and the lives of its people. This was also their dream. Now as Américanos, they were free to live as they wanted.

 

I feel it was that belief in “freedom” and in the “American Dream” that drove their ready participation in the many American wars, in service to these ideals even, if the nation itself had glaring faults.

 

Finally, the de Riberas had always been soldados. They had served el Imperio Español, el Imperio Méjicano and later its replacement governments, and now they entered military service of this great nation, the U.S. of America. The family served their new country in every war, including the Korean War. Why would they have done this? I believe it was their love of country, a belief in “freedom,” and faith in the “American Dream.”

 

After 1920 C.E., the family like many other Americans suffered and served through WWI, the bad economic conditions of the Great Depression, and WWII. By the time of the Korean War in 1950 C.E., the de Riberas of New Mexico had generations of American military service. They understood what was at stake. Once again, they were willing to serve and die if necessary for the “Dream.” I am positive that they would have agreed with this quote by Thomas Jefferson. “With all the imperfections of our present government, it is without comparison the best existing, or that ever did exist.” Thomas Jefferson also said this, “We will be soldiers, so our sons may be farmers, so their sons may be artists.” This the de Riberas had always done.

 

Here, I must say that I’ve been asked several times why I refer to the de Riberas of New Mexico as a “Clan.” The Rivera (originally de Ribera) family name is listed in the New Mexico Office of the State Historian as one of the founding families of the state. Salvadór Matías de Ribera (later spelled Rivera) was the founding progenitor of the New Mexico Riberas. Salvadór served in the Spanish Military at the Presidio in Santa Fé. He was born in Puerto de Santa María in Southwest España near Cádiz. The town of Ribera, New Mexico, is named after him.

 

In New Mexico, those of the Spanish-speaking population of colonial descent such as the de Riberas are referred to by the predominant Spanish term Hispano. This is analogous to those from California, Californio, and those from Texas, or Tejano. In New Mexico, this Spanish-speaking population was always proportionally greater than those of California and Texas. The term is commonly used to differentiate those who settled the area early, around 1598 C.E. to 1848 C.E., from later Mexican migrants.

 

Currently, the majority of the Hispano population is distributed between New Mexico and Southern Colorado. A community of people in Southern Colorado who migrated there in the early 19th-Century C.E. are descended from Hispanos from New Mexico. Most of New Mexico's Hispanos, numbering in the hundreds of thousands, live in the northern half of the state. The predominant ancestry claimed by the state's citizens is that of descendants of Spanish settlers.

 

It is accepted that the de Riberas of New Mexico and Colorado are a group of families the heads of which claim descent from a common ancestor, Salvadór Matías de Ribera. This group of people is of a common descent, a family, a clan.

 

These are just a few of the de Ribera Clan who fought in both WWII and Korea.

 

In Korea, “We fought for the Right reasons, at the Right time, in the Right place”

 

One of the de Ribera Clan fought in both WWII and Korea. His name, U.S. ARMY S SGT Philip Fidel Rivera Santa , New Mexico, enlisted on January 6, 1941 C.E.

 

Philip Fidel Rivera Santa Fé, New Mexico

Santa Fe National Cemetery
501 North Guadalupe Street
Santa Fé, NM 87501

Section: V

Site: 1873

Birth: May 1, 1918

Death: September 21, 1970

Age: 52

Branch: U.S. ARMY

Rank: S SGT

War: WORLD WAR II, KOREA

 

 

SANTA FE NATIONAL CEMETERY

501 North Guadalupe Street Santa , NM 87501

 

A second member of the de Ribera Clan Porfirio Estrada Rivera fought in both in WW II and Korea. In Korea he served in the U.S. Navy.

 

Porfirio Estrada Rivera Santa Fé, New Mexico

Santa Fe National Cemetery
501 North Guadalupe Street
Santa Fé, NM 87501

Section: 9

Site: 103

Birth: September 15, 1925

Death: July 10, 1995

Age: 69

Branch: US ARMY, US NAVY

Rank: CPL, AD3

War: WORLD WAR II, KOREA

Porfirio Rivera CPL, AD3, Santa Fé, NM

SANTA FE NATIONAL CEMETERY

501 North Guadalupe Street Santa , NM 87501

RIVERA, PORFIRIO ESTRADA  

AD3 U.S. NAVY

CPL U.S. ARMY

WORLD WAR II, KOREA

DATE OF BIRTH: 09/15/1925

DATE OF DEATH: 07/10/1995

BURIED AT: SECTION 9 SITE 103

 

A third member of the de Ribera Clan António Rivera fought in both Korea and Vietnam. He served in the U.S. Army.

 

SANTA FE NATIONAL CEMETERY

501 North Guadalupe Street Santa Fé, NM 87501

RIVERA, ANTÓNIO

SGT U.S. ARMY

KOREA, VIETNAM

DATE OF BIRTH: 12/29/1927

DATE OF DEATH: 07/20/2009

BURIED AT: SECTION 20 SITE 1638

 

 

 

Another member of the de Ribera Clan Pete D. Rivera fought in both Korea and Vietnam. He served in the U.S. Navy.

 

SANTA FE NATIONAL CEMETERY

501 North Guadalupe Street Santa Fé, NM 87501

RIVERA, PETE D  

YNC CPO U.S. NAVY

KOREA, VIETNAM

DATE OF BIRTH: 11/05/1934

DATE OF DEATH: 07/19/2001

BURIED AT: SECTION 6  SITE 2159

 

Another of the de Ribera Clan who served in the Korea War was U.S. Army Private Gavino J Rivera of Santa Fé, New Mexico, born October 4, 1929 C.E. Rivera, Gavino J, b. 10/04/1929, d. 08/17/1996, US Army, PVT, Res: Albuquerque, NM, Plot: 9 0 2660, bur. 08/21/1996.

Corporal Eugene C. Rivera was another member of the de Ribera Clan from Santa Fé, New Mexico, served in the Korea War. He was a Communications Chief and U.S. Army Ranger serving with the 8th Ranger Company (Airborne) during the Korean War. On April 25, 1951 C.E., the 8th Ranger Company found itself heavily engaged with PAV forces as they provided forward reconnaissance during the withdrawal of the U.S. 24th Infantry Division near a Korean terrain feature designated Hill 628. Rivera operating the only remaining radio adjusted artillery fire upon the enemy. While doing so, the unit found itself trapped. Despite their best efforts, friendly troops were unable to break through the Chinese lines to reconnect with the isolated unit. As casualties mounted, the Rangers were encouraged to, "Get out the best you can."

 

Not willing to abandon any soldier, the Rangers prepared to make their final stand as CPL Rivera spotted American tanks. To save his fellow Rangers, CPL Rivera of Santa Fé, New Mexico, bravely climbed a desolate hill, and while under relentless fire from the enemy, established and maintained radio contact with the U.S. Army tank platoon leader, Lieutenant David Teich. Teich was in a tank company near the 38th parallel in 1951 when a radio distress call came in from the Eighth Ranger Company. Wounded, outnumbered, and under heavy fire, the Rangers were near Teich's tanks, and facing 300,000 Communist troops, moving steadily toward their position. Teich wanted to help, but was ordered to withdraw instead, his captain saying "We've got orders to move out. Screw them. Let them fight their own battles."

 

Teich went anyway and led four tanks over to the Rangers' position. The tanks then took out so many Rangers on each tank that they covered up the tank's turrets. Eugene C. Rivera’s selfless act allowed the M46 Patton, tiger-striped tanks of the Sixth Tank Battalion to break the enemy encirclement and evacuate the wounded.

 

Following are more members of the de Ribera Clan from New Mexico, that served during the Korea War in the armed forces branches of the U.S. Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force:

 

SANTA FE NATIONAL CEMETERY

501 North Guadalupe Street Santa , NM 87501

RIVERA, ALEJANDRO E.  

CPL U.S. ARMY

KOREA

DATE OF BIRTH: 10/27/1929

DATE OF DEATH: 07/16/2002

BURIED AT: SECTION 23  SITE 12

 

 

SANTA FE NATIONAL CEMETERY

501 North Guadalupe Street Santa Fé, NM 87501

RIVERA, ALFRED JR 

PFC U.S. ARMY

KOREA

DATE OF BIRTH: 02/07/1929

DATE OF DEATH: 06/08/2007

BURIED AT: SECTION COL-2  SITE A30

 

 

SANTA FE NATIONAL CEMETERY

501 North Guadalupe Street Santa Fé, NM 87501

RIVERA, CARPIO  

PV2 U.S. ARMY

KOREA

DATE OF BIRTH: 09/26/1929

DATE OF DEATH: 04/21/2006

BURIED AT: SECTION 13  SITE 491

 

 

SANTA FE NATIONAL CEMETERY

501 North Guadalupe Street Santa Fé, NM 87501

RIVERA, CLEMENTE GENOVEVO  

PFC U.S. ARMY

KOREA

DATE OF BIRTH: 04/15/1931

DATE OF DEATH: 02/04/2002

BURIED AT: SECTION 3  SITE 678

 

 

SANTA FE NATIONAL CEMETERY

501 North Guadalupe Street Santa Fé, NM 87501

RIVERA, FRANK AGUILINO  

PV2 U.S. ARMY

KOREA

DATE OF BIRTH: 06/04/1929

DATE OF DEATH: 05/10/2007

BURIED AT: SECTION V SITE 120

 

SANTA FE NATIONAL CEMETERY

501 North Guadalupe Street Santa Fé, NM 87501

RIVERA, MANUEL ABAN

U.S. NAVY

KOREA

DATE OF BIRTH: 11/08/1932

DATE OF DEATH: 10/13/1996

BURIED AT: SECTION V SITE 1231

 

 

SANTA FE NATIONAL CEMETERY

501 North Guadalupe Street Santa Fé, NM 87501

RIVERA, ADOLFO JR  

AB3 U.S. NAVY

KOREA

DATE OF BIRTH: 08/7/1930

DATE OF DEATH: 02/06/2014

BURIED AT: SECTION 24 SITE 875

 

 

SANTA FE NATIONAL CEMETERY

501 North Guadalupe Street Santa , NM 87501

RIVERA, LALO MARTOLO  

SN U.S. NAVY

KOREA

DATE OF BIRTH: 10/12/1931

DATE OF DEATH: 05/03/2015

BURIED AT: SECTION 25B SITE 28

 

 

SANTA FE NATIONAL CEMETERY

501 North Guadalupe Street Santa Fé, NM 87501

RIVERA, LUTHER L  

SGT U.S. MARINE CORPS

KOREA

DATE OF BIRTH: 07/15/1931

DATE OF DEATH: 08/09/2008

BURIED AT: SECTION 19 SITE 55

 

SANTA FE NATIONAL CEMETERY

501 North Guadalupe Street Santa Fé, NM 87501

RIVERA, RICARDO  

A2C U.S. AIR FORCE

KOREA

DATE OF BIRTH: 03/11/1937

DATE OF DEATH: 12/09/1979

BURIED AT: SECTION 3  SITE 663

 

SANTA FE NATIONAL CEMETERY

501 North Guadalupe Street Santa Fé, NM 87501

RIVERA, BEN E  

A1 U.S. AIR FORCE

KOREA

DATE OF BIRTH: 10/26/1933

DATE OF DEATH: 09/03/1985

BURIED AT: SECTION 6  SITE 467

 

 

SANTA FE NATIONAL CEMETERY

501 North Guadalupe Street Santa Fé, NM 87501

RIVERA, JOSÉ ELOY (E.)

A3C U.S. AIR FORCE

KOREA

DATE OF BIRTH: 04/03/1934 Las Vegas, San Miguel County, New Mexico, USA

DATE OF DEATH: 05/06/2012

BURIED AT: SECTION 24 SITE 688

 

 

The Hispano Americans of New Mexico and other locales gave their all, and in some cases, their lives during these wars. I often wonder what these men and women would think of the 21st-Century C.E. if they were able to be brought back to life. If they saw and heard this generation’s questioning the need for patriotism and its mistrust of government and its officials, and less than civil public discourse, would they be confused or angered? Or would they agree?

 

I agree with President Theodore Roosevelt’s statement when he said, “Patriotism means to stand by the country. It does not mean to stand by the president or any other public official, save exactly to the degree in which he himself stands by the country. It is patriotic to support him insofar as he efficiently serves the country. It is unpatriotic not to oppose him to the exact extent that by inefficiency or otherwise he fails in his duty to stand by the country. In either event, it is unpatriotic not to tell the truth, whether about the president or anyone else.” 

I. Introduction

 

In this Chapter, I cannot hope do justice to all of the men and women of all races and ethnicity who served in this heroic effort. One would hope that others will attempt to write about these other men and women. As this is the family history about a Hispano family, the de Riberas of New Mexico, I have identified those fellow Hispanos from the state of New Mexico who were casualties of the Korean War and placed their names and information in the months in which they fell during the war.

 

As the de Riberas are also Hispanic Americans, I chose to include other non-Hispano Hispanic military personnel.

 

A. The Power and Failure of the American Elite

 

The Korean War began when the ongoing civil war escalated into open warfare. On June 25, 1950 C.E., Communist North Korean People's Army (NKPA) forces supported by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and China invaded the Democratic south. This was in an effort to unite the entire peninsula under one Communist government. This was not about freedom.

 

The Korea Peninsula had been ruled by Japan from 1910 C.E. until the closing days of World War II. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) then an Allied power declared war on Japan in August 1945 C.E. After having reached an agreement with the U.S., the USSR then liberated Korea north of the 38th parallel. By liberation, I mean to say that the Soviets liberated all possessions from all parties and controlled the means of any and all production.

 

It should have been understood by the American Elite that by allowing, giving, providing  the USSR Communists a foothold anywhere on the Korean Peninsula was to pretend that what they were doing in Eastern Europe of the time was a one-off situation. Clearly history proved the Elites wrong! The Communists had every intention of subverting any authority that was not acceptable to them. Does the term “Comintern” strike a familiar note!

 

The Comintern or Communist International was an international Communist organization founded by Vladimir Lenin the Russian communist revolutionary and head of the Bolshevik Party. He rose to prominence during the Russian Revolution of 1917 C.E. The Comintern was established in Moscow, USSR in 1919 C.E. It was officially dissolved in 1943 C.E. 

 

This ultra-radical organization degenerated under Joséph Stalin who served as General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party USSR from 1922 C.E. to his death on March 5, 1953 C.E. The Comintern became a political instrument of USSR which was used to unite Communist groups in various countries. In effect, the Comintern continued the promotion of Revolutionary Marxism, including on the Korea Peninsula.

 

By 1948 C.E., U.S. forces moved into the Korean south. The splitting of Korea into two separate governments was a product of the Cold War between the USSR and the U.S. Both governments claimed to be Korea’s legitimate government. Also, neither side accepted the existing border as permanent.

 

Here it is important to clarify that before and after the Korean War, the American elite or upper-class controlled and directed U.S.’ foreign and domestic policy. Good or bad, every nation on the face of the earth has its elite. The American elite or upper-class thought itself to be as an aristocratic group, controlling society's means of production. This included those who gain this position due to socioeconomic means and not personal achievement.

 

The idea that the American cosmopolitan elite having controlled and dominated American foreign policy and diplomacy is a reality. Why is this important? It was this social stratum of American society, and not the average man on the street, that assessed, planned, and implemented the military engagements of the Korean War.

 

For the purpose of this chapter, the term, "elite" describes a person or group of people who are members of the uppermost class of society. In the U.S., this archaic society was based upon lineage from parents or grandparents of the Revolutionary War and passed-on. American elitists for a time were almost exclusively, White Anglo-Saxon Protestants (WASPs). They were the social group of wealthy and well-connected white Americans of Protestant and predominantly British ancestry, many of whom trace their ancestry to the American colonial period.

 

The American elitist’s belief and attitudes about themselves was that they were a select group of people of a superior ancestry, of intrinsic quality, of high intellect, wealth, special skills, or experience. As such, they felt that they were more likely to be more constructive for society as a whole. Therefore, they deserved more influence and greater authority than the common working man.

 

It was to the elites that the American people of the 1940s C.E. and 1950 C.E. willingly left the all important decisions of war. That includes the Korean War. I am not for one moment saying that to enter the Korean Peninsula in the defense of its people was unwise or unwarranted. What I am saying is that the elite decision-makers failed to understand the entire scope of the conflict before entering into that civil war. The American Elite’s strategic military approach became one of changing plans in mid-stream which eventually resulted in a tactical stalemate.

 

This elitist control would continue until at least the 1960s. The group dominated American society and culture and dominated in the leadership of the Republican and Democratic parties. They were very well placed in major financial, business, legal, and academic institutions and had close to a monopoly of elite society due to intermarriage and nepotism.

 

During the latter half of the 20th-Century C.E., others of different ethnic and racial groups would grow in influence and WASP dominance would begin to weaken. These Elites of the WASP American families would remain as "the Establishment,” however, their historical dominance and control over the financial, cultural, academic, and legal institutions of the U.S. would gradually decline.

 

As opposed to the Elite, the average American who had little power or control in the U.S., simply fought and died in Korea for ideals. The ideals of "Freedom” and the “American Dream” are the national ethos of the U.S. It’s a set of ideals in which freedom includes the opportunity for prosperity, success, and an upward social mobility for the family and children. At its base is that belief that it is achieved through hard work in a society with few barriers. About these good souls, I agree with Sargent Shriver’s comments. “The only genuine elite are the elite of those men and women who gave their lives to justice and charity.”

 

II. Hispanic American Patriotism and the Korean War

 

Hispanics have fought in every American war since the Revolutionary War. Many Hispanic Americans would again come forward during the Korean War. They would give their all despite the racial and ethnic prejudice existing in the nation which negatively impacted them.

 

Hispanics and other minority groups did not suffer from naïveté. They understood that the Native Americans had been placed on reservations and that African Americans were relegated to the edge society. Hispanics had seen Asian Americans deported or placed in detention camps, or allowed work as gardeners and cooks. The Hispanics also had been isolated into their barrios where they forgot their historical and cultural roots. In short, to be an American, meant to be perfectly American and Hispanics were clearly not. During that time, under the best of circumstances every non-White racial and ethnic group was tolerated. American society created a place for each group which was not necessarily equal.

 

Now I return to the proposition that when and where practicable, as Américanos, these Hispanics were free to live as they wanted. Their innate belief in America, its sense of “freedom” and the “American Dream” is what drove them to readily participate in the many American wars. Their adherence to those ideals led the de Riberas to service America in Korea. This they did despite America’s glaring faults.

 

Unfortunately after World War II ended, the regular U.S. military had been considerably downsized. General MacArthur's request for more troops was approved, but in order to meet his needs quota, it became necessary to activate thousands of National Guardsmen from all across the U.S. From then on, our nation's National Guard played an important role in the Korean War.

 

According to the National Guard Bureau in Arlington, Virginia, when war be out in Korea about one third (138,600 men) of the Army Guard's total strength was mobilized. Forty-three units, including two infantry divisions, actually served in Korea. Other guard units were deployed to stateside and worldwide locations close to and far away from Korea.

 

There was more than National Guard manpower needed. Some 67 percent of the Army National Guard's equipment was also mobilized for war. The Army National Guard and the Air National Guard gave up motor vehicles, tanks, and other ground weapons, and light aircraft. This included 156 M-26 tanks and some 592 M-4 medium tanks. The Air National Guard provided its F-84 and F-74 jet fighter aircraft, spare parts for these aircraft including the F-51 aircraft, life vests, and life rafts for the active forces.

 

Elements of the Air National Guard would also be deployed. By the fall of 1950 C.E., about one sixth of the Air National Guard would be activated. During 1951 C.E., 22 of the 27 Air National Guard wings, with supporting units, would be called up. These Guardsmen left post-World War II civilian jobs, new brides, young children, college studies, and many hopes and dreams when their units were activated for the war.

 

In the American Southwest, the War Department had earlier directed the reorganization of the New Mexico Guard in March 1947 C.E. This order gave the State five separate Anti-Aircraft Battalions, one Operations Detachment, two Signal Radar Units, one Engineer Searchlight Maintenance Unit, and three Ordnance Companies.

 

The Korean War caused activation into Federal service of the 716th AAA Gun Battalion along with the 726th and 394th Signal Radar Maintenance Unit. The 188th was also activated during the conflict. New Mexico units furnished individual members, many Hispanos, as replacements to units engaged in active combat.

 

One group of American Hispanics that heard the nation’s call and reported for duty was the Puertorriqueños. Puerto Rico’s 65th Infantry in an exercise involving the 65th in February 1950 C.E. changed the minds of many Army leaders about the 65th's usefulness. The 65th held off the entire 3rd Infantry Division in a successful defense. Pentagon planners took note. With the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950 C.E., the 65th was ordered to Korea and assigned to the 3rd Infantry Division. Brigadier-General Juan Codero, Puerto Rico's Adjutant General commanded the 296th Infantry when it was mobilized in 1950 C.E. and was one of the commanders of the 65th in Korea, making him, perhaps, the only Guard member to command a regular regiment in Korea.

 

While the 65th was on its way, its sister Puerto Rico Guard unit, the 296th Infantry, was mobilized. Like many Guard units, the 296th was tasked to provide replacements. Brigadier-General Juan Codero commanded the 296th Infantry when it was mobilized in 1950 C.E. and was one of the commanders of the 65th in Korea, making him, perhaps, the only Guard member to command a regular regiment in Korea.

 

The 65th Infantry had always lived up to its motto of "Honor and Fidelity."  It would fight in some of the toughest battles of the Korean War. The Unit would earn two U.S. Presidential Unit Citations, two Republic of Korea (ROK) Presidential Unit Citations, two U.S. Meritorious Unit Commendations, and the Greek Gold Medal of Bravery. Four of its soldiers would be awarded the Distinguished Service Cross, the second highest award for valor.

 

Shortly after the 65th arrived in ROK, its commander, Colonel William Harris, was approached by Eight Army commander Lieutenant-General Walton Walker. The general asked, "Will the Puertorriqueños fight?" "I and my Puertorriqueños will fight anybody," replied Harris proudly. Walker then pointed to a waiting northbound train and ordered, "Get on, and then go that way." For the next three years the men of the 65th would fight their way up and down the Korean Peninsula.

 

Any doubts about their fighting ability would be quickly dispelled. The regiment would earn a distinguished combat record. Fighting in some of the toughest battles of the Korean War, the 65th would earn two U.S. Presidential Unit Citations, two Republic of Korea Presidential Unit Citations, two U.S. Meritorious Unit Commendations, and the Greek Gold Medal of Bravery. Four of its soldiers would be awarded the Distinguished Service Cross, the second highest award for valor.

 

Colonel Harry Micheli, later the senior Army instructor at the Antilles Military Academy in Puerto Rico, reported to the 65th as a new second lieutenant in the fall of 1951 C.E. He stated, "I remember that the 65th was reorganizing after a year of heavy combat. Many of the old-time regulars had left as casualties. They were replaced by Puerto Rico Guardsmen, non-Hispanic Guardsmen from various states, and The Republic of Korea Army (ROKA) replacements from ROK. We trained until we were a cohesive unit," he added, "and then we reentered combat."

 

III. A prelude to the Korean War - U.S. Political Events 1940-1950 C.E.:

 

A. The World of WWII

 

I provide the following so that the reader might have a better understanding of America and the world at large prior to the Korean War. I start after the Europeans had begun WWII and continue until the start of the Korean War. The world during this period was an ugly, vicious, and cruel place. All nations involved suffered. Why?  WWII started because the great European powers had unnecessarily forgotten the lessons of WWI. Just four years before the Europeans repeated the errors of WWI in 1939 C.E, Winston Churchill gave a speech attempting to remind his audience of past mistakes which led to War earlier.

 

In a 1935 C.E. House of Commons speech after the Stresa Conference, Churchill suggested that failure to act quickly in considering the future, not necessarily a failure to adequately ruminate upon the past, will result in history repeating itself. Churchill said, "Want of foresight, unwillingness to act when action would be simple and effective, lack of clear thinking, confusion of counsel until the emergency comes, until self-preservation strikes its jarring gong — these are the features which constitute the endless repetition of history.” WWII was a result of that repetition of history.

 

By 1940 C.E., with Europe at war, everything had changed. European countries were desperate for goods to use in the war effort. They spent millions of dollars on American steel, ammunition, weapons, and food. Yet private businesses were slow to react to the demands of war. Many manufacturers continued to make consumer goods when military hardware was most needed. Shortages of raw materials also held up the recovery. Rather than issuing government orders or taking control of industries, the Roosevelt administration chose to guide private industry into producing what was required. It struck deals with private businesses to boost wartime production. This mixture of private money and federal incentives became the model for the American economy for the next thirty years. Yet that same year, the federal government estimated that more than half the families in the U.S. were below the poverty level.

 

Between 1940 C.E. and 1945 C.E., American industry would produce eighty-six thousand tanks, thirty thousand aircraft, and sixty-five hundred ships. U.S. Steel would make twenty-one million helmets for the army. Quality improved as well. Aircraft would fly farther and faster than ever. The General-Purpose vehicle, known in soldier slang as the GP, or Jeep, grew tougher. Advances were made during wartime that helped American industry reach its dominant postwar position. 

 

Though these wartime production levels had finally put an end to the Great Depression, in 1941 C.E., eight million Americans remained out of work. Another eight million made less than the legal minimum wage. Nearly 40% of America lived in poverty. The median salary was less than 2,000 dollars per year. Despite all government efforts to keep supplies steady, the war continued to create shortages. In order to make sure essential supplies were shared fairly, many items, including meat, sugar, butter, and canned goods were rationed. Every U.S. citizen was given a book of stamps. These stamps had to be handed over by the customer when he or she bought rationed goods. Many suppliers made extra money by illegally selling rationed goods to customers who did not have enough stamps, charging them extra. Gasoline was also rationed, but in a different way. Every vehicle was rated A to E, and carried a sticker in the window with a letter on it. Those rated "A" were private automobiles, and were entitled to very little gas. Emergency vehicles were rated "E," and could take as much as they needed. Others fell in between. Before long, there was a thriving black, or illegal, market in gasoline and other rationed goods.

 

The 1940s C.E. would also witness a new regime of Mexican expulsion or “Repatriation” from within the U.S. to Mexico. Between 1941 C.E. and 1950 C.E., U.S. federal authorities would deport more than 1.3 million Mexican nationals. Interestingly, this included the time of WWII and the begining of the Korean War. By the mid-1940s, continued annual arrests and expulsions of Mexicans illegally present in the U.S. exceeded 60,000 per year. Did Hispanics understand this was happening? The answer is, yes. Did they serve and fight in WWII anyway? Again, the answer is, yes!

 

By 1943 C.E., the American economy was more productive than it had ever been. Unfortunately, there were still shortages at home.

 

Outside of the U.S., in some Latino Américano countries the life of most inhabitants seemed little changed in 1945 C.E., at the end of World War II, from what it had been in 1910 C.E.

Latino Américano economies remained hindered by backwardness. In the Andean countries and Central América, urban dwellers were a decided minority even at the end of World War II, in 1945 C.E. Moreover, the usual pattern was that of a single primate city vastly overshadowing lesser urban centers. Paraguay was still overwhelmingly rural and isolated, as was Honduras, except for its coastal banana enclave. Even in Brasil, the sertão, or semiarid backcountry, was barely affected by changes in the coastal cities or in the fast-growing industrial complex of São Paulo. But in Latino América as a whole more people were becoming linked to the national and world economies, introduced to rudimentary public education, and exposed to emerging mass media.

 

At the Yalta Conference in February 1945 C.E., Soviet leader Joséph Stalin pledged that his nation would declare war on Japan exactly three months after Nazi Germany was defeated.

By that time, Korea had been a Japanese possession since the early-20th-Century C.E. During World War II, the Allies, the U.S., USSR, China, and Great Britain (GB), made a somewhat hazy agreement that Korea should become an independent country following the WWII. As the war progressed, U.S. officials began to press the USSR to enter the war against Japan.

 

The Korea of 1945 C.E. was still was a remote country known only to a small number of missionaries and adventurous businessmen. It held little importance in the official scheme of things. Though the U.S. had proposed the thirty-eighth parallel as a dividing line between the two occupation armies of the U.S. and the USSR, U.S. policymakers still were unsure of the strategic value of ROK. Formulating a U.S. policy for Korea was difficult due to the intensification of the confrontation between the U.S. and the USSR and the polarization of Korean politics between left and right. U.S. policy toward Korea became even more uncertain after the deadlock of the U.S.-USSR joint commission.

 

B. The End of WWII

 

In Europe, German cities would be in need of clean up and rebuilding. During the WWII, approximately 50 percent of Nazi Germany's infrastructure was destroyed. Dresden was one of the hardest hit cities. Eight square miles of Dresden, which had boasted some of the most beautiful baroque architecture in Europe, were destroyed when Allied bombers dropped more than 5,000 tons of high explosives and incendiary bombs on the city in February 1945.

WWII was declared final or at its end on victory in Europe Day on May 8, 1945 C.E. At this point the war in the Pacific had not yet ended.

 

The Potsdam Conference (July 17, 1945 C.E.,-August 2, 1945 C.E.,) was held near Berlin. It was the last of the WWII meetings held by the “Big Three” heads of state. Featuring U.S. President Harry S. Truman, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill (and his successor, Clement Attlee) and Soviet Premier Joséph Stalin, the talks established a Council of Foreign Ministers and a central Allied Control Council for administration of Germany. The leaders arrived at various agreements on the German economy, punishment for war criminals, land boundaries, and war reparations. Although talks primarily centered on postwar Europe, the Big Three also issued a declaration demanding “unconditional surrender” from Japan. That unconditional surrender would bring further complication. Korea was to become such a complication. In the years before and during WWII, both the U.S. and USSR had worked to liberate the region from the Japanese.

Also at the Potsdam Conference it was agreed that USSR troops would occupy the northern portion of Korea, as Japan was then occupying the Korean Peninsula. The USSR was to invade the northern half of Korea and take it from under Japanese control as agreed during the Potsdam Conference. The American forces would liberate the southern half of Korea soon thereafter. This was to be done in order to secure the area and liberate it from Japanese control. The occupations were to be temporary, and Korea was to eventually decide its own political future. Also, a date was not set for the end of the U.S. and USSR occupations. Thus the upcoming conflict in Korea would have its beginnings in 1945 C.E. 

 

Early in August 1945 C.E., two young State Department aides, Dean Rusk and Charles Bonesteel, consulted a National Geographic map of Asia to determine the postwar dividing line between USSR and U.S. zones of control in Korea. Neither was an expert on the country. Failing to find any obvious natural barrier between the North and the South, they selected the 38th parallel. This new post-WWII border which would become the dividing line between U.S. and USSR control zones in Korea had been tentatively proposed after the Potsdam Conference. The division placed the capital city of Seoul in the American zone, just 35 miles south of the dividing line. On August 8, 1945 C.E., the USSR declared war on Japan. By August 9th, USSR forces invaded northern Korea. A few days later on August 14, 1945 C.E., the Empire of Japan surrendered.

 

The People's Republic of Korea (PRK), a short-lived Korean provisional government was organized on that same day of August 14, 1945 C.E. The Provisional Government of the Republic of Korea was a partially recognized Korean government-in-exile, based in Shanghai, China, and later in Chungking, during the Japanese Korean period of 1910 C.E. through 1945 C.E. On April 11, 1919 C.E., the provisional constitution was enacted, and the national sovereignty was called "Republic of Korea (KPG)" and the political system was called "Democratic Republic." It introduced the presidential system and established three separate systems of legislative, administrative and judicial separation. The KPG claimed that it inherited the territory of the former Korean Empire. It actively began supporting an independence movement under the Provisional Government. KPG received economic and military support from the Kuomintang of China, the USSR, and France.

 

The Provisional Government resisted Japanese colonial rule of Korea and coordinated the armed resistance against the Japanese Imperial Army during the 1920s C.E. and 1930s C.E. This struggle culminated in the formation of Korean Liberation Army in 1940 C.E., which brought together many if not all Korean resistance groups in exile. With the liberation of Korea from Japanese occupation at the end of World War II, the Korean Provisional Government came to an end.

 

After the Surrender of Japan on August 15, 1945 C.E., the Provisional Government of the KPG was dissolved. Its members then returned to Korea, where they began to put together their own political organizations in what came to be South Korea and competed for power. On August 15, 1948 C.E., Syngman Rhee a Korean a politician in the south, became the first president of the Provisional Government of the KPG. The Constitution of South Korea stated that the Korean people inherited the rule of the KPG.

 

C. Post WWII World

 

1.0  The USSR Enters the Korean Peninsula

 

On August 18, 1945 C.E., several USSR amphibious military landings were conducted ahead of the land campaign. The three landings took place in northern Korea. One landing was at South Sakhalin. A second landing took place in the Kuril Islands, in preparation for USSR 25th Army troops coming overland. The third landing was in South Sakhalin and the Kurils, located directly to the north of Japan and east of Sakhalin. The purpose was the establishment of USSR sovereignty. Next, the USSR military land advance was stopped a good distance short of the Yalu River. There the Korean Peninsula starts.

 

Over the next few years, the situation in Korea would steadily worsen. A civil war between communist and nationalist forces in southern Korea would result in thousands of people killed and wounded. With forces in Korea, the USSR was able to establish control in the Peninsula's northern area and immediately establish a headquartered at P’yŏngyang for a period. In accordance with arrangements made earlier with the American government to divide the Korean Peninsula, USSR forces stopped at the 38th parallel, leaving the Japanese still in control of the southern part of the Peninsula. They had agreed to temporarily to divide Korea at the 38th parallel of latitude north of the equator.

 

The USSR would continue in its steadfast refusal to consider any plans for the reunification of Korea. This policy division would eventually result in the formation of two countries. In the north, above the 38th parallel was communist Korea under the leadership of Kim Il-Sung supported by the Soviets. To the south was to be a democratic Korea headed by Syngman Rhee supported by the U.S. Like the American forces in the south, USSR troops remained in Korea after the end of the war to rebuild the country. The Soviets were also instrumental in the creation and early development of the NKPA and Korean People's Air Force (KPAF), as well as for stabilizing the early years of the Northern regime. 

 

Japan formally signed surrender documents on September 2, 1945 C.E., WWII was formally at an end. That same month, in North Korea the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) was established. Korean leaders and exiles abroad, mainly in China, had earlier established self-governing bodies, or people's committees, and organized the Central People's Committee. These exiles had sustained a skeletal organization in other parts of China until 1945 C.E., awaiting their return to Korea. These proclaimed the establishment of the "Korean People's Republic" on September 6, 1945 C.E.

 

2.0  The U.S. Enters the Korean Peninsula

 

On September 7, 1945 C.E., U.S. General Douglas MacArthur announced that Lieutenant-General John R. Hodge was to administer South Korean affairs. Keeping to their part of the bargain, U.S. forces entered southern Korea under Lieutenant-General Hodge and landed in Inch’ŏn the following day of September 8, 1945 C.E., the United States Army Military Government in Korea (USAMGIK) was established as the official ruling body of the southern half of the Korean Peninsula. With this in place, U.S. troops in Korea began their postwar occupation.

 

The Lieutenant-General, commander of the U.S. occupation forces in Korea would be obliged to work under a severe handicap. His mission was to maintain peace and order until the international conflict over Korea was resolved. His administration possessed very limited resources, yet Hodge was expected to pursue the "ultimate objective" of fostering conditions which would bring about the establishment of a free and independent nation. In addition, Lieutenant-General Hodge had to contend with hostile Korean political groups.

 

The months after Hodge’s arrival, he would witness a vast inflow of population. South Korea's population, estimated at just over 16 million in 1945 C.E., would grow by 21 percent during the following year.

 

The Provisional Government of the Republic of Korea, sent a delegation with three interpreters to General Hodge, but he refused to meet with them. The U.S. recognized neither the republic nor the provisional government headed by Syngman Rhee, its first president, and Kim Ku and Kim Kyu-sik, premier, and vice premier, respectively. The U.S. would not recognize any group as a government until an agreement was reached among the Western Allies. The exiles were appeased by the favorable treatment they received when they returned to South Korea, however, they were now incensed by the U.S. Military Government in Korea's order to disband. The U.S. Army military government that administered the American-occupied zone proceeded to disband the local people's committees and impose direct rule, assigning military personnel who lacked language skills and knowledge of Korea as governors at various levels.

 

On September 12, 1945 C.E., the People's Republic of Korea (PRK) was again proclaimed, as Korea was being divided into two occupation zones, with the USSR occupying the north, and the U.S. occupying the south. In the north, the Soviet authorities co-opted the committees into the structure of the emerging DPRK (North Korea). It was based on a network of people's committees and presented a program of radical social change.

 

Although the U.S. and USSR occupations were supposed to be temporary, the division of Korea quickly became permanent. At this juncture, each side was willing to make accommodations.

 

3.0 Ratification of the United Nations

 

In the world at large, the United Nations (UN) Charter was ratified by its five permanent members the U.S., GB, France, China (the non-Communist Republic of China), and the USSR on October 24, 1945 C.E. It was to become the international stage for resolving disputes peacefully.

 

The Korean Communist Party was resuscitated in October 1945 C.E. with the help of the Comintern. It had been a major force behind the Central People's Committee and the "Korean People's Republic." It quickly built a substantial following among the workers, farmers, and students.

On November 13, 1945 C.E., the Free French leader General Charles de Gaulle was named president of France's Provisional Government of the French Republic (1944 C.E.-1946 C.E.). With WWII over, France was ready to rebuild.

 

On November 20, 1945 C.E., the Nuremberg Trials opened. For the next 10 months, a tribunal comprised of Allied jurists would pass judgment on scores of Nazi war criminals.

 

4.0 The Moscow Conference and the Division of Korea

 

The decision for the final division of Korea would be made at the Moscow Conference in December of 1945 C.E., between the U.S., the USSR, GB, and the Republic of China. At that time, the Republic of China was a sovereign state in East Asia founded in 1912 C.E., after the Qing dynasty, the last imperial dynasty, was overthrown in the Xinhai Revolution. It occupied part of territories within modern China, Mongolia, and Taiwan.

 

These parties would have Korea ruled over by a trusteeship for five years starting in 1946 C.E. The eventual goal was to be an entirely independent Korea.

 

The Americans selected the 38th Parallel for the dividing of Korea when the onslaught of the USSR offensives in Asia threatened to turn the whole peninsula of Korea into a Communist state. It was believed that the USSR would attempt to take the entire Korea Peninsula forcing the U.S. to leverage the fact that it had fought for most in the Pacific and therefore deserved rights to the entirety of Korea. This was the same argument the Soviets used with Eastern Europe. The Soviets accepted this remedy. Why were the Soviets so accepting of half of Korea rather than its entirety? It allowed the Soviets to have a Communist partner in Asia. It should be remembered that the Soviets to have even half a Communist country in Asia, was better than having nothing at all. At that time, the Soviets were still awaiting the outcome of the Chinese Civil War and Vietnam remained a French colony. The USSR would later try to gain the entirety of Korea through its backing of Kim il-Sung and the Korean War.

 

In international affairs, the U.S. government committed to a multibillion-dollar loan to prop up the British economy on December 6, 1945 C.E. U.S. President Truman ended the wartime Lend Lease arrangements abruptly in August 1945 C.E. Suddenly, GB found it did not have enough dollars to make expected payment for undelivered supplies, bankruptcy loomed. As GB emergency measure, the government sold gold and minerals, this GB could not do for long. GB attempted negotiations on the matter expecting a gift in recognition of the country's contribution to the war effort. Despite three months of hard wrangling, the Anglo American Agreement produced a business loan instead of a subsidy, with additional conditions in America’s favor. In December 1945 C.E., the British Government succumbed, agreeing to not only a U.S. loan of $4.34 billion, then double the size of the then British economy, but also other onerous stipulations.

 

GB’s economy had been distorted by six years of total war. GB had given her all for the freedom of the world. Both blood and treasure had been expended in great amounts. During the war, the British economy had been heavily geared towards war production, at approximately 55 percent of her GDP. This was much greater than in the USSR or America. The wartime U.S. Lend Lease arrangements started in 1941 C.E. had helped GB through her wartime difficulties. GB was now in a precarious position. She was exporting only approximately a fifth of what it had before the war and non-military imports were five times higher than in 1938 C.E. 1.4 million people would remain in the armed forces by 1946 C.E.

 

Meanwhile in Korea’s south, the U.S. military government under Lieutenant-General John R. Hodge, administrator of Korean affairs, refused to recognize the newly formed People's Republic of Korea (PRK) and its People's Committees, and outlawed it on December 12, 1945.

 

By December 17, 1945 C.E., at the Moscow Conference, the Allies agreed that the U.S., the USSR, the Republic of China, and GB would take part in a trusteeship over Korea. It was to be for up to five years in the lead-up to independence. The Council of Foreign Ministers agreed on Korea having a provisional government, or temporary government, set up quickly before a real government was ready. This would become difficult to do because of the growing Cold War. Though the U.S. officials were pessimistic about resolving their differences with the USSR, they remained committed to the December 1945 C.E. decision of the Allied foreign ministers (made during their Moscow meeting) that a trusteeship under four powers, including China, should be established with a view toward Korea's eventual independence. Thus, U.S. officials were slow to draw up long-range alternative plans for South Korea.

 

Moreover, as the USSR consolidated its power in North Korea and the Nationalist Party (Guomindang or Kuomintang--KMT) government of Chiang Kai-shek began to falter in China, Theses and other issues caused U.S. strategists to begin to question the long-run defensibility of South Korea.

 

When the decision to establish a five-year trusteeship in Korea was announced, it exacerbated an already difficult situation. To the Koreans, many who had anticipated immediate independence were humiliated. The initially warm Korean welcome to U.S. troops as liberators cooled. Many Koreans began demanding their independence immediately. The Korean Communist Party, which was closely aligned with the USSR Communist party, supported the trusteeship. Why? They believed that they could later take by force what they wanted.

 

In the U.S. after 1945 C.E., America’s major corporations began growing larger. With the pressure of growth, corporate America was desperate to separate Americans from the $140 billion they had saved in times of shortage and rationing. Keeping that spending under control would be one of the biggest challenges faced by U.S. President Truman in the late-1940s C.E.

 

The automobile industry was robust. The number of automobiles produced annually would quadruple between 1946 C.E. and 1955 C.E. At the same time, a housing boom was being stimulated in part by easily affordable mortgages for returning servicemen. This also would fuel the expansion. The rise in defense spending as the Cold War escalated would play a part in economic growth.

 

Workers found their own lives changing as industrial America changed. Fewer workers produced goods; more provided services. Within the U.S., economic growth was being driven by different sources. By 1946 C.E., unemployment was low, wages were at record levels, and the economy was booming. Labor shortages caused by the war meant that many women and teenagers had entered the labor market. Soon, the returning soldiers would threaten to push unemployment back up after the war. To mitigate this, U.S. President Truman, Roosevelt's successor, used the GI Bill to put the soldiers through college instead. This eased the pressure on the economy and produced a better-educated workforce.

 

Also in 1946 C.E., the U.S. government closed the internment camps in which some 120,000 ethnic Japanese in the American West had been incarcerated since 1942 C.E. This issue continues to haunt the U.S. even unto our day.

 

In Europe, after end of WWII, in 1946 C.E., the eight square miles of Dresden ruins would be cleared and replaced by modern structures. The Dresden Frauenkirche, a Lutheran church, was an exception, as its decaying ruins were left untouched. After the reunification of Germany, the church was restored for $175 million.

 

Homeless German children bartered and begged. Young children sold or bartered whatever they could to survive on the streets of Berlin. A black market developed in Berlin, with cigarettes, liquor, and chocolate as three of the commodities most sought by Berliners from occupation troops. For many months after the war, German children would roam the streets scavenging or beg for food.

 

Regarding Asia, by early 1946 C.E. the USAMGIK responsible for the governance of the south had come to rely heavily on the advice and counsel of ideologically conservative elements within Korea. These included landlords and other propertied persons.

 

A Joint USSR-U.S. Commission met in 1946 C.E. and later in 1947 C.E. to work towards a unified Korea administration. Unsurprisingly, it failed to make progress. This was due to increasing Cold War antagonism and to Korean opposition to the trusteeship. Meanwhile, the division between the two zones was deepening as the difference in policy between the occupying powers led to a polarization of politics. It was also to be the genesis of the future transfer of population between North and South.

 

By 1947 C.E., these divisions in Korea were causing social unrest. Only approximately half the Korean labor force of 10 million was gainfully employed. Labor strikes and work stoppages were occurring. Demonstrations orchestrated by the communists against USAMGIK's policies drew large crowds. Temporary stoppages of electricity--supplied from the northern areas--in the early part of 1946 C.E. and later in late-1947 C.E., plunged the southern region of Korea into darkness on both occasions. Also the economic situation was at this point nearly as difficult in the north as it was in the south. During Japanese occupation of the peninsula they had concentrated agriculture in the south and heavy industry in the north. A complete transition of the existing infrastructure was needed. There was a deepening despair affecting the Korean people and they were becoming disillusioned and disconcerted. Koreans began to pay close attention to political leaders of various persuasions who offered new ways of solving the Korean problem.

 

In Japan, on January 1, 1946 C.E., Emperor Hirohito addressed his subjects and stated that he was not, contrary to popular belief, a divine being. This proposition was unfathomable for most Japanese to accept. 

 

The Korean Communist Party had been taking various stances on the idea of trusteeship. It once again changed its stance on trusteeship and came out in support of it on January 3, 1946 C.E. The Party remained under the control of the USSR command in P’yŏngyang. Should it be necessary for the Party to come into disagreement later, it could be used to come into direct confrontation with the U.S. military government.

 

On the world stage, on January 17, 1946 C.E., the UN Security Council (UNSC) convened in London to agree on procedural rules for the international body. A week later, on January 24, 1946 C.E., the International Atomic Energy Commission was established to help regulate emerging nuclear weapons technology.

 

In North Korea, in February 1946 C.E., a provisional government called the Provisional People's Committee was formed under Kim Il-sung Kim Il-sung (April 15, 1912-July 8, 1994). He had spent the last years of WWII training with Soviet troops in Manchuria. Conflicts and power struggles would later ensue at the top levels of government in P’yŏngyang as different political aspirants maneuvered to gain positions of power in the new government.

By March 1946 C.E., the Provisional People's Committee instituted a sweeping land-reform program. Lands belonging to Japanese and collaborator landowners was divided and redistributed to poor farmers. The Communists next organized the many poor civilians and agricultural laborers under the People's Committees. Soon, a nationwide mass campaign began to control the old landed classes. Landlords were allowed to keep only the same amount of land as poor civilians who had once rented their land, thereby making for a far more equal distribution of land. As a result, former village leaders were eliminated as a political force without resort to bloodshed, precluding their return to power. The new landowning farmers responded positively. This North Korean land reform was achieved with little violence. Also, northern Korean key industries were nationalized.  

 

Many of the Japanese, collaborators, and former landowners in the north fled to the south. The U.S. military government estimated that 400,000 northern Koreans moved to the south as refugees. There some of them obtained positions in the new South Korean government.

 

In another part of Asia, on March 2, 1946 C.E., the Communist revolutionary nationalist leader Hồ Chí Minh (May 19, 1890 C.E.-September 2, 1969 C.E.) became the Chairman and First Secretary of the Workers' Party of Vietnam. Earlier, following the August Revolution (1945 C.E.) organized by the Việt Minh, Hồ Chí Minh had become Chairman of the Provisional Government.

He was also President (1945 C.E.-1969 C.E.) of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam). He was a key figure in the foundation of the People's Army of Vietnam. 

 

The intensification of the confrontation between the U.S. and the USSR had only continued to worsen. The Capitalist Western Bloc (the U.S, its allies, and others) now understood the challenge being presented by the Communist Eastern Bloc (the USSR, its satellite states, and the communists in China). On March 5, 1946 C.E., former British Prime Minister Winston Churchill delivered his seminal "Iron Curtain" speech at Missouri's Westminster College. It is considered one of the most famous orations of the Cold War period. Churchill condemned the USSR’s policies in Europe and declared, “From Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic, an iron curtain has descended across the continent.” This Churchill speech is considered one of the opening volleys announcing the beginning of the Cold War.

 

Frustrated by Japan's lack of progress with creating a new constitution, U.S. General Douglas MacArthur assigned the role to members of his own staff. The result was a constitution based more on British parliamentary rule than on the U.S. model. The document limited the “human” Emperor of Japan to a symbolic role. It also gave women the right to vote. Women reacted enthusiastically. In April 1946 C.E., for the first time in their nation's history millions of Japanese women voted in the election that gave Japan its first modern prime minister, Yoshida Shigeru. Japanese women vote in Japanese election. When Japan’s women cast their votes, it was perhaps the most visible sign of Japan's postwar political transformation to the modern age.

 

On April 28, 1946 C.E., the Allied International Military Tribunal for the Far East indicted Japanese war minister Tojo Hideki as a war criminal. It charged him with 55 counts. He would later be sentenced to death in November 1948 C.E.

In May 1946, it was made illegal to cross Korea’s 38th parallel without a permit. Both sides were consolidating control of their borders. Also, in May of 1946 C.E. and later, in April 1947 C.E., the U.S. supported the returned Korean exiles and the conservative elements. To facilitate this, the U.S. military government tried to mobilize support behind a coalition between the moderate left represented by Yo Un-hyong, who had been the figurehead of the Central People's Committee, and the moderate right, represented by Kim Kyu-sik, vice premier of the exiled government.

 

During the movement to unify Korea’s political left and the political right, Lyuh Woon-hyung represented the center-left. Specifically, he occupied a position on the center between the left and the right. Lyuh’s political stance was attacked by both the extreme right and the extreme left. This made his efforts to pursue a centrist position increasingly untenable by the political realities of the time. As for Kim Kyu-sik of the right-wing group, this leader had been the clear choice of the U.S. military government. He, however, could not be dissuaded from his fruitless trip to P’yŏngyang in the north, leaving in place a political standoff. These attempts only intensified the existing splits within the left-wing and right-wing camps. It produced no positive results.

 

During that month, there were many other problems facing the U.S. South Korean left-wing and right-wing groups frequently engaged in violent clashes and not only on ideological grounds, but also because of their opposing views about the trusteeship decision. The moderates took the position that Koreans should oppose the trusteeship. This was unacceptable to the other parties. Communist leaders were driven underground in May 1946 C.E. after the discovery of a currency counterfeiting operation run by the Party.

 

By June 1946 C.E., the ardent anti-communist Syngman Rhee wanted the immediate independence of Korea, even at the price of indefinite division. He campaigned actively for this within Korea and the U.S.

 

In the U.S. of the postwar years, the consumer age had begun. Americans were buying huge numbers of cars, refrigerators, televisions, and other household appliances. Price controls imposed by the Office of Price Administration (OPA) ended on July 1, 1946 C.E. Almost immediately, prices increased. This time, American industry was ready to respond. It increased production of consumer goods forcing prices back down.

 

Also on July 1, 1946 C.E., on the military front the U.S. detonated a plutonium bomb "Able," off Bikini Atoll. It was a part of Operation Crossroads, an effort to learn more about the power of the atomic bomb. The U.S. postwar nuclear tests at Bikini Atoll were designed to examine the effects of atomic bombs on naval vessels. Bikini's 167 inhabitants had been forcibly relocated in early-1946 C.E., and 71 surplus and captured ships were anchored in the lagoon to serve as targets. Other targets included planes and 5,400 rats, goats, and pigs.

 

In Europe, a little after a years of the War’s end, on July 4, 1946 C.E., a false kidnapping allegation fueled an anti-Semitic pogrom in Kielce, Poland, claimed the lives of some 40 Jews. It is only fitting that their fellow travelers, forty-three members of the Waffen-SS, were sentenced to death on July 16, 1946 C.E. for the December 1944 C.E. Malmedy Massacre of American prisoners-of-war (POWs) during the Battle of the Bulge. They would eventually be released.

 

In Korea, on July 19, 1947 C.E., Lyuh Woon-hyung who represented Korea’s political center-left, specifically, a position on the center between the left and the right, was assassinated in Seoul by a 19-year-old man named Han Chigeun. The 19-year-old was a recent refugee from North Korea and an active member of a nationalist right-wing group. There is no question in my mind that the Communists orchestrated that foul act.

 

On July 25, 1946 C.E., a second U.S. nuclear detonation, code-named "Baker," took place. The two separate atomic blasts sank ships and left others heavily contaminated with radiation. Whatever the scientific gains, the highly public tests only exacerbated deteriorating relations between the U.S. and the USSR.

 

In September 1946 C.E., thousands of Korean laborers and peasants rose up against the USAMGIK, but the uprising was quickly quelled. Much to the communists’ chagrin it failed to prevent scheduled October elections for the South Korean Interim Legislative Assembly. Also that month, the ardent anti-communist Syngman Rhee, and first president of the Provisional Government became the most prominent politician in the South. He would later work as a pro-Korean lobbyist in the U.S. pressuring the American government to abandon negotiations for a trusteeship and create an independent Republic of Korea in the south. 

 

The communists in South Korea participated in another serious riot in October 1946 C.E. Soon, most of their leaders left for the north. Again, their attempt to stop the October elections for the South Korean Interim Legislative Assembly failed.

 

In Europe, on October 1, 1946 C.E., high-ranking Nazi officials, including Hermann Göring, Hans Frank, Joachim von Ribbentrop, and Arthur Seyss-Inquart, were sentenced to hang by the Allied court at Nuremberg. The Nazis were being given their well earned rewards for the holocaust.

Only Göring would escape his fate by the taking of his own life shortly before his scheduled execution.

 

November 3, 1946 C.E., a new Japanese constitution, one that resolves that the nation will never again "be visited with the horrors of war through the action of government," was proclaimed by Emperor Hirohito. He was the very person responsible for that horrible war in the Pacific and in Asia.

 

In December 1946 C.E., the USAMGIK established the South Korean Interim Legislative Assembly. It was to formulate draft laws which would be used as the basis for political, economic, and social reforms. South Korea's substantial problems, however, required solutions at a much higher level. Earlier during the Korean-Japanese Period, Japan had developed Korea's economy as an integral part of their empire, linking Korea to Japan and Manchuria. Even if the U.S. Military occupation forces had arrived with a carefully developed economic plan, the situation would have still been difficult. The division of the two Koreas into two zones at an arbitrary line further aggravated the situation. These and many other inherent problems in the building of a self-sufficient economy in the southern half of the peninsula imposed a great burden.

Most of the heavy industrial facilities were located in northern Korea, in the USSR zone. These included the chemical plants that produced necessary agricultural fertilizers. Southern Korea’s light industries were dependent on electricity from the hydraulic generators located on the Yalu River on the Korean-Manchurian border. Electric generating facilities in the south supplied only 9 percent of the total need. Railroads and industries in the south also had been dependent upon bituminous coal imported from Manchuria, Japan, and the north.

 

These problems were aggravated by the fact that most of Korea's mines and industries had been owned and operated by Japan. In the months following the start of the American occupation, the U.S. military government allowed 700,000 Japanese to depart from South Korea. This left almost all of the mines and factories without managers, technicians, and capital resources. This situation was now causing severe problems of unemployment and material shortages.

 

The conservative Korean Democratic Party, supported by landlords and small-business owners, opposed the assembly because their principal leaders were excluded from it. Although many of the assembly's forty-five elected members were conservatives, most of the forty-five appointed members were moderates nominated by Kim Kyu-sik, who had emerged as Hodge's choice for political leadership. Unfortunately, Kim lacked dynamism and broad support among the masses. These circumstances threw South Korea's economy into complete chaos. The left-wing political groups being consolidated and trained by the South Korean Workers' Party a communist party in South Korea (1946 C.E. to 1949 C.E.), simply ignored the assembly.

 

On December 31, 1946 C.E., U.S. President Truman issued a presidential proclamation declaring an official end to WWII. With that war behind them, the Allies faced great almost insurmountable economic problems. The European partner economies were in a shattered state and their ability to help themselves out of this crisis was negligible. It was now up to the U.S.!

 

The year 1947 C.E., has commonly been established as the beginning of the Cold War. It is believed that it began with the announcement of the Truman Doctrine, a U.S. foreign policy pledging to aid nations threatened by USSR expansionism. The capitalist Western Bloc had little choice but to act. The Communist Comintern was active everywhere.

 

During President Truman’s administration, the U.S. embarked upon economic reforms in occupied territories to promote a wide distribution of ownership of the means of production. It believed that economic equity would fend off revolutionary sentiment and undergird democracy. The U.S. conducted these programs in Korea to stop the expansion of revolutionary appeals and laying groundwork for democracy to thrive. Plans for U.S.-sponsored land reform policies in South Korea should be understood in the context of the 1947C.E.-1948 C.E. period of Cold War which brought a needed clampdown on burgeoning left-wing revolutionary radicalism.

 

The U.S. Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP) and South Korean authorities began carrying out a land reform. Its intent was to retain the institution of private property. They confiscated and redistributed all land held by the Japanese colonial government, Japanese companies, and individual Japanese colonists. The Korean government also carried out a reform whereby Koreans with large landholdings were obliged to divest most of their land. Under the economic program of land reform land was sold cheaply to tenants, who represented nearly half of all farmers. This program fostered economic growth. SCAP tried to break up the large corporations, but fewer than 30 of the originally targeted 1,200 were dissolved. Anti-monopoly and fair trading laws were passed to promote industrial change. Some labor reform was enacted, such as independent labor unions.

 

Due to the Cold War’s political competition, on February 17, 1947 C.E., The U.S. launched its “Voice of America,” a pro-West radio station, to broadcast to the USSR and Eastern Europe. This was to keep the politically and physically controlled peoples informed. The Voice of America was then an arm of the U.S. State Department. Much of the first program offered brief summaries of current events, a discussion of how the U.S. federal budget and political system worked.

 

Even with the pressures of the Cold War, the disbanding of the WWII Empire of Japan had to be addressed. It involved the demilitarization, dismantling armaments industries, and the demobilizing the armed forces. It also placed great importance upon purging 200,000 wartime government officials. As a part of this massive military restructuring, 25 war leaders were being brought to trial for war crimes. In addition, it was essential for the democratization of Japan that a new constitution, effective from May 1947 C.E., be implemented. The constitution renounced war and armed forces. During this time the emperor lost his divine status and Universal suffrage was enacted. Social legislation benefited women, as the civil code announced equality between the sexes and equal inheritance rights. Coeducation became the norm, and education was democratized and generally improved at all levels.

 

In Europe, on June 14, 1947 C.E., the Auschwitz-Birkenau Memorial and Museum was opened for its first permanent exhibition on the seventh anniversary of the arrival of the Nazi camp's first prisoners.

 

In Korea, the moderate left-wing camp was in disarray after their leader, Lyuh Woon-hyung, was assassinated on July 19, 1947 C.E. Woon-hyung was one of the Korean politicians who argued that Korean independence was essential to world peace. He had also been advocating for the independent reunification of Korea since its national division in 1945 C.E. Clearly the USSR and Korean Communists had been unhappy with his efforts.

 

In July 1947 C.E., in an article printed in the journal Foreign Affairs, senior U.S. State Department official George Kennan (under the alias "X") expressed his theory for containing USSR expansion. This policy of “containment” would become the basis of the Truman Administration's foreign policy. The blueprint for U.S. policy for the Cold War was now in place.

 

On the world front, in an effort to stem the tide of Jewish nationalism in GB's Palestinian mandate, on July 18, 1947 C.E., the British navy sent the ship President Warfield and its 4,500 Jewish refugee passengers back to Germany. That same month in India, the fight for independence from GB continued. Indian statesmen and National Congress Party leaders Jawaharlal Nehru and Mohandas Gandhi viewed WWII as an opportunity to shed the yoke of British colonialism and establish an independent India.

 

Earlier in 1939 C.E., the British governor-general used his own authority to bring India into the war. At the time, Indian leaders pushed for self-government in exchange for cooperation. By 1942 C.E., the British Cripps Mission instituted an interim government and promised full independence after the end of WWII. More than two million Indians eventually served on the Allied side during the war, and 24,000 were killed. When the war ended in 1945 C.E., Indians pressed for the independence that was promised. On August 15, 1947, power was finally transferred and India was declared a free nation.

 

At the final meeting of the Joint Commission in September 1947 C.E., USSR delegate Terentii Shtykov proposed that both USSR and U.S. troops withdraw and allow the Korean people an opportunity to form their own government. This was rejected by the U.S. and was a clear failure by the Joint Commission to make progress on Korea. The U.S. next submitted the Korean problem before the UN that month. Additionally, in an atmosphere of scarcities of food and other commodities and runaway inflation in Korea the U.S. was forced to scuttle its earlier plan to provide $500 million over five years for South Korean development.

 

In November 1947 C.E., the UN General Assembly recognized Korea's claim to independence. It also began making preparations for the establishment of a government and the withdrawal of occupation forces. The USSR was opposed any such UN involvement in Korea. At that time, with the U.S. having more influence over the UN than the USSR, the UN passed a resolution on November 14, 1947 C.E., declaring that free elections should be held and foreign troops should be withdrawn. It also established that a UN commission for Korea, the UN Temporary Commission on Korea (UNTCOK), should be created. The USSR boycotted the voting and did not consider the resolution to be binding, arguing that the UN could not guarantee fair elections. In the absence of USSR cooperation, it was decided to hold UN-supervised elections in the south only. 

 

UN efforts were being made across the globe. For the Middle East the body had a partition plan for Palestine. UN Resolution 181 was passed and approved by the General Assembly on November 29, 1947 C.E. The Arab states would later invade the new Jewish state on May 15, 1948 C.E.

 

In 1948 C.E., the rebuilding of post-WWII Europe was an important issue. U.S. President Truman signed into law legislation for the Marshall Plan. Quite simply, a weak Europe meant a strong and dangerous USSR.  That same year, the USSR implemented the Berlin blockade. The action underscored the problems arising from the Cold War. It was now clear to all that the Cold War geopolitical tensions between powers of the Eastern Bloc and powers in the Western Bloc were growing. These tensions would eventually split the temporary WWII alliance which had been created to war against Nazi Germany. After WWII, the USSR and the U.S. were the only superpowers. Unfortunately, they had profound economic and political differences. It dramatically emphasized the need for the democracies to remain strong.

 

In Korea, after more than a millennium of being unified was now officially split into two halves along the 38th parallel with separate governments. This north and south division was seen as controversial and temporary by both regimes. From 1948 C.E. until the start of the civil war on June 25, 1950 C.E., the armed forces of each side would engage in a series of bloody conflicts along the border. North Korea would soon be led into war by Kim Il-Sung, who ruled over the country as a communist dictator. South Korea would be forced to fight for its existence as an independence democracy with President Syngman Rhee, an anti-communist statesman, at its head.

 

The U.S. again offered to hold Korean national elections in 1948 C.E. The USSR refused the offer. Despite this, UN-supervised elections were held that year in the U.S. occupied south. Syngman Rhee won the election and his government received a popular mandate. This led to the establishment of the Republic of Korea (ROK) in South Korea.

 

The USSR refused to recognize Rhee’s government and insisted that Kim Il-Sung in the north was the true leader of all Korea. The decision to proceed with separate elections was unpopular among many Koreans, who rightly saw it as a prelude to a permanent division of the country. General strikes in protest against the decision began in February 1948 C.E. This was promptly followed by the establishment of the DPRK in the North with Kim Il-sung appointed as its leader. The U.S. now supported the South and the USSR supported the North, with each government claiming sovereignty over the whole Korean peninsula. Having secured the establishment of a communist government in North Korea, Soviet troops soon withdrew.

 

In April, Jeju islanders rose up against the looming division of the country. ROKA troops were sent to quell the rebellion on the island which lies in the Korea Strait, south of South Jeolla Province. Tens of thousands of islanders were killed and by one estimate, 70% of the villages were burned by the ROKA troops. The uprising would flare up later with the outbreak of the Korean War.

 

Also in April 1948 C.E., a conference of Korean organizations from the north and the south met in P’yŏngyang the capital of the north. The right-wing southern politicians Kim Kooand Kim Kyu-sik attended the conference and boycotted the elections in the south, as did other politicians and parties. The conference called for a united government and the withdrawal of foreign troops. Syngman Rhee of the south and U.S. General Hodge denounced the conference. Kim Koo would be assassinated the following year.

 

On April 3, 1948 C.E., the U.S. Marshall Plan was signed into law by President Truman. It would ultimately provide more than $13 billion for the reconstruction of war-torn Europe. Why? With the Cold War growing colder, the U.S. and its allies of WWII wanted a strong Europe as a bulwark against USSR communist expansionism. The USSR would now need to formulate a response!

 

In May 1948 C.E., the UN’s UNTCOK arrived to supervise the election of a national assembly which was to be held. The USSR objected to the UN resolution and refused to admit the commission to the USSR-controlled zone in the north. It was becoming increasingly clear that two separate regimes would be established on the peninsula. The prospect of perpetuating the division of Korea catapulted some of the southern political leaders to action, significantly altering the political landscape there. The choice they faced was between immediate independence at the price of indefinite division, or postponement of independence until the deadlock between the U.S. and the USSR was resolved.

 

Rhee had been campaigning actively within Korea and the U.S. for the first alternative since June 1946 C.E. Other major figures in the right-wing camp, including Kim Ku and Kim Kyu-sik, decided to oppose the "separate elections" in the south, hoping to resolve the international impasse by holding talks with their northern counterparts.

 

Communists in the south also boycotted the May 1948 elections, and were discredited when P’yŏngyang the capital of North Korea cut off electricity, leaving the anti-communist dictator Syngman Rhee a clear field though he lacked grass roots support apart from the Korean Democratic Party. By this time, the communists in the south had lost much of their political following, particularly after a serious riot in October 1946 C.E.; most of their leaders congregated in the north.

 

On May 10, 1948 C.E., Korea’s south held its general election. It took place despite widespread violence, intimidation, and a boycott by opponents of Syngman Rhee. Soon thereafter, the elected National Assembly adopted a constitution setting forth a presidential form of government and specifying a four-year term for the presidency. Syngman Rhee, whose supporters had won the elections, became head of the new assembly.

 

On May 14, 1948 C.E., GB's mandate to govern Palestine expired. Palestine is divided into the State of Israel and an Arab state. The Jewish National Council then proclaimed the independent State of Israel. The next day on May 15, 1948 C.E., Egyptian, Syrian, and Jordanian forces invade the one-day-old State of Israel. Israel resisted and soon went on the offensive.

 

This was yet one more manifestation of the Cold War. The official USSR ideological position on Zionism condemned the movement as bourgeois nationalism. Lenin had rejected Zionism as a reactionary movement, "bourgeois nationalism," "socially retrogressive," and a backward force that deprecates class divisions among Jews. Soviets believed that the main objective of the Zionist movement was to bring about a mass immigration of Jews from countries where they had been scattered among the general population into Israel. Under Stalin's rule limited emigration of Jews from the USSR into Israel was initially accepted. This was done in order to invest in what he hoped for would be a socialist Israel. Later, with the exodus of Jews from the USSR Jewish emigration to Israel was interpreted as a damaging due to the loss of Jewish intellectual capital negatively affecting the communist nation.

 

On June 25, 1948 C.E., U.S. President Truman signed the Displaced Persons Act which allowed more than 200,000 European refugees to settle in the U.S. Clearly it was a stop-gap measure to lessen the economic burden on European nations until the Marshall Plan could take effect. The USSR was unhappy with the U.S.’s decision to rebuild Europe. It much preferred a weak Europe to a strong one which was seen as more dangerous to it. Two days later, the Western Blok countries of the U.S., GB, and France were forced to respond to the USSR’s blockade of Berlin on June 27, 1948 C.E. They immediately implemented an airlift of supplies to the two million people in the city's western sector.

 

5.0 The ROK and the DPRK Proclaimed

 

The "ROK (South Korea)" was proclaimed and formally took over power from the USAMGIK with Syngman Rhee as the first president on August 15, 1948 C.E. Four days after the proclamation, Communist authorities completed the severing of north-south ties by shutting off power transmission to the south. Within less than a month, on September 9th, a communist regime, the DPRK, would be proclaimed under Premier Kim Il Sung as prime minister. He then claimed authority over the entire country. This he stated was by virtue of elections conducted in the north and the underground elections allegedly held in the south. The ROK would scarcely have time to get its political house in order before North Korea launched its attack on South Korea less than one year later.

 

After the election’s unrest had continued in the South. In October 1948 C.E., the Yeosu–Suncheon Rebellion took place in the southern part of the peninsula in Yeosu, Suncheon, and various surrounding towns in the South Jeolla province of South Korea. The rising anti-government sentiment towards the Syngman Rhee regime finally ignited into a rebellion.  Some ROKA regiments based in the Yeo-Sun area with left-leaning soldiers raised arms in opposition to the Rhee government's handling of the Jeju Uprising, which occurred just months earlier in April. About 2,000 soldiers rebelled against the government. This Communist-led revolt by some army regiments consumed much of the army's attention and resources.

 

Later in the aftermath of that revolt, a massive purge would weaken the South’s entire military establishment. Given South Korea's precarious future and continuing communist victories in China, the U.S. was no longer as eager to continue providing Korea with support.

 

After Truman's November 1948 C.E. election victory, Dean Gooderham Acheson (April 11, 1893 C.E.-October 12, 1971 C.E.) would become his secretary of state on January 21, 1949 C.E. He was an anti-Communist who believed in patience. Acheson was an American statesman and lawyer who had earlier helped to design the Marshall Plan and was a key player in the development of the Truman Doctrine. As U.S. Secretary of State in the administration of President Truman from 1949 C.E. to 1953 C.E., he would play a central role in defining American foreign policy during the Cold War and the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The North Atlantic Treaty establishing NATO would be signed on April 4, 1949 C.E. Acheson's most famous decision would be convincing President Truman to intervene in the Korean War.

 

December 9, 1948 C.E., the UN General Assembly (UNGA) enacted the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. Three days later on December 12, 1948 C.E., the UNGA accepted the report of UNTCOK and declared the Republic of Korea to be the "only lawful government in Korea." None of the members of UNTCOK considered the election as having established a legitimate national parliament. For one, the Australian government, which had a representative on the commission declared that it was "far from satisfied" with the election.

 

After Nazi Germany's collapse earlier in 1945 C.E., it had transformed the face of Post-WWII Europe. As a result of Germany's fall, Europe's new boundaries were redrawn and Germany was partitioned into four zones of occupation. Millions became refugees as national boundaries were created. The Allied Zones merged into the Federal Republic of Germany in 1949 C.E., while the USSR occupied zone became the German Democratic Republic. In the east, the USSR expanded its borders at the expense of a now defunct Nazi Germany, Finland, and Poland. They also annexed the Baltic countries of Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania. These new Communist states in the east as part of the Eastern Bloc would soon confront the western democracies. Communism in Europe was on the march.

 

In 1949 C.E., while the U.S. continued training and supplying South Korea’s military, Washington did not want the ROK making trouble by invading the North. To prevent such an invasion of the North it kept the ROKA's military capacity limited. It left Syngman Rhee's government with just enough military strength and resources to combat leftist communist guerrillas fighting his government in the South.

 

That same year of 1949 C.E., South Korea’s Syngman Rhee government established the Bodo League in order to keep an eye on its political opponents. The majority of the Bodo League's members were innocent farmers and civilians who were forced into membership. The registered members or their families would be executed later at the beginning of the Korean War. Having secured the establishment of a democratic government in South Korea, U.S. troops withdrew that same year. The USSR took notice as did the communists in China.

 

The trial of Axis Sally, a Nazi propagandist to American troops in Europe, began on January 25, 1949 in Washington, D.C. Born Mildred Elizabeth Sisk (November 29, 1900 C.E.-June 25, 1988 C.E.) in Portland, Maine, she took the surname Gillars in 1911 C.E. after her mother remarried. Mildred Elizabeth Gillars would be convicted of treason by the U.S. in 1949 C.E. following her capture in post-war Berlin. On March 10, 1949 C.E., a jury would convict Gillars on just one count of treason for making the Vision of Invasion broadcast. She was sentenced to 10 to 30 years in prison and given a $10,000 fine. By 1950 C.E., a federal appeals court would uphold the sentence. Gillars served her sentence at the Federal Reformatory for Women in Alderson, West Virginia. She would be become eligible for parole in 1959 C.E., but would not apply until 1961 C.E. She would later be released on June 10, 1961 C.E.

 

In 1918 C.E., Mildred Elizabeth Gillars enrolled at Ohio Wesleyan University to study dramatic arts, but left without graduating. In 1934 C.E., she moved to Dresden, Germany, to study music, and was later employed as a teacher of English at the Berlitz School of Languages in Berlin.

By 1940 C.E., she obtained work as an announcer with the Reichs-Rundfunk-Gesellschaft (RRG), German State Radio.

 

In 1941 C.E., the U.S. State Department was advising American nationals to return home. However, Gillars chose to remain because her fiancé, Paul Karlson, a naturalized German citizen. He had told her that he would never marry her if she returned to the U.S. Shortly afterwards, Karlson was sent to the Eastern Front, where he was killed in action.

Axis Sally’s became an American broadcaster employed by the Third Reich in Nazi Germany to disseminate propaganda during World War II. He career changed in 1942 C.E., when Max Otto Koischwitz, the program director in the USA Zone at the RRG, cast Gillars in a new show called Home Sweet Home. She soon acquired several names amongst her GI audience, including the Berlin Bitch, Berlin Babe, Olga, and Sally, but the one most common was "Axis Sally."

 

In Tokyo, Japan, General Douglas MacArthur, commander of the U.S. forces in the Pacific, wanted Washington to give more importance to developments in Asia. He saw communism as more of a threat in Asia than it was in Europe. In March, 1949 C.E., seven months before Mao Zedong proclaimed the People's Republic of China (PRC), MacArthur had described the U.S. defense parameter in the Far East as starting in the Philippines, running through Okinawa and the other Ryukyu islands to Japan and then to the Aleutian Islands and Alaska. Unfortunately, MacArthur had left China and Korea on the Asian continent outside of the U.S. defense parameter in the Far East. The communists took notice and misread U.S. military defense policy and the intent of his statements regarding Korea. They believed that the U.S. might not defend Korea if invaded.

 

6.0 The New North Atlantic Treaty Organization

 

In 1949 C.E. talks soon began on a new intergovernmental military alliance which between North America’s U.S. and Canada, and several Western European nations. Earlier in 1948 C.E., the Treaty of Dunkirk, a Treaty of Alliance and Mutual Assistance, had been expanded to include the Benelux countries, in the form of the WU. The WU or the Brussels Treaty Organization (BTO) was a European military alliance established between France, GB and the three Benelux countries earlier in September 1948 C.E. in order to implement the Treaty of Brussels signed in March the same year. Earlier, on March 4, 1947 C.E., the Treaty of Dunkirk was signed by France and the United Kingdom as a Treaty of Alliance and Mutual Assistance in the event of a possible attack by Germany or the USSR in the aftermath of World War II.

 

NATO became a reality with the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty on April 4, 1949 C.E. by the member states of the Western Union (WU) and the U.S., Canada, Portugal, Italy, Norway, Denmark and Iceland. The new NATO organization would constitute a system of collective defense whereby its independent member states agreed to a mutual defense in response to an attack by any external party. It was to be a bulwark against communist aggression. NATO would eventually become a military alliance between 29 North American and European countries.

The Western Bloc Cold Warriors were now establishing a cohesive, coordinated military defense posture and an organization to carry it off.

 

By May 1949 C.E., the USSR now realized that their blockade of western Berlin had only strengthened the resolve of the other former WWII Allies and led directly to the formation and establishment of NATO. The Soviets then decided to lift it. Again, they had misread the stability and fortitude of the Western Bloc nations. The Cold War was now beyond a thaw.

 

Israel signed the third of three armistice agreements, with Syria, to end the 1948 War, on July 20, 1949 C.E. Agreements with Egypt, Lebanon, and Transjordan had been signed earlier in the year. Communist USSR had failed to bring down the new state of Israel.

 

Regarding Korea, the Russians had announced the pull out of their troops from North Korea back in late-1948 C.E. By now, the Truman administration was eager to pull its troops out of South Korea and give the ROK an image of greater independence. By June 29, 1949 C.E., the majority of U.S. military occupation forces were withdrawn and only an advisory group of about 500 military advisers left there. It must be remembered that the ROK had earlier been placed outside of the U.S. defense perimeter. What the USSR and the rising communists of China saw was a U.S. in retreat!

 

Soon, North Korea's communist leader, Kim Il-sung, journeyed to Moscow, USSR, to meet with its dictator Joséph Stalin. There, he requested aid so he could unite Korea by force. In response to Stalin’s blunt questions, Kim replied that he was confident that he could defeat the forces of South Korea. At that time, Stalin advised against it as he did not want to provoke the Western Bloc. He told Kim that it was important that the division between the North and the South at the 38th parallel remain peaceful.

 

B. The USSR has the Atomic Bomb

 

On August 29, 1949 C.E., the USSR detonated its first atomic bomb at its Kazakhstan test site. This changed everything. It came as a great shock to the U.S., as she did not expect the USSR to possess nuclear weapon knowledge that soon. This USSR atomic bomb explosion brought with it military parity, a game changer. Why? The USSR’s Communist Party dominated the economy, the military, the press, and many other organizations. Outside of Russia it controlled the other satellite states in the Eastern Bloc. At this time, the USSR was also funding communist parties around the world, sometimes in competition with communist China. It wanted and needed to be in possession of the atomic bomb which gave the USSR more military stature and parity with the U.S. It also sent the message that it was ready to compete with the U.S. on a more equal footing. The Cold War had just become even colder.

 

The U.S. Western Bloc stood in opposition to the USSR Eastern Bloc. These two blocs were also political and ideological opponents. The U.S. is a federal republic with a two-party presidential system. The First World nations of the Western Bloc were generally liberal democratic countries with a free press and independent organizations. These were economically and politically entwined with a network of republics and some authoritarian regimes throughout the Third World. Most of these Third World nations had previously been former colonies of Western Bloc members. There was also a Neutral Bloc of nations which came about which sought good relations with both Blocs known as the Non-Aligned Movement.

 

These two superpowers had never engaged directly in full-scale armed combat. For a time, only the U.S. had Nuclear weapons. Now with the Soviets having the bomb, the Western Bloc was more vulnerable. This was on the chessboard of military supremacy a “Checkmate.” In the geopolitical game between the U.S. led Western Bloc and the USSR led Eastern Bloc this new USSR game position placed the U.S.’s king (being the only holder of a nuclear weapon) in check. Simply put, once the USSR had this weapon there was no way to remove the threat without an all out war. Having checkmated the Americans the Soviets won this game.

 

C. China now a Communist Nation

 

October 1, 1949 C.E., China's Communist Party achieved a resounding victory over Chiang Kai-shek's Kuomintang regime. Support from the Allies had been enough to prop up Chiang Kai-shek in the face of eight years of Japanese aggression. Clearly, however, the Western Blok was not as fortunate. The Kuomintang Nationalist economy was now ravaged by inflation. It infrastructure had been devastated during WWII and the communist movement had regained new strength during that war. The two generations of civil war finally ended with a Kuomintang withdrawal to Taiwan, leaving the communists in control of the mainland. It was then that Chairman Mao Zedong proclaimed the founding of the PRC in Beijing. The communists had taken control in China. Now that China was a communist nation, U.S. President Harry Truman became concerned that other countries around the PRC might also become communist. The Cold War was now further intensified and the environment of political weather was decidedly not getting warmer. 

 

The PRC and the DPRK exchanging diplomatic recognition on October 6, 1949 C.E. was purposeful. It was a signal to the USSR and the U.S. that it had an interest in its Asian neighbor.

 

The ongoing aggression by the USSR during the Cold War would become an important cause of the Korean War. Relations between the two occupying powers, the U.S. and USSR, had become steadily worse. Now, five years after WWII, the American Army was about one twelfth of the size it had been. Joséph Stalin had recently lost a Cold War dispute over the Berlin Blockade and subsequent airlift and wanted revenge. With Mao Zedong’s victory in China, Stalin needed to immediately improve his standing in the communist world.

 

With the Communists having acquired power in China, in December 1949 C.E. the U.S. Secretary of State Dean Acheson stated that this new China situation was something that Americans would need to accept for at least a while. He also said that people should learn to live with evil and observed that it had been around since the fall of Adam and Eve. This gave little comfort to the member states of the Western Bloc.

 

On December 24, 1949, the ROKA massacred citizens or their family of Mungyeong suspected of being Communist sympathizers. They then affixed the blame to Communists.

 

By the end of the decade of the 1940s C.E., there were now two competing states on the Korean Peninsula separated by the border of the 38th parallel. In the south, the anti-communist dictator Syngman Rhee enjoyed the support of the American government. In the north, the Communist dictator Kim Il Sung enjoyed the support of the Soviets. Unfortunately, neither dictator was content to remain on his side of the border. With border skirmishes having been common for some time, nearly 10,000 North and ROKA soldiers had been killed in battle before the upcoming Korean War had even begun.

 

In the 1950s C.E., another wave of America’s major corporations growing larger would occur. New conglomerates, firms with holdings in a variety of industries, would lead the way. Large corporations also developed holdings overseas, where labor costs were often lower.

 

Unlike the Eastern Bloc countries and the other Communists states, as the Cold War unfolded in the half decade after World War II, the U.S. experienced phenomenal economic growth. The war brought the return of prosperity, and in the postwar period the U.S. consolidated its position as the world's richest country. It’s Gross National Product, a measure of all goods and services produced in the U.S., jumped from about $200 thousand-million in 1940 C.E. to $300 thousand-million in 1950 C.E.

 

Also by 1950 C.E., the U.S. poverty rate was about 30 percent. About one-half of American seniors would remain in poverty in the early-1950s C.E.

 

In 1950 C.E., arrests of Mexicans living illegally in the U.S. reached 458,000 individuals. Here we must remember that just as had happened the period just before America’s entrance into WWII, Hispanic Americans were aware of this current intensely difficult issue of “Repatriation.” Once again, Hispanics were expected to accept injustices. This they did for love of country.

 

That year, the fear of Communist expansion had reached a fevered pitch. Many believed that sedition and treason were everywhere within the U.S. After all, Eastern Europe had fallen and so had China. Stoking these fears was the Republican U.S. Senator from the state of Wisconsin Joséph McCarthy. He was gaining political power, and McCarthyism (1950 C.E.-1954 C.E.) had begun. McCarthyism would become the practice in the U.S. of making accusations of subversion or treason without proper regard for evidence. The term refers to U.S. senator Joséph McCarthy and had its origins in the period in the U.S. known as the Second Red Scare, lasting from the late-1940s C.E. through the 1950s C.E. It was characterized by heightened political repression as well as a campaign spreading fear of Communist influence on American institutions and of espionage by Soviet agents. It would later become known as the McCarthy era. Was it factual? The American left says no! Were there communist in the U.S. government? The answer was proven to be, yes!

 

In Latino América things had improved little economically. In Argentina, Brasil, and Cuba the number of immigrants had been significant up to the time of the Great Depression. In Cuba’s case, they arrived from the neighboring West Indies and, above all, from España. Population growth continued to be mainly from natural increase. It was still not explosive. While birth rates in most countries remained high, death rates had not yet been sharply reduced by advances in public health. But it was steady. The total Latino Américano population rose from roughly 60 million in 1900 C.E. to 155 million at mid-20th-Century C.E. The urban proportion had reached about 40 percent, though proportion differed among countries.

 

The U.S. was seen by Latino Américanos as their only possible hope for stability through commerce, trade, and their resulting jobs.

 

By 1950 C.E., South Korea’s economy was under stress. More than 1 million workers had returned to Korea from Japan, 120,000 from China and Manchuria, and 1.8 million from the North Korea to the south. The annual rate of increase of births over deaths continued at about 3.1 percent. At the time, rural areas were inhospitable to newcomers, as a result most of the refugees settled in urban areas. Seoul received upwards of one-third of the total. An already difficult situation was further aggravated by the scarcity of food and other commodities. There was also runaway inflation caused in part by the fact that the departing Japanese had flooded Korea with newly printed yen.

 

By January 1950 C.E., The USSR and the newly minted Communist China recognize the Communist Democratic Republic of Vietnam. These two military powerhouses were intent upon the gradual takeover of Southeast Asia. The U.S. did have a response? Yes, partially!

 

That response was a document fundamental to the Truman Administration’s foreign policy. It was the National Security Council (NSC) 48/2. The document focused on stopping communist expansion by giving economic and military aid to various countries. Support would be given to France for their fight against Ho Chi Minh, to the Philippines government for in struggle with the Huk guerrillas, and to GB for their in their efforts against guerrillas in Malaya. In the document there was no mention of U.S. military intervention anywhere including defending Chiang's Taiwan military forces. This was another American international military policy faux pas.

 

On January 10, 1950 C.E., after the UN retained Nationalist China as the holder of China's UNSC seat, the USSR delegate walked out of the UNSC in disgust. It was yet one more Communist ruse meant for public consumption. The USSR hardly expected the U.S. and its allies to hand over the seat to a Communist China.

Two days later on January 12, 1950 C.E., in a speech to the National Press Club briefing, U.S. Secretary of State Dean Acheson outlined current U.S. Pacific defense posture, spoke of American interests in the Far East, and described a defense parameter that was similar to MacArthur's. In his presentation he included Japan and the Philippines, but not South Korea explicitly. Acheson said nothing about defending South Korea from an attack by North Korea, but he believed this was needed no more than he had to mention defending New Zealand or Australia. In short, this was interpreted as implying that South Korea is not under the protection of the U.S.

 

The understanding gained by of the communists of the USSR, China, and North Korea of the Acheson speech was that apparently Washington would not be sending troops to defend the Republic of Korea.  Soon, Kim Il-sung the Supreme Leader of North Korea was complaining to the USSR that peaceful reunification of the Korean Peninsula was impossible. He had been encouraged by the Communist victory in China. Kim Il-sung’s position was that the Korean people want liberation and would not understand why the opportunity to have it was missed. Soviet premier Joséph Stalin was also impressed by the Communist Chinese victory. Perhaps with his newly possessed atomic bomb, he was interested in having another success for anti-capitalism.

 

Concerns about the USSR and China taking an overt anti-capitalist stance which included military interventions caused the U.S. to change course. After Acheson's comments on January 12th came signs of Washington changing its strategy regarding the Far East. Two days later on January 14, 1950 C.E., the U.S. recalled all consular officials from China after the seizure of the American consul general in Peking.

Things regarding Korea had changed rapidly. On January 17, 1950 C.E., North Korean leader Kim Il-Sung proposed the “liberation” of South Korea to Soviet officials. Following weeks of telegram exchanges between Beijing, Moscow, and P'yŏngyang by March in early spring, Kim would secure assurances of support for his invasion of South Korean from Soviet premier Joséph Stalin and Chinese leader Mao Zedong.

 

In the Middle East, Israel's Knesset proclaimed Jerusalem the capital of Israel on January 23rd by a vote of 60-2 with members of Mapam and Herut abstaining. Interestingly, during the vote, an amendment was proposed by Herut. The amendment would have made the resolution applicable to all of Jerusalem, including the Old City which at the time was occupied by Transjordan. It was defeated. The two members who voted against the proposal were from the Communist party which supported an International trusteeship for the city as had been proposed by the UN. Evidently, the USSR was behind yet another divide and conquer scheme, this time in the Middle East.

 

Off-the-record testimony was given by General Omar Bradley of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee two days later on January 25th. He stated that a potential enemy, Communist China, possessing Taiwan would be a threat to America's position in the Pacific. This clearly was an indication that the Americans were coming to understand the threats to democracy in Asia and beyond.

 

On that same day, January 25th, U.S. government official Alger Hiss, an alleged USSR spy who escaped a treason trial earlier due to the expiration of the statute of limitations, was sentenced to five years for perjuring himself while under investigation. Hiss an American government official had been accused by Whittaker Chambers, a former U.S. Communist Party member of being a Soviet spy on August 3, 1948 C.E. Chambers testified under subpoena before the House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC) that Hiss had secretly been a Communist while in federal service. Called before HUAC, Hiss categorically denied the charge.

Chambers produced new evidence during the pretrial discovery process indicating that he and Hiss had been involved in espionage, which both men had previously denied under oath to HUAC. A federal grand jury then indicted Hiss on two counts of perjury. Chambers admitted to the same offense. As a cooperating government witness, he was never charged.

 

It should be noted that, before Hiss was tried and convicted, he was involved in the establishment of the UN both as a U.S. State Department official and as a U.N. official. Thus, there were communists in the U.S. government. He was one!

 

January 27th, Emil Julius Klaus Fuchs a German theoretical physicist who had helped the U.S. and GB build atomic bombs, confessed to passing nuclear secrets to the USSR. While at the Los Alamos National Laboratory, Fuchs was responsible for many significant theoretical calculations relating to the first nuclear weapons and, later, early models of the hydrogen bomb. He would later be convicted of supplying to the USSR during and shortly after the Second World War information from the American, British, and the Canadian Manhattan Project. After spending nine years' imprisonment in GB, Fuchs would immigrate to Communist East Germany where he would resume his career as a physicist and scientific leader.

 

D. USSR Agrees to Help the DPRK with its Plan of Attack on the ROC and to Unify Korea

 

On January 30th, USSR Premier Stalin informed Kim Il-sung in a telegram that he was now willing to help Kim in his plan of attack on the south to unify Korea. In the discussions with Kim that followed, Stalin suggested that in return for his support he would like a yearly minimum of 25,000 tons of lead. He also advised the Supreme Leader of North Korea to minimize his risk. Stalin apparently believed that it was possible to win a quick victory in Korea and present the world with a fait accompli.

 

His fledgling competition within the communist world, Chinese leader Mao Zedong and his associates concurred in this. Mao had advised Stalin that the U.S. would not intervene in Korea. A quick victory in Korea would further his advance against his enemy Chiang Kai-shek, now in Taiwan which he saw as a part of China. The Chinese leader also believed that the U.S. would not intervene in a Taiwan military intervention by China.

 

The alliance between China and the USSR was signed in February. It alarmed U.S. strategists in Washington, so much so that a revised bill on Korean aid reached Congress and was signed into law by President Truman later that February. The Chinese were now making the Cold War even colder!

 

On February 9th, in a speech in Wheeling, West Virginia, U.S. Senator Joséph McCarthy (R-WI) asserted that Communists had infiltrated the State Department. This played to concerns held by the American public that saw signs of these activities as reported earlier by the press. Her it must be said that, the past of the American “Left” had been largely unexamined about its collaboration with the Communist Marxist-Leninism in the 1930s C.E., 1940s C.E., and up to the 1950s C.E. It would appear that while anti-communist liberals and leftists condemned the communists, there was a formulaic, transparent insincerity about much of left-liberal anti-communism.

 

In April, Former Nazi scientist Wernher Magnus Maximilian Freiherr von Braun was appointed director of development operations of the U.S. Redstone Arsenal's Army Ballistic Missile Agency in Huntsville, Alabama. He had been a German aerospace engineer and space architect. Von Braun had been the leading figure in the development of rocket technology in Germany. While in his twenties and early thirties, von Braun worked in Nazi Germany's rocket development program. He helped design and develop the V-2 rocket at Peenemünde during World War II. He would later be considered the father of rocket technology and space science in the U.S. The Cold War had made fast friends of enemies of an earlier time.

 

In April 1950 C.E., a U.S. National Security Council (NSC) report known as NSC-68 recommended that the U.S. use military force to “contain” communist expansionism anywhere it seemed to be occurring, “regardless of the intrinsic strategic or economic value of the lands in question.” There was no longer a question of which Western democracy was to be attacked, or why, it was only a question of when the communists would strike next. The Cold War was now frozen in place.

 

April 1, 1950 C.E., the 1950 Census count found the U.S. a population to be over 150 million people. The 14% increase since the last census now showed a count of 150,697,361. The most populous state in the U.S. was New York, now followed by California. The geographic center of the U.S. population had now moved west into Richland County, Illinois, 8 miles north-northwest of Olney. The U.S. was thriving.

In May 1950 C.E., North Korea's Prime minister Kim Il-sung secretly visited Beijing to brief the Chinese Communist Party chairman Mao Zedong and other Chinese leaders on his Korean War plans for the South.

 

In early June, the Acheson State Department sent its bi-partisan Republican operative, John Foster Dulles, to South Korea. His trip reflected increasing concerns over Korea. Dulles was ordinary American. He was a grandson of the former Secretary of State John Watson Foster and the nephew of Woodrow Wilson’s Secretary of State Robert Lansing. Dulles had been surrounded by members of the foreign affairs community from an early age. In short, he was a member of the American Elite. Dulles would later be appointed Secretary of State by President Dwight Eisenhower on January 21, 1953 C.E. 

 

On June 6th, SCAP Douglas MacArthur banned communists from public service positions in Japanese government. The following day, of June 7th, in Tokyo, Japan, General MacArthur ordered the Japanese Government to remove from public life the seventeen top members of the staff of the Communist party's official propaganda organ Akhata or Red Flag. The Americans were no longer tolerating the maneuvers of the Comintern in their Bloc.

 

Republican John Foster Dulles was invited to the 38th parallel on June 17th, on behalf of the U.S. State Department and there he spoke of America's determination to stand by South Korea. On this mission to Korea, he was to assess the situation there. The crucial question was whether the U.S. was now, should include Korea within its region of interest. He would carry out several important diplomatic missions for the Truman administration.

 

Back in the U.S., on June 17th, Julius Rosenberg was arrested on suspicion of espionage, based on David Greenglass' confession. The American citizens Julius and Ethel Rosenberg had been suspected of spying, with others, for the USSR. Later, they would be tried, convicted, and executed by the federal government of the U.S. They were accused of providing top-secret information about radar, sonar, jet propulsion engines, and transmitting nuclear weapon designs to the USSR. At the time of their treason the U.S. was the only country in the world with nuclear weapons. To say that this helped world communism would be an understatement.

 

At this juncture, we should pause to consider the reality of the world of 1950 C.E. The Cold War was an incontrovertible truth. The Comintern was an active, worldwide communist conspiracy to bring down all non-communist nations and their governments. They and their adherents were actively destabilizing governments both from within and from without. These communists and their intellectually sympathetic fellow travelers were actively practicing sedition and inciting those that they could against the status quo of capitalism, authority, and order in targeted countries. They were challenging the establishment wherever and whenever possible. They were also treasonous, involving themselves in collusion with any anti-national force available through the providing of material support to people and groups working against any nation which was not under communist control and domination. Their every action had been, and was, to undermine and weaken democracies and other forms of government before they took armed action.

 

As for the U.S., it was not prepared for war. American military and civilian leaders were caught by surprise. Their only recourse was to intervene in Korea with poorly trained and equipped U.S. garrison troops from occupied Japan. Why? Because immediately after WWII the armed forces of the U.S. were vastly reduced in number and defense spending was dramatically cut. Despite this, the American military establishment remained confident in its capabilities. Unfortunately, it also had little knowledge of NKPA and Chinese Communist forces or military doctrine. This intertwined with a well-known disregard for the Asians and the Chinese as soldiers became the basis for the American military’s approach to the Korean War. There were also strategic intelligence blunders.

 

American civilian and military leaders involved were all products of WWII. The earlier attack on Pearl Harbor had clearly demonstrated the requirement for intelligence collection and analysis. The answers to why it happened were simple and they held lessons for America. The role of intelligence in America’s national security existed within the context of domestic U.S. political perception. With the defeat of Japan five years earlier, American historical isolationism moved quickly inward again. U.S. intelligence resources had been reduced at the end of the war. The looming conflict with Communism was seen as being focused on Europe, our traditional geographic area of interest.

 

To add to this dilemma, U.S. and USSR troops had been withdrawn from their respective parts of Korea. The USSR, however, left behind a well-equipped and trained NKPA. On the other hand, the U.S. had provided its South Korean ROKA military forces with only light weapons and little training. The one bright spot was that as U.S. forces withdrew, General MacArthur had instructed General Charles A. Willoughby to establish a secret intelligence office in Seoul. This was known as the Korean Liaison Office (KLO). Its responsibility was to monitor troop movements in the North and the activities of Communist guerrillas operating in the South.

 

By late 1949 C.E., the KLO was reporting that the Communist guerrillas represented a serious threat to the ROK. The office had also noted that many of the guerrillas were originally from the South, and thus were able to slip back into their villages when hiding from local ROKA security forces. In short, the U.S. was not prepared or capable of defending the ROK! While all along communist North Korea had been preparing for this adventure.

 

By June of 1950 C.E., humanity at large was under the cloud of the Cold War. Less than five years after WWII, the political and economic world was divided into two competing entities, the U.S.’s capitalist Western Bloc and the USSR’s communist Eastern Bloc. At risk were the Non-Aligned Bloc and those other countries which the two Bloc which were in the process of defending and or fighting over. The USSR, then the dominant communist state, jealously guarded its leadership position within the communist camp against the newly created PRC. The USSR led the communist worldwide campaign to overthrow any country which it sought after. While not directly confronting the West, it became adept at the use of political and military surigates to achieve its ends.

 

In the beginning of the Korean War the USSR chose to promote the war between the north and south through subterfuge, the providing of armaments, and with some air cover. It would not place boots on the ground other than advisors. Later, the PRC would enter upon the scene with men and arms when the NKPA was faltering and in danger of defeat. It would then move to directly challenge the forces of the UN, which included the U.S. The PVA troops would prove formidable!

 

Our American soldiers, including the de Ribera Clan’s soldados and those of its extended families of New Mexico, were about to face their worse military nightmares. They were out classed, out gunned, out generaled, and out of luck even before they set foot on the Korean Peninsula. The only thing, the greatest thing they had going for them was being Americans, and Americans never gave up!

 

IV. The Korean War

 

On June 25, 1950 C.E., the communist North Koreans attacked South Korea in a surprise onslaught. From that day until the armistice on July 27, 1953 C.E., Koreans would endure mass destruction, pain, and suffering. The events of the Korean War would also reveal the continued evil and darkest of man’s heart. By the end of the war, more than three million Koreans would be dead. Millions of refugees would remain homeless and distraught. About one million Chinese would sacrifice their lives during that war. American casualties would number fifty-four thousand two hundred and forty-six dead.

 

“If the best minds in the world had set out to find us the worst possible location in the world to fight this damnable war,” U.S. Secretary of State Dean Acheson (1893 C.E.-1971 C.E.) once said, “… the unanimous choice would have been Korea.”


The Korean War can be viewed in three parts.

·       The First Phase began on June 25, 1950 C.E., and ended on the day UN forces moved into North Korea's territory.

·       The Second Phase was essentially the South Korea’s attack and retreat from North Korea.

·       The Last Phase of the war saw "see-saw" fighting on the thirty-eighth parallel, stalemate, and negotiation talks.

 

A. The Korean War begins

 

1.0 Background

 

The Korean War would be the first major conflict following the end of World War II. It would also be the first war of the Cold War and a proxy war between the U.S. and USSR. At the point of the unwarranted attack, the U.S. had little choice but to intervene militarily in Korea. The U.S.’s “Containment Policy” against USSR Communism had to be upheld for the purpose of doing everything possible to keep Communism from spreading around world. There was also the “Domino Theory.” It was a popular belief within the U.S. which would be accepted from the 1950's C.E., until the end of the Cold War. The theory held the idea that if USSR Communism was able to spread into a single country, then it had the potential to spread to all of the other surrounding countries. At its base was the idea that the America needed to prevent the first domino from falling to the spread of communism. If a country in a given area or region turned to communism, others in the area would follow.

 

By June of 1950 C.E., the conflicts along the North-South border had escalated dramatically prior to the North Korean forces invading South Korea, triggering the Korean War. At this point in time, the NKPA military forces totaled nearly 200,000 soldiers including a tank division and an air force division. In comparison, Republic of Korea Army (ROKA) forces totaled less than 100,000 and lacked any tanks. They had a small air force that paled in comparison to the North Korean Air Force (NKAF). 

 

2.0 The First Phase of the Korean War

 

On June 25, 1950, at 4 a.m., the Korean War began when seventy thousand NKPA troops of the DPRK supported by the USSR and China launched a full-scale invasion of the nation's neighbor to the south, the pro-Western Republic of Korea. Ten divisions moving in six columns poured across the 38th parallel invading South Korea. Backed by USSR weaponry, the NKPA utilized a blitzkrieg style invasion using T-34 tanks supported by artillery catching the Republic of Korea Armed Forces (South) by surprise. When a massive NKPA artillery barrage began the incursion quickly escalate into open warfare.

 

The NKPA strategy was to aggressively pursue ROKA forces on all avenues of approach to the south and engage them. From their initial offensive in July, and through early-August, the NKPA would use flanking tactics to defeat the ROKA forces and later the UN forces they encountered and push the ever southward. They attacked from the front and initiating a double envelopment of both flanks of the defending units, which allowed the NKPA to surround and cut off the opposing ROKA troops, forcing them to retreat in disarray.

 

At this juncture, it should be obvious that the North Korean invasion came as an alarming surprise to American government officials. As far as they were concerned, this was no longer a simply a border dispute between two unstable dictatorships on the other side of the globe. American officials believed it was now a war against the forces of international communism itself. Many feared it was the first step in a communist campaign to take over the world. For this reason, nonintervention was not considered an option by many top decision-makers. “If we let Korea down,” President Harry Truman said, “the Soviet[s] will keep right on going and swallow up one [place] after another.”

 

President Truman immediately appealed to the UN to take "Police Action" against the "unwarranted" North Korean attack. This led to the UNSC recognizing the act as a North Korean invasion of South Korea. The UNSC then adopted Resolution 83 on June 27, 1950 C.E. It authorized UN member states to provide military assistance to South Korea and intervene and assist South Korea in the conflict. The UN next set about creating a force to intervene in the region. It authorized the formation of UN forces and dispatched them to South Korea to repel the North Korean invaders. Twenty-one countries of the UN would eventually contribute to the UN force, with the U.S. providing around 90% of the military personnel.

 

The USSR could have vetoed the UN resolution. But at the time, they were boycotting the proceedings because the Nationalist Chinese government on Taiwan still occupied the “China seat” on the UNSC.

 

On that same day of June 27, 1950 C.E., understanding the greater Communist plan for world domination, thirty-five U.S. military advisors were sent to South Vietnam to give military and economic aid to the anti-Communist government.

Meanwhile in South Korea, as the ROKA forces blew up the bridge across the Han River, they trapped their own soldiers and killed hundreds of refugees evacuating the city of Seoul. The South Koreans had no method of stopping the onslaught of the T-34 tanks as they lacked anti-tank weapons and had no tanks of their own, resulting in a rout. The NKPA captured portions of South Korea's capital of Seoul by June 28th, forcing the government and its shattered army retired in good order in retreat further south.

 

Here it is important to remember that the initial attacks by NKPA forces were successful against the south due to their overwhelming military advantage. The NKPA was larger and better equipped than the ROKA. Stalin had supported the war effort by sending hundreds of advisors in the form of Soviet Generals who had extensive experience from World War II. The smaller ROKA suffered from widespread lack of organization and equipment, and was unprepared for war. The numerically superior NKPA forces destroyed isolated resistance from the 38,000 ROKA soldiers on the front before it began moving steadily south. Most of ROKA forces retreated in the face of the invasion.

 

On June 29th, the NKPA captured all of Seoul and pressed southward.

 

Under the "name of the United Nations," just three days after the resolution was passed, on June 30, 1950 C.E., the U.S. President Harry S. Truman dispatched land, sea, and air forces to the peninsula to beat back the NKPA attack and to prevent South Korea's collapse. The U.S.' Seventh Fleet dispatched Task Force 77, led by the fleet carrier USS Valley Forge; the British Far East Fleet dispatched several ships, including HMS Triumph, to provide air and naval support. Although the navies blockaded North Korea and launched aircraft to delay the NKPA forces these efforts alone did not stop the NKPA juggernaut on its southern advance.

 

J.R.R. Tolkien, in his the second volume of the high fantasy novel, The Lord of the Rings, The Two Towers, said it best. “War must be, while we defend our lives against a destroyer who would devour all; but I do not love the bright sword for its sharpness, nor the arrow for its swiftness, nor the warrior for his glory. I love only that which they defend.” 

 

By June 30th, U.S. ground forces and air strikes were approved against North Korea. President Truman orders U.S. President Truman ordered ground troops into the country to supplement the air support. In Tokyo on that same day, Division commander, Major-General William F. Dean of U.S. 8th Army determined that the 21st Infantry Regiment was the most combat-ready of the 24th Infantry Division's three regiments. Dean decided to send the 21st Infantry's 1st Battalion from the formation because its commander, Lieutenant-Colonel Charles Bradford Smith, was the most experienced leading man, having experience at the Battle of Guadalcanal during World War II. General MacArthur then instructed Lieutenant-General Walton H. Walker, U.S. 8th U.S. Army commander, to order the 24th Infantry Division, stationed on Kyushu, to Korea at once. It must be stated that the strength of U.S. forces in the Far East had steadily declined since the end of World War II and the closest unit was the 24th Infantry Division of the U.S. 8th Army, headquartered in Japan. Cuts in U.S. military spending had resulted in the Division’s being under strength and using outdated equipment.

 

Major-General William F. Dean, commander of the 24th Infantry Division, was to send a delaying force of about 500 men immediately to Korea. He had C-54 Skymaster transport aircraft airlift one battalion from the Division garrison under Major-General Smith's command into Korea (Task Force Smith). The battalion was to be deployed quickly to block advancing NKPA forces and perform a holding action while the remainder of the Division could be moved to South Korea by sea. Major-General Dean's orders to Major-General Smith, “When you get to Pusan, head for Taejon. We want to stop the NKPA as far from Pusan as we can. Block the main road as far north as possible. Make contact with General Church. If you can't find him, go to Taejon and beyond if you can. Sorry I can't give you more information - that's all I've got. Good luck, and God bless you and your men!”

 

The first units of the 24th Infantry Division, Task Force Smith, named for its commander Major-General Smith left Itazuke Air Base in Japan arrived in South Korea on June 30th. The Task Force consisted of 406 men of the 1st Battalion, 21st Infantry Regiment, as well as 134 men of A Battery, 52nd Field Artillery Battalion under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Miller O. Perry. The forces were both poorly equipped and under strength. 1st Battalion, 21st Infantry had only two companies of infantry (B and C Company), as opposed to the regulation three for a U.S. Army battalion.

 

The 1st Battalion had only half of the required number of troops in its headquarters company, half of a communications platoon, and half of a heavy weapons platoon, which was armed with six obsolescent M9A1 Bazooka rocket launchers, two 75mm recoilless rifles, two 4.2 inch mortars, and four 60mm mortars. Much of this equipment was drawn from the rest of the under strength 21st Infantry. A Battery, which formed the entire artillery support for the Task Force, was armed with six 105mm howitzers. These howitzers were equipped with 1,200 high explosive (HE) rounds, but these were incapable of penetrating tank armor. Only six high explosive anti-tank (HEAT) rounds were issued to the battery, all of them allocated to the number six howitzer sited forward of the main battery emplacement. A Battery also had four .50 caliber M2 Browning heavy machine guns.

 

To make matters worse, most of the soldiers of the Task Force were teenagers with no combat experience and only eight weeks of basic training. Only one in six enlisted soldiers had combat experience. The soldiers were each equipped with only 120 rounds of ammunition and two days of C-rations. Only one third of the officers in the task force had combat experience from World War II. Many of them nevertheless volunteered to join the task force.

Task Force Smith order of battle

1st Battalion, 21st Infantry

Headquarters Platoon

B Company

C Company

Heavy Weapons Platoon

52nd Field Artillery Battalion

A Battery

 

The mission was to get the Communists out of South Korea. Given the UN’s military disadvantages, the war was to begin for the Allies as a defensive one. The NKPA were so successful that they were able to push back South Korean and later the Task Force Smith American troops to the Pusan Region in southeast Korea and came dangerously close to capturing the entire Korean peninsula. 

 

By July, more American troops entered the war on South Korea’s behalf. Rhee’s ROKA forces, were by contrast frightened, confused, and seemed inclined to flee the battlefield at any provocation. It was also one of the hottest and driest summers on record. In the begining, the desperately thirsty American soldiers were often forced to drink water from rice paddies that had been fertilized with human waste. The result was dangerous intestinal diseases and other illnesses being a constant threat.

 

By July 1, 1950 C.E., a complete Task Force Smith arrived in South Korea and briefly established a headquarters in Taejon. The Task Force soon after began moving north by rail and truck to oppose the NKPA. Task Force Smith took the initial "shock" of NKPA advances, delaying much larger NKPA units with the goal of buying time to allow more U.S. units into Korea. Its mission was to move as far north as possible and begin engaging the NKPA to stem their advance so that the rest of the 24th Infantry Division could be moved into South Korea to reinforce it.

It was the 24th Division’s commander, William F. Dean, who personally ordered Smith to stop the NKPA force along the highway from Suwon and "as far from Pusan" as possible.

 

The Battle of Osan

 

The Battle of Osan would be one of the first Korean War engagements. It would be fought in the village of Osan was. On July 4, 1950 C.E., Task Force Smith’s was one of the first Korean War engagements. The force was moved to Osan, south of the South Korean capital Seoul, and ordered to fight as a rearguard to delay advancing NKPA forces while additional U.S. troops arrived in the country to form a stronger defensive line to the south.

Task Force Smith consisted of 400 infantry supported by an artillery battery dug in on two hills straddling the road north of the village of Osan, 6 miles south of Suwon and about 25 miles south of Seoul. These ridges rose up to 300 feet above the road, providing visibility almost the entire distance to Suwon. The battalion set up a 1 mile long line over these ridges.

 

Task Force Smith artillery contingents were placed along the road with the infantry formations on the two hills, five of the howitzers sited 1 mile behind the infantry, and the sixth with its six HEAT shells positioned halfway between the infantry and the other five field artillery pieces.

 

As they waited to meet the advancing NKPA forces heavy rain made air support impossible so Smith and Perry pre-registered the artillery battery in the hope that that target registration point (TRP) for that special location on the battlefield for an artillery strike would be just as effective. That TRP's exact location and distance was known to both the spotters and the firing element. This would allow 52nd Field Artillery guns to place fire there with almost no time spent once they receive the orders to fire.

 

The task force lacked both anti-tank guns and effective infantry anti-tank weapons, having been equipped with obsolescent 2.36-in. rocket launchers and a few 57 mm recoilless rifles. Aside from a limited number of HEAT shells for the unit's 105-mm howitzers, crew-served weapons capable of defeating the T-34 Soviet tank had not been distributed to U.S. Army forces in Korea. This was a recipe for disaster.

 

In the very first encounter, a NKPA tank column equipped with ex-Soviet T-34/85 tanks overran the Task Force Smith and continued its advance southward. After the NKPA tank column had breached U.S. lines the Task Force opened fire on a force of some 5,000 NKPA infantry approaching its position, temporarily holding up the NKPA advance. NKPA troops eventually flanked and overwhelmed American positions and the remnants of the task force retreated in disorder.

 

Eloy Herrera was born 1928 C.E. He was U.S. ARMY PFC and casualty of the Korean War. He died in Korea on July 5, 1950 C.E. His home was in Union, New Mexico.

 

U.S. ARMY PFC Eloy Herrera, who joined the U.S. Army from New Mexico, served with Task Force Smith. On July 5, 1950 C.E., Task Force Smith, the first U.S. ground element to engage NKPA troops, was defending a position north of Osan, South Korea. The Task Force’s goal was to delay enemy forces by blocking their movement down the road south from Suwon to Taejon, which was a major avenue of advance for the NKPA. That morning, the Task Force was engaged by a column of enemy tanks. The anti-tank weapons that the infantrymen employed were ineffective, and a large number of tanks broke through their position. Task Force Smith was forced to withdraw to the south, suffering heavy casualties in the process. 

 

New Mexico U.S. Military Fatal Hispano Casualties of the Korean War

Name

Service

 Rank 

Birthdate (YYYYMMDD)

Home of Record:

City County

Incident or Death Date (YYYYMMDD)

Remains Recovered

Herrera Eloy

ARMY

PFC

19280000

Unknown

Union

19500705

Y

 

At around 0730 on July 5th, Task Force Smith spotted a column of eight NKPA T-34/85 tanks of the 107th Tank Regiment, NKPA 105th Armored Division heading south toward them. The NKPA forces, driving south from Seoul, were in pursuit of retreating ROKA forces.

 

At 0816 the 52nd Field Artillery Battalion‘s, A battery fired its first rounds at the advancing NKPA tanks. The tanks were approximately 1.2 miles from the U.S. infantry force when hit with numerous 105mm howitzer rounds, but were unaffected. When the tanks closed to 2,300 feet of the U.S. force the 75mm recoilless rifles fired, scoring direct hits on the lead tanks. No damage was done to them. The NKPA tanks returned fire, but they were unable to locate the American positions and gun emplacements, and their fire was ineffective.

 

Once the NKPA tanks reached the infantry line, the U.S. troops fired some 22 2.36-inch rockets at a range of 15 yards from his M9A1 launcher tube. Some of these rockets failed to ignite. The remainder did and several struck the rear plate armor of several T-34s, where their armor was thinnest. Unfortunately, the warheads failed to penetrate the armor. Without damage, the NKPA tanks continued their advance, ignoring the roadblock and continuing down the road. The operators assumed the roadblock was manned by ROKA troops, and ignored it since it did not pose them a serious threat. When the tank column came over the crest of the road, the forward howitzer, commanded by Corporal Herman V. Critchfield, Chief of Section and 5 cannoneers, fired its HEAT rounds, damaging the first two tanks and setting one of them on fire. One of the crew members of the burning tank emerged with a PPSh-41 and killed a member of an American machine gun crew before being killed himself. That American became the first casualty of Korean War ground combat.

 

The howitzer, depleted of HEAT rounds, began firing high explosive rounds before being destroyed by the third T-34. The tanks then advanced, continuing to ignore the American howitzer and bazooka fire. U.S. forces managed to disable another NKPA T-34 when a 105mm shell struck and damaged its tracks. Unfortunately, the tracks of the T-34 tanks cut communication signal wires between the U.S. infantry and artillery forces, further compounding the confusion. Lieutenant-Colonel Perry was wounded in the leg by NKPA small arms fire as he was attempting to get the crew of the disabled tank to surrender. His artillery Section continued firing at the NKPA tanks with no effect.

 

A second column of 25 NKPA T-34 tanks approached the Task Force within an hour. This second T-34 formation advanced singly or by twos, and threes, close together with no apparent formal organization. The A Battery’s howitzer hit another tank from this column in its tracks, disabling it, and damaged three more. The NKPA tanks destroyed the forward number six howitzer and wounded one of its crew members. They also killed or wounded an estimated twenty infantrymen and had destroyed all the parked vehicles behind the infantry line. At the main battery position one of the five remaining 105mm guns had been slightly damaged by a near-hit. Several of the men in the 52nd Field Artillery Battalion began deserting their positions but Perry managed to convince most of them to return.

 

The ineffectiveness of the 2.36-inch bazooka had been demonstrated repeatedly during World War II against German armor. Post-WWII peacetime defense cutbacks resulted in the 24th Infantry Division having never received improved U.S. M20 3.5-inch bazookas with M28A2 HEAT antitank ammunition, capable of defeating USSR tanks.

 

After the last NKPA tanks passed the U.S. lines, no NKPA forces were spotted for around an hour. At approximately 11:00, three more NKPA tanks were sighted advancing from the north. Behind them was a column of trucks 6 miles long under the command of Major General Lee Kwon Mu which were advancing from Seoul. These carried two full infantry regiments, the 16th Infantry Regiment and the 18th Infantry Regiment of the NKPA 4th Infantry Division, amounting to almost 5,000 troops. The column apparently was not in communication with the tanks that had preceded it and the NKPA infantry was not aware of the UN troop's presence.

 

At 11:45, when the NKPA column had advanced to within 1,000 yards of the U.S. troops, Major-General Smith gave the order for the Task Force to open fire with everything it had. The mortar, machine gun, artillery, and rifle fire destroyed several trucks, scattering the column. The three lead tanks moved to within 980 feet of Task Force Smith and opened fire. Behind them, around 1,000 of the NKPA infantry formed in the rice paddies to the east of the road in an attempt to envelop the U.S. forces but were repulsed. Smith attempted to order artillery fire on the NKPA force but runners were unable to get back to the field artillery positions, and so he assumed they had been destroyed by the tanks.

 

Within 45 minutes, another enveloping NKPA force formed to the west of the road, forcing Smith to withdraw a platoon to the east side of the road. Quickly thereafter the U.S. infantry began taking mortar and artillery fire from the NKPA.

 

American withdrawal

 

Soon, soldiers of the U.S. 21st Infantry Regiment, 24th Division, were captured and executed by NKPA forces. This outright murdering of Americans tells a great deal about what these Hispano Americans were up against. The NKPA were butchers, pure and simple!

 

Then the retreat of the U.S. force began which quickly became a confused and a disorganized rout. Task Force Smith suffered its highest casualties during this withdrawal as its soldiers were most exposed to enemy fire. The surviving members of Task Force Smith reached Battery A's position. The artillerymen disabled the five remaining howitzers by removing their sights and breechblocks and retired in good order the northern outskirts of Osan with the remains of the Task Force on foot. There most of the unit's hidden transport vehicles were found intact. The vehicles, unmolested by the NKPA forces, departed for Pyongtaek and Cheonan, picking up stragglers along the way. Eventually joining units of the U.S. 24th Infantry Division would establish a second line of defense.

 

Two-hundred fifty of Task Force Smith's force had returned to the American lines before nightfall. About 150 of the force were either killed, wounded or missing. Most of the other stragglers found their way into the American lines over the next several days. The last stragglers from 2nd Platoon, B Company, reached Chonan five days later, only 30 minutes ahead of the NKPA army. Task Force Smith suffered 60 dead, 21 wounded and 82 captured, 32 of whom would eventually die in captivity. This casualty count accounted for 40 percent of Task Force Smith.

 

Later, U.S. troops advancing northward during the Pusan breakout offensive would discover a series of shallow graves containing the bodies of several soldiers of the 24th Infantry Division. All had been their hands bound behind their backs with communications wire and shot in the back of the head. This continued butchery by the NKPA should dispel any notions that the communists were anything less than evil! The Americans would see a great deal more of this type of war crime.

 

The NKPA casualties were approximately 42 dead and 85 wounded, with four tanks destroyed or immobilized. The NKPA advance was delayed for approximately seven hours.

 

Aftermath

 

The Battle of Osan showed the U.S. forces to be weak, unprepared for the war, were provided with only outdated weapons which were insufficient to overcome NKPA armor, poorly trained, and the inexperienced. U.S. units were at that point no match for better-trained NKPA troops. These undisciplined U.S. troops had abandoned their positions prematurely, leaving equipment and wounded for NKPA troops to capture. The force had also stayed too long in its position, allowing NKPA troops to envelop the force. It was all of this that caused heavy casualties as it retreated. These types of weaknesses would play out with other U.S. units for the next month as NKPA troops pushed the U.S forces further back. The disparity in the number of troops engaged by the NKPA certainly had a profound effect on the outcome of this and future battles.

 

Though the Task Force Smith was badly defeated it accomplished its mission of delaying NKPA forces from advancing for several hours. During the battle, the 24th Infantry Division's 34th Infantry Regiment was able to set up in Pyeongtaek, 15 miles to the south. Over the next month, the U.S. 24th Infantry Division would fight in numerous engagements to delay NKPA forces with similar results. The NKPA, overwhelming U.S. forces time and again, would be able to push the U.S. 8th Army all the way back to Pusan, where the Battle of the Pusan Perimeter would culminate in the eventual defeat of the NKPA .

 

In the Middle East, on July 5th, the Law of Return, which opened Israel to worldwide Jewish immigration, was passed by the Israeli Knesset. This threatened her Islamic neighbors and played into the hands of the USSR.

 

The Battle of Pyongtaek July 6, 1950 C.E.

 

The Battle of Pyongtaek was the second engagement between UN and NKPA forces during the Korean War. It occurred on July 6, 1950 C.E. in the village of Pyongtaek in western South Korea. There, the U.S. Army's 34th Infantry Regiment, 24th Infantry Division was assigned to delay elements of the NKPA's 4th Infantry Division as it advanced south following its victory at the Battle of Osan the day before. The regiment emplaced at Pyongtaek and Ansong would form a line to hold the NKPA in an area where the terrain formed a bottleneck between mountains and the Yellow Sea.

 

Soon half of the Regiment's strength was ordered to retreat from its position before the NKPA force was encountered, leaving the flank open for the remaining force, 1st Battalion at Pyongtaek. The Battalion encountered NKPA forces the morning of July 6th. After a brief engagement it was unable to repel them effectively. The Battalion then mounted a disorganized retreat to Cheonan several miles away.

 

Aftermath

 

The Regiment had failed to significantly delay the NKPA forces in their movement south. The fight ended in a North Korean victory following unsuccessful attempts by American forces to inflict significant damage or delays on advancing NKPA units, despite several opportunities to do so.

 

Planned Assault on Inchŏn Code Name Operation Bluehearts Abandoned

 

On July 10th, General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, General J. Lawton Collins the Army Chief of Staff, and Admiral Forrest Sherman Chief of Naval Operations held a meeting in Tokyo, Japan, to convince other military leaders that an assault on Inchŏn was necessary. The planned assault on Inchŏn code named Operation Bluehearts was abandoned when it became clear that the 1st Cavalry Division would be needed on the Pusan Perimeter.

 

Ernest Montoya was born 1916 C.E. He was U.S. ARMY Sergeant with the 21st Infantry Regiment: A. He was a casualty of the Korean War KIA. He died in Korea on July 10, 1950 C.E. KIA. His home was in Bernalillo, New Mexico.

 

New Mexico U.S. Military Fatal Hispano Casualties of the Korean War

Name

Service

 Rank 

Birthdate (YYYYMMDD)

Home of Record:

City County

Incident or Death Date (YYYYMMDD)

Remains Recovered

Montoya Ernest

ARMY

SGT

19160000

Unknown

Bernalillo

19500710

Y

 

Gilbert Gutiérrez was born 1930 C.E. He was U.S. ARMY Private With the 21st Infantry Regiment: L and a casualty of the Korean War KIA. He died in Korea on July 7, 1950 C.E. His home was in Bernalillo, New Mexico.

 

New Mexico U.S. Military Fatal Hispano Casualties of the Korean War

Name

Service

 Rank 

Birthdate (YYYYMMDD)

Home of Record:

City County

Incident or Death Date (YYYYMMDD)

Remains Recovered

Gutiérrez Gilbert

ARMY

PVT

19300000

Unknown

Bernalillo

19500711

Y

 

Manuel A. Barraza was born 1931 C.E. He was U.S. ARMY Private with the 21st Infantry Regiment: I and a casualty of the Korean War KIA. He died in Korea on July 12, 1950 C.E. His home was in Grant, New Mexico.

 

New Mexico U.S. Military Fatal Hispano Casualties of the Korean War

Name

Service

 Rank 

Birthdate (YYYYMMDD)

Home of Record:

City County

Incident or Death Date (YYYYMMDD)

Remains Recovered

Barraza Manuel A   

ARMY

PVT

19310000

Unknown

Grant

19500712

Y

 

Battle of Taejon which lasted from July 14th through July 21, 1950 C.E.

 

Servando González was born 1929 C.E. He was U.S. ARMY PFC with the 3rd Engineer’s and a casualty of the Korean War KIA. He died in Korea on July 16, 1950 C.E. His home was in Bernalillo, New Mexico.

 

New Mexico U.S. Military Fatal Hispano Casualties of the Korean War

Name

Service

 Rank 

Birthdate (YYYYMMDD)

Home of Record:

City County

Incident or Death Date (YYYYMMDD)

Remains Recovered

González Servando

ARMY

PFC

19290000

Unknown

Bernalillo

19500716

Y

 

The U.S. 24th Infantry Division was again defeated by the NKPA during the Battle of Taejon which lasted from July 14th through July 21, 1950 C.E.

The Battle of Taejon was another early battle of the Korean War between UN and NKPA forces. Forces of the U.S. Army attempted to defend the headquarters of the U.S. 24th Infantry Division. The entire 24th Division was gathered to make a final stand around Taejon, holding a line along the Kum River to the east of the city. The 24th’s troops were already exhausted from the previous two weeks of delaying actions to stem the advance of the NKPA. The Division was also hampered by a lack of communications, equipment, and a shortage of heavy weapons to match the KPA's firepower. This was the plight of the outnumbered, ill-equipped, and untrained American forces.

 

As the battle progressed at the riverbank near the City of Taejon, after several days, the the 24th Infantry Division was overwhelmed and pushed back by a militarily and numerically superior force of NKPA. What followed was the fighting of an intense urban battle to defend that major city and transportation hub of Taejon. After a fierce three-day struggle, the UN forces withdrew.

 

Aftermath

 

Unfortunately, during the action the NKPA captured Major-General William F. Dean, the commander of the U.S. 24th Infantry Division, and highest ranking American prisoner during the Korean War. Although the 24th could not hold the city, it achieved a strategic victory by delaying the NKPA. This at least provided time for other U.S. divisions to establish a defensive perimeter around Pusan further to the south. The delay imposed at Taejon probably prevented what could have been a U.S. rout during the subsequent Battle of Pusan Perimeter.

 

Pre-battle Preparations for the Battle of Inchŏn

 

The landing at Inchŏn was not the first large-scale amphibious operation since World War II. That distinction belonged to the UN landing that took place on July 18, 1950 C.E. at Pohang, South Korea. That operation, however, was not made in NKPA-held territory and was unopposed. This would not be the case with the Inchŏn landings.

 

Days after the beginning of the Korean War, General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, the U.S. Army officer in command of all UN forces in Korea, envisioned an amphibious assault to retake the Seoul area. The city had fallen in the first days of the war in the First Battle of Seoul. MacArthur later wrote that he thought the ROKA would push the NKPA Army back far past Seoul. He also said he decided days after the war began that the battered, demoralized, and under-equipped ROKA, many of whom did not support the ROK government put in power by the U.S., could not hold off the NKPA forces even with U.S. support. MacArthur felt that he could turn the tide if he made a decisive troop movement behind NKPA lines, and preferred Inchŏn over Chumunjin-up or Kunsan as the landing site. He had originally envisioned such a landing, code named Operation Bluehearts, for July 22nd, with the U.S. Army's 1st Cavalry Division landing at Inchŏn.

 

Louis V. Acevedo was born 1930 C.E. He was U.S. ARMY PFC and casualty of the Korean War. He with the Unit 21st Infantry Regiment: C and died of wounds in Korea on July 20, 1950 C.E. His home was in Cháves, New Mexico.

 

Joe L. Madril was born on September 3, 1930 C.E. He was U.S. ARMY PFC with the 19th Infantry Regiment: H and a casualty of the Korean War. He was Declared Dead on July 20, 1950 C.E. His home was in Torrance, New Mexico.

 

Joe E. Montoya was born 1927 C.E. He was U.S. ARMY PFC with the 19th Infantry Regiment: H and a casualty of the Korean War. He was KIA, Declared Dead died in Korea on July 20, 1950 C.E. His home was in San Miguel, New Mexico.

 

New Mexico U.S. Military Fatal Hispano Casualties of the Korean War

Name

Service

 Rank 

Birthdate (YYYYMMDD)

Home of Record:

City County

Incident or Death Date (YYYYMMDD)

Remains Recovered

Acevedo Louis V    

ARMY

PFC

19300000

Unknown

Cháves

19500720

Y

Madril Joe L

ARMY

PFC

19300903

Unknown

Torrance

19500720

N

Montoya Joe E

ARMY

PFC

19270000

Unknown

San Miguel

19500720

Y

 

Code-name Operation Chromite a New Plan for an Amphibious Assault of Inchŏn

 

On July 23rd, MacArthur formulated a new plan, code-named Operation Chromite, calling for an amphibious assault of Inchŏn by the U.S. Army's 2nd Infantry Division and the U.S. Marine Corps's 5th Marine Regiment in mid-September 1950 C.E. This too fell through as both units were moved to the Pusan Perimeter. MacArthur decided instead to use the U.S. Army's 7th Infantry Division, his last reserve unit in East Asia, to conduct the operation as soon as it could be raised to wartime strength.

 

Rudy Velásco Trujillo Mesa was born 1931 C.E. He was U.S. ARMY Private and casualty of the Korean War. He died in Korea on July 27, 1950 C.E. His home was in Grant, New Mexico.

 

Ernesto Jr. García was born 1930 C.E. He was U.S. ARMY PFC with the 29th Infantry Regiment: and casualty of the Korean War. He was MIA on July 27, 1950 C.E. till 11/04/50 and died in Korea KIA. His home was in Mora, New Mexico.

 

New Mexico U.S. Military Fatal Hispano Casualties of the Korean War

Name

Service

 Rank 

Birthdate (YYYYMMDD)

Home of Record:

City County

Incident or Death Date (YYYYMMDD)

Remains Recovered

Trujillo Mesa Rudy Velásco

ARMY

PVT

19310000

Unknown

Grant

19500727

N

García Ernesto Jr.

ARMY

PFC

19300000

Unknown

Mora

19500727

Y

 

Juan Quintana was born April 4, 1929 C.E. He was U.S. ARMY PFC and casualty of the Korean War. He died in Korea on July 28, 1950 C.E. His home was in Quay, New Mexico.

 

New Mexico U.S. Military Fatal Hispano Casualties of the Korean War

Name

Service

 Rank 

Birthdate (YYYYMMDD)

Home of Record:

City County

Incident or Death Date (YYYYMMDD)

Remains Recovered

Quintana Juan

ARMY

PFC

19290429

Unknown

Quay

19500728

N

Reynaldo Sedillos was born 1927 C.E. He was U.S. ARMY Private was with the 52nd Field Artillery: A and a casualty of the Korean War. He died in Korea on July 30, 1950 C.E. KIA. His home was in Grant, New Mexico.

 

New Mexico U.S. Military Fatal Hispano Casualties of the Korean War

Name

Service

 Rank 

Birthdate (YYYYMMDD)

Home of Record:

City County

Incident or Death Date (YYYYMMDD)

Remains Recovered

Sedillos Reynaldo

ARMY

PVT

19270000

Unknown

Grant

19500730

Y

 

With the establishment of the UN Pusan Perimeter in August, UN forces held a continuous line which the NKPA could not flank. The NKPA advantages in numbers decreased daily as the superior UN logistical system brought in more troops and supplies to the UN forces.

In preparation for the Inchŏn invasion, General MacArthur activated the U.S. 8th Army's X Corps to act as the command for the landing forces, and appointed Major-General Almond, his chief of staff, as corps commander, anticipating the operation would mean a quick end to the war.

 

Throughout August, General MacArthur faced the challenge of re-equipping the U.S. 7th Infantry Division as it had sent 9,000 of its men to reinforce the Pusan Perimeter and was far under strength. He also faced the challenge that the U.S. Marine Corps, reduced in size following World War II, had to rebuild the U.S. 1st Marine Division, using elements of the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade fighting at Pusan as well as the 1st U.S. Marine Regiment and the 7th Marine Regiment, which pulled U.S. Marines from as far away as the Mediterranean Sea to Korea for the task. MacArthur ordered Korean Augmentation to the U.S. Army (KATUSA) troops, ROKA conscripts assigned to U.S. Army units, to reinforce the U.S. 7th Infantry Division, while allocating all equipment coming into Korea to U.S. X Corps, despite it being crucially needed by the U.S. 8th Army on the front lines.

 

Herman J. Luján was born 1930 C.E. He was U.S. ARMY PFC and casualty of the Korean War. He died in Korea on August 2, 1950 C.E. His home was in Quay, New Mexico.

 

New Mexico U.S. Military Fatal Hispano Casualties of the Korean War

Name

Service

 Rank 

Birthdate (YYYYMMDD)

Home of Record:

City County

Incident or Death Date (YYYYMMDD)

Remains Recovered

Luján Herman J

ARMY

PFC

19300000

Unknown

Quay

19500802

Y

 

When the NKPA approached the Pusan Perimeter on August 5th, they attempted the same frontal assault technique on the four main avenues of approach into the perimeter. Throughout the remainder of August, they conducted direct assaults resulting in the First Battle of Naktong Bulge, the Battle of Taegu, Battle of Masan, the Battle of the Bowling Alley, and the Battle of Battle Mountain.

 

The First Battle of Naktong Bulge fought from August 5th through August 19, 1950 C.E.

 

The First Battle of Naktong Bulge was an engagement between United States and NKPA forces August 5th through August 19, 1950 C.E. in the vicinity of Yongsan and the Naktong River in South Korea. It was a part of the Battle of Pusan Perimeter, and was one of several large engagements fought simultaneously.

 

On August 5th, the NKPA 4th Infantry Division crossed the Naktong River in the vicinity of Yongsan, attempting to cut U.S. supply lines to the north as well as gaining a bridgehead into the Pusan Perimeter. Opposing it was the U.S. 24th Infantry Division of the U.S. 8th Army. Over the next two weeks, U.S. and NKPA forces fought a bloody series of engagements inflicting heavy casualties on one another in a confusing series of attacks and counterattacks. Neither side was able to gain the upper hand. In the end, the U.S. forces, aided by reinforcements, air support and heavy weapons, destroyed the invading NKPA force which was hampered by lack of supply and high desertion rates.

 

Aftermath

 

The battle ended in a victory for the U.S. after large numbers of U.S. reinforcements destroyed an attacking NKPA division. The battle was a turning point in the war for NKPA forces, which had seen previous victories owing to superior numbers and equipment. The U.S. forces now had a numerical superiority and more equipment, including tanks and weapons capable of defeating the NKPA T-34 tanks.

 

The Battle of Taegu fought from August 5th through August 20, 1950 C.E.

 

The Battle of Taegu was an engagement around the city of Taegu, South Korea, between UN and NKPA forces. The fighting would continue from August 5th through August 20, 1950 C.E. It was a part of the Battle of Pusan Perimeter, and was one of several large engagements fought simultaneously.

 

Right at the center of the Pusan Perimeter, Taegu stood at the entrance to the Naktong River valley. It was also the major transportation hub and last major South Korean city aside from Pusan itself remaining in UN hands. There, Commander of the U.S. 8th, Army Lieutenant-General Walton Walker, had established Taegu as the 8th's headquarters. The natural barriers provided by the Naktong River to the south and the mountainous terrain to the north converged around Taegu. Unfortunately, it was an area where NKPA forces could advance in large numbers in close support.

 

From south to north, the city was defended by the U.S. 1st Cavalry Division, and the ROKA II Corps’ ROKA 1st Division and ROKA 6th Division. 1st Cavalry Division was spread out along a long line along the Naktong River to the south, with its 5th Cavalry Regiment and 8th Cavalry Regiment holding a 79,000 foot line along the river south of Waegwan, facing west. The U.S. 7th Cavalry held position to the east in reserve, along with artillery forces, ready to reinforce anywhere a crossing could be attempted. The ROKA 1st Division held a northwest-facing line in the mountains immediately north of the city while the ROKAA 6th Division held position to the east, guarding the narrow valley holding the Kunwi road into the Pusan Perimeter area.

 

Five KPA divisions, the 10th, 3rd, 15th, 13th, and 1st Divisions, amassed to oppose the UN at Taegu. From south to north, these five KPA divisions occupied a wide line encircling Taegu from Tuksong-dong and around Waegwan to Kunwi. The KPA planned to use the natural corridor of the Naktong valley from Sangju to Taegu as its main axis of attack for the next push south, so the divisions all eventually moved through this valley, crossing the Naktong at different areas along the low ground. Elements of the DPRK 105th Armored Division also supported the attack.

In a series of engagements, each of the NKPA divisions attempted to cross the Naktong and attack the defending forces. The success of these NKPA attacks upon UN forces varied by region. But attacks in the U.S. 1st Cavalry Division sector were repulsed and the attacks in the ROKA sector were more successful.

 

During the battle on August 17th, however, NKPA troops were able to surprise U.S. troops on Hill 303 and capture them. Late in the battle, these troops were machine gunned in the Hill 303 massacre. On Hill 303 at Waegwan, on a hill above Waegwan, South Korea, forty-one U.S. Army POWs were shot and killed by troops of the NKPA during one of the numerous smaller engagements of the Battle of Pusan Perimeter. Operating near Taegu during the Battle of Taegu elements of the U.S. Army's 2nd Battalion, 5th Cavalry Regiment, 1st Cavalry Division, were surrounded by NKPA troops crossing the Naktong River at Hill 303. While most of the U.S. troops were able to escape, one platoon of mortar operators misidentified NKPA troops as ROKA reinforcements and was captured. NKPA troops held theses Americans on the hill and initially did try to move them across the river and out of the battle. Unfortunately, they were unable to do so because of a heavy U.S. counterattack. U.S. forces eventually broke the NKPA advance, routing the force. As the NKPA began their retreat one of the officers ordered the POWs to be shot so they would not slow the NKPA down.

 

Here, I must stress that killing one’s enemy when wounded and helpless has been done in all wars. There is the desperation of combat, the lack of provisions for caring for the wounded, and often no troops to spare to guard them. Some would say that this is a practical necessity, however horrible. For most soldiers, there is an enormous difference between killing during the confusion and peril of combat and the murder of a fellow soldier when safe from retribution. The latter is simply unforgiveable.

 

Despite these setbacks, the UN forces were successful in driving most of the NKPA away, but the decisive battle to secure the city would occur during the Battle of the Bowling Alley.

 

Aftermath

 

The battle ended in a victory for the UN after their forces were able to drive off an offensive by NKPA divisions attempting to cross the Naktong River and assault the city.

 

The Battle of Masan fought between August 5th and September 19, 1950 C.E.

 

The Battle of Masan was an engagement between UN and NKPA forces, which took place between August 5th and September 19, 1950 C.E., in the vicinity of Masan and the Naktong River in South Korea. It was part of the Battle of Pusan Perimeter, and was one of several large engagements fought simultaneously. Operating as the extreme southern flank of the Pusan Perimeter, the U.S. Army's 25th Infantry Division placed its regiments around the South Korean city of Masan, with the U.S. 24th Infantry Regiment and U.S. 5th Regimental Combat Team based in Haman and nearby Sobuk-san, and the U.S. 35th Infantry Regiment based along the Nam River to the west of the city. Throughout the six-week battle, the NKPA 6th and 7th Divisions attacked the U.S. 25th Division's regiments in an attempt to break through the UN forces and attack Pusan.

 

An initial UN counteroffensive out of Masan proved ineffective in stopping the NKPA from advancing. In the subsequent fight, the U.S. 35th Infantry was able to repel the NKPA at the Battle of Nam River and were highly regarded for these actions. However, the U.S. 24th Infantry performed very poorly at the battles of Blue Mountain and Haman, forcing the U.S. 25th Division to muster reserves to counter the NKPA gains against the U.S. 24th.

 

Aftermath

 

The UN units were able to defeat and repel the NKPA repeatedly, including through a coordinated offensive across the entire perimeter. In delaying and pushing back the NKPA, the U.S. 25th Infantry Division was able to buy time for the buildup of UN forces to in the Pusan Perimeter and the mounting of the counterattack at Inchŏn.

 

The battle ended in a victory for the UN after large numbers of U.S. and ROKA troops were able to repel the repeated attacks of two NKPA divisions.

 

Juan Luján was born 1932 C.E. He was U.S. ARMY PFC the 34th Infantry Regiment: HMtr, part of the 24th Division, and a casualty of the Korean War KIA. He died in Korea on August 6, 1950 C.E. His home was in Bernalillo, New Mexico.

 

New Mexico U.S. Military Fatal Hispano Casualties of the Korean War

Name

Service

 Rank 

Birthdate (YYYYMMDD)

Home of Record:

City County

Incident or Death Date (YYYYMMDD)

Remains Recovered

Luján Juan

ARMY

PFC

19320000

Unknown

Bernalillo

19500806

Y

 

Casimiro Pachéco was born 1928 C.E. He was U.S. ARMY PFC with the 34th Infantry Regiment: Company L, part of the 24th Division, and a casualty of the Korean War KIA. He died in Korea on August 8, 1950 C.E. His home was in Mora, New Mexico.

 

New Mexico U.S. Military Fatal Hispano Casualties of the Korean War

Name

Service

 Rank 

Birthdate (YYYYMMDD)

Home of Record:

City County

Incident or Death Date (YYYYMMDD)

Remains Recovered

Pachéco Casimiro

ARMY

PFC

19280000

Unknown

Mora

19500808

Y

 

On August 11, 1950 C.E., Ethel Rosenberg was arrested after a grand jury appearance.

 

José l. Archuleta was born September 10, 1929 C.E. He was U.S. ARMY Private and casualty of the Korean War. He died in Korea on August 11, 1950 C.E. His home was in Taos, New Mexico.

 

New Mexico U.S. Military Fatal Hispano Casualties of the Korean War

Name

Service

 Rank 

Birthdate (YYYYMMDD)

Home of Record:

City County

Incident or Death Date (YYYYMMDD)

Remains Recovered

Archuleta José l  

ARMY

PVT

19290910

Unknown

Taos

19500811

N

 

The Battle of the Bowling Alley took place from August 12th through August 25, 1950 C.E. 

 

The Battle of the Bowling Alley took place from August 12th through August 25, 1950 C.E. UN forces engaged the NKPA near the city of Taegu, South Korea. The battle took place in a narrow valley, dubbed the "Bowling Alley," which was north of Taegu. It followed a week of fighting between the NKPA’s 13th Division and the ROKA 1st Division along the latter's last defensible line in the hills north of the city. Reinforcements, including the U.S. Army's 27th and 23rd Infantry Regiments were committed to bolster the South Koreans' defenses. This battle and several others were smaller engagements of the Battle of Pusan Perimeter.

 

For another week, NKPA divisions launched all the troops they had in massed attacks against the ROKA and U.S. lines. Their attacks, which usually occurred at night and were supported by armor and artillery, advanced with infantry and tanks in close support of one another. Each NKPA attack ran into well-established UN lines, where U.S. tanks, mines and entrenched infantry were positioned to counter them. Strikes by U.S. aircraft ravaged the attacking NKPA. The fighting was fierce with many casualties on both sides, particularly where the North and South Koreans fought one another.

 

Aftermath

 

The repeated attacks eventually broke and pushed back the NKPA forces. They continued their push against the Pusan Perimeter until they were outflanked in the Battle of Inchŏn.

 

The Battle of Battle Mountain from August 15th through September 19, 1950 C.E. 

 

The Battle of Battle Mountain was an engagement between UN and NKPA forces from August 15th through September 19, 1950 C.E., on and around the Sobuk-san mountain area in South Korea. It was one of several large engagements fought simultaneously during the Battle of Pusan Perimeter.

 

Operating in defense of Masan, the U.S. Army's 25th Infantry Division placed its 24th Infantry Regiment and 5th Infantry Regiment on Sobuk-san to defend its two peaks, P'il-bong and Hill 665, which would later be known as "Battle Mountain." What followed was a month-long struggle with the NKPA's 6th Division, in which Battle Mountain changed hands 20 times. During the deadlock, neither side was able to secure a definite victory in capturing the mountaintop.

 

Aftermath

 

The U.S. forces succeeded in their mission. The battle ended in a victory for the UN after large numbers of U.S. and ROKA troops were able to prevent a NKPA division from capturing the mountain area and from advancing beyond Battle Mountain. This helped pave the way for the NKPA eventual defeat and withdrawal from the area after the Battle of Inchŏn.

 

Xavier P. Martínez was born 1930 C.E. He was U.S. ARMY PFC with the 5th Infantry Regiment: Company B RCT and casualty of the Korean War KIA. He died in Korea on August 22, 1950 C.E. His home was in Doña Ana, New Mexico.

 

New Mexico U.S. Military Fatal Hispano Casualties of the Korean War

 

Name

Service

 Rank 

Birthdate(YYYYMMDD)

Home of Record:

City County

Incident or Death Date (YYYYMMDD)

Remains Recovered

Martínez Xavier P

ARMY

PFC

19300000

Unknown

Doña Ana

19500822

Y

 

The Battle of P'ohang-dong from August 5th-August 20, 1950 C.E.

 

At the Battle of P'ohang-dong from August 5th through August 20, 1950 C.E., on the east coast of the Korean Peninsula. It was a part of the Battle of Pusan Perimeter, and was one of several large engagements fought simultaneously. ROKA forces supported by the U.S. Navy and U.S. Air Force defended the eastern coast of the country as a part of the Pusan Perimeter. The area contained the vital supply line to the main UN force at Taegu. When several divisions of NKPA crossed through mountainous terrain to push the UN forces back, a complicated battle ensued in the rugged terrain around P'ohang-dong. The engagement was continuous for 5 days around the town of P'ohang-dong, South Korea.

 

For two weeks, NKPA and ROKA ground units fought in several bloody, back-and-forth battles. During the fight, there was the taking and retaking of the same ground, with neither side able to gain the upper hand. Finally, following the breakdown of the NKPA supply lines and amidst mounting casualties, the exhausted NKPA troops were forced to retreat.

 

Aftermath

 

The battle ended in a victory for the UN after its forces were able to drive off an attempted offensive by three NKPA divisions in the mountainous eastern coast of the country. The battle was a turning point in the war for North Korean forces, which had seen previous victories owing to superior numbers and equipment, but the distances and demands exacted on them at P'ohang-dong rendered their supply lines untenable.

 

All along the front NKPA attacks stalled as UN forces repelled these attacks. The NKPA troops reeled from these defeats the first time in the war NKPA tactics had failed.

 

Late August, finally brought some hope to the leadership of UN forces in the shape of a plan code named Operation Chromite. On August 23rd, the U.S. commanders held an amphibious assault of Inchŏn meeting at MacArthur's headquarters in Tokyo. The Battle of Inchŏn was to be an amphibious invasion involving 261 naval vessels. Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army General Joséph Lawton Collins, Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Forrest Sherman, and U.S. Air Force operations deputy Lieutenant-General Idwal H. Edward all flew from Washington, D.C., to Japan to take part in the briefing; Chief of Staff of the U.S. Air Force General Hoyt Vandenberg did not attend. The responsible U.S. Marine Corps staff to lead the amphibious assault of Inchŏn and landing was not invited to the briefing. This was to become a contentious issue.

 

General MacArthur had earlier decided to use the Joint Strategic and Operations Group (JSPOG) of his U.S. Far East Command (FECOM). The initial amphibious assault of Inchŏn plan was met with skepticism by the other generals because Inchŏn's natural and artificial defenses were formidable. The approaches to Inchŏn were two restricted passages, which could be easily blocked by naval mines. The current of the channels was also dangerously quick – three to eight knots. Finally, the anchorage was small and the harbor was surrounded by tall seawalls. U.S. Navy Commander Arlie G. Capps noted that the harbor had "every natural and geographic handicap." U.S. Navy leaders favored a landing at Kunsan, but MacArthur overruled these because he did not think they would be decisive enough for victory. MacArthur also felt that the NKPA, who also thought the conditions at the channel of Inchŏn, would make a landing impossible, would be surprised and caught off-guard by the attack.

 

During the briefing, nine members of the staff of U.S. Navy Admiral James H. Doyle spoke for nearly 90 minutes on every technical and military aspect of the landing. MacArthur told the officers that though a landing at Kunsan would bring a relatively easy linkup with the U.S. 8th Army, it "would be an attempted envelopment that would not envelop" and would place more troops in a vulnerable pocket of the Pusan Perimeter. MacArthur won over Sherman by speaking of his affection for the U.S. Navy and relating the story of how the Navy carried him out of Corregidor to safety in 1942 C.E. during World War II. Sherman agreed to support the Inchŏn operation, leaving Doyle furious.

 

The Joint Chiefs of Staff approved MacArthur's plan on August 28th. President Truman also provided his approval.

 

Pete Torres was born 1932 C.E. He was U.S. ARMY PFC and casualty of the Korean War. He died in Korea on August 31, 1950 C.E. His home was in Bernalillo, New Mexico.

 

New Mexico U.S. Military Fatal Hispano Casualties of the Korean War

Name

Service

 Rank 

Birthdate (YYYYMMDD)

Home of Record:

City County

Incident or Death Date (YYYYMMDD)

Remains Recovered

Torres Pete

ARMY

PVT

19320000

Unknown

Bernalillo

19500831

Y

 

By the end of August, General MacArthur was continuing to defend the major strongholds in South Korea and had managed to halt the advance of the NKPA troops and their allies. They had   reached their farthest point inside of South Korea. The NKPA forces had also been pushed beyond their limits. Many of the original units were at far reduced strength and effectiveness. Logistic problems wracked the NKPA, and shortages of food, weapons, equipment, and replacement soldiers proved devastating for NKPA. The NKPA force, however, retained high morale and enough supplies to allow for one more large-scale offensive. By the time, the NKPA invasion force for the offensive reached the “Pusan Perimeter,” its strength had been cut nearly in half and it was almost entirely lacking in armor.

 

For the UN forces, months of fighting had reduced the area under their control to a 5,000-square-mile rectangle in the ROK centered on the critical southeastern port of Pusan. The only bright side was that thousands of additional UN troops had arrived to reinforce the Perimeter.

 

At this juncture, there was no certainty within the UN high command that the military security situation at the Pusan Perimeter was controllable or tenable. The arrogance and hubris the UN, U.S., and ROK political and military leadership had diminished. Any reliance on the traditional Western view that the Asians, other than the Japanese, were inferior and could not fight let alone beat a White army was forever discarded. Within a very short period, the NKPA had driven the mighty UN forces almost to the end of the Peninsula. They had proven that they could fight, had fought, and would continue to fight both efficiently and effectively. It was now time for a UN gamble which would place its military back in the game. That gamble was to be Operation Chromite.

 

North Korea Naval mine clearance

 

The UN forces only became aware of the presence of mines in North Korean waters in early September 1950 C.E. This revelation raised fears that this would interfere with the proposed Inchŏn invasion. Within weeks of the outbreak of the Korean War, the USSR had shipped naval mines to North Korea for use in coastal defense, with USSR naval mine warfare experts providing technical instruction in laying and employment of the mines to North Korean personnel. Some of the mines were shipped to Inchŏn. It was now too late for the UNC to reschedule the landings. Fortunately, the North Koreans had laid relatively few and unsophisticated mines at Inchŏn.

 

Destroyers in the UN assault force visually identified moored contact mines in the channel at low tide and destroyed them with gunfire. It was believed that when the UN invasion force passed through the channel at high tide to land on the assault beaches, it would pass over any remaining mines without incident.

 

In early September of 1950 C.E., a U.S. Air Force 3rd Bombardment Group (Light) B-26 Invader conducted a rocket attack on the rail yard at Iri, South Korea, near Songhak-ri, as part of deception operations to draw NKPA attention away from the planned Inchŏn landings.

 

With men, supplies, and ships obviously concentrating at Pusan and in Japanese ports for a major amphibious operation, the Japanese press began referring to the upcoming landings as "Operation Common Knowledge." The UN Command (UNC) now feared that it would fail to achieve surprise in the Inchŏn landings. Exacerbating this fear, the leader of a North Korean-Japanese spy ring was arrested in Japan in early September 1950 C.E. In his possession was a copy of the plan for Operation Chromite, and the UN forces did not know whether he had managed to transmit the plan to North Korea before his arrest.

 

In one last bid to break the Pusan Perimeter, the NKPA threw its entire military into the Great Naktong Offensive on September 1st. It was a five-pronged simultaneous attack across the entire Pusan Perimeter. NKPA troops attacked Kyongju and surrounded Taegu and Ka-san. They also re-crossed the Naktong Bulge, threatening Yongsan. Then they continued their attack at Masan, focusing on Nam River and Haman. The attack caught UN forces by surprise and almost overwhelmed them. Despite the NKPA efforts, however, in one of the most brutal fights of the Korean War, the NKPA were unsuccessful. They simply could not hold their gains. Upon their retreat from the offensive, the NKPA was a much weaker force and now vulnerable to counterattack.

 

Inchŏn infiltration

 

Before the main land battle at Inchŏn, UN forces would land spies in Inchŏn and bombard the city's defenses via air and sea. Deception operations were also carried out to draw NKPA attention away from Inchŏn.

 

On September 1st, fourteen days before the landing at Inchŏn of September 15th, a reconnaissance team was placed in Inchŏn Harbor to obtain information on the conditions there. The team, led by U.S. Navy Lieutenant Eugene F. Clark, landed at Yonghung-do, an island in the mouth of the harbor. From there, they relayed intelligence back to the UNC. With the help of locals, Clark, gathered information about tides, beach composition, mudflats, and seawalls. A separate reconnaissance mission, codenamed Trudy Jackson, was mounted by the U.S. military. Trudy Jackson also dispatched Lieutenant Youn Joung of the ROK Navy and ROKA Army Colonel Ke In-Ju to Inchŏn to collect further intelligence on the area of Inchŏn.

 

Detailed reports were provided on NKPA artillery positions and fortifications on the island of Wŏlmi-do, at Inchŏn, and on nearby islands. The tides at Inchŏn have an average range of 29 feet and a maximum observed range of 36 feet, making the tidal range there one of the largest in the world and the littoral maximum in all of Asia. Clark observed the tides at Inchŏn for two weeks and discovered that American tidal charts were inaccurate, but Japanese charts were quite good. During the extensive periods of low tide they located and removed some North Korean naval mines, but, critically to the future success of the invasion, Clark reported that the North Koreans had not in fact systematically mined the channels.

 

When the NKPA discovered that the agents had landed on the islands near Inchŏn, they made multiple attacks, including an attempted raid on Yonghung-do with six junks. Clark mounted a machine gun on a sampan and sank the attacking junks. In response, the NKPA killed perhaps as many as 50 civilians for helping Clark.

 

Gilberto J. Padilla was born 1929 C.E. He was U.S. ARMY PFC and casualty of the Korean War. He died in Korea on September 1, 1950 C.E. His home was in Bernalillo, New Mexico.

 

New Mexico U.S. Military Fatal Hispano Casualties of the Korean War

Name

Service

 Rank 

Birthdate (YYYYMMDD)

Home of Record:

City County

Incident or Death Date (YYYYMMDD)

Remains Recovered

Padilla Gilberto J

ARMY

PFC

19290000

Unknown

Bernalillo

19500901

Y

 

Lupe R. Rodríguez Jr. was born 1931 C.E. He was U.S. ARMY Corporal with 5th Infantry Regiment: F Company RCT and a casualty of the Korean War KIA. He died in Korea on September 2, 1950 C.E. His home was in Doña Ana, New Mexico.

 

New Mexico U.S. Military Fatal Hispano Casualties of the Korean War

Name

Service

 Rank 

Birthdate (YYYYMMDD)

Home of Record:

City County

Incident or Death Date (YYYYMMDD)

Remains Recovered

Rodríguez Lupe R Jr.

ARMY

CPL

19310000

Unknown

Doña Ana

19500902

Y

 

The U.S. Navy was also active on behalf of the upcoming Inchŏn landings. U.S. Navy patrol aircraft, surface warships, and submarines were operating in the Sea of Japan (East Sea) and the Yellow Sea to detect any reaction by North Korean, USSR, or PRC military forces. On September 4, 1950 C.E., F4U Corsair fighters of Fighter Squadron 53 (VF-53) operating from the aircraft carrier U.S.S. Valley Forge (CV-45) shot down a USSR Air Force A-20 Havoc bomber after it opened fire on them over the Yellow Sea as it flew toward the UN naval task force there.

 

On the Inchŏn landings front, UN forces staged an elaborate deception operation in order to ensure surprise during the landings and to draw NKPA attention away from Inchŏn by making it appear that the landing would take place 105 miles to the south at Kunsan.

 

By September 5, 1950 C.E., aircraft of the U.S. Air Force's Far East Air Forces began attacks on roads and bridges to isolate Kunsan, typical of the kind of raids expected prior to an invasion there.

 

James Aragón Jr. was born 1929 C.E. He was U.S. Marine Corps Corporal and casualty of the Korean War. He died in Korea on September 5, 1950 C.E. His home was in Paguate, Cíbola, New Mexico.

 

New Mexico U.S. Military Fatal Hispano Casualties of the Korean War

Name

Service

 Rank 

Birthdate (YYYYMMDD)

Home of Record:

City County

Incident or Death Date (YYYYMMDD)

Remains Recovered

Aragón James Jr.       

Marine Corps

CPL

19290213

Paguate

Cíbola

19500905

Y

 

A naval bombardment of Kunsan followed on September 6th and on September 11th U.S. Air Force B-29 Superfortress bombers joined in an aerial campaign, bombing NKPA military installations in the area.

 

José P. Montoya was born 1914 C.E. He was U.S. ARMY PFC and casualty of the Korean War. He died in Korea on September 6, 1950 C.E. His home was in Colfax, New Mexico.

 

New Mexico U.S. Military Fatal Hispano Casualties of the Korean War

Name

Service

 Rank 

Birthdate (YYYYMMDD)

Home of Record:

City County

Incident or Death Date (YYYYMMDD)

Remains Recovered

Montoya José P

ARMY

PFC

19140000

Unknown

Colfax

19500906

Y

 

Cárlos Y. Morales was born 1928 C.E. He was U.S. ARMY PFC and casualty of the Korean War. He died in Korea on September 8, 1950 C.E. His home was in Doña Ana, New Mexico.

 

New Mexico U.S. Military Fatal Hispano Casualties of the Korean War

Name

Service

 Rank 

Birthdate (YYYYMMDD)

Home of Record:

City County

Incident or Death Date (YYYYMMDD)

Remains Recovered

Morales Cárlos Y

ARMY

PFC

19280000

Unknown

Doña Ana

19500908

Y

 

Five days before the Inchŏn landing, on September 10, 1950 C.E. 43 UN warplanes flew over Wŏlmi-do, dropping 93 napalm canisters. Its mission was to "burn out" its eastern slope in an attempt to clear the way for American troops.

 

By September 12, 1950 C.E., NKPA forces attempted to advance further and were completely halted. It was then that General MacArthur decided to launch an attack at Inch’ŏn. Some 150 miles behind enemy lines, MacArthur knew that the attack at Inch’ŏn would cut off all of the supply lines for the NKPA and force them to retreat even further. The hope was to relieve the pressure in the Pusan region and begin the process of forcing the NKPA out of South Korea.

 

The flotilla of UN ships that were to land and support the amphibious force during the battle was commanded by Vice Admiral Arthur D. Struble. He was an expert in amphibious warfare. Struble had participated in amphibious operations in World War II, including the Normandy landings and the Battle of Leyte. He got underway for Inchŏn in his flagship, the heavy cruiser U.S.S. Rochester (CA-124), on September 12, 1950 C.E.

 

Among his ships were the Gunfire Support Group, consisting of Rochester, the heavy cruiser U.S.S. Toledo (CA-133), the British light cruisers HMS Jamaica and HMS Kenya, and the six U.S. destroyers of Task Element 90.62, made up of U.S.S. Collett (DD-730), U.S.S. De Haven (DD-727), U.S.S. Gurke (DD-783), U.S.S. Henderson (DD-785), U.S.S. Lyman K. Swenson (DD-729), and U.S.S. Mansfield (DD-728).

 

As the landing groups neared, cruisers and destroyers from the U.S. and Canada shelled the NKPA fortifications on Wŏlmi-do and checked for mines in Flying Fish Channel. The first Canadian forces entered the Korean War when the Royal Canadian Navy destroyers HMCS Cayuga, HMCS Athabaskan, and HMCS Sioux bombarded the coast. The UN Fast Carrier Force offshore flew fighter cover, interdiction, and ground attack missions. Hundreds of Korean civilians were killed in these attacks on the lightly defended port.

 

UN forces took other measures to focus NKPA attention on Kunsan. In addition to aerial and naval bombardment, on the docks at Pusan, U.S. Marine Corps officers briefed their men on an upcoming landing at Kunsan within earshot of many Koreans. On the night of September 12th-September 13, 1950 C.E. the Royal Navy frigate HMS Whitesand Bay (F633) landed U.S. Army special operations troops and Royal Marine Commandos on the docks at Kunsan, making sure that NKPA forces noticed.

 

Before the actual invasion, UN forces also conducted a series of drills, tests, and raids elsewhere on the coast of Korea, where conditions were similar to Inchŏn. These drills were used to perfect the timing and performance of the landing craft, but also were intended to confuse the NKPA further as to the location of the invasion. The port city of Kunsan in particular was subject to a number of UN air strikes.

 

Bombardments of Wŏlmi-do and Inchŏn

 

At 07:00 on September 13th, the U.S. Navy's Destroyer Squadron Nine, headed by the destroyer U.S.S Mansfield steamed up Eastern Channel and into Inchŏn Harbor. There it fired upon NKPA gun emplacements on Wŏlmi-do. Between them, the Canadian and U.S. destroyers fired over a thousand 5-inch shells, inflicting severe damage on Wŏlmi-do's fortifications. The attacks tipped off the NKPA that a landing might be imminent, and the NKPA officer in command on Wŏlmi-do assured his superiors that he would throw their enemies back into the sea.

 

NKPA artillery returned fire, inflicting significant damage on three of the attacking warships, killing one sailor and wounding six others. The U.S.S destroyer Gurke sustained three shell hits resulting in light damage and no casualties. The U.S. Navy destroyer U.S.S. Collett (DD-730) was among the ships damaged during the Wolmi-do bombardment. She received the most damage, taking nine 75-millimeter-shell hits, which wounded five men. These American destroyers then withdrew after bombarding Wŏlmi-do for an hour. The U.S.S. Rochester, U.S.S. Toledo, HMS Jamaica, and HMS Kenya then proceeded to bombard the NKPA batteries for the next three hours from the south of the island.

 

Meanwhile, back at Inchŏn Lieutenant Clark and his ROKA squad watched from hills south of Inchŏn, plotting locations where NKPA machine guns were firing at the flotilla. They relayed this information to the invasion force via Japan in the afternoon.

 

During the night of the 13th and 14th of September, Vice Admiral Struble decided on another day of bombardment for Wŏlmi-do Island.

 

Esmeal López was born 1931 C.E. He was U.S. ARMY PFC and casualty of the Korean War. He died in Korea on September 13, 1950 C.E. His home was in Quay, New Mexico.

 

New Mexico U.S. Military Fatal Hispano Casualties of the Korean War

Name

Service

 Rank 

Birthdate (YYYYMMDD)

Home of Record:

City County

Incident or Death Date (YYYYMMDD)

Remains Recovered

López Esmeal

ARMY

PFC

19310000

Unknown

Quay

19500913

Y

 

The U.S. Navy's Destroyer Squadron Nine destroyers moved back up the channel off Wŏlmi-do Island on the 14th of September. They and the cruisers bombarded the island again that day. UN Aircraft Carrier Task Force 77 bombed and strafed the harbor at Inchŏn. It was comprised of three U.S. Navy Essex-class aircraft carriers. They were the U.S.S. Valley Forge (CV-45), the

U.S.S. Philippine Sea (CV-47), the U.S.S. Boxer (CV-21). Valley Forge and Philippine Sea each carried two squadrons of F9F "Panther" jet fighters and two of propeller-driven F4U "Corsair" fighter bombers, plus a squadron of the heavier AD "Skyraider" attack planes. The Boxer had an all-propeller air group: four squadrons of F4Us and one of ADs. Also present was one British carrier, HMS Triumph, with two squadrons of propeller-driven planes. In addition plus the American escort carriers U.S.S. Badoeng Strait (CVE-116) and U.S.S. Sicily (CVE-118), each providing a base for Marine Corps' F4Us, specialists in close-air support for ground forces. Soon, a U.S. tank landing ship entered the harbor at Inchŏn before the landings.

 

The Inchŏn Landing

 

The U.N forces had been on the defensive until September 15th. At that time, UN forces under the command of General MacArthur and led by U.S. Major-General Edward M. Almond, staged the successful amphibious landing at Inch’ŏn, near Seoul. The battle began on September 15th as a surprise amphibious assault when U.S. X Corps landing some 75,000 troops on the Korean coast.

 

It would end 4 days later on September 19, 1950 C.E., as an unqualified, resounding success for the UN and the most decisive and important UN victory of the Korean War. It ended a string of victories by the NKPA. It also partially severed the NKPA's supply lines in South Korea and resulted in a strategic reversal in favor of the UN.

 

At 00:50 on 15 September 1950 C.E., Lieutenant Clark and his ROKA squad activated the lighthouse on Palmido Island in Jung-gu. Later that morning, the ships carrying the amphibious force followed the destroyers toward Inchŏn and entered Flying Fish Channel, and the U.S. Marines of the invasion force got ready to make the first landings on Wŏlmi-do Island.

 

The NKPA had not been expecting an invasion at Inchŏn they continued to believe that the main invasion would happen at Kunsan. As a result, only a small NKPA force of the 22nd Infantry Regiment was diverted to Inchŏn before dawn on September 15, 1950 C.E. Unfortunately, for the NKPA the troops already stationed at Inchŏn had been weakened by Clark's guerrillas and napalm bombing runs had destroyed key ammunition dumps. In total, 261 ships took part.

 

On the day of the invasion, NKPA forces at Wŏlmi-do Island were outnumbered by more than six to one by the UN troops. At 06:30 on September 15, 1950 C.E., the lead elements of U.S. X Corps, and later the others, landed from tank landing ships (LSTs) at "Green Beach" on the northern side of Wŏlmi-do. The landing force consisted of the U.S. 3rd Battalion, 5th Marine Regiment, led by Lieutenant-Colonel Robert Taplett and nine M26 Pershing tanks from the U.S. Marine Corps' 1st Tank Battalion. One tank was equipped with a flamethrower and two others had bulldozer blades. The entire island was captured by noon at the cost of just 14 UN casualties. NKPA casualties included over 200 killed and 136 captured, primarily from the 918th Artillery Regiment and the 226th Independent Marine Regiment.

 

For Red Beach and Blue Beach, Vice Admiral James H. Doyle, Commander of an amphibious ready group, announced that the time of landing or H-Hour, would be 17:30.

 

The forces on Green Beach would have to wait until 19:50 for the tide to rise allowing the other waves to come ashore at "Red Beach" and "Blue Beach." During this time, extensive shelling and bombing, along with anti-tank mines placed on the only bridge, kept the small NKPA force from launching a significant counterattack.

 

The NKPA 22nd Infantry Regiment would retreat to Seoul after the main landing that evening.

 

Red Beach

 

Late on the afternoon of September 15th, the LSTs approached Red Beach and as the lead ships they came under heavy mortar and machine gun fire from NKPA defenders on Cemetery Hill. Despite the concentrated fire, they disembarked assault troops and unloaded vital support equipment. In addition, their guns wiped out NKPA batteries on the right flank of Red Beach. Three (LST 857, LST 859 and LST 973) of the eight LSTs took some hits from mortar and machine gun fire, which killed a sailor and injured a few others.

 

The Red Beach forces were made up of the Regimental Combat Team 5, which included the 3rd Battalion of the ROK Marine Corps (MC) or ROKMC. They used ladders to scale the sea walls. Lieutenant-Colonel Raymond L. Murray, serving as Commanding Officer of the U.S. 5th Marines, had the mission of seizing an area three thousand yards long and a thousand yards deep, extending from Cemetery Hill (northern) at the top down to the Inner Tidal Basin (near Tidal Basin at the bottom) and including the promontory in the middle called Observatory Hill. The 1st Battalion would be on the left, against Cemetery Hill and northern half of Observatory Hill. The 2nd Battalion would take the southern half of Observatory Hill and Inner Basin.

 

Hispanic American Lieutenant Baldomero López of the U.S. Marine Corps scaled a seawall after landing on Red Beach on September 15th. He was killed after covering a live grenade with his body. He was posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor.

 

López was born on August 23, 1925 C.E., in Tampa, Florida, and grew up in the neighborhood of Ybor City. His father, also named Baldomero López, had emigrated to the U.S. from the Astúrias region of España as a young man. The younger López attended Hillsborough High School, where he was an accomplished basketball player and a regimental commander in the school's Junior Reserve Officers' Training Corps program. He enlisted in the U.S. Navy on July 8, 1943 C.E., shortly after graduating from high school, and served until June 11th of the next year.

 

He was selected to attend the U.S. Naval Academy in the midst of World War II, and because of the ongoing war he and his classmates were placed in an accelerated three-year program. Upon graduating on June 6, 1947 C.E., he was commissioned a second lieutenant in the Marine Corps. He attended The Basic School at Quantico, Virginia, after which he became a platoon commander in the Platoon Leaders Class Training Regiment.

 

In 1948 C.E., López went to China, where he served as a mortar section commander and later as a rifle platoon commander at Tsingtao and Shanghai. On his return from China he was assigned to Camp Pendleton, California. He was serving there when, shortly after the outbreak of the Korean War, he volunteered for duty as an infantry officer in Korea. He was promoted to the rank of first lieutenant on June 16, 1950 C.E.

 

Red Beach forces had suffered eight dead and 28 wounded.

 

After neutralizing NKPA defenses at Inchŏn on the night of September 15th, UN forces opened the causeway to Wolmi-do Island, allowing the ROKMC 3rd Battalion of the U.S. 5th Marines Regiment and the tanks from Green Beach to enter the battle at Inchŏn.

 

In the aftermath of the Pusan Perimeter battle, of the 70,000 NKPA troops around Pusan, NKPA casualties from September 1st through September 15th ranged from roughly 36,000 to 41,000 killed and captured, with an unknown total number of wounded. Because UN forces had concentrated on taking Seoul rather than cutting off the NKPA's withdrawal north, the remaining 30,000 NKPA soldiers escaped to the north. They were soon reconstituted there as a cadre for the formation of new NKPA divisions hastily re-equipped by the USSR.

 

After NKPA resistance was extinguished in Inchŏn

 

Immediately after NKPA resistance was extinguished in Inchŏn, at the Beachhead the supply and reinforcement process began. Seabees and Underwater Demolition Teams that had arrived with the U.S. Marines constructed a pontoon dock on Green Beach and cleared debris from the water. The dock was then used to complete the unloading of the LSTs and clearing the beach at high tide early on September 16th.

 

That same morning, Lieutenant-Colonel Murray and Colonel Lewis Burwell "Chesty" Puller had their operational orders from General Oliver P. Smith. The U.S. 1st Marines and 5th Marines began moving along the Inchŏn-Seoul road. The U.S. 5th Marines (Red and Green Beaches forces) entered the city of Inchŏn, taking it by the afternoon.

 

That same day, realizing their blunder, sent six columns of T-34 tanks to the beachhead. The columns were without infantry support were spotted by a strike force of F4U Corsairs at the village of Kansong-ni, east of Inchŏn and two flights of F4U Corsairs from U.S. Marine Fighter Squadron 214 (VMF-214). The UN aircraft bombed the attackers and the armored columns suffered extensive damage, while the U.S. forces lost one airplane. A quick counter-attack by M26 Pershing tanks destroyed the remainder of the NKPA armored division and cleared the way for the capture of Inchŏn.

 

The 1st U.S. Marine Regiment under the command of Colonel Puller landing at Blue Beach, but was much farther south of the other two beaches and was last to reach the shore. Their mission was to take the beachhead and the road to Yongdungpo and Seoul. The 2nd Battalion would land on the left at Blue Beach One and ROKMC 3rd Battalion would land on Blue Beach Two. A little cove around the corner south of Blue Beach Two was called Blue Beach Three. As they approached the coast, the combined fire from several NKPA gun emplacements sank one LST. UN destroyer fire and bombing runs eliminated the NKPA defenses. When the Blue Beach forces finally arrived, the NKPA forces at Inchŏn had already surrendered. The U.S. 1st Marine Regiment spent much of its time strengthening the beachhead and preparing for the inland invasion.

 

Air attack on U.S.S. Rochester and HMS Kenya

 

Just before daylight at 05:50 on September 17th, two USSR-made NKPA aircraft attacked the U.S.S. Rochester while she was anchored off Wolmi-do. Initially the aircraft were thought to be friendly until they dropped four bombs over the American ship. All but one missed and the one that did hit dented Rochester's crane and failed to detonate. There were no American casualties in the skirmish. After the aircraft attacked Rochester, she and the nearby HMS Jamaica opened fire on them with antiaircraft guns. The Il-2 then strafed HMS Kenya, killing one sailor and wounding two. At about the same time, fire from Jamaica hit the Il-2 and it crashed into the water. The Yak-9 fled after losing its partner. Rochester's crew later painted a Purple Heart on her damaged crane.

 

That same day, the U.S. 5th Marines ambushed a column of 6 NKPA T-34 tanks and 200 infantry, inflicting heavy casualties on the NKPA.

 

Capture of Kimpo airfield

 

As the work of the UN forces continued on September 17th, General MacArthur made an extremely urgent request for the early capture of Kimpo airfield, the largest and most important in Korea. It was determined that when it was secured, the U.S. Fifth Air Force could bring fighters and bombers over from Japan to operate more efficiently and effectively against NKPA. As a result, the U.S. 2nd Battalion, 5th Marines were ordered to attack Kimpo airfield that night.

 

The NKPA forces there were under the command of Brigadier General Wan Yong, commander of the NKAF. He had already begun organizing their defense of the airfield. By that time, several NKPA troops had already fled across the Han River toward Seoul to escape the upcoming fight. What troops he had left were a combination of partially trained combat and service forces. The NKPA defenses and defenders were almost as bad as the morale. The NKPA realized that no help was coming from the North Korean officials at Seoul.

 

By the night of the 17th, much of Kimpo Airfield had been taken. By that next morning of the 18th, the NKPA were all gone and Kimpo airfield was securely in the hands of the U.S. Marines. Fortunately, Kimpo airfield remained in excellent shape. The NKPA had been unable to do any major demolition. In fact, several NKAF planes were still on the field.

 

The U.S. Marines were now fully in control of Kimpo Airfield and it would now become the center of UN Allies land-based air operations. Transport planes immediately began flying in gasoline and ordnance for the aircraft stationed there.

 

Narcisso Pachéco was born 1930 C.E. He was U.S. ARMY Corporal and casualty of the Korean War. He died in Korea on September 18, 1950 C.E. His home was in Eddy, New Mexico.

 

New Mexico U.S. Military Fatal Hispano Casualties of the Korean War

Name

Service

 Rank 

Birthdate (YYYYMMDD)

Home of Record:

City County

Incident or Death Date (YYYYMMDD)

Remains Recovered

Pachéco Narcisso

ARMY

CPL

19300000

Unknown

Eddy

19500918

Y

 

Battle of Seoul

 

Though warned that the process of taking Seoul would allow remaining NKPA forces in the south to escape, General MacArthur felt that he was bound to honor promises given to the South Korean government to retake the capital as soon as possible. The General then personally oversaw the U.S. 1st Marine Regiment’s fight through NKPA positions on the road to Seoul. The NKPA attempted to stall the UN offensive to allow time to reinforce Seoul and withdraw troops from the south. In contrast to the quick victory at Inchŏn, the advance on Seoul was slow and bloody. The NKPA launched another T-34 attack, which was trapped and destroyed, and a Yak bombing run in Inchŏn harbor, which did little damage.

 

Now having arrived at the battle staging areas, control of Operation Chromite was given to Major-General Almond, the U.S. X Corps commander. Almond now pressed for the capture Seoul by September 25th, exactly three months after the NKPA assault across the 38th parallel.

 

Before the battle, NKPA had just one under strength division in the City of Seoul. The majority of its forces were south of the capital. The U.S. Marines armed with an M1 rifle and an M1918 Browning Automatic Rifle would engage them in urban warfare during the battle for Seoul, on streets where Korean civilians died in the battle.

 

On the second day, vessels carrying the U.S. Army's 7th Infantry Division arrived in Inchŏn Harbor. Almond was eager to get the division into position to block a possible NKPA movement from the south of Seoul. On the morning of September 18th, the division's 2nd Battalion of the 32nd Infantry Regiment landed at Inchŏn and the remainder of the regiment went ashore later in the day.

 

In Europe, the next day of September 19, 1950 C.E. Communist Party members employed by the West German government were fired from their jobs. The Cold War was now causing removal of communists from sensitive position in the Western Bloc nations.

Back in Korea, on that same day, after having recently surprised the NKPA with the Inchŏn Landings, two UN forces were on a new offensive pushing the NKPA back. UN forces under the command of the U.S. 8th Army, advancing from the south, would meet up with forces of U.S. X Corps, advancing from the north at Osan. This offensive would eventually culminate in a complete defeat of the NKPA in the south.

 

That morning, the U.S. 2nd Battalion moved up to relieve a U.S. Marine battalion occupying positions on the right flank south of Seoul. Meanwhile, the U.S. 7th Division's 31st Regiment came ashore at Inchŏn. Responsibility for the zone south of Seoul highway was then passed to U.S. 7th Division at 18:00. The 7th Infantry Division then engaged in heavy fighting with NKPA soldiers on the outskirts of Seoul.

 

That same day of September 19th, U.S. engineers repaired the local railroad up to eight miles inland.  The UNC was already planning for future military actions.

 

António Sandoval was born 1930 C.E. He was U.S. ARMY PVT and casualty of the Korean War. He died in Korea on September 22, 1950 C.E. His home was in Harding, New Mexico.

 

Jesús Rivas was born 1922 C.E. He was U.S. ARMY PVT and casualty of the Korean War. He died in Korea on September 22, 1950 C.E. His home was in Hidalgo, New Mexico.

 

New Mexico U.S. Military Fatal Hispano Casualties of the Korean War

Name

Service

 Rank 

Birthdate (YYYYMMDD)

Home of Record:

City County

Incident or Death Date (YYYYMMDD)

Remains Recovered

Sandoval António

ARMY

PVT

19300000

Unknown

Harding

19500922

Y

Rivas Jesús

ARMY

PVT

19220000

Unknown

Hidalgo

19500922

Y

 

By September 22nd, the UN forces, U.S. Marines, had also been continuing the unloading of necessary supplies and reinforcements. They would finally unload 6,629 vehicles and 53,882 troops, along with 25,512 tons of supplies. That same day, the determined U.S. Marines entered Seoul to find it fortified. Casualties mounted as the forces engaged in grueling house-to-house combat to clear the city of the NKPA.  

 

Back in the U.S., on September 23, 1950 C.E. the McCarran Internal Security Act, which called for the registration of all Communist organizations, was passed by Congress over Truman's veto. The Cold War was becoming a deep freeze and communist infiltration of U.S. institutions was now greatly feared.

 

The 1950 Mckoffie Internal Security Act or Internal Security Act was passed on September 23, 1950 C.E. This was during the height of anti-Communist hysteria in the U.S. But was it hysteria? Was the Comintern not real? Were the USSR and China not engaged geopolitical undermining of legitimate governments in Eastern Europe, Asia, Southeast Asia, and the Middle East? Were not the Western Bloc nations finding communist infiltration in every one of their governments?

The act was therefore aimed at furthering a necessary conservative anti-Communist agenda. It sought to eliminate Communist influence in American politics and society through what some on the left described as coercion. The act found it necessary to place some restrictions on particular freedoms such as speech and association due to their connection to sedition and treasonist acts. The left claimed that it was an attempt to criminalize a particular ideology, Communism, and also an assault on private associations that involved no provable criminal activity.

 

The Internal Security Act made it illegal to pursue a Communist or totalitarian political agenda and required all Communist organizations to register with the U.S. Attorney General. Any organizations that failed to register could be brought before the Subversive Activities Control Board (SACB) and forced to register as Communist. Registered organizations were required to label their publications and broadcasts as originating from a Communist organization. Furthermore, members of registered organizations were denied employment in the government or in private firms with federal defense contracts and were prohibited from applying for or using passports.

The act also contained a number of provisions dealing with immigration and naturalization. Aliens who were at any time members of or affiliated with a Communist or totalitarian party were denied entry to the U.S. Those already in the U.S. could be deported without a hearing. Naturalized citizens could have their citizenship revoked if they joined a registered Communist organization within five years of becoming a citizen. Additionally, aliens who were members of newly registered Communist organizations could be denied naturalization unless they were able to prove that they had left the organization within three months of its being registered.

Finally, judicial standards for search and seizure, the use of informants, wiretapping, and other forms of surveillance were relaxed. The act also allowed the president to declare an “internal security emergency,” during which time the Attorney General was empowered to detain anyone who “probably would engage in, or conspire to engage in, acts of espionage or sabotage.” There were provisions for administrative hearings, but not court trials. In this way, Communist organizations remained formally legal, but mechanisms were institutionalized that allowed the indefinite detention of their members without any criminal act being committed and with limited judicial oversight. For some, these were necessary evils given the Cold War. The Cold War had just heated up!

 

Roberto Rocha Delgado was born 1929 C.E. He was U.S. Marine Corps PFC and casualty of the Korean War. He died in Korea on September 23, 1950 C.E. His home was in Mesilla Doña Ana, New Mexico.

 

New Mexico U.S. Military Fatal Hispano Casualties of the Korean War

Name

Service

 Rank 

Birthdate (YYYYMMDD)

Home of Record:

City County

Incident or Death Date (YYYYMMDD)

Remains Recovered

Rocha Roberto Delgado

Marine Corps

PFC

19301229

Mesilla

Doña Ana

19500923

Y

 

At the end of the summer, President Truman and General MacArthur, the commander in charge of the Asian theater, had decided on additional war aims. Now, for the Allies, the Korean War was to be an offensive one. It was to be a war to “liberate” the North from the communists. Why? It was now clear to all that the communists had every intention of taking over the entire peninsula. They were not interested in peaceful coexistence. Thus, the north had to be freed.

 

Initially, their new strategy had been a success. An amphibious assault at Inchŏn pushed the NKPA out of Seoul and back to their side of the 38th parallel. As American troops crossed the boundary and headed north toward the Yalu River, the border between North Korea and Communist China, the Chinese became concerned. They now felt it necessary to protect their country from what they called “armed aggression against Chinese territory.” Chinese leader Mao Zedong then sent troops to North Korea and warned the U.S. to keep away from the Yalu boundary unless it wanted full-scale war

 

This was something that President Truman and his advisers did not want. They were concerned that such a war would lead to Soviet aggression in Europe, the deployment of atomic weapons, and millions of senseless deaths. To General MacArthur, however, anything short of this wider war represented “appeasement,” an unacceptable surrender to the communists.

 

Rumaldo Vásquez was born 1931 C.E. He was U.S. ARMY PFC and casualty of the Korean War. He died in Korea on September 24, 1950 C.E. His home was in Luna, New Mexico.

 

New Mexico U.S. Military Fatal Hispano Casualties of the Korean War

Name

Service

 Rank 

Birthdate (YYYYMMDD)

Home of Record:

City County

Incident or Death Date (YYYYMMDD)

Remains Recovered

Vásquez Rumaldo

ARMY

PFC

19310000

Unknown

Luna

19500924

Y

 

Major-General Almond declared Seoul liberated the evening of September 25th, a claim repeated by General MacArthur the following day. At the time of Almond's declaration, however, the NKPA remained in most of the city and U.S. Marines were still engaged in house-to-house combat with them.

The next day on September 26th, the Hotel Bando (which had served as the U.S. Embassy) was cleared by Easy Company of 2nd Battalion, 1st U.S. Marine Regiment. During this fight several marines were wounded.

 

Juan A. Griego was born 1931 C.E. He was U.S. ARMY PFC and casualty of the Korean War. He died in Korea on September 27, 1950 C.E. His home was in Sandoval, New Mexico.

 

New Mexico U.S. Military Fatal Hispano Casualties of the Korean War

Name

Service

 Rank 

Birthdate (YYYYMMDD)

Home of Record:

City County

Incident or Death Date (YYYYMMDD)

Remains Recovered

Griego Juan A  

ARMY

PFC

19310000

Unknown

Sandoval

19500927

Y

 

It was not until September 28th that the last of the NKPA elements were driven out of Seoul or destroyed.

 

Pusan Perimeter breakout

 

Meanwhile, U.S. 5th Marines came ashore at Inchŏn. The last NKPA troops in South Korea still fighting were defeated when Walton H. Walker's U.S. 8th Army broke out of the Pusan Perimeter, joining the U.S. Army's X Corps in a coordinated attack on NKPA forces.

 

The end of the First Phase of the Korean War was complete. By the end of that phase of the Korean War, one hundred and eleven thousand South Koreans had died and fifty-seven thousand were missing.

 

3.0 The Second Phase of the Korean War

 

The PRC had been watching the events and waiting to see what the Americans would do next. They patiently refused to enter the Korean War before American forces under the command of General MacArthur had retaken Seoul. When they next crossed the thirty-eighth parallel on September 30th, the Chinese contemplated their next decision. Whet their assessment told them was that the UN now had other, larger intentions. Perhaps, their real target was China? This brought the PRC leadership to a decision point. They were now awake!

 

Napoléon Bonaparte the French warrior and great student of history understood China said, “China is a sleeping giant. Let her sleep, for when she wakes she will move the world.” Even in his day, China saw itself as most superior and special in every way while it saw other nations as backwards. She also had a huge population and a respect for learning and knowledge. When she was awakened, what else would that overly proud nation do after regaining its footing? The world was about to see!

 

In October 1950 C.E., the PRC was only one year old, and the Beijing regime faced daunting tasks of regime consolidation and economic reconstruction. As a result, the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) which had been established earlier in January 1946 C.E. consistently predicted that China would not enter the Korean War, even if the U.S. crossed the 38th parallel. This was to prove to be an egregious error.

 

Both Stalin and Kim Il-Sung sent messages to Mao in October of 1950 C.E. requesting the PRC’s military assistance in Korea. Stalin wanted to avoid the USSR from getting involved in the conflict and facing off directly against the U.S. Kim Il-Sung was desperate for any assistance he could obtain due to his mounting losses. As a result, this ultimately led to the PRC entering the Korean War on the side of the North Koreans.

The U.S. Government acting on the CIA’s prediction, sent additional American forces into North Korea on October 8, 1950 C.E. C.E. the PRC would prove the CIA’s analysis wrong when it sent masses of troops into Korea late in October, pushing the U.S. force back and south of the 38th parallel before the end of 1950 C.E. Why did the PRC intervene despite all the odds against Beijing?

 

By mid-October 1950 C.E., after the successful landing at Inchŏn by the U.S. X Corps and the subsequent destruction of the NKPA, the Korean War appeared to be all but over. UN forces were rapidly advancing further into North Korea with the intention of reuniting North and South Korea before the end of 1950 C.E. Unfortunately for the UN North Korea is divided through the center by the impassable Taebaek Mountains. It was this geography which separated the UN forces into two groups. The U.S. 8th Army advanced north through the western coast of the Korean Peninsula, while ROKA I Corps and the U.S. X Corps advanced north on the eastern coast.

 

Mao Zedong had been reported as saying that the PRC would enter the conflict in Korea militarily if need be. Why? Because Mao wanted to prevent foreign forces, such as the Americans, from occupying territory adjacent to the PRC’s border. These warnings should have made it clear to the UN that the Chinese intended to fight!

 

Just two weeks after MacArthur, with the support of Defense Secretary George Marshall, had decided it was time to move his troops on the offensive inside North Korea to force the NKPA past the 38th parallel and deep into North Korea, UN forces managed to capture P’yŏngyang, the capital of North Korea, on October 19th, 1950 C.E.

 

Now, believing his troops had the momentum to carry the battle forward, MacArthur expressed his intentions to carry the war into China. While MacArthur was posturing, PRC officials were busy helping fund and supply the NKPA.  ​

 

On that same day, following setbacks sustained by the NKPA and the UNC’s crossing of the 38th parallel, the awakened giant, China, entered the Korean War in support of North Korea. In addition to dispatching the PVA to Korea to fight against the UNC, the PRC also received North Korean refugees and students and provided economic aid during the war. Large formations of Chinese PVA troops secretly crossed the border into North Korea. One of the first PVA units to reach the Chosin Reservoir area was the PVA 42nd Corps, and it was tasked with stopping the eastern UN advances.

 

Nelson R. Romero was born 1929 C.E. He was U.S. ARMY PFC and casualty of the Korean War. He died in Korea on October 21, 1950 C.E. His home was in Bernalillo, New Mexico.

 

New Mexico U.S. Military Fatal Hispano Casualties of the Korean War

Name

Service

 Rank 

Birthdate (YYYYMMDD)

Home of Record:

City County

Incident or Death Date (YYYYMMDD)

Remains Recovered

Romero Nelson R

ARMY

PFC

19290000

Unknown

Bernalillo

19501021

Y

 

By October 25, 1950 C.E., having destroyed the bulk of the NKPA, the now confident UN troops continued their push deeper into North Korea. With NKPA forces in retreat, ROKA forces were approximately twenty-five miles north of the parallel. They captured Wonson the port city of Wonsan, located on the eastern side of North Korea. Thereafter, they marched toward the Yalu River with almost no resistance from the NKPA units. As the UN ROKA I Corps troops approached the Yalu River they made contact with the PVA 9th Army and halted at Funchilin Pass, south of the Chosin Reservoir.

 

Mao was also unpleasantly surprised by the U.S. Marine landing at Wonsan. In a telegraph to Commander Song Shilun of the PVA 9th Army on October 31st, he immediately called for the destruction of the ROKA Capital Division, ROKA 3rd Infantry Division, U.S. 1st Marine Division, and U.S. 7th Infantry Division.

 

Still, the UN assault forces continued north to the Yalu River having no knowledge that the Chinese PVA forces had secretly crossed the Yalu River into North Korea in late October. The major intervention by the PRC in the war was to begin in November 1950 C.E. This unexpected decision of PRC's entry into the war in early October would turn the tide of the war. The Northern units, consisting of Sino (PVA)-Korean (NKPA) troops, would send the U.N. forces retreating again.

 

With the USSR providing air support, the Sino-Korean troops engaged American forces in a surprise attack on November 1st. Sino-Korean troops under veteran commander General Peng Dehuai inflicted serious losses on the lead units of the UN advance. After being encircled by advancing Sino-Korean troops, the U.S. 8th Cavalry Regiment was forced to retreat to Ch’ongch’on River in North Korea while the Sino-Korean troops withdrew into mountain hideouts. This sudden appearance of Sino-Korean forces sent the main body of UN forces reeling back to the south bank of the Ch’ŏngch’ŏn River, this within days of attack into North Korea by UN forces.

 

That same day in Washington, the second of two assassination attempts on U.S. President Harry S. Truman occurred on November 1, 1950 C.E. It was carried out by militant Puertorriqueño pro-independence activists Oscar Collazo and Griselio Torresola while the President resided at Blair House during the renovation of the White House. Both men were stopped before gaining entry to the house. Torresola mortally wounded White House Police officer Leslie Coffelt, who killed him in return fire. Secret Service agents wounded Collazo. President Harry S. Truman was upstairs in the house and not harmed. Whether communists were involved one can only guess. Given the state of the Cold War and the stakes involved, Comintern agents may have infiltrated the Puertorriqueño pro-independence parties and in a clandestine fashion had some responsibility in the affair.

 

Meanwhile in Korea, after the landing at Wonsan, the U.S. 1st Marine Division of the U.S. X Corps engaged the defending PVA 124th Division on November 2nd. The ensuing battle caused heavy casualties among the Chinese.

 

Elias Eli Torres was born 1931 C.E. He was U.S. ARMY PFC and casualty of the Korean War. He died in Korea on November 5, 1950 C.E. His home was in Mora, New Mexico.

 

New Mexico U.S. Military Fatal Hispano Casualties of the Korean War

Name

Service

 Rank 

Birthdate (YYYYMMDD)

Home of Record:

City County

Incident or Death Date (YYYYMMDD)

Remains Recovered

Torres Elias Eli

ARMY

PFC

19310000

Unknown

Mora

19501105

N

 

On November 6th, the PVA 42nd Corps ordered a retreat back to the north with the intention of luring the UN forces into the Chosin Reservoir.

 

Under the PRC Chairman Mao's urgent orders to destroy of the ROKA Capital Division, ROKA 3rd Infantry Division, U.S. 1st Marine Division, and U.S. 7th Infantry Division, the PVA 9th Army was rushed into North Korea by November 10th.

 

The PVA 9th Corps was one of China's elite formations, composed of veterans and former POWs from the Huaihai Campaign. But it did have several deficiencies which hampered its ability during the upcoming battle. Initially, the PVA 9th Army was intended to be outfitted in Manchuria during November. This was before Mao suddenly ordered it into Korea. The outfitting did not happen. As a result, the PVA 9th Corps Army had almost no winter clothing for the harsh Korean winter. Similarly, poor logistics forced the PVA 9th Corps Army to abandon heavy artillery, while working with little food and ammunition. The food shortage forced the PVA 9th Corps Army to initially station a third of its strength away from the Chosin Reservoir in reserve. Since foraging was not an option in the sparsely populated starvation and exposure soon broke out among the PVA units. By the end of the battle, more Chinese troops would die from the cold than from combat and enemy air raids.

 

On November 14, 1950 C.E., a cold front from Siberia descended over the Chosin Reservoir, and the temperature plunged to as low as −35 °F. The weather was accompanied by frozen ground. It also created considerable danger of frostbite casualties, icy roads, weapon malfunctions, and medical supplies froze. Morphine syrettes, devices for injecting liquid through a needle were a closed flexible tube much like a typical tube of toothpaste, had to be defrosted in a medic's mouth before they could be injected. Frozen blood plasma was useless on the battlefield. The cutting off of clothing to deal with a wound caused risks of gangrene and frostbite. Batteries used for the Jeeps and radios quickly ran down and did not function properly in the cold temperature. The lubrication in the guns gelled and rendered them useless in battle. Likewise, the springs on the firing pins would not strike hard enough to fire the round, or would jam.

 

Undetected by UN Intelligence, the PVA 9th Army quietly entered the Chosin Reservoir area on November 17th, with the 20th Corps of the 9th Army relieving the 42nd Corps near Yudami-ni.

 

Manuel A. López was born 1922 C.E. He was U.S. ARMY Sergeant and casualty of the Korean War. He died in Korea on November 19, 1950 C.E. His home was in Doña Ana, New Mexico.

 

New Mexico U.S. Military Fatal Hispano Casualties of the Korean War

Name

Service

 Rank 

Birthdate (YYYYMMDD)

Home of Record:

City County

Incident or Death Date (YYYYMMDD)

Remains Recovered

López Manuel A

ARMY

SGT

19220000

Unknown

Doña Ana

19501119

Y

 

Faced with the sudden attacks by PVA forces in the U.S. 8th Army sector Chosin Reservoir, General MacArthur ordered the 8th to launch the Home-by-Christmas Offensive. To support the offensive, MacArthur ordered the U.S. X Corps to attack west from the Chosin Reservoir and to cut the vital Manpojin-Kanggye-Huichon supply line. As a response, Major-General Almond formulated a plan on November 21st. It called for the U.S. 1st Marine Division to advance west through Yudami-ni, while the U.S. 7th Infantry Division would provide a regimental combat team to protect the right flank at Sinhung-ni. The U.S. 3rd Infantry Division would also protect the left flank while providing security in the rear area. By then the U.S. X Corps was stretched thin along a 400-mile front.

 

The UN mission responded with MacArthur’s “Home-by-Christmas” offensive on November 24th. It was MacArthur’s hope that the offensive would force the PVA to withdrawal their army from the war and bring an end to the Korean War. In reality, the PRC’s leadership undertook their own offensive campaign called the “Second Offensive Campaign” against the advancing UN forces. The majority of the fighting occurred along the valley of the Ch’ongch’on River between the PVA 13th Army and U.S. 8th Army. While this time, the Americans were able to avoid being encircled, they still suffered heavy losses. As a result, the “Home-by-Christmas” offensive failed. Even with this U.S. forces defeat, on that same day, the U.S. 1st Marine Division occupied both Sinhung-ni on the eastern side of the Chosin Reservoir, and Yudami-ni on the west side of the reservoir.

 

By November 26, 1950 C.E., Chinese PVA forces opened a counteroffensive in the Korean War while the UN forces were in retreat southward toward the 38th parallel. This PRC action halted any thought of a quick resolution to the conflict.

 

Blas W. A. Luján was born 1930 C.E. He was U.S. ARMY Corporal and casualty of the Korean War. He died in Korea on November 26, 1950 C.E. His home was in Santa Fé, New Mexico.

 

New Mexico U.S. Military Fatal Hispano Casualties of the Korean War

Name

Service

 Rank 

Birthdate (YYYYMMDD)

Home of Record:

City County

Incident or Death Date (YYYYMMDD)

Remains Recovered

Luján Blas W A

ARMY

CPL

19300000

Unknown

Santa Fé

19501126

N

The Battle of Chosin Reservoir between November 27th and December 13th

 

Prelude - Location, terrain, and weather

 

Chosin Reservoir is a man-made lake located in the northeast of the Korean peninsula and the area around it sparsely populated. The Battle was fought over some of the roughest terrain in Korea and some of the harshest winter weather conditions. The Battle's main focus was around the 78-mile long road that connects Hungnam and Chosin Reservoir, which served as the only retreat route for the UN forces. Through these roads, Yudami-ni and Sinhung-ni, located at the west and east side of the reservoir respectively, are connected at Hagaru-ri. From there, the road passes through Kot’o-ri and eventually leads to the port of Hungnam. The road had been created by cutting through the hilly terrain of Korea, with steep climbs and drops. Dominant peaks, such as the Funchilin Pass and the Toktong Pass, overlook the entire length of the road. The road's quality was poor, and in some places it was reduced to a one lane gravel trail.

 

Forces and strategies

 

Map of the Battle of the Chosin Reservoir

 

Under the best of conditions the Battle of Chosin Reservoir would have been a difficult undertaking. Given the need for the battle commanders to be trusting and supportive of each other, anything else would be detrimental. Unfortunately, Major-General Almond of the U.S. X Corps and Major-General Oliver P. Smith of the U.S. 1st Marine Division shared a mutual loathing of each other. The dislike dated back to a meeting before the landing at Inchŏn, when Major-General Almond had spoken of how easy amphibious landings are even though he had never been involved in one.

 

Major-General Smith believed there were large numbers of PVA forces in North Korea despite the fact that higher headquarters in Tokyo said otherwise. Major-General Almond felt Smith was overly cautious. The mutual distrust between the commanders and their differing assessments of the enemy troop strength caused Smith to slow the U.S. 1st Marine Division's advance towards the Chosin Reservoir in violation of Almond's instructions. Along the way toward Chosin, the cautious Smith established supply points and airfields at Hagaru-ri and Kot’o-ri.

 

As the U.S. X Corps was pushing towards the reservoir, the PVA were formulating their battle strategy. It was based upon their experiences earlier during the Chinese Civil War. PVA planners worked from the assumption that only a light UN presence would be at the reservoir. Given this, the PVA 9th Corps would first to destroy the UN garrisons at Yudami-ni and Sinhung-ni and then push towards Hagaru-ri. The PVA planners also believed the bulk of the U.S. X Corps would then move to rescue the destroyed UN units. The 9th Army would then move to block and trap the main UN forces on the road between Hagaru-ri and Hungnam. Initially, the 9th Army committed eight divisions for the battle, with most of the forces concentrated at Yudami-ni and Sinhung-ni.

 

The lack of accurate intelligence about the UN forces left the PVA plan flawed. It is true that the U.S. X Corps was stretched thin over northeast Korea making for difficult defense. The slowness of the U.S. Marine advance, however, allowed the bulk of the U.S. 1st Marine Division, including the U.S. 5th, 7th and 11th Marines, to be concentrated at Yudami-ni where the PVA 9th Army’s eight divisions were.

 

Smith’s cautiousness and his placement of an airfield and supply dump at strategically important Hagaru-ri was about to pay off. The C-47-capable airfield was under construction and a supply dump being prepared. These sites were only being lightly defended by the U.S. 1st and 7th Marines. Only Regimental Combat Team 31 (RCT-31), an under strength and hastily formed regimental combat team of the U.S. 7th Infantry Division, was thinly spread along the eastern bank of the reservoir. Those units would later take the brunt of the Chinese assaults. None of this was a priority for the PVA forces.

 

As for the UN forces, the U.S. 1st Marine Division had an effective strength of 25,473 men at the start of the battle, and it was further reinforced by the British 41 Royal Marine Commando and the equivalent of two regiments from the U.S. 3rd and 7th Army Infantry Divisions. This gave the UN forces a combined strength of about 30,000 men during the course of the battle. There was another act up the UN’s sleeve. The UN forces at Chosin were also to be supported by one of the greatest concentrations of air power during the Korean War. The 1st U.S. Marine Aircraft Wing was stationed at Yonpo Airfield. Five aircraft carriers from the U.S. Navy's Task Force 77 were also available and capable of launching 230 sorties daily which would provide close air support during the battle. In addition, the U.S. Air Force Far East Combat Cargo Command in Japan had a capacity of airdropping 250 tons of supplies per-day to resupply the trapped UN forces.

 

The Chinese PVA’s strength for the battle was estimated at 120,000 troops. This was due to the 9th Army being composed of 12 divisions with the strength of over 10,000 men per-division. Before arriving in Korea, however, the PVA 9th Corps Army was reinforced. Each of its three corps now had four divisions instead of the usual three. Infantry from two formerly surrendered Nationalist divisions had been absorbed earlier. This brought each infantry company up to strength. Some companies had approximately 150 men, but other companies were reinforced with more than 200 men. On average, each division of the 9th Army had more infantry troops than other PVA divisions.

 

Eventually, all 12 divisions of the PVA 9th Corps Army would be deployed. Eight divisions of the PVA 20th and 27th Corps served as the main attacking force. Four divisions of the PVA 26th Corps initially were held back in reserve, and deployed after 20th and 27th Corps exhausted all their available strength.

 

Battle of Chosin Reservoir

 

The Battle of Chosin Reservoir took place about a month after the PRC entered the conflict and sent the PVA 9th Army to infiltrate the northeastern part of North Korea. It would be a decisive battle in the Korean War. Between November 27th and December 13th, 30,000 UN troops under the field command of Major-General Oliver P. Smith were encircled and attacked by about 120,000 Chinese troops under the command of Song Shilun who had been ordered by Mao to destroy the UN forces.

 

The PVA had set its battle plans in motion. The UN forces were now assessed and appropriate PVA actions and forces applied. The PVA commanders understood the ancient Chinese military strategist Sun Tzu very well. They had studied his ancient Chinese military treatise The Art of War dating roughly from 771 to 476 BC. “If your enemy is secure at all points, be prepared for him… If your opponent is temperamental, seek to irritate him… If his forces are united, separate them… Attack him where he is unprepared, appear where you are not expected.”

 

On November 27, 1950 C.E., PVA forces surprised U.S. Major-General Almond’s command at the Chosin Reservoir area. A brutal 17-day battle in freezing weather followed. The UN forces were eventually able to break out of the encirclement and to make a fighting withdrawal to the port of Hungnam, inflicting heavy casualties on the PVA. U.S. Marine units were supported in their withdrawal by the U.S. Army's RCT-31 to their east, which suffered heavy casualties and the full brunt of the PVA offensive. Following the retreat of the U.S. 8th Army from northwest Korea in the aftermath of the Battle of the Ch'ongch'on River, the evacuation of the U.S. X Corps from the port of Hungnam in northeast Korea marked the complete withdrawal of U.S. troops from North Korea.

 

The PVA’s 20th and 27th Corps of the 9th Corps Army launched multiple attacks and ambushes along the road between the Chosin Reservoir and Kot'o-ri on the night of November 27th. At Yudam-ni, the U.S. 5th, 7th and 11th Marines were surrounded and attacked by the PVA‘s 79th and 89th Divisions, while the 59th Division attacking the road between Yudam-ni and Hagaru-ri to cut off communication. Similarly, U.S. Army unit RCT-31, later to be called RCT-31, was isolated and ambushed at Sinhung-ni by the PVA 80th, 81st and 94th Divisions. At Hagaru-ri, the U.S. 1st Marine Division command headquarters was attacked by the PVA’s 58th Division. Finally, the PVA’s 60th Division surrounded elements of the U.S. 1st Marines at Kot'o-ri from the north.

 

Actions at Yudam-ni - Chosin Reservoir

 

Acting on Major-General Almond's instruction, Smith ordered the U.S. 5th Marines to attack west toward Mupyong-ni on November 27th. The attack was soon stalled by the Chinese PVA 89th Division and forced the U.S. Marines to dig in on the ridges surrounding Yudam-ni. As night came, three PVA regiments of the 79th Division attacked the ridges on the north and northwest of Yudam-ni, hoping to annihilate the garrison in one stroke. Close range fighting soon developed as the attackers infiltrated U.S. Marine positions, but the U.S. 5th and 7th Marines held the line while inflicting heavy casualties on the PVA.

 

Actions East of the reservoir

 

RCT-31, later known as "Task Force Faith," was a hastily formed regimental combat team from the U.S. 7th Infantry Division that guarded the right flank of the U.S. Marine advance towards Mupyong-ni. Before the battle, RCT-31 was spread thin, with main elements separated on the hills north of Sinhung-ni, the Pyungnyuri Inlet west of Sinhung-ni, and the town of Hudong-ni south of Sinhung-ni. This placed them in two separate positions along a 10-mile stretch down the east side of the reservoir. Although the PVA believed RCT-31 to be a reinforced regiment, the Task Force was actually under strength, with one battalion missing, due to the bulk of the U.S. 7th Infantry Division being scattered over northeast Korea.

 

On the night of November 27th, three regiments from the PVA 80th Division attacked the northern hills and the Pyungnyuri Inlet, completely surprising the UN defenders. The ensuing battle inflicted heavy casualties on the U.S. 1st Battalion, 32nd Infantry, to the north of Sinhung-ni, while the 57th Field Artillery Battalion and the U.S. 3rd Battalion, 31st Infantry, were almost overrun at the Pyungnyuri Inlet to the west of Sinhung-ni. The PVA also sent the 242nd Regiment of the 81st Division towards Hill 1221, an undefended hill that controlled the road between Sinhung-ni and Hudong-ni. As the night's fighting ended, "RCT-31" had been separated into three elements. Believing that the UN defenders had been completely destroyed at the Pyungnyuri Inlet, the PVA stopped its attacks and proceeded to loot the U.S. positions for food and clothing.

 

As morning came on November 28th, the U.S. 3rd Battalion, 31st Infantry (3/31st) Infantry counterattacked the PVA 239th Regiment at the Pyungnyuri Inlet, sending the surprised 239th back in a complete rout.

 

In the afternoon, U.S. Army Major-General Almond flew into the Sinhung-ni perimeter of U.S. Army unit RCT-31. He was convinced that it was strong enough to begin its attack north and deal with whatever "remnants" of PVA forces in their way. Almond ordered Colonel Allan D. Maclean, the commander of RCT-31, to resume the offensive north while presenting Silver Stars to three of Maclean's officers. In disgust, Lieutenant-Colonel Don C. Faith, Jr., the commander of the 1/32nd Infantry, threw his medal into the snow.

 

On the night of November 28th, the PVA 80th Division attacked again with four regiments. With devastating fire from the UN force’s M16 and M19 anti-aircraft (AA) guns attached to the 57th Field Artillery Battalion, they swept the PVA ranks at the Pyungnyuri Inlet. The Chinese assault became a disaster as their communications broke down. After the fighting, the PVA 238th and the 239th Regiment together had fewer than 600 soldiers left.

 

On the other hand, attacks by the PVA 240th Regiment had RCT-31 under siege. Almond finally instructed the U.S. 1st Marine Division to rescue RCT-31 by breaking out of Yudam-ni, an impossible order for Major-General Oliver P. Smith to implement. Only the 31st Tank Company was able to attempt to rescue of the RCT-31 by attacking Hill 1221 from Hudong-ni that day. But without infantry support, the armored attack was stalled by slippery roads, rough terrain, and close infantry assaults.

 

Actions at Yudam-ni - Chosin Reservoir

 

While the battle was underway at Yudam-ni, the PVA 59th Division blocked the road between Yudam-ni and Hagaru-ri by attacking the defending Charlie and Fox Companies of the U.S. 7th Marines. The successful assault forced Charlie Company to retreat into Yudam-ni, which left Fox Company commanded by Captain William E. Barber isolated on a hill overlooking the Toktong Pass, a vital pass that controlled the road.

 

On November 29th, several efforts by the U.S. 7th Marines failed to rescue Fox Company, despite inflicting heavy casualties on the PVA. Aided by artillery from Hagaru-ri and Marine Corsair fighters, Fox Company managed to hold out for five days while enduring constant attacks by the PVA 59th Division.

 

Actions at Sinhung-ni - Chosin Reservoir

 

On November 29th, the U.S. 1st Battalion managed to break through the PVA blockade and

Colonel Maclean ordered a retreat from the northern hills towards Sinhung-ni. After reaching the Sinhung-ni perimeter, Colonel Maclean was lost when he mistook some Chinese soldiers for Americans.

 

By the night of November 29th, the PVA finally stopped their attacks and waited for fresh reinforcements.

 

Order to break out from Yudam-ni to Hagaru-ri Chosin Reservoir

 

The U.S. 8th Army on the Korean Western Front was forced into full retreat at the Battle of the Ch'ongch'on River, and General MacArthur ordered Major-General Almond to withdraw the U.S. X Corps to the port of Hungnam. Acting on the instruction of Almond and Smith, Lieutenant-Colonel Raymond L. Murray and Colonel Homer L. Litzenberg, commanders of the U.S. 5th and 7th Marines, respectively, issued a joint order to break out from Yudam-ni to Hagaru-ri on November 30th. Faced with tough fighting between the blocking PVA divisions and the withdrawing U.S. Marines, Smith remarked, "Retreat, hell! We're not retreating we're just advancing in a different direction."

 

For the breakout, the U.S. Marines formed into a convoy with a single M4A3 Sherman tank as the lead. The plan was to have 3rd Battalion, U.S. 5th Marines (3/5) as the vanguard of the convoy, with three battalions covering the rear. At the same time, U.S. 1st Battalion, 7th Marines (1/7) would attack towards Fox Company in order to open the road at Toktong Pass. To start the breakout, U.S. 3rd Battalion, 7th Marines (3/7) had to first attack south and capture Hills 1542 and 1419 in order to cover the road from Chinese attacks. The breakout was carried out under the air cover of the U.S. 1st Marine Air Wing.

 

Raymundo Holguín was born 1930 C.E. He was U.S. ARMY PFC and casualty of the Korean War. He died in Korea on November 30, 1950 C.E. His home was in Doña Ana, New Mexico.

 

Cárlos B. Moya was born 1927 C.E. He was U.S. ARMY PFC and casualty of the Korean War. He died in Korea on November 30, 1950 C.E. His home was in Santa Fé, New Mexico.

 

Alberto S. Ramírez was born 1931 C.E. He was U.S. ARMY PFC and casualty of the Korean War. He died in Korea on November 30, 1950 C.E. His home was in Grant, New Mexico.

 

Silva Jesús Aragón was born 1930 C.E. He was U.S. ARMY Corporal and casualty of the Korean War. He died in Korea on November 30, 1950 C.E. His home was in Doña Ana, New Mexico.

 

New Mexico U.S. Military Fatal Hispano Casualties of the Korean War

Name

Service

 Rank 

Birthdate (YYYYMMDD)

Home of Record:

City County

Incident or Death Date (YYYYMMDD)

Remains Recovered

Holguín Raymundo

ARMY

PFC

19300000

Unknown

Doña Ana

19501130

N

Moya Cárlos B

ARMY

PFC

19270000

Unknown

Santa Fé

19501130

N

Ramírez Alberto S

ARMY

PFC

19310000

Unknown

Grant

19501130

N

Aragón Silva Jesús

ARMY

CPL

19300000

Unknown

Doña Ana

19501130

Y

 

Action at Hudong-ni - U.S. Forces Left Stranded

 

By November 30th, the U.S. forces evacuated Hudong-ni in order to defend Hagaru-ri, leaving the rest of RCT-31 completely stranded.

 

Action at Sinhung-ni - U.S. Forces Unable to Breakout

 

On November 30th, Major General David G. Barr, the commander of the U.S. 7th Infantry Division, flew into Sinhung-ni and met with Lieutenant-Colonel Don C. Faith, Jr., who by now had assumed command of RCT-31. Faith expressed the difficulties for a breakout, particularly the 500 wounded that RCT-31 had to bring along.

 

On the same day, parts of the Chinese PVA 94th Division and the rest of the 81st Division arrived as reinforcements for the 80th Division. By midnight, six PVA regiments renewed their attacks, and Zhan Danan, the commander of the 80th Division, ordered the complete destruction of RCT-31 before dawn. Again, the U.S. 57th Battalion's AA guns held the PVA at bay, but the shell supplies were running desperately low.

 

Actions at Hagaru-ri

 

To support the U.S. Marine attack towards Mupyong-ni, Hagaru-ri became an important supply dump with an airfield under construction. Major-General Oliver P. Smith and U.S. 1st Marine Division headquarters were also located at Hagaru-ri. With the bulk of the U.S. 1st Marine Division gathered at Yudam-ni, Hagaru-ri was lightly defended by two battalions from the U.S. 1st and 7th Marines, the rest of the garrison being composed of engineers and rear support units from both the U.S. Army and the U.S. Marine Corps.

 

The original PVA plan called for the 58th Division to attack Hagaru-ri on the night of November 27th, but the division became lost in the countryside due to the outdated Japanese maps it used. It was not until the dawn of November 28th that the 58th Division arrived at Hagaru-ri.

 

Actions at Yudam-ni - Chosin Reservoir

 

Caught by complete surprise on the night of November 27th, the UN forces at Chosin Reservoir were cut off at Yudam-ni, Sinhung-ni, Hagaru-ri, and Kot'o-ri by 28 November. As day broke on November 28th, the Chinese and Americans were locked in a stalemate around the Yudam-ni perimeter in the Battle of Chosin Reservoir.

 

During the Battle of Chosin Reservoir, after the heavy losses suffered by the PVA 79th Division at Yudam-ni, the PVA 9th Corps Army headquarters realized that the bulk of the U.S. 1st Marine Division was stationed at Yudam-ni, with a garrison strength that was double the initial estimate. Believing that any further assaults would be futile, Song Shilun ordered the PVA 9th Army to switch their main attacks toward Sinhung-ni and Hagaru-ri, leaving Yudam-ni alone from November 28th through the 30th.

 

Actions at Hagaru-ri

 

Meanwhile, the UN garrison at Hagaru-ri had noticed from the fighting and ambushes that had occurred the previous night that there were PVA forces around them. Lieutenant-Colonel Thomas L. Ridge, commander of U.S. 3rd Battalion, 1st Marines (3rd/1st), predicted the PVA attack would come on the night of November 28th. Almost everyone, including rear support units with little combat training, was pressed into service on the front line due to the manpower shortage, and the entire perimeter was on full alert by 21:30.

 

It was not long before the PVA 173rd Regiment attacked the western and the southern perimeter of Hagaru-ri, while the 172nd Regiment struck the hills on Hagaru-ri’s northern perimeter. Despite the preparations, the under strength UN garrison with only two battalions from the U.S. 1st and 7th Marines was overwhelmed. The PVA soon opened several gaps in the defenses and reached the rear areas. The resulting chaos, however, caused a breakdown in discipline among the PVA soldiers, who began looting food and clothing instead of exploiting the situation. The defending Americans managed to destroy the PVA forces in counterattacks, while a breakdown of communications between the PVA regiments allowed the gaps to close. When the fighting stopped, the PVA 172nd Regiment had only gained the East Hill on the northern perimeter.

 

Another Chinese PVA attack on Hagaru-ri was planned for the night of November 29th, but air raids by the U.S. Marine VMF-542 Night Fighter Squadron broke up the PVA formations before it could be carried out.

 

Given the critical manpower shortage at Hagaru-ri, on November 29th, Smith ordered Colonel Lewis "Chesty" Puller of the U.S. 1st Marine Regiment to assemble a task force to be sent north from Kot'o-ri to open the road south of Hagaru-ri. A task force was formed with 921 troops from the 41 Royal Marine Commandos, G Company of the U.S. 1st Marines, and B Company of the U.S. 31st Infantry. It was dubbed "Task Force Drysdale" after its commander, Lieutenant-Colonel Douglas B. Drysdale, who also commanded 41 Royal Marine Commandos.

 

On the afternoon of November 29th, Task Force Drysdale pushed north from Kot’o-ri, while under constant attack from the PVA 60th Division. The Task Force's harrowing experience later earned the road the nickname "Hell Fire Valley." As the PVA attacks dragged on, the Task Force became disorganized, and a destroyed truck in the convoy later split the Task Force into two segments.

 

That night, despite suffering 162 dead and missing and 159 wounded, Task Force Drysdale managed to bring in 300 badly needed infantrymen for the defense at Hagaru-ri. Although the lead segment of the PVA fought its way into the lightly defended Hagaru-ri on the night of November 29th, the rear segment was destroyed.

 

As more reinforcements arrived from Hudong-ni on November 30th, the garrisons at Yudam-ni and Hagaru-ri attempted to recapture the East Hill. All efforts failed, despite the destruction of a PVA company. When darkness settled, the PVA gathered its remaining 1,500 soldiers in a last-ditch attempt to capture Hagaru-ri. The reinforced UN defenders annihilated most of the attacking forces, with only the defenses around the East Hill giving way. On the next day of the 31st, as the PVA 58th Division tried to advance from the East Hill they were cut down.

 

Responding to Peng's concern over the troops' conditions, Mao limited the scope of the Third Phase Campaign the Third Battle of Seoul to pin down the ROKA forces along the 38th parallel while inflicting as much damage as possible. Upon noticing that the U.S. units were not interspersed between the ROKA formations, therefore unable to support the South Koreans, Mao ordered the PVA 13th Army to destroy the ROKA 1st Infantry Division, the ROKA 6th Infantry Division and the ROKA III Corps. Following Mao's instruction, Peng placed the PVA 38th, 39th, 40th and 50th Corps of the 13th Army in front of the ROKA 1st and 6th Infantry Division, while the 42nd and the 66th Corps of the 13th Army were moved into ROKA III Corps' sector. The start date of the offensive was set to December 31st in order to take advantage of the night assault under a full moon and the anticipated low alertness of the UN soldiers during the holiday. For the same reasons Ridgway had predicted that December 31st would be the likely time for the new Chinese offensive. Believing that the destruction of the ROKA forces at the 38th parallel would render the UN forces incapable of counterattacks in the future, Mao promised to pull all Chinese troops off the front line for rest and refit by the end of the campaign.

 

On December 1, 1950 C.E., President Truman created the Federal Civil Defense Administration under the Office of Emergency Management. The purpose of the FCDA, according to President Truman’s order, “shall be to promote and facilitate the civil defense of the United States in cooperation with several States.” The Cold War now called for special emergency powers for the FCDA and the President in the event of a national crisis. According to President Truman, the act established a “basic framework for preparations to minimize the effects of an attack on our civilian population, and to deal with the immediate emergency conditions which such an attack would create.” Fears of a USSR attack on Europe and the U.S. while America’s military was involved in North Korea prompted many of these types of action.

 

Action - Chosin Reservoir Hills 1542 and 1419

 

On the morning of December 1st, U.S. 3rd/7th Marines engaged the PVA 175th Regiment of the 59th Division at Hills 1542 and 1419. By the afternoon, the UN convoy passed the U.S. 3rd/7th's position at Hills 1542 and 1419. At that time, the U.S. 1st/7th Marines were trying to break the PVA blockade at Hill 1419. Despite being badly reduced by combat, hunger and frostbite, the PVA 59th Division sent in its last five platoons and refused to yield Hill 1419. The PVA defenders soon forced the U.S. Marines to dig in on the slopes between the road and the peaks. As night approached, the U.S. 1st/7th finally captured the peak at the blockade at Hill 1419 and started to march through the hills on the east side of the road. Relying on the element of surprise, they managed to destroy several PVA positions along the road.

 

Action Chosin Reservoir - at Yudam-n and Kot'o-ri

 

With Hagaru-ri still not captured, the PVA High Command scrambled the 79th Division to resume attacks on Yudam-ni, while the 89th Division rushed south towards Kot'o-ri. The PVA struck at night on December 1st and the ferocity of the fighting forced the rear U.S. covering forces to call in night fighters, fighter aircraft adapted for use at night or in other times of bad visibility, to suppress the attacks.

 

By December 1st, the PVA 58th Division after having tried to advance from the East Hill was virtually destroyed, with the remainder waiting for reinforcements from the 26th Corps of the 9th Army. Much to the frustration of General Song Shilun commander of the PLA 9th Army Group, the 26th Corps did not arrive before the U.S. Marines broke out of Yudam-ni.

 

Smith having refused to abandon his division’s equipment chose the Yudam-ni–Hagaru-ri movement at a critical stage. Hagaru-ri had become an important supply dump with an airfield. Once the two groups had united at Hagaru-ri, they could absorb ammunition and replacements by air and evacuate the worst wounded and frozen casualties. The airfield was opened to traffic on December 1st, allowing UN forces to bring in reinforcements and to evacuate the dead and wounded.

 

Action - Chosin Reservoir RCT-31 ordered to Breakout of Sinhung-ni

 

On the day of December 1st, Lieutenant-Colonel Faith finally ordered RCT-31 to breakout from Sinhung-ni and to withdraw to Hagaru-ri. The breakout began that day as soon as the weather allowed the U.S. 1st Marine Aircraft Wing to provide air cover. As the soldiers formed a convoy and tried to leave the Sinhung-ni perimeter, the PVA 241st Regiment immediately swarmed over the American forces, with three other regiments closing in. Left with no choice, the covering aircraft dropped napalm right in front of RCT-31, causing casualties among both PVA and U.S. troops. The resulting firestorm wiped out the blocking PVA Company and allowed the convoy to advance. As the front of RCT-31 made their way forward, heavy small arms fire caused many members of the rear guard to seek shelter below the road instead of protecting the trucks. PVA fire also killed or wounded those already in the trucks as well as the drivers, who viewed the job as a form of suicide.

 

Slowly, the convoy from Sinhung-ni to Hagaru-ri approached a roadblock under Hill 1221 in the late afternoon. Several parties tried to clear Hill 1221, but after taking part of the hill, the leaderless soldiers continued out onto the frozen reservoir instead of returning to the UN Column. As Lieutenant-Colonel Faith led an assault on the roadblock under Hill 1221, he was hit by a PVA grenade and subsequently died of his wounds. It was then that the RCT-31 became Task Force Faith.

 

The convoy from Sinhung-ni managed to fight past the first roadblock, but as it reached the second at Hudong-ni, RCT-31 disintegrated under PVA attacks. Out of the original 2,500 soldiers, about 1,050 managed to reach Hagaru-ri, and only 385 survivors were deemed able-bodied. The remnants of RCT-31 were formed into a provisional army battalion for the rest of the battle.

 

Celestino Chávez was born 1931 C.E. He was U.S. ARMY CPL and casualty of the Korean War. He died in Korea on December 2, 1950 C.E. His home was in Mckinley, New Mexico.

 

Primero R. Martínez was born 1931 C.E. He was U.S. ARMY PFC and casualty of the Korean War. He died in Korea on December 2, 1950 C.E. His home was in Bernalillo, New Mexico.

 

George Torres was born 1930 C.E. He was U.S. ARMY CPL and casualty of the Korean War. He died in Korea on December 2, 1950 C.E. His home was in Luna, New Mexico.

 

New Mexico U.S. Military Fatal Hispano Casualties of the Korean War

Name

Service

 Rank 

Birthdate (YYYYMMDD)

Home of Record:

City County

Incident or Death Date (YYYYMMDD)

Remains Recovered

Chávez Celestino

ARMY

CPL

19310000

Unknown

Mckinley

19501202

N

Martínez Primero R

ARMY

PFC

19310000

Unknown

Bernalillo

19501202

N

Torres George

ARMY

CPL

19300000

Unknown

Luna

19501202

N

 

Action - Chosin Reservoir Taking of Toktong Pass and withdrawal from Yudam-ni

 

On the morning of December 2nd, Fox Company and the U.S. 1st/7th Marines made a joint attack on the Toktong. The fighting lasted well into the morning. Having secured the Toktong Pass, the road between Yudam-ni and Hagaru-ri was open. Although the road had been opened between Yudam-ni and Hagaru-ri, the UN convoy from Yudam-ni still had to fight through the numerous PAV positions on the hills overlooking the road until all the U.S. Marines managed to withdraw from Yudam-ni on their way to Hagaru-ri.

 

On that first night of the retreat from Yudam-ni, the PAV struck the UN convoy in force and inflicted heavy casualties on the U.S.3rd/5th Marines. Although strong air cover suppressed most of the PAV forces for the rest of the march, the cold weather, harassing fire, raiding parties, and roadblocks slowed the retreat to a crawl, while inflicting numerous casualties.

 

Action - Chosin Reservoir UN Convoy Reaches Hagaru-ri

 

Despite those difficulties, the UN convoy from Yudam-ni reached Hagaru-ri in an orderly fashion on the afternoon of December 3rd.

 

With the U.S. Marines at Yudam-ni having completing their withdrawal to Hagaru-ri on December 4th, the trapped UN forces could finally start their breakout towards the port of Hungnam.

On December 6th, the Communist forces retook P’yŏngyang. That same day, U.S. Marines at the Chosin Reservoir began their “attack in a different direction” as they engage in a fighting retreat to the Port of Hŭngnam.

 

Breakout

 

The breakout began on December 6th, with the U.S. 7th Marines as the advance guard of the retreating column from the Changjin (Chosin) Reservoir. The U.S. 5th Marines were detailed to bring up and protect the rear of the force. At the same time, the much-delayed PVA 26th Corps arrived at Hagaru-ri with its 76th and 77th Divisions to relieve the 58th and 60th Divisions. The U.S. 7th Marines continued their advance and pushed aside the PVA 76th Division south of Hagaru-ri. The U.S. 5th Marines protecting the rear of the force broke off and took over the Hagaru-ri perimeter and recaptured the East Hill from the PVA 76th Division.

 

That night, using the normal battle tactic of the PVA, the PVA 76th and 77th Division launched an attack on the Hagaru-ri perimeter from all directions to stop the UN force’s breakout towards the port of Hungnam. It was a last effort to stop the breakout. The U.S. 5th Marines repulsed the attacks, inflicting heavy casualties.

 

Meanwhile, the 7th U.S. had captured the high ground surrounding the road between Hagaru-ri and Kot’o-ri opening the road. This was not to last long. As soon as the U.S. Marines pulled out, the PVA 77th Division returned to the peaks. They soon began attacking the retreating UN column from the Chosin Reservoir. As chaotic fighting broke out, the retreat was slowed to a crawl. The U.S. Marine night fighters, however, returned to suppress the PVA forces. Most of the blocking PVA troops were eliminated.

 

Finally, on December 7th the remainder of the U.S. Marines Chosin Reservoir column managed to reach Kot'o-ri with little difficulty. Some of its last elements reached Kot'o-ri later that night.

 

By now, the Chinese PVA forces were suffering from logistics problems and exhaustion after their earlier victories and there were arguments against continuing the ongoing Third Phase Campaign. The PVA logistics system was based on the concept of People's War with the native population supplying the army. Korean population living near the 38th parallel had become indifferent and sometimes hostile giving little. The Chinese were now suffering from hunger and the lack of winter clothing. PVA Commander General Peng Dehuai telegraphed to Mao that the PVA needed at least three months rest, to replace its casualties, to be resupplied, and reorganized.

 

The PVA High Command’s reaction to the failure of the 26th Corps at Hagaru-ri, ordered the 26th and 27th Corps to chase down and destroy the escaping UN force. The 20th Corps was assigned to block the U.S. Marines’ escape route. But with most of the 20th Corps destroyed at Yudam-ni and Hagaru-ri, the only forces between Kot'o-ri and Hungnam were the remnants of the 58th and 60th Divisions. In desperation, General Song Shilun commander of the PLA 9th Army Group ordered these troops to dig in at Funchilin Pass. They were also ordered to blow up the vital concrete Treadway Bridge spanning the treacherous mountain gorge at Funchilin Pass. This was to be done in the hope that the terrain and other obstacles would allow the PVA’s 26th and 27th Corps to overcome the retreating UN forces. The PVA 180th Regiment that occupied Hill 1081 had blown up the original concrete bridge and two improvised replacements in succession.

 

Back in the United States, on December 8, 1950 C.E., shipments to Communist China were banned by the U.S. Why did the U.S. government ban shipments to Communist China on December 8, 1950 C.E.? During 1950 C.E. China had been earning monies through foreign exchange by trading with Hong Kong. Hong Kong was also provided restricted currency and military supplies to China. Thus, the U.S. Government imposed a total embargo on American trade and payment transactions with the PRC. In May 1951 C.E., the U.N. General Assembly would adopt a resolution recommending that every country impose an embargo on shipments of military weapons and strategic materials to areas under the control of China and the DPRK.


On that same day, General MacArthur ordered the evacuation of the U.S. X Corps in order to reinforce the U.S. 8th Army, which by then was badly depleted and retreating rapidly towards the 38th parallel. The importance to the continued retreat of the escaping UN forces from the Chosin Reservoir and other locations cannot be overstated. The PVA’s resources were of such a level that they could given adequate time rapidly reinforce and reconstitute commands.

 

According to Chinese archives, about 73 percent of Chinese infantry forces, 67 percent of Chinese artillery forces, 100 percent of Chinese armored forces and 52 percent of Chinese air forces were deployed in Korea at one point or another, alongside 600,000 civilian laborers – in total more than three million civilian and military personnel.

 

As of November 10, 1950 C.E., the PLA 9th Army entered Korea in order to reinforce Chinese forces on the east side of Taebaek Mountains. This development brought the total PVA strength to 450,000, including 380,000 combat personnel.

 

Now, there was the possibility that the PVA might blow up the vital concrete Treadway Bridge spanning the treacherous mountain gorge at Funchilin Pass a key part of the escape route. It was necessary for the U.S. 1st Battalion, 1st Marines (1/1) to attack Hill 1081 from the south. At the same time, the U.S. 7th Marines and RCT-31 attacked the Treadway Bridge from the north, only to encounter defenders who were already frozen in their foxholes. Both locations were captured on December 9th, though the dug in remnants of the 58th and 60th Divisions defenders fought to the last man.

 

The UN forces found a 29-foot gap in the concrete bridge which had to be repaired. It not repaired immediately or the retreating U.S. Marines would have to abandon all of their vehicles, and carrying out their wounded and dead under fire would be a nearly impossible task. With the path to Hungnam blocked at Funchilin Pass, eight C-119 Flying Boxcars flown by the U.S. 314th Troop Carrier Wing were used to drop portable bridge sections by parachute. The bridge, consisting of eight separate 18 ft long, 2,900 lb sections, was dropped one section at a time, using a 48 ft parachute on each section. Four of these sections, together with additional wooden extensions were successfully reassembled into a replacement bridge by Marine Corps combat engineers and the U.S. Army 58th Engineer Treadway Bridge Company on that day, enabling UN forces to proceed.

 

Though the PVA 58th and 60th Divisions had been outmaneuvered by the Funchilin Pass replacement bridge, they still tried to slow the UN advance with ambushes and raids. Fortunately for the UN forces, after weeks of non-stop fighting, the two Chinese divisions combined had only 200 soldiers left. The last UN forces left Funchilin Pass by December 11th.

 

They would still have one last engagement during the UN forces withdrawal. They were ambushed at Sudong by the pursuing PVA 89th Division. Task Force Dog of the 3rd Infantry Division repulsed it with little difficulty. The Task Force's reconnaissance platoon, artillery battalion, and G Company of the 65th Infantry were involved in several actions against the enemy in that area.

 

The UN forces finally reached the Hungnam perimeter by 21:00 on December 11th. By the time the UN forces arrived at Hungnam, following General MacArthur orders, the ROKA I Corps, the ROKA 1st Marine Regiment and the U.S. 3rd and 7th Infantry Divisions had set up defensive positions around Hungnam's port. There were some skirmishes that broke out between the defending U.S. 7th, 17th and 65th Infantry and the pursuing PVA 27th Corps. Fortunately, strong UN naval gun fire support provided by U.S. Navy Task Force 90 badly mauled PVA 9th Army Group. This left PVA forces unable to approach the Hungnam perimeter.

 

Aftermath

 

Two entire Chinese armies had been tasked with the destruction of the U.S. 1st Marine Division. They only succeeded in driving the American force from North Korean territory. During the Chosin Reservoir action, the PVA paid an enormous price. 80,000 Chinese troops were killed or wounded. The PVA Ninth Army Group was rendered combat-ineffective for months. The Battle of Chosin Reservoir became one of the most-storied episodes in U.S. Marine Corps history.

 

On that same day of December 11, 1950 C.E., at the UN, a ceasefire was proposed to China along the 38th parallel. It was offered in order to avoid any further escalation of hostility between China and the U.S.

 

By December 15, 1950 C.E., the ROKA 1st Infantry Division had retreated back to the town of Choksong on the southern bank of the Imjin River where its original defensive position at the start of the Korean War had been located. On the right flank of the ROKA 1st Infantry Division, the ROKA 6th Infantry Division was located at the north of Dongducheon along the southern bank of the Hantan River. The ROKA 1st Infantry Division planned to defend the Imjin River by placing its 11th and 12th Regiments at the west and the east side of Choksong respectively. The ROKA 6th Infantry Division was tasked with defending Route 33 at the Hantan River by placing its 7th and 19th Regiments on each side of the road. Both the ROKA 15th Regiment of the 1st Infantry Division and the ROKA 2nd Regiment of the 6th Infantry Division were placed in the rear as reserves. The ROKA had also constructed numerous bunkers, barbed wire obstacles, and minefields on both banks of the river in order to strengthen defenses and to maintain troop morale. Faced with the ROKA defense, the Chinese had prepared for well over a month for the offensive.

 

In the weeks before the operational orders for the Third Phase Campaign were issued by PVA High Command, the advance elements of the PVA 39th Corps had been conducting detailed reconnaissance on ROKA defenses. The ROKA positions were then thoroughly analyzed by PVA commanders, engineers, and artillery officers. The PVA "thrust" companies, which were composed of specially trained assault and engineer teams, were also organized to lead the attack across the Imjin and Hantan River. During the preparation, the PVA artillery units had suffered heavy losses under UN air attacks, but PVA Deputy Commander Han Xianchu still managed to bring up 100 artillery pieces for action against the ROKA fortifications.

 

Actions - Third Battle of Seoul Forces and strategies

 

By December 22, 1950 C.E., the U.S. 8th Army's front had stabilized along the 38th parallel. Just days before his death, General Walton Walker had placed the U.S. 8th Army’s I Corps, the U.S. IX Corps, and the ROKA III Corps along the 38th parallel to defend Seoul. The U.S. 8th’s I and IX Corps were to defend the Imjin and Hantan River respectively, with the ROKA III Corps guarding the areas around Chuncheon. The boundary between the U.S. 8th’s I Corps and the IX Corps was marked by Route 33. It was defended by the ROKA 1st Infantry Division on the west side and the ROKA 6th Infantry Division on the east side.

 

That day, the Chinese PVA High Command issued the operational orders that signaled the start of the Third Phase Campaign and for the Third Battle of Seoul. The PVA 39th and 50th Corps were tasked with the destruction of the ROKA 1st Infantry Division, while the 38th and the 40th Corps were tasked with the destruction of the ROKA 6th Infantry Division.

 

On December 23, 1950 C.E., PRC's Foreign Minister Zhou Enlai formally rejected the earlier proposed UN ceasefire. They also demanded that all UN forces to be withdrawn from the Korean Peninsula. Commander of the U.S. 8th Army, General Walton Walker, was killed when a civilian truck collided with his jeep in a traffic accident on that same day, on December 23, 1950 C.E. Was the USSR once again up to its old tricks?

 

Just five years earlier, on December 9, 1945 C.E. a collision occurred when a two and a half ton GMC Army truck, which had been parked facing U.S. General Patton's car, roared into life and suddenly and inexplicably careening directly into the opposite lane and violently collided with the General’s staff car. The actions of the truck driver seemed designed to intentionally injure, or kill, the General. Both the driver of the truck and his two passengers quickly vanished. No criminal charges were ever filed. No accountability was ever recorded. The official accident reports and key-witnesses went missing. It should be noted that U.S. Army Intelligence warned General Patton earlier that his life was in danger from the People's Commissariat for Internal Affairs (NKVD). USSR Marshall Stalin had ordered Patton to be assassinated.

 

Action - Chosin Reservoir Evacuation at Hungnam

 

The last UN unit left at 14:36 on December 24th, and the Port Hungnam was destroyed to deny its use to the enemy. The U.S. military evacuation movement by sea was conducted by a 193-ship armada. It was assembled at the Port and evacuated not only the UN troops, but also their heavy equipment and roughly a third of the Korean refugees.

 

About 105,000 soldiers, 98,000 civilians, 17,500 vehicles, and 350,000 tons of supplies were shipped from Hungnam to Pusan, and they would later rejoin the war effort in Korea. Commanding Major-General Smith was credited for saving the U.S. 8th’s X Corps from destruction, while the 1st Marine Division, the 41 Royal Marines Commando and RCT-31 were awarded the Presidential Unit Citation for their tenacity during the battle. Fourteen Marines, two other soldiers and one Navy pilot received the Medal of Honor, and all of the UN troops that served at Chosin were later honored with the nickname "The Chosin Few."

The PVA 27th Corps entered Hungnam on the morning of December 25th. A day later, Lieutenant-General Matthew B. Ridgway assumed command of the U.S. 8th Army.

 

Although the PVA had been weakened from their earlier battles, with nearly 40 percent of its forces rendered combat ineffective, its unexpected victories over the UN forces had convinced the Chinese leadership of the invincibility of the PVA. Immediately after the PVA 13th Army's victory over the U.S. 8th Army at the Ch'ongch'on River, the PRC's Chairman Mao Zedong started to contemplate another offensive against the UN forces on the urging of North Korean Premier Kim Il-sung. After learning of MacArthur's plans and the UN ceasefire, Mao also believed that the UN evacuation of the Korean Peninsula was imminent. Although the over-stretched Chinese logistics prevented the PVA from launching a full-scale invasion against South Korea, Mao still ordered the PVA 13th Army to launch an intrusion, dubbed the "Third Phase Campaign the Third Battle of Seoul," to hasten the UN withdrawal and to demonstrate China's desire for a total victory in Korea.

 

Because the ROKA forces had suffered nearly 45,000 casualties at the end of 1950 C.E., most of the ROKA units were composed of raw recruits with little combat training. After inspecting the front just days before the battle, General J. Lawton Collins, the U.S. Army Chief of Staff, concluded that most of the ROKA formations were only fit for outpost duties. At the same time, the U.S. 8th Army was also suffering from low morale due to its earlier defeats, and most of its soldiers were anticipating an evacuation from Korea. The U.S. 8th Army's lack of will to fight and to maintain contact with PVA forces resulted in a lack of information on PVA troop movements and intentions.

 

After inspecting the front on December 27th, Lieutenant-General Ridgway ordered the U.S. 8th's I and IX Corps to organize a new defensive line around Koyang to Uijeongbu, called the Seoul Bridgehead line, to cover the Han River crossings in case the UN forces were forced to evacuate Seoul.

 

Before the beginning of the battle, the ROKA III Corps composed of four divisions, was located to the east of the U.S. 24th Infantry Division of the U.S. 8th's IX Corps, defending the 38th parallel to the north of Gapyeong and Chuncheon. The cold winter created great difficulties for the ROKA defenders, with the heavy snow hindering construction and icy roads limiting food and ammunition supplies. NKPA guerrillas were also active in the region, and had caused serious disruption in the rear of the ROKA III Corps.

 

By December 31, 1950 C.E., with the evacuation at Hungnam during the Battle of Chosin Reservoir completed, the PVA order of battle in Korea was reduced to 18 infantry divisions, as opposed to the 30 infantry divisions present on November 16, 1950 C.E.

 

Casualties Chosin Reservoir

 

The U.S. 8th's X Corps and the ROKA I Corps reported a total of 10,495 battle casualties. These were comprised of 4,385 U.S. Marines, 3,163 U.S. Army personnel, 2,812 South Koreans attached to American formations, and 78 British Royal Marines. The U.S. 1st Marine Division also reported 7,338 non-battle casualties due to the cold weather. Despite the losses, the U.S. 8th's X Corps preserved much of its strength.

 

The PVA 9th Army officially reported 48,156 casualties during the course of the battle. This represented about one third of its total strength. Of those casualties, 19,202 were attributed to combat, while 28,954 were attributed to the harsh Korean winter and lack of food. Outside of official channels, the estimation of PVA casualties has been described as high as 60,000. The 9th Army was put out of action for three months. With the absence of 9th Army, the PVA order of battle in Korea was reduced to 18 infantry divisions.

 

For the PRC, Mao Zedong reported, “...Casualties had reached a 40,000 high. The Central [Government] expresses its deepest sorrow...”

 

By the end of December, PVA forces would re-cross the parallel in an attempt to retake Seoul. Fighting resumed when the PVA army began their Third Phase Offensive at the 38th parallel which they launched on New Year’s Eve 1950 C.E.

 

Here it should be remembered that after the PRC entered the Korean War, the conflict was in a new phase. It had done this to prevent North Korea from falling under UN control. The PVA entered Korea and launched a series of surprise attacks against the UN forces near the Sino-Korean border. Later on the Korean western front, the battles at the Ch'ongch'on River Valley and the Chosin Reservoir had compelled the UN forces to retreat southward back to the 38th parallel by December 1950 C.E. The PVA and NKPA forces then recaptured much of North Korea.

 

General MacArthur had been planning a series of withdrawals to the Pusan Perimeter under the assumption that UN forces were about to be overwhelmed in Korea. After the U.S. 8th Army and U.S. Marine Corps forces suffered disastrous defeats, the U.S. 8th Army retreated back to the Imjin River. Next, UN defensive positions were set up around the South Korean capital of Seoul. The intent was for the U.S. 8th Army to hold Seoul for as long as possible.

 

Third Battle of Seoul from December 31, 1950 C.E.-January 7, 1951 C.E.

 

Prelude

 

Seoul is the capital city of South Korea, which is roughly bisected into northern and southern halves by the Han River. Seoul is located 35 miles south of the 38th parallel. The battle was to be fought over the UN defenses at the 38th parallel, which stretches horizontally from the Imjin River mouth on the Korean west coast to the town of Chuncheon in central Korea. A road dubbed "Route 33" runs south across the 38th parallel at the Hantan River, passes through Uijeongbu and eventually arrives at Seoul. Interestingly, it is an ancient invasion route towards Seoul. Another road ran across the Imjin River, and it connects Seoul and Kaesong through the town of Munsan and Koyang. Finally, a road runs through Chuncheon and it connects to Seoul from the northeast. The harsh Korean winter, with temperatures as low as −20 °C, had frozen the Imjin and the Hantan River over most of the river crossings, eliminating a major obstacle for the attacking PVA forces.

 

The Third Battle of Seoul took place from December 31, 1950 C.E. to January 7, 1951 C.E. around the South Korean capital of Seoul. On December 31, 1950 C.E., the PVA 13th Army attacked the ROKA's 1st, 2nd, 5th, and 6th Infantry Divisions along the 38th parallel breaching UN Forces' defenses at the Imjin River, Hantan River, Gapyeong, and Chuncheon.

 

Action - The Third Battle of Seoul

 

Acting on Lieutenant-General Ridgway's prediction, the ROKA Army Headquarters ordered all units to full alert at dusk on December 31st, but many of its soldiers were either drunk from the New Year celebration or had abandoned their posts in order to escape the cold.

 

The PVA artillery units began shelling ROKA defenses at 16:30 on December 31st. The first blow fell on the ROKA 1st Infantry Division’s 12th Infantry Regiment, due to the unit's positioning as both the boundary between the ROKA 1st and 6th Infantry Divisions and the boundary between U.S. 8th’s I and the X Corps. Because the river banks on ROKA 12th Regiment's flanks were composed of high cliffs difficult for the attackers to scale, most of the 12th Regiment's strength was used to defend its center.

With intelligence on this development, the PVA 39th Corps decided that the ROKA 12th Regiment's flanks on either side of the boundary between the ROKA 1st and 6th Infantry Divisions and the boundary between U.S. 8th’s I and the X Corps would be the best main points of attack on the ROKA 12th Regiment. This battle plan it was thought would achieve maximum surprise. Following a feint attack on the ROKA 12th Regiment's center, the PVA 38th Corps’ 116th and the 117th Divisions struck both flanks of the ROKA 12th Regiment, catching it off guard. The ROKA 12th Regiment was then unable to offer much resistance. Within hours, the ROKA 12th Regiment was cut to pieces and the battery of the U.S. 9th Field Artillery Battalion was seized by the PVA.

 

Under the cover of the fleeing ROKA soldiers, the attacking PVA forces then penetrated the ROKA 15th Regiment's defenses without firing a shot. Desperate to contain the PVA breakthrough, Brigadier-General Paik Sun Yup of the ROKA 1st Infantry Division used the division's rear service personnel to form an assault battalion, but the battalion was unable to stop the PVA advance.

 

Battle

 

Action - Imjin River and the Hantan River

 

By the evening of December 31, 1950 C.E., the PVA 13th Army having launched a massive attack against ROKA forces along the 38th parallel, also attacked along the Imjin River and the Hantan River.

 

The PVA 38th, 39th, 40th and 50th Corps had almost decimated the ROKA 1st Infantry Division and the U.S. 24th Infantry Division's forces and penetrated their defenses. With the PVA 38th and the 40th Corps forces on both flanks of the ROKA 6th Infantry Division, they then began their attacks against the ROKA 6th. It did not go as the PVA commanders had planned.

 

The original plan had called for the PVA 38th and the 40th Corps to attack the ROKA 19th Regiment on the 6th Infantry Division's right flank. Fortunately for the UN forces, the bulk of the PVA forces mistakenly attacked the U.S. 19th Infantry Regiment of the U.S. 24th Infantry Division. The 24th was stationed to the east of the ROKA 19th Regiment. Poor PVA intelligence had also made the Chinese charge through several minefields, resulting in heavy casualties to the attackers. Despite these setbacks and losses, the Chinese had pushed the U.S. 19th Infantry Regiment back, exposing the right flank of the ROKA 6th Infantry Division in the process.

 

Action - Gapyeong and Chuncheon

 

The PVA operational order for the Third Phase Campaign called for the 42nd and the 66th Corps to protect the Chinese left flank by eliminating the ROKA III Corps’ ROKA 2nd Infantry Division placed on the Corps' left flank at the hills north of Gapyeong and its ROKA 5th Infantry Division defended the corps' center at Chuncheon. The PVA were also to cut the road between Chuncheon and Seoul. Following instructions, the two PVA corps quickly struck after midnight on New Year's Eve, on January 1, 1951 C.E.

 

The PVA 124th Division first penetrated the flanks of the ROKA 2nd Infantry Division at Gapyeong. They then blocked the Division's retreat route. The trapped ROKA 17th Infantry Division and 32nd Regiments and the ROKA 2nd Infantry Division were forced to retreat in disarray.

 

At the Chuncheon sector, the PVA 42nd and the 66th Corps forced the ROKA III Corps into full retreat.

 

While the PVA 66th Corps pressured the ROKA 5th Infantry Division's front, the PVA 124th Division then advanced eastward in the ROKA rear and blocked the ROKA 5th Infantry Division's retreat route as well. The maneuver by the PVA 124th Division soon left the ROKA 5th Infantry Division’s 36th Regiment surrounded. The ROKA 36th Regiment was then forced to make its escape by infiltrating the PVA lines using mountain trails. At that point, the ROKA III Corps had lost contact with its 2nd and 5th Infantry Divisions. In the meanwhile, the remainder of the ROKA III Corps was retreating to the town of Wonju.

 

By now, the ROKA 6th Infantry Division was forced into full retreat. The PVA then advanced southward in an attempt to encircle the ROKA 6th Division and managed to intercept some of its elements. Fortunately, most of the ROKA 6th Division escaped the trap by infiltrating the PVA lines using the mountain trails. In any event, PVA had given the ROKA 6th Division a routing and the ROKA 1st Infantry Division out of action.

 

As Lieutenant-General Ridgway tried to inspect the front on the morning of January 1st, he was greeted by the fleeing and weaponless remnants of the ROKA 6th Infantry Division a few miles north of Seoul. Despite Ridgway's efforts to stop the retreat, the division continued to flee south. It was not until the personal intervention of South Korean President Syngman Rhee that the division finally stopped its retreat. Only the ROKA 11th Regiment remained intact.

 

Action - Evacuation of Seoul

 

With the collapse of the UN defenses at the 38th parallel, the evacuation/retreat from Seoul began on January 1st at 09:00. By the night of January 1st, the UN defenses at the Imjin River and the Hantan River had also completely collapsed with the PVA advancing 9 miles into UN territory.

 

By midnight on January 1st, U.S. IX Corps’ 24th Infantry Division reached the Seoul Bridgehead line south of Uijeongbu. The 27th Commonwealth Brigade was then moved into the IX. Corps rear as reserves.

 

Donaciano Salazar was born 1929 C.E. He was U.S. ARMY PFC and casualty of the Korean War. He died in Korea on January 2, 1950 C.E. His home was in Mckinley, New Mexico.

 

New Mexico U.S. Military Fatal Hispano Casualties of the Korean War

Name

Service

 Rank 

Birthdate (YYYYMMDD)

Home of Record:

City County

Incident or Death Date (YYYYMMDD)

Remains Recovered

Salazar Donaciano

ARMY

PFC

19290000

Unknown

Mckinley

19510102

Y

 

At 04:00 on January 3rd, the 1st Battalion, Royal Ulster Rifles (1RUR) first made contact with the 149th Division of the PVA 50th Corps. The PVA surprised and overran the B and D Company of 1RUR, but a counterattack by Major C. A. H. B. Blake of 1RUR restored the battalion's position by the early morning. 

 

While 1RUR was under attack, PVA forces had infiltrated the 1st Battalion, Royal Northumberland Fusiliers' (1RNF) positions by exploiting the unguarded valleys between hilltops occupied by the British. The entire 1RNF soon came under sniper fire and the PVA made repeated attempts to capture the Y Company of 1RNF. To restore 1RNF's position, Major-General Thomas Brodie of the British 29th Infantry Brigade sent the W Company of 1RNF with four Churchill tanks as reinforcements. The reinforcements were met with machine gun and mortar fire. The PVA resistance immediately began crumbling under the Churchill tanks' devastating assaults. The surviving PVA troops fled while under the bombardment from 4.2 inch mortars and 25 pounder field guns.

 

Aftermath

 

After the fighting had ended, the British 29th Infantry Brigade suffered at least 16 dead, 45 wounded, and 3 missing. The PVA lost 200 dead, these found within 1RNF's position.

 

With the ROKA 1st Infantry Division in a forced withdrawal and out of action, the PVA stopped its advance. At that point, the Chinese forces lacked the ability to lay siege to the city. On the morning of January 3rd, after conferring with Major-General’s Frank W. Milburn and John B. Coulter the commanders of the U.S. I. and IX. Corps respectively, Ridgway ordered the complete evacuation of Seoul. Major-General Milburn then ordered retreat toward the Seoul Bridgehead Line of his U.S. I. Corps to begin. Following his orders, the U.S. 25th Infantry Division of I. Corps then took up position to the west of Koyang, while the British 29th Independent Infantry Brigade of I. Corps had dug in to the east.

 

PVA Commander General Peng Dehuai was surprised to hear of the UN evacuation order for Seoul. That same morning, Peng ordered the PVA 13th Army to pursue the retreating UN forces by attacking towards Seoul. The U.S. 24th and 25th Infantry Divisions and the British 29th Infantry Brigade soon bore the brunt of the Chinese attacks. As the Americans in the U.S. IX Corps' Sector were attempting to withdraw, the U.S. 24th Infantry Division was immediately attacked by the PVA 38th Corps. In the fierce fighting that followed, the U.S. 19th Infantry Regiment on the Division's left flank was involved in numerous hand-to-hand struggles with the PVA around Uijeongbu. During their attacks, the PVA soon overran E and G Companies of U.S. 19th Infantry Regiment, but American artillery and air strikes soon inflicted 700 casualties in return.

 

At 14:00 Major-General Coulter also ordered a withdrawal of his U.S. IX Corps which was at the time east of I Corps. The Anglo-Australian 27th British Commonwealth Brigade was instructed to cover the rear.

 

During their attacks against the ROKA 6th Infantry Division some PVA forces managed to trap the 3rd Battalion, Royal Australian Regiment (3RAR) of the 27th British Commonwealth Brigade at Uijeongbu. The 3rd Battalion managed escape the trap with only four wounded. The retreating U.S. IX Corps was by then under heavy PVA pressure. The 27th Commonwealth Brigade was again called upon to cover the retreat of IX Corps.

 

The British 29th Infantry Brigade of the U.S. I Corps was on the left flank of the U.S. 24th Infantry Division when ordered to defend the areas east of Koyang on the Seoul Bridgehead Line. There, it became involved in some the hardest fighting of the entire battle. This was the 29th Infantry Brigade's first action of the Korean War. The 1RUR covered the 29th Brigade's left flank, while the 1RNF was stationed on the Brigade's right flank. The 1st Battalion, Gloucestershire Regiment and the 1st Battalion, 21st Royal Thai Regiment covered the 29th Brigade's rear and provided artillery support.

 

While the British 29th Infantry Brigade and the PVA 149th Division fought at the east of Koyang, the U.S. 25th Infantry Division of the U.S. I Corps started to withdraw on the left flank of 29th Infantry Brigade. The evacuation plan called for a coordinated withdrawal between the U.S. 25th Infantry Division and the British 29th Infantry Brigade in order to prevent the PVA from infiltrating the UN rear areas. Unfortunately, heavy fighting soon made the coordination between American and British units impossible.

 

Following the U.S. 25th Infantry Division’s 27th Infantry Regiment forming the rear guard for the U.S. I Corps, the 25th Infantry Division and the British 29th Infantry Brigade were ordered to evacuate at 15:00 on January 3rd. The 25th Infantry Division and the British 29th Infantry Brigade were ordered to evacuate at 15:00 on January 3rd. The 25th Infantry Division then retreated with few difficulties. The British 29th Infantry Brigade’s withdrawal did not start until that night at 21:30.

 

The PVA’s 149th Division next infiltrated the UN rear areas via the road which was by now completely open between the American rear guards and the British units. The PVA troops soon set up an ambush against 1RUR and the Cooper Force of the 8th King's Royal Irish Hussars. Once in place, the PVA soon attacked and overran them. In the desperate hand-on-hand combat that followed, they were also able to attack the Cromwell tanks of the Cooper Force with bundle grenades and Bangalore torpedoes, setting several on fire.

Of the 1RUR troops under the command of Major J.K.H. Shaw, 100 soldiers managed to escape the trap. Major J.K.H. Shaw and Major Blake of 1RUR and Captain D. Astley-Cooper of the Cooper Force were killed in action. Another 208 British soldiers went missing in action most of these were captured by the PVA. The U.S. 27th Infantry Regiment would later request and attempt a rescue of the trapped British troops. Major-General Thomas Brodie of the British 29th Infantry Brigade ordered a stop the rescue in order to prevent more unnecessary losses.

 

On that same night of January 3rd, the U.S. 24th Infantry Division evacuated Seoul. The 27th Commonwealth Brigade did not start to cross the Han River until the morning of January 4th, and by 07:40 the entire U.S. IX Corps had left Seoul. When at 08:00 the British 29th Infantry Brigade left Seoul, the U.S. 27th Infantry Regiment became the last UN tactical unit that remained in the city. The ROK government in Seoul which had been reduced to essential personnel before the battle also left the city.

 

By that afternoon, the NKPA I Corps, the PVA 38th Corps, and the PVA 50th Corps entered Seoul. They were greeted by an empty city in flames. Most of the civilians had either fled south through the frozen Han River or evacuated to the nearby countryside. A PVA platoon reached the Seoul City Hall at about 13:00 and raised the DPRK flag of the North. After fighting several holding engagements at the outskirts of Seoul, the U.S. 27th Infantry Regiment finally crossed the Han River at 14:00.

 

Aftermath

 

Although the UN casualties were moderate during the battle, the Third Battle of Seoul was a significant success for the PVA military in Korea. With the loss of Seoul, the morale of the UN forces was at its lowest point during the war. The new commander of the U.S. 8th Army, General Matthew Ridgway, was extremely displeased with its performance. Ridgway then took immediate steps to restore morale and the fighting spirit of the UN forces in Korea.

 

In the aftermath of the Chinese attacks along the 38th parallel, Ridgway worried that the PVA would exploit the breakthrough at Chuncheon. His immediate concern was the encirclement of his entire U.S. 8th Army. His larger worry was that the UN troops lacked the ability to hold against the PVA offensive.

 

On January 5th, the PVA 42nd and 66th Corps were relieved by the NKPA II and V Corps, and the NKPA launched a separate offensive towards Wonju. PVA Commander Peng also ordered the PVA 50th Corps and the NKPA I Corps to seize Gimpo and Inchŏn while instructing all other units to rest on the northern bank of the Han River. That day, Ridgway ordered the U.S. 8th Army to withdraw from the Han River and to form a new defensive line, dubbed "Line D," at the 37th parallel between Pyeongtaek and Changhown. The Inchŏn port and the Kimpo Airfield were then demolished to deny their use to the PVA and NKPA forces.

 

Seferino C. Lucero was born 1930 C.E. He was U.S. ARMY PFC and casualty of the Korean War. He died in Korea on January 1, 1951 C.E. His home was in Santa Fé, New Mexico.

 

New Mexico U.S. Military Fatal Hispano Casualties of the Korean War

Name

Service

 Rank 

Birthdate (YYYYMMDD)

Home of Record:

City County

Incident or Death Date (YYYYMMDD)

Remains Recovered

Lucero Seferino C

ARMY

PVT

19300000

Unknown

Santa Fé

19510107

Y

 

Despite its earlier victory, the PVA had become completely exhausted after fighting nonstop since the start of the Chinese intervention. PVA Deputy Commander Han Xianchu reported to Peng that although combat casualties had been light with only 8,500 battle casualties, the poor logistics and the exhaustion had cost the "backbone" of the PVA forces during the Third Phase Campaign. Earlier, the UN’s U.S. Far East Air Forces' "Interdiction Campaign No.4," had been launched on December 15, 1950 C.E. against PVA and NKPA supply lines. It was now causing the Chinese to be unable to sustain any further offensives southward.

 

On January 7th, PVA Commander General Peng Dehuai was forced to halt the Third Phase Campaign due to troop exhaustion and to prevent a repeat of the Inchŏn landing. Believing that the UN forces in Korea were thoroughly demoralized and unable to counterattack, Mao finally permitted the PVA to rest for at least two to three months, while having Peng and other PVA commanders were planning for one last decisive battle in the spring of 1951 C.E.

 

Previous to the Communist Chinese victory at the Third Battle of Seoul, UN members had been divided on how to respond to PRC intervention in Korea. With the PVA forces having captured Seoul, the Chinese invasion of South Korea galvanized the UN's support for South Korea. The idea of the evacuation of the Peninsula was soon abandoned by the UNC. Also during this time, General MacArthur started to regain confidence with Ridgway leading the U.S. 8th Army and in UN forces' ability to hold Korea.

 

Aftermath

 

In the aftermath of the longest protracted retreat from the Ch'ongch'on River of American military forces in U.S. history, the pursuing PVA forces appeared to have lost a lot of its troop strength and was suffering from a lack adequate logistical support. With the Chinese PVA exhausted after months of nonstop fighting since the start of the Chinese intervention, it allowed the UN forces to regain the initiative in Korea. General Ridgway now began preparing a general counterattack to the Han, Seoul, and then to the 38th Parallel. First, however, he needed some idea of the PVA forces below the Han River.

 

Ridgway’s intent was to inflict as many casualties as possible on the PVA while sustaining as few as possible UN casualties. All of this to make the PVA forces hesitate if they in fact intend an immediate further advancement southward. Once that was accomplished the 8th Army could stage for the counter-attack without interference. In effect, these were the objectives for Operation Thunderbolt. On January 25, 1951 C.E., Ridgway launched his counterattack. Operation Thunderbolt was a complete surprise to the Chinese commanders. Ridgway’s U.S. 8th Army was now on the move again. With Northern PVA forces unsuccessful in their response, by the end of January 1951 C.E., U.N. forces were back on the Han River and every indication had then soon at the 38th parallel.

 

The PRC having rejected the UN ceasefire offer earlier on December 23, 1950 C.E. had damaged their international prestige which had been built upon its earlier military successes. Under the UN’s current understanding of the overall military conditions at-hand, UN members rallied toward the U.S. A UN resolution would later be passed on February 1, 1951 C.E. condemning the PRC as an aggressor in the Korean War. The bloody war would now drag on for another two years due to the PRC’s demand for all UN forces to be withdrawn from the Korean Peninsula. Later, this would make it difficult for the PRC to either join the UN or to deny U.S. support for Taiwan.

 

Bennie Sisneros was born on December 29, 1928 C.E. He was U.S. NAVY SA and casualty of the Korean War. He died in Korea on February 2, 1951 C.E. His home was in Albuquerque Bernalillo, New Mexico.

 

New Mexico U.S. Military Fatal Hispano Casualties of the Korean War

Name

Service

 Rank 

Birthdate (YYYYMMDD)

Home of Record:

City County

Incident or Death Date (YYYYMMDD)

Remains Recovered

Sisneros Bennie

Navy

SA

19281229

Albuquerque

Bernalillo

19510202

N

 

Félix Martínez was born 1931 C.E. He was U.S. ARMY Corporal and casualty of the Korean War. He died in Korea on February 5, 1951 C.E. His home was in Bernalillo, New Mexico.

 

New Mexico U.S. Military Fatal Hispano Casualties of the Korean War

Name

Service

 Rank 

Birthdate (YYYYMMDD)

Home of Record:

City County

Incident or Death Date (YYYYMMDD)

Remains Recovered

Martínez Félix

ARMY

CPL

19310000

Unknown

Bernalillo

19510205

Y

 

George E. Chávira was born 1931 C.E. He was U.S. ARMY Corporal With the 19th Infantry Regiment: Company E and a casualty of the Korean War KIA. He died in Korea on February 6, 1951 C.E. His home was in València, New Mexico.

 

New Mexico U.S. Military Fatal Hispano Casualties of the Korean War

Name

Service

 Rank 

Birthdate (YYYYMMDD)

Home of Record:

City County

Incident or Death Date (YYYYMMDD)

Remains Recovered

Chávira George E

ARMY

CPL

19310000

Unknown

València

19510206

Y

 

Manuel J. Martínez was born 1927 C.E. He was U.S. ARMY Corporal and casualty of the Korean War. He died in Korea on February 12, 1951 C.E. His home was in Cháves, New Mexico.

 

New Mexico U.S. Military Fatal Hispano Casualties of the Korean War

Name

Service

 Rank 

Birthdate (YYYYMMDD)

Home of Record:

City County

Incident or Death Date (YYYYMMDD)

Remains Recovered

Martínez Manuel J

ARMY

CPL

19270000

Unknown

Cháves

19510212

Y

 

Abie Lawrence Apodaca was born August 9, 1932 C.E. He was U.S. ARMY PFC and casualty of the Korean War. He died in Korea on February 14, 1951 C.E. His home was in Bernalillo, New Mexico.

 

New Mexico U.S. Military Fatal Hispano Casualties of the Korean War

Name

Service

 Rank 

Birthdate (YYYYMMDD)

Home of Record:

City County

Incident or Death Date (YYYYMMDD)

Remains Recovered

Apodaca Abie Lawrence  

ARMY

PFC

19320809

Unknown

Bernalillo

19510214

N

 

Note: Defense POW/MIA Accounting Agency (DPAA) Personnel Missing - Korea (PMKOR) (Reported for NEW MEXICO Accounted For):

 

Total Accounted: 1

Remains ID Date Name Rank/Rate Location Branch Date of Incident 9/3/2014

APODACA, ABIE LAWERENCE Cpl SOUTH KOREA U.S. ARMY 2/14/1951

 

Juan María Barela was born 1926 C.E. He was U.S. ARMY PFC and casualty of the Korean War. He died in Korea on February 15, 1951 C.E.  His home was in Socorro, New Mexico.

 

Alfred G. Lucero Salgado was born 1932 C.E. He was U.S. ARMY PFC and casualty of the Korean War. He died in Korea on February 15, 1951 C.E. His home was in Cháves, New Mexico.

 

New Mexico U.S. Military Fatal Hispano Casualties of the Korean War

Name

Service

 Rank 

Birthdate (YYYYMMDD)

Home of Record:

City County

Incident or Death Date (YYYYMMDD)

Remains Recovered

Barela Juan María

ARMY

PFC

19260000

Unknown

Socorro

19510215

Y

Salgado Lucero Alfred G 

ARMY

PFC

19320000

Unknown

Cháves

19510215

Y

 

In response to the PRC rejection of the earlier UN ceasefire offer, the UN had launched Operation Killer on February 18, 1951 C.E., an eight-day UN offensive to push PVA and NKPA forces north of the Han River. It would be concluded on February 28th.

 

Alfonso González was born 1925 C.E. He was U.S. ARMY PFC and casualty of the Korean War. He died in Korea on March 2, 1951 C.E. His home was in Santa Fé, New Mexico.

 

New Mexico U.S. Military Fatal Hispano Casualties of the Korean War

Name

Service

 Rank 

Birthdate (YYYYMMDD)

Home of Record:

City County

Incident or Death Date (YYYYMMDD)

Remains Recovered

González Alfonso

ARMY

PFC

19250000

Unknown

Santa Fé

19510302

Y

 

Action - 38th Parallel

 

General Ridgway’s gains of Operation Killer which had ended earlier on February 28th, and Operation Ripper which began on March 6, 1951 C.E. had been taken notice of in Washington D.C. These successful U.S. geographic advances were influencing decisions in Washington regarding which operations should be undertaken above the 38th Parallel. Washington’s politicians were also aware that there was evidence that the NKPA were in the process of building offensive preparations. Officials in the Departments of State and Defense believed that Ridgway's recent successes might have convinced the PVA and NKPA that they could not win a military victory. If this was the case, The PRC and DPRK might agree to negotiate an end to hostilities. These issues assumed new importance as a political question.

 

As Ridgway was about to open Operation Courageous, the decision centered on how and when to approach the desired Korean cease-fire. The current consensus in Washington was that the PRC and DPRK would be more inclined to agree to a cease-fire if the fighting could be ended in the vicinity of the 38th Parallel where the war had begun and under conditions which restored the pre-war borders.

 

The UNC had no immediate intention of forbidding all ground actions above the parallel. In the U.S., there was some question in the mind of Secretary of State Dean Acheson and among many members of the UN as to whether the U.S. 8th Army should make a general advance into North Korea.

 

On the advice of these officials, President Harry S. Truman planned to make a public statement suggesting the UN's willingness to end the fighting. The statement was carefully worded to avoid a threatening tone and so to encourage a favorable reply. Truman intended to deliver the appeal as soon as his statement had been approved by officials of all nations that had contributed forces to the U.N. Command. On the advice of these officials, President Harry S. Truman planned to make a public statement suggesting the UN's willingness to end the fighting. The statement was carefully worded to avoid a threatening tone and so to encourage a favorable reply. Truman intended to deliver the appeal as soon as his statement had been approved by officials of all nations that had contributed forces to the U.N. Command.

 

In addition, there was the importance that the timing of the presidential announcement of the UN's willingness to end the fighting also be tied to the fact that General Ridgway's forces were fast approaching the 38th Parallel.

 

The Fourth Battle of Seoul

 

The Fourth Battle of Seoul, or UN Operation Ripper, was a UN military operation conceived by the commander U.S. 8th Army, General Matthew Ridgway. It had been launched earlier on March 6, 1951 C.E. The operation was intended to destroy PVA and the NKPA forces around Seoul and the towns of Hongch'on, 50 miles east of Seoul, and Chuncheon, 15 miles further south. The operation was also aimed at bringing UN troops up to the 38th parallel. The UN Operation involving the U.S. I Corps and IX Corps on the west near Seoul and Hoengsong and U.S. X Corps and ROKA III Corps in the east was to reach "Line Idaho." This was an arc with its apex just south of the 38th Parallel in South Korea. Operation Ripper was to be preceded by the largest artillery bombardment of the Korean War.

 

Arturo Vigil was born 1929 C.E. He was U.S. ARMY PFC with the 19th Infantry Regiment Company K and casualty of the Korean War KIA. He died in Korea on March 10, 1951 C.E. His home was in San Miguel, New Mexico.

 

New Mexico U.S. Military Fatal Hispano Casualties of the Korean War

Name

Service

 Rank 

Birthdate (YYYYMMDD)

Home of Record:

City County

Incident or Death Date (YYYYMMDD)

Remains Recovered

Vigil Arturo

ARMY

PFC

19290000

Unknown

San Miguel

19510310

Y

 

During the Fourth Battle of Seoul, the U.S. 25th Infantry Division quickly crossed the Han and established a bridgehead. Further to the east, IX Corps reached its “first phase line” on March 11th. Three days later, the advance would proceed to the next phase line.

 

In the greater world, on March 13, 1951 C.E. the State of Israel demanded $1.5 billion in German war reparations to help pay for the post-Holocaust refugee crisis. The Reparations Agreement between Israel and the Federal Republic of Germany, or the Wiedergutmachung Agreement, was signed on September 10, 1952 C.E. It would later be entered in force on March 27, 1953 C.E. According to the Agreement, West Germany was to pay Israel for the costs of "resettling so great a number of uprooted and destitute Jewish refugees" after the war. It was also to compensate individual Jews, via the Conference on Jewish Material Claims Against Germany, for losses in Jewish livelihood and property resulting from Nazi persecution.

 

Action - UN liberation of Seoul

 

During the night of March 14th-15th, elements of the ROKA 1st Infantry Division and the U.S. 3rd Infantry Division liberated Seoul. The PVA and NKPA forces were compelled to abandon it when the UN approach to the east of the city threatened them with encirclement. Following the recapture of Seoul, the PVA and NKPA forces retreated northward, conducting skillful delaying actions that utilized the rugged, muddy terrain to maximum advantage, particularly in the mountainous U.S. X Corps sector.

 

This would mark the fourth and last time the capital changed hands since June 1950 C.E. The ROK’s capital city had been devastated by fighting. Its population was reduced to a fraction of its prewar size. During this time, conditions in all of Korea were desperate. Every city in both North and South Korea were in crisis. Koreans had frantically fled their homes in search for refugee camps, safety, shelter, and food. Chaos now existed in Seoul.

 

Even with such obstacles, Operation Ripper pressed on throughout March. In the mountainous central region, the U.S. IX and U.S. X Corps pushed forward methodically. The IX Corps found itself up against light opposition. The X Corps, however, faced staunch enemy defenses. As the U.N. troops trudged forward, they were subjected to continually descending sharp slopes or ascending steep heights in order to attack enemy positions. In some cases, these positions were located above the clouds. Despite these harsh and inhospitable conditions, UN forces had advanced north an average of 30 miles from their start lines.

 

Action - UN liberation of Seoul

 

On March 15th, Hongch'on was taken by UN forces. Three days later on March 18th, General Ridgway issued an order to have the U.S. X Corps, the ROKA III, and U.S. I Corps to reconnoiter the areas between Hwach'on Reservoir on the northern border, and on the east coast along the UN Army’s front.

 

As President Truman looked for a way to prevent a wider war with the PRC, MacArthur did much to provoke it. He would soon be sending a letter to Republican Congressman Joséph William Martin, Jr. of Massachusetts, the-minority leader in the U.S. House of Representatives on March 20, 1951 C.E. Martin shared MacArthur’s support for declaring all-out war on China–and who could be counted upon to leak the letter to the press. “There is,” MacArthur wrote, “no substitute for victory” against international communism.

 

The Joint Chiefs of Staff notified General MacArthur of the President's plan of a presidential announcement of the UN's willingness to end the fighting via a message radioed from Washington on March 20th. They informed him of the prevalent feeling in the UN that the UNC should make no major advance above the 38th Parallel before the presidential appeal was delivered and the reactions to it determined. They also asked for his recommendations on how much freedom of ground action UN forces should have in the vicinity of the parallel during the diplomatic effort to provide for their security and to allow them to maintain contact with the NKPA. MacArthur had been pressing Washington for decisions favoring a military, not a diplomatic, solution to the war.

 

March 20, 1951 C.E., on the Korean front there were genuine differences of opinion between General MacArthur and the President Truman’s administration over policy. One was MacArthur's deep-seated belief that it was not possible to separate the struggle against Communism in Europe from that going on in Asia. This was seen as the result of being stationed for too many years in the Orient, and of his perspective as a theater commander responsible only for part of the Far East.

 

Another important policy difference was MacArthur's belief that China was not, as Acheson maintained, "the USSR's largest and most important satellite," but an independent state with its own agenda that, in MacArthur's words, "for its own purposes is (just temporarily) allied with Soviet Russia." If MacArthur's thesis was accepted, then it followed that expanding the war with the PRC would not provoke a conflict with the USSR. The Joint Chiefs emphatically disagreed, although this contradicted their position that it was Europe and not Asia that was the prime concern of the USSR. Even among Republicans, there was little support for MacArthur's position.

 

Shortly before he received the Joint Chiefs' message MacArthur expressed his views in a letter to Republican Congressman Joséph William Martin, Jr. of Massachusetts, the minority leader in the U.S. House of Representatives. The congressman earlier had written MacArthur asking for comment on Martin's thesis that Nationalist Chinese forces "might be employed in the opening of a second Asiatic front to relieve the pressure on our forces in Korea." General MacArthur replied that his own view followed "the conventional pattern of meeting force with maximum counterforce", that Martin's suggestion on the use of Chiang Kai-shek's forces was in consonance with this pattern, and that there was "no substitute for victory."

 

Letter from Douglas MacArthur to Joséph W. Martin (Tokyo, 20 March 1951 C.E.)

 

General Headquarters,

Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers,

Tokyo, Japan, March 20, 1951 C.E.

 

Hon. Joséph W. Martin, Jr.,

House of Representatives, Washington, D.C.

 

Dear Congressman Martin:

 

I am most grateful for your note of the 8th forwarding me a copy of your address of February 12. The latter I have read with much interest, and find that with the passage of years you have certainly lost none of your old-time punch. My views and recommendations with respect to the situation created by Red China’s entry into war against us in Korea have been submitted to Washington in most complete detail. Generally these views are well known and clearly understood, as they follow the conventional pattern of meeting force with maximum counterforce, as we have never failed to do in the past. Your view with respect to the utilization of the Chinese forces on Formosa is in conflict with neither logic nor this tradition. It seems strangely difficult for some to realize that here in Asia is where the Communist conspirators have elected to make their play for global conquest, and that we have joined the issue thus raised on the battlefield; that here we fight Europe’s war with arms while the diplomatic there still fight it with words; that if we lose the war to communism in Asia the fall of Europe is inevitable, win it and Europe most probably would avoid war and yet preserve freedom. As you pointed out, we must win. There is no substitute for victory. With renewed thanks and expressions of most cordial regard, I am Faithfully yours,

 

Although MacArthur had been denied the decisions that in his judgment favored a military solution, he nevertheless wanted no further restrictions placed on the operations of his command. In so advising the Joint Chiefs on March 21st, he pointed out, as he had some time earlier, that under current conditions any appreciable UN effort to clear North Korea already was out of the question.

 

Action - Operation Courageous

 

Operation Courageous a U.S. Army military operation designed to trap large numbers of PVA and NKPA troops between the Han and Imjin Rivers north of Seoul, opposite the ROKA I Corps. The intent of the Operation was for U.S. I Corps, which was composed of the U.S. 25th and 3rd Infantry Divisions and the ROKA 1st Infantry Division, to advance quickly on the NKPA and PVA troops and reach the Imjin River with all possible speed.

 

Action - Maneuvering

 

As a first step in the attempt to block and attack the NKPA I Corps, General Matthew Ridgway on March 21, 1951 C.E., ordered his own U.S. I Corps to move forward to Line Cairo, which he extended southwestward across U.S. General Lincoln Milburn's zone through Uijongbu on the Han River. At points generally along this line six to ten miles to the north, General Milburn's patrols had made some contact with the NKPA I Corps west of Uijongbu and the PVA 26th Army to the east. As of that day, General Ridgway had not yet given the final green light to the airborne landing Operation Tomahawk. This resulted in General Milburn having to wait. Milburn was to occupy Line Cairo on March 22nd, a day ahead of the airborne landing at Munsan-ni. There, he was to wait for Ridgway's further order to continue north.

 

Action - UN liberation of Seoul

 

Chuncheon, a major PVA and NKPA supply hub was empty by the time UN forces finally occupied it. It was secured by March the 22nd. The capture of Chuncheon was the last major ground objective of Operation Ripper which was to end on April 4, 1951 C.E.

 

Action - 38th Parallel

 

While awaiting a response from the Joint Chiefs regarding his not wanting any further restrictions placed on the operations of his command, MacArthur informed General Ridgway of the new development on March 22nd.

 

MacArthur expected the Joint Chiefs’ response from Washington to be a new directive for ground operations, possibly one forbidding entry into North Korea in strength. In the meantime, it was his intent to allow the U.S. 8th Army to advance north of the Parallel as far as logistics could support major operations. The only restriction was Ridgway’s obtaining MacArthur's specific authorization before moving above the parallel in force.

 

Ridgway acknowledging these conditions and notified General MacArthur that he currently was developing plans for an advance that would carry U.S. 8th Army forces ten to twenty miles above the Parallel. This was to be to a general line following the upstream trace of the Yesong River as far as Sibyon-ni in the west, falling off gently southeastward to the Hwach'on Reservoir, then running east to the coast. As in past and current operations, the objective would be the destruction of enemy troops and materiel. MacArthur approved Ridgway's concept but also scheduled a visit to Korea for March 24th, when he would have an opportunity to discuss the plans in more detail.

 

Action - Operation Courageous

 

As of March 22nd, Operation Tomahawk could only take place if General Ridgway received assurances that weather conditions on March 23rd would favor a parachute drop, and that ground troops could link up with the airborne force within twenty-four hours. Operation Tomahawk was a critical part of Operation Courageous which designed to trap large numbers of Chinese PVA and NKPA forces between the Han and Imjin Rivers north of Seoul, opposite the ROKA I Corps. The intent of the Operation was for I Corps, which was composed of the U.S. 25th Division and 3rd IDs and the ROKA 1st Division, to advance quickly on the PVA and NKPA positions and reach the Imjin River with all possible speed.

The three divisions of the I Corps finally started toward Line Cairo at 08:00 on March 22nd.

 

The ROKA 1st Division, advancing astride Route 1 in the west, overcame very light resistance and had troops on the phase line by noon. The ROKA 3rd Division astride Route 3 in the center and the U.S. 25th Division on the right also met sporadic opposition but moved slowly and ended the day considerably short of the line.

 

Meanwhile, General Milburn assembled an armored task force in Seoul for a drive up Route 1 to make the initial contact with the 187th Airborne Regimental Combat Team, if and after it dropped on Munsan-ni. Building the force around the 6th Medium Tank Battalion, which was borrowed from the 24th Division of the IX Corps, he added the 2nd Battalion, 7th Infantry Regiment; all but one battery of the 58th Armored Field Artillery Battalion from the 3rd Division; and from corps troops he supplied a battery of the 999th Armored Field Artillery Battalion and Company A, 14th Engineer Combat Battalion. He also included two bridgelaying Churchill tanks from the British 29th Brigade, which had recently been attached to the I Corps. Lieutenant-Colonel John S. Growdon, commander of the 6th Medium Tank Battalion, was to lead the task force.

 

Action - Operation Courageous

 

Ridgway made the final decision on the airborne operation late in the afternoon of March 22nd during a conference at U.S. 8th Army main headquarters in Taegu. The Fifth Air Force commander assured him that the weather would be satisfactory on the next day. The new U.S. 8th Army G-3 predicted that contact with the airborne unit could be made within a day's time, as Ridgway required. He also believed that the entire I Corps could be able to advance rapidly. Given these reports, General Ridgway ordered the airborne landing to take place at 09:00 on the following day.

 

On hearing the final word on the Munsan-ni drop, General Milburn directed Task Force Growdon to pass through the ROKA 1st Division on Line Cairo early on March 23rd and proceed via Route 1 to reach the airborne troops, while his three divisions were to resume their advance with the objective of reaching line Aspen. The ROKA 1st Division, which would be following Task Force Growdon, was to relieve the 187th Airborne Regimental Combat Team upon reaching Munsan-ni, and the airborne unit then was to prepare to move south and revert to U.S. 8th Army reserve.

 

Action - Operation Tomahawk

 

Operation Tomahawk was a critical part of Operation Courageous. The Operation was finally launched on March 23, 1951 C.E. The airborne military operation was designed to drop the 187th Regimental Combat Team (RCT) with the 2nd and 4th Ranger Companies at Munsan-ni, about 19 miles north of the then current front line. They did so, parachuting from One hundred twenty C-119 and C-46 Flying Boxcar transport aircraft near Munsan-ni in the second largest airborne operation of the war. The 187th Regimental Combat Team’s 3,437 paratroopers and 12 officers and men of the 60th Indian Parachute Field Ambulance landed with suffering only 4 fatalities, 3 KIA and 1 in an accident.

 

At 10:00, the artillery was heavy dropped. In the brief interval between the drops of the 1st and 2nd Battalions, General Ridgway arrived by L-19, landing on a road between Munsan-ni and the northern drop zone. En route, he had flown over Task Force Growdon then held up at Sinwon-ni, a fact he passed to General Bowen.

 

Shortly after 10:00, Ridgway saw a single stick of paratroops jump from a plane over the lower drop zone. The replacement plane carrying the 1st Battalion commander and party had finally reached Munsan-ni, and its passengers had jumped in the correct zone not knowing that they would be the only troops in the area.

 

To the north, resistance from a few small groups of NKPA in and immediately around the drop zone was minor and sporadic. It amounted to a limited amount of fire from mortars located somewhere to the north. The 1st Battalion's misdirected drop caused overcrowding and was complicated the 3rd Battalion's assembly. The units soon sorted themselves out and secured the borders of the drop zone. The 2nd Battalion proceeded to occupy heights northeast of the drop zone against moderate but scattered opposition. The 1st Battalion, less Company B, moved into the areas to the north and northwest, clearing Munsan-ni itself in the process.

 

Action - Operation Ripper Linkup

 

Operation Ripper, also known as the Fourth Battle of Seoul, had been in progress since being launched on March 6, 1951 C.E. By March 23rd, General Ridgway had lengthened Line Benton eastward through the U.S. 1st Cavalry Division's patrol base at Ch'unch'on and as far as the 1st U.S. Marine Division's zone on the IX Corps right, where it joined the last few miles of Line Cairo.

 

General Milburn was to establish physical contact with the187th Airborne Regimental Combat Team and the 2nd and 4th Ranger Companies and assume control of the airborne force once it was on the ground. The Airborne forces were to block Route 1 in the Munsan-ni area. At the same time, Milburn was to open a general corps advance toward Line Aspen, which traced the lower bank of the Imjin River west and north of Munsan-ni, then sloped eastward across the corps zone to cut Routes 33 and 3 eight miles north of Uijongbu. Once on Aspen, Milburn was to expect General Ridgway's order to continue to Line Benton. This was the final Operation Courageous objective line, located some ten miles farther north. When reaching Line Benton the U.S. I Corps would be in place at the 38th Parallel. In the west, the final line fell off to the southwest along the Imjin.

 

Next, U.S. I. Corps was ordered to move to Line Benton by General Ridgway. General William M. Hoge was to send his western forces there to protect the U.S. I Corps’ exposed east flank. When Hoge’s forces reached Line Benton, General Ridgway extended its line southeastward virtually into the U.S. IX Corps zone. IX Corps was then across the front of the 24th Division and about halfway across the front of the ROKA 6th Division, to a juncture with Line Cairo. Meanwhile, in coordination with General Milburn's drive to lines Cairo and Aspen, General Hoge was to complete the occupation of his sector of Line Cairo.

 

Elsewhere along the UN Army’s Front, as of yet, neither General Almond's patrols nor those of the ROKA corps had moved very deeply into North Korean territory. The U.S. X Corps and I Corps, and ROKA III remained under General Ridgway's March 18th orders to reconnoiter the area between the Hwach'on Reservoir and the east coast.

 

Action - First attack

 

The 5th Regimental Combat Team prepared to launch an offensive against the PVA forces in their M4A3E8 Sherman tanks which they had painted with a tiger scheme as a psychological effort to undermine PVA morale. The UN force was to advance along the Han River area, Korea.

 

Task Force Growdon, which was completely motorized, passed through the ROKA 1st Division shortly after 07:00. There had been no PVA forces opposing the armored column as it moved ahead of the South Koreans. Within minutes, the third tank in column hit a mine while bypassing a destroyed bridge at the small Changnung River. The Task Force was held up while engineers removed a dozen other mines from the bypass. It now proceeded slowly from that point with a mine detector team leading the way. Colonel Growdon's column had moved only a mile to the village of Sinwon-ni before it encountered more mines.

 

That day, Major-General Robert H. "Shorty" Soule's forces would occupy the area of Uijongbu with some difficulty. The 3rd Division came up against unusually strong PVA positions. The first unit to enter the town was Task Force Hawkins. It had been built around the bulk of the 64th Tank Battalion and two platoons of tanks, one from each the 15th and 65th Infantry Regiments. They reached Uijongbu about 09:00 and found it undefended. The Task Force then reconnoitered on Route 33 northward for several miles before returning to the division position. The Task Force made no contact with the enemy, but mines disabled two tanks.

 

Company B went on a rescue mission to the southern drop zone area to Hill 216 which overlooked the drop zone from the northwest after the command group of the 1st Battalion came under fire there. Company B soon forced PVA troops off the hill, allowing its survivors to withdraw to the southwest, and reach the drop zone by 15:00. The rescue force and the battalion command group arrived at the regimental position to the north about two hours later. By that time Bowen's forces had secured all assigned objectives.

 

The point of Task Force Growdon’s column reached Munsan-ni at 18:30 on March 23rd. The remainder of the extended Task Force column would take several hours longer. These were made up of armored elements from the U.S. 24th Infantry Division's 6th Medium Tank Battalion and infantry elements from the U.S. 3rd Infantry Division.

 

The Task Force had encountered no PVA positions along Route 1. Their progress had been kept to an intermittent crawl due to having to lift or explode over 150 live mines. Some of had been booby-trapped, and others were dummy mines. Casualties were few, but four tanks were disabled by mines. As the last of these tanks hit a mine a mile below Munsan-ni, the explosion attracted enemy artillery fire which damaged two more.

 

When the 187th Regimental Combat Team (RCT) with the 2nd and 4th Ranger Companies linked up with Task Force Growdon the forces then advanced toward their goal, met with only weak resistance, and minefields. By the time they arrived, the PVA and NKPA had already retreated.

 

It now appeared that the 3rd Division could continue to move forward with relative ease. But Major-General Soule's forces came under heavy fire when they resumed their attack on the morning of March 24th. The PVA forces had organized strong positions in Hill 468 rising three miles northwest of Uijongbu and Hill 337 about a mile north and slightly east of town. From these positions they were in fair condition to block advance on the Route 33 axis to the north and over Route 3 leading out of Uijongbu to the northeast. On the 3rd's right, the 15th Infantry eventually managed to clear Hill 337 on the 24th, but the 65th Infantry on the left failed in an all-day attempt to force the Chinese from the Hill 468.

 

General Milburn viewed the situation at corps center as an opportunity to trap and destroy the PVA forces holding up the 3rd Division. After General Soule's forces encountered the strong PVA positions on the morning of March 24th, Milburn had ordered General Bowen commander of the 1st Battalion of the 187th to pull in his patrols and prepare the 187th Airborne Regimental Combat Team for an eastward attack on the Route 2Y axis. The objective was high ground abutting Route 33 about ten miles north of Uijongbu, just above the trace of line Aspen. From this position Bowen was to prevent the PVA forces in front of the 3rd Division from withdrawing over Route 33. The 3rd Division was to continue its northward attack in the meantime and eventually drive the PVA forces against Bowen's position.

 

The tail of Task Force Growdon finally arrived at the airborne position at 07:00 on March 24th.

General Milburn's orders to the 187th for operations on that day called only for patrolling. Having been given control of Task Force Growdon by Milburn, General Bowen built his principal patrols around Task Force Growdon's tanks and sent them to investigate ferry sites on the Imjin and to check Route 2Y, an earthen road running east from Munsan-ni, as far as the village of Sinch'ŏn, ten miles away. One patrol made contact while checking an Imjin ferry site and ford ten miles northeast of Munsan-ni. Six PVA were killed and twenty-two captured. The patrol suffered no casualties, but a tank had to be destroyed after it got bogged down at a stream crossing while approaching the lmjin. A few rounds of artillery fire meanwhile fell in the northern drop zone but caused no casualties.

 

The ROKA 1st Division had advanced steadily toward Munsan-ni without enemy contact. Early on March 24th, Task Force Boone, a division armored column stepped ahead of the ROKA 1st Division. It consisted of Company C, 64th Tank Battalion on loan to General Paik Sun-yup from the 3rd Division. It also had Paik's tank destroyer battalion which had been organized as an infantry unit, and two of his engineer platoons.

 

By day's end the remainder of the Major-General Soule's division occupied a line extending from positions athwart Route 1 about three miles below Munsan-ni northeastward to Pobwon-ni, a village on lateral Route 2Y six miles east of Munsan-ni area.

 

At 17:00 General Paik relieved General Frank S. Bowen, commander of the 1st Battalion of the 187th of responsibility for the Munsan-ni area. He then placed Task Force Boone which had reached the 187th Airborne Regimental Combat Team at midmorning, in position just above the town.

 

The lack of resistance to the wider sweep of the ROKA 1st Division's advance confirmed that the bid to block and attack the NKPA I Corps had been futile. To the east, the fact that the PVA 26th Army still had forces deployed to delay the advance of the 3rd and 25th Divisions had become equally clear. The U.S. 25th Division located on the U.S. I Corps’ right had run into a large number of minefields and small but well entrenched PVA groups employing small arms, machine gun, and mortar fire.

 

General Bowen commander of the 1st Battalion of the 187th started east at 18:00, intending to march as far as Sinch’ŏn during the night and open his attack the following morning. Company C of Task Force Growdon, was the only unit of the 6th Tank Battalion able to move at 18:00. All other companies of the battalion had too little fuel after patrolling and were to catch up with Bowen's column after being resupplied from Seoul. By now, Task Force Growdon was also short the 2nd Battalion, 7th Infantry, which had been sent back to the 3rd Division.

 

General Bowen’s force shaped around the tanks of Company C led the way toward Sinch’ŏn. After making seven miles, Bowen's column moved through a system of ridges. Landslides twice trapped the leading tanks. In the second instance, no bypass could be found. As engineers tried to open the road, rain began to fall and became steadily heavier. As the heavy rains made the poor road even worse, General Bowen ordered the tanks back to Munsan-ni.

 

At nightfall on March 24th, Assistant Commanding General Joséph F. Bradley's 2nd Infantry Division forces held positions almost due west of Uijongbu in the 3rd Division's zone at corps center.

 

Aftermath

 

At this juncture, PVA casualties counted on the field included 136 dead and 149 taken captive. Estimated losses of PVA and NKPA forces killed and wounded during the month raised the total considerably higher. Some 4,800 PVA and NKPA had been captured. Nevertheless, the results in terms of troops and supplies destroyed were considerably less than anticipated.

 

During prisoner interrogations it was concluded that the majority of the remainder of the NKPA I Corps had apparently withdrawn above the Imjin well before the airborne landing. As for the NKPA forces who had been in the area, these were from the 36th Regiment of the NKPA 19th Division and had numbered between three hundred and five hundred.

 

UN Battle casualties among the airborne troops were light, totaling 19. Jump casualties were higher at 84, but almost half of these returned to duty immediately after treatment.

 

General MacArthur’s winning of a Political Battle, But Losing the Political War.

 

Elsewhere, while his troops were battling on the ground, General MacArthur was creating a fight of his own. MacArthur had belittled the PRC's military power, noting in particular that PVA forces could not win in Korea. He also made statements that could be, and were, interpreted as threatening that the UN would decide to attack China if hostilities continued. These remarks prompted other governments to ask whether there had been a change in U.S. policy. In President Truman's judgment, MacArthur’s comments had so contradicted the tone of his own planned statement that he decided not to issue it for fear of creating more international confusion.

 

MacArthur had also issued a communique before leaving Tokyo, in which he offered to confer with his enemy counterpart on arranging a cease-fire. He specified that he was making the offer "within the area of my authority as the military commander" and that he would be in search of "any military means" for achieving the desired result. He thus kept the bid within the military sphere.

 

MacArthur's call for victory in Korea thoroughly angered the President. It was, he wrote a few days later, "not just a public disagreement over policy, but deliberate, premeditated sabotage of U.S. and UN policy." Importantly, MacArthur had not cleared his communique with Washington as the President's directive of December 1950 C.E. required for all releases touching on national policy. Truman considered MacArthur's violation of this directive as "open defiance of my orders as President and as Commander in Chief." His immediate action was to order the Joint Chiefs of Staff to send MacArthur a reminder of that December directive.

 

Included in the President’s requested reminder sent by the Joint Chiefs on March 24th were orders that MacArthur report to them for instructions should his enemy counterpart respond to his offer and "request an armistice in the field." No such response was expected, however, and since Truman had canceled his own cease-fire initiative, operations in strength above the 38th Parallel again had become a tactical question for General MacArthur and General Ridgway to answer. MacArthur, in fact, publicly revealed his answer before he really knew that the diplomatic effort to achieve a cease-fire had been canceled.

 

Late on March 24th, MacArthur returned to Tokyo following his conference with Ridgway and a visit to the Korean Front. He immediately announced that he had directed the U.S. 8th Army to cross the Parallel "if and when its security makes it tactically advisable.” More specifically than that, MacArthur had actually approved Ridgway's concept of a general advance as deep as twenty miles into North Korea. This was not simply a military act, it was political! Privately, the President had now decided that MacArthur had to go!

 

MacArthur’s Orders and the 38th Parallel

 

In Korea, during the day of March 24th, General Ridgway extended Line Cairo from its original terminus in the U.S. Marine zone. It now stretched northeastward across the remainder of the U.S. Army front to the town of Chosan-ni on the east coast. The final objective line of Operation Ripper had now become a combination of the Benton and Cairo Lines. It followed the upstream trace of the Imjin virtually to the 38th Parallel in the west, but just a few miles below the Parallel for almost all of its remaining length to the east. It then rose to an east coast anchor some eight miles above the parallel. General Ridgway's forces having achieved the adjusted line, encountered no more than the sporadic delaying action.

 

Aftermath

 

To clarify, since March 7th, the U.S. 8th Army’s forces had made impressive territorial gains. They had recaptured the ROK capital and moved between twenty-five and thirty miles north to reach the 38th Parallel. Unfortunately for the UNC, the PVA high command had been, and still was, marshalling its main forces beyond the reach of UN forces. Also obvious, was that only UN advances above the 38th parallel north would make possible an attack on the PAV’s main forces.

 

UN Forces North of the 38th Parallel

 

The following day of March 25th back in Korea, General Bowen’s remaining forces proceeded to Sinch’ŏn after the engineers had cleared the road sufficiently. Sinch'ŏn County is in South Hwanghae province, North Korea. Sinch'ŏn is bordered to the north by Anak, to the west by Samch'ŏn and T'aet'an, to the south by Pyŏksŏng and Sinwŏn, and to the east by Chaeryŏng.

 

They arrived there at about 06:00. A half-hour later, Bowen ordered the 2nd Battalion, with the 3rd Battalion following in support, to seize Hill 228 rising on the west side of Route 33. The units soon ran into small arms, machine gun, and mortar fire from positions on several nearer hills. They were also being hampered by a continuing driving rain. By day's end, the two battalions were some two miles short of Hill 228. Route 33 remained available to the PVA forces in front of the 3rd Division if they chose to withdraw over it. Withdrawal seemed to be the PVA intention.

 

The next day on March 26th, the U.S. 3rd Division resumed its attack from the south and advanced two miles beyond the hills where strong PVA positions had delayed it the day before. There, it met only light resistance. Meanwhile, the tank company of the 65th Infantry moved ahead on Route 3X, a secondary road angling northwest off Route 33 to Sinch’ŏn. As they did, mines along the road disabled four tanks and kept the company from reaching its destination. Fortunately, it encountered no enemy positions. All of this was in an attempt to contact the 187th Airborne RCT.

 

That same day, the withdrawal of the PVA delaying forces was confirmed when the 3rd Division as well the 25th Division could move forward against little or no opposition. To the north, however, the PVA continued to oppose the efforts of the 187th Airborne RCT to capture Hill 228. During the afternoon of March 26th, two tank columns from the U.S. 3rd Division joined Bowen's forces using Route 33 and a lesser road to the west. Late that day, it became obvious that the PVA were backing away from the 3rd and 25th Divisions.

 

Next, General Ridgway ordered his U.S. I. Corps and IX. Corps to Line Benton. It was originally conceived by the General, that the advance by the U.S. IX. Corps to Line Benton was to be limited to General Hoge's western forces. It was intended simply to protect the U.S. I. Corps' right flank. But Ridgway had since modified his plan of operations, widening the advance to include the entire U.S. IX Corps and all other forces to the east.

 

Action - Operations Rugged and Dauntless

 

General Ridgway assembled corps and division commanders for a meeting at his Yoju headquarters on March 27th. This he did in advance of issuing more orders for attacks above the 38th Parallel. He discussed the courses of action that were now open to them or that they might be obliged to follow. He informed them that the possibility of Soviet intervention was had once again been raised. According to a reputable foreign source, the USSR planned to launch a large scale offensive in Korea near the end of April employing Soviet regulars of Mongolian extraction under the guise of volunteers. Ridgway doubted the accuracy of the report.

 

As a matter of prudence, however, since the U.S. 8th Army might be ordered out of Korea in the event of Soviet intervention, he intended to pass the evacuation plan as outlined in January by the U.S. 8th Army staff to corps commanders for further development. To ensure that U.S. 8th Army forces not start "looking over the shoulder," no word of the course of action or preparations for it was to go beyond those assigned to work on the plan.

 

Here, he advised that future governmental decisions might compel the U.S. 8th Army to adopt a static defense. These being immobile would operate only in a certain key areas and be fortified positions which could not be easily abandoned without serious consequences to UN forces. He also warned that UN forces might have to engage a numerically superior enemy which might not be similarly inhibited in the choice of tactics. This could mean defending from the rush or pressure by these forces. Because of the inherent rigidity of these static defenses, it would require strong leadership. Also, due to the common tactics employed by the enemy to bypass these static defenses which includes airborne drops and other means, imaginative tactical thinking would be needed by the U.S. commanders who would have to deal with PVA and NKPA units getting to UN targets without being attacked. There was also the possibility of the enemy simply attacking UN targets with specific offensive units that technically out-range them.

Ridgway told those gathered that he agreed with General MacArthur's earlier prediction that a stalemate would ultimately develop on the battlefront. He also explained that he did not know just how far the U.S. 8th Army would drive into North Korea before the stalemate occurred. The assembled commanders were informed that at the moment, how far the U.S. 8th Army would drive into North Korea could not be accurately assessed. In essence, the U.S. 8th Army would continue to move forward and in the next advance would cross the 38th Parallel. In short, these U.S. commanders were being prepared for the worst of circumstances which might befall them and their troops.

 

Since his meeting with MacArthur on March 24th, Ridgway had revised his concept for advancing above the parallel. His originally intent was to direct a strong attack northwestward across the Imjin, expecting that in moving as far as the Yesong River the attack force would find the elusive NKPA I Corps. Later, his Intelligence staff would discover that the bulk of the NKPA corps had withdrawn behind the Yesong. Intelligence had also warned that the attack force would be vulnerable to envelopment by a fresh PVA unit located off the right flank of the advance. The unit which Intelligence had not yet fully identified was the PVA XIX Army Group. As a result, Ridgway elected to limit operations northwest of the Imjin to only reconnaissance and combat patrols.

 

Preparation for Operation Rugged

 

He planned his main attack toward the centrally located major road and rail complex named the Iron Triangle of the towns of P’yongyang in the north and Ch'orwon and Gimhwa-eup in the south. It lay twenty to thirty miles above the 38th Parallel in the diagonal corridor dividing the Taebaek Mountains into northern and southern ranges between the port of Wonsan in the northeast and Seoul in the southwest. Other routes emanating from the triangle of towns connected with P'yongyang to the northwest and with the western and eastern halves of the present front. The complex was obviously important to the ability of the communist high command for its unique center of communications, to move troops and supplies within the forward areas, and to coordinate operations laterally.

 

Ridgway's first concern was to occupy ground that could serve as a base both for continuing the advance toward the major road and rail complex of the Iron Triangle. Secondly, in view of the enemy's evident offensive preparations, he needed to develop a defensive position. The base selected was Line Kansas, which traced the lower bank of the Imjin in the west. From the Imjin eastward as far as the Hwach'on Reservoir the Line lay two to six miles above the 38th parallel across the approaches to the Iron Triangle. Following the lower shoreline of the reservoir, it then turned slightly north to a depth of ten miles above the parallel before falling off southeastward to the Yangyang area on the coast.

 

The advance to Line Kansas was designated Operation Rugged. The U.S.’s I and IX Corps were to seize the segment of the line between the Imjin and the western edge of the Hwach'on Reservoir. To the east, the X Corps was to occupy the portion tracing the reservoir shore and reaching Route 24 in the Soyang River valley. ROKA III and I Corps were to take the section between Route 24 and Yangyang. Once in position, Ridgway planned to pull substantial forces off Line Kansas immediately after reaching it in anticipation of enemy offensive operations and prepare them for counterattacks. The IX Corps was to release the 1st Cavalry Division to army control. The Division was to assemble at Kyongan-ni, below the Han River southeast of Seoul. When their, the Division was prepare to meet enemy attacks aimed at the capital via Route 1 from the northwest, over Routes 33 and 3 from the north, or through the Pukhan River valley from the northeast.

 

In the X Corps zone, the bulk of the 2nd Division was to assemble at Hongch'on and make ready to counter an attack following the Route 29 axis. A division yet to be selected from one of the two ROKA corps in the east was to assemble at Yuch'on-ni on Route 20. Once there, the ROKA unit was to prepare in either corps sector for operations against enemy attacks. On March 29th, the 187th Airborne RCT was to leave the I Corps zone for Taegu. Meanwhile, it was to be ready to return north to reinforce operations wherever needed.

 

Planning of Operation Dauntless

 

While these X Corps zone forces established themselves in reserve, Ridgway planned to launch Operation Dauntless. It was to be a limited advance by U.S.’s I and IX Corps toward the Iron Triangle. The planned attacks by these two Corps on Lines Utah and Wyoming, was to be in succession. Their objective was only to menace the triangle, not to invest it. In effect, Ridgway’s plan was to have them create a broad salient bulging above line Kansas between the Imjin River and Hwach'on Reservoir. The two Corps, once in position, would take the areas of the prominent heights commanding the Ch'orwon-Kumhwa base of the communications complex. If struck by strong enemy attacks during or after the advance, the two Corps would to return to the Kansas Line.

 

Even with armored support, the 187th Airborne RCT was unable to captured Hill 228 until before 09:00. They used the remainder of March 27th for reorganization and resupply.

 

Meanwhile, the 3rd Division’s 15th and 65th Infantry Regiments were attempting to reach the 187th Airborne RCT forces. The 1st Battalion of the 15th Infantry made first contact late in the afternoon of March 27th. Despite General Milburn's hopes for the operation, the two regiments drove no forces into the guns of the airborne unit. The PVA forces resisting the 187th's eastward attack had either kept Route 33 open long enough for the forces withdrawing before the 3rd Division to pass north, or the withdrawing PVA units had used another road, perhaps Route 3.

 

Early on March 28th, General Bowen’s 2nd Battalion, with the 3rd Battalion following in support, attacked the heights on the east side of Route 33. After an all-day battle to eliminate stiff enemy resistance, once 2nd Battalion had prevailed it occupied them. By nightfall of that day, the 25th Division on the right had kept pace with the 3rd Division and moved through spotty resistance until both units were on or above Line Aspen.

 

In the U.S., on March 29, 1951 C.E., the Rosenbergs were convicted of espionage. Julius and Ethel Rosenberg had been found guilty of conspiracy of wartime espionage and sentenced to death. Morton Sobell was also convicted of the crime and sentenced to thirty years in prison.

Louis Otero was born 1932 C.E. He was U.S. ARMY PVT and casualty of the Korean War. He died in Korea on March 30, 1951 C.E. His home was in Lincoln, New Mexico.

 

New Mexico U.S. Military Fatal Hispano Casualties of the Korean War

Name

Service

 Rank 

Birthdate (YYYYMMDD)

Home of Record:

City County

Incident or Death Date (YYYYMMDD)

Remains Recovered

Otero Louis

ARMY

PVT

19320000

Unknown

Lincoln

19510330

Y

 

Felipe T. Sedillo was born 1930 C.E. He was U.S. ARMY PFC and casualty of the Korean War. He died in Korea on March 31, 1951 C.E. His home was in Cháves, New Mexico.

 

New Mexico U.S. Military Fatal Hispano Casualties of the Korean War

Name

Service

 Rank 

Birthdate (YYYYMMDD)

Home of Record:

City County

Incident or Death Date (YYYYMMDD)

Remains Recovered

Sedillo Felipe T

ARMY

PFC

19300000

Unknown

Cháves

19510331

Y

 

Despite the U.S. 8th Army’s having occupied their principal geographic objectives of the UN liberation of Seoul Operations, the goal of destroying PVA and NKPA forces and equipment had again eluded them. The communist were able to withdraw before suffering extensive damage.

By the end of March, UN forces at the 38th parallel were preparing for a confrontation with PVA and NKPA forces. To maintain, and in some areas regain, contact with enemy forces, General Ridgway allowed each corps to start toward Line Kansas as it completed preparations.

 

Action - 38th Parallel

 

Between April 2nd and April 5th, Operation Rugged staggered to a full start.

 

When General MacArthur made his customary appearance on April 3rd, this time in the ROKA I Corps zone on the east coast, Ridgway brought him up to date on plans. MacArthur agreed with the Operation Rugged and Operation Dauntless concept, urging in particular that Ridgway make a strong effort to hold the Kansas Line. At the same time, MacArthur believed that the two operations would move the battlefront to that "point of theoretical stalemate" he had predicted in early-March. Once Ridgway's forces reached their Kansas and Wyoming Lines objectives MacArthur intended to limit offensive operations to reconnaissance and combat patrols, none larger than a battalion.

 

In America, the Rosenbergs were sentenced to death on April 5, 1951 C.E., by Judge Kaufman under Section 2 of the Espionage Act of 1917, 50 U.S. Code 32 (now 18 U.S. Code 794), which prohibits transmitting or attempting to transmit to a foreign government information "relating to the national defense."

 

During the months of April and May of 1951 C.E., fighting along Korea’s thirty-eighth parallel had taken on was a sort of "see-saw" motion. Neither the DPRK nor ROK was really advancing beyond the parallel. Washington politicians were frustrated that the UN forces could not win decisively. On April 5th, Congressman Joséph W. Martin, Jr. read the text of a letter he had received from MacArthur, dated March 20th, criticizing the Truman administration's priorities on the floor of the House.

 

Abel García was born 1931 C.E. He was U.S. ARMY PFC and casualty of the Korean War. He died in Korea on April 8, 1951 C.E. His home was in Mckinley, New Mexico.

 

New Mexico U.S. Military Fatal Hispano Casualties of the Korean War

Name

Service

 Rank 

Birthdate (YYYYMMDD)

Home of Record:

City County

Incident or Death Date (YYYYMMDD)

Remains Recovered

García Abel

ARMY

PFC

19310000

Unknown

Mckinley

19510408

Y

 

For Truman, this letter was the last straw. On April 11, 1951, C.E. General Douglas MacArthur was relieved of his Korean command by U.S. President Harry S. Truman. MacArthur's unauthorized threat to bring the war to China was in direct opposition to Truman's wishes and a case of insubordination with his unwillingness to prosecute a limited war. He was succeeded as UN commander by Lieutenant-General Matthew Ridgway.

 

President Truman famously fired General Douglas MacArthur and replaced him with General Ridgeway. MacArthur had angered Truman with his handling of the war and for insubordination, which means that MacArthur was going against the orders or wishes of the president. Specifically, General MacArthur believed it was in the best interest of the U.S. to begin a war with China and push the Korean War onto the mainland of Asia. As well, MacArthur was in favor of using atomic weapons in order to defeat the NKPA and the PVA. He believed that any other approach was a form of appeasement and did not want to give into the pressure of the communist nations. Truman felt differently and generally wanted to avoid a war with China.  Truman did not want to overextend the U.S. in Asia and wanted to avoid the possibility of an atomic war with the USSR. Ultimately, Truman fired MacArthur for trying to start a war with China and refusing to follow the orders of the president.

 

MacArthur later wrote that Congressman Martin had released the letter "for some unexplained reason and without consulting me," but it had not been marked as being confidential or off the record.

Tony A. Montaño was born 1928 C.E. He was U.S. ARMY PFC and casualty of the Korean War. He died in Korea on April 14, 1951, C.E. His home was in Luna, New Mexico.

 

New Mexico U.S. Military Fatal Hispano Casualties of the Korean War

Name

Service

 Rank 

Birthdate (YYYYMMDD)

Home of Record:

City County

Incident or Death Date (YYYYMMDD)

Remains Recovered

Montaño Tony A

ARMY

PFC

19280000

Unknown

Luna

19510414

Y

 

Battle of the Imjin River April 22nd through April 25, 1951 C.E.:

 

The Battle of the Imjin River, also known as the Battle of Gloster Hill, took place from April 22nd through April 25, 1951 C.E. when troops from the Chinese PVA attacked UN positions on the lower Imjin River in an attempt to achieve a breakthrough and recapture the South Korean capital Seoul. The attack was part of the Chinese Fifth Phase Campaign with the aim being to regain the initiative on the battlefield after a successful UN counter-offensive in March 1951 C.E. had allowed UN forces to establish themselves beyond the 38th parallel at Line Kansas.

 

The section of the UN line where the battle took place was defended primarily by British forces of the 29th Infantry Brigade, consisting of four battalions, three British and one Belgian infantry supported by tanks and artillery. Despite facing a greatly numerically superior enemy, the brigade held its general positions for three days. When the UN units were ultimately forced to fall back, their actions in the Battle had blunted the Chinese offensive. This allowed UN forces to retreat to defensive positions north of Seoul, where the Chinese were halted.

 

Background

 

Following the North Korean invasion of South Korea, a UN counter-offensive had reached the North Korean border with China. China fearing for its own security and concerned about the loss of the Communist North Korea, intervened with three offensives between October 1950 C.E. and January 1951 C.E. These pushed UN forces south of the original border between North and South Korea along the 38th parallel allowing the capture of Seoul. A fourth offensive in mid-February was blunted by the American IX Corps. At the end of February, the UN launched a series of offensive operations, recapturing Seoul on March 15th and pushing the front line back northwards. In early-April, Operation Rugged established the front in a line that followed the lower Imjin River, then eastwards to the Hwacheon Reservoir and on to the Yangyang area on the east coast, known as Line Kansas. The subsequent “Operation Dauntless” pushed out a salient located between the Imjin River as it dog-legged north and the Hwacheon Reservoir, known as Line Utah.

 

The deployment of UN forces during the initial stages of the Chinese Spring Offensive.

 

The British 29th Brigade's position as needed to stop a direct advance on Seoul.

 

On April 22nd, the front line in the west along Lines Kansas and Utah was held by the American I Corps comprising, from west to east, the ROKA 1st Division, the American 3rd Division with the British 29th Brigade under command the American 25th Division with the Turkish Brigade under command, and the American 24th Division.

 

The 29th Infantry Brigade, commanded by Brigadier Tom Brodie, consisted of the 1st Battalion Gloucestershire Regiment (Glosters), under Lieutenant-Colonel James P. Carne; the 1st Battalion Royal Northumberland Fusiliers (Fusiliers), under Lieutenant-Colonel Kingsley Foster; the 1st Battalion Royal Ulster Rifles (Rifles), under the temporary command of Major Gerald Rickord; and the Belgian Battalion, under Lieutenant-Colonel Albert Crahay (700 men), to which Luxembourg's contribution to the UN forces was attached. The brigade was supported by the 25 pounders of 45 Field Regiment Royal Artillery (RA) commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel MT Young, the 4.2 inch mortars of 170 Heavy Mortar Battery RA, the Centurion tanks of C Squadron 8th King's Royal Irish Hussars under the command of Major Henry Huth, and by 55 Squadron Royal Engineers.

 

The four battalions of 29th Brigade covered a front of 12 miles. Gaps between units had to be accepted because there was no possibility of forming a continuous line with the forces available.

 

"Brigadier Brodie determined to deploy his men in separate unit positions, centered upon key hill features" On the left flank, the Glosters were guarding a ford over the Imjin 1 mile east of the ROKA 1st Division; the Fusiliers were deployed near the centre, around 2 miles northeast of the Glosters; the Belgians, occupying a feature called Hill 194 on the right, were the only element of the 29th Brigade north of the river.

 

Their connection with the rest of the brigade depended on two pontoon bridges about half a mile apart. These bridges connected the Belgians with Route 11, the 29th Brigade's main line of supply and communication. The Rifles served as the brigade's reserve and were deployed along Route 11. Extensive defensive preparations were not completed because the British expected to hold the position for only a short time. Minefields, deeply dug shelters, and extensive wire obstacles had not been constructed. The British position on the Imjin River "was deemed safe" but vulnerable in case of an attack.

 

Chinese Spring Offensive of April of 1951 C.E.:

 

The commander-in-chief of the PVA and NKPA forces in the Field, General Peng Dehuai, planned to "wipe out...the American 3rd Division...the British 29th Brigade and the 1st Division of the Puppet Army...after this we can wipe out the American 24th Division and 25th Division," and promised the capture of Seoul as a May Day gift to Mao Zedong. To achieve the objective Peng planned to converge on Seoul with three PVA army groups and a NKPA corps; a total strength of some 305,000 men. The III and IX Army Groups were to attack the right flank of the American 3rd Division and the 24th and 25th Divisions on Line Utah, east of the Imjin where it turned north. The XIX Army Group on the PVA right flank, west of the Imjin River where it turned north, were to attack the remainder of the 3rd Division and the ROKA 1st Division. On the XIX Army Group front, the NKPA I Corps and PVA 64th Army would attack the ROKA 1st Division, while the 63rd Army would attack on their left, pitting it against 29th Brigade. The 63rd Army comprised three divisions, the 187th, 188th and 189th, with each division comprising three regiments, each of which comprised three battalions. Some 27,000 men in 27 battalions would be attacking 29th Brigade's four battalions, albeit in echelon, one division after the other.

 

Battle

 

The battle opened on the night of April 22, 1951 C.E. A PVA patrol on the north bank of the river made its way around the Belgians on Hill 194. It then continued to advance east towards the two bridges on which the Belgians depended. Elements of the 29th Brigade's reserve, the 1st RUR, were deployed forward at about 22:00 to secure the crossing but were soon engaged by PVA forces trying to cross the river. The Rifles were unable to secure the bridges. This development meant that the Belgian battalion on the north bank of the river was in danger of being isolated from the rest of the 29th Brigade.

 

PVA forces following the initial patrol either attacked the Belgian positions on Hill 194 or continued their advance towards the bridges. Those who were able to cross the Imjin attacked the Fusiliers' right rear company, Z Company, on Hill 257, a position close to the river and almost directly south of the crossings. Further downstream, PVA forces managed to ford the Imjin and attacked the Fusiliers' left forward company, X Company, on Hill 152. The retreat of X Company from Hill 152 had serious consequences for Y Company, which occupied the right forward position of what can be described as a squarish fusilier position marked out by four widely spaced company perimeters at the corners. Although Y Company was not attacked directly, PVA forces threatened its flanks by forcing Z and X Companies from their positions. After unsuccessful British attempts to regain those lost positions on Hill 257 and 194, Y Company's position was abandoned, the retreat being covered by C Squadron, 8th Hussars.

 

On the left of the 29th Brigade's line, a patrol of 17 men from the Glosters' C Company lying in wait on the river bank repulsed three attempts by a battalion of the PVA’s 559th Regiment, 187th Division to cross the river. They eventually retired without loss when their ammunition ran low and assaulting troops finally gained the opposite bank.

 

During the night the Glosters' A and D Companies were attacked, and by 07:30 A Company, outnumbered six to one, had been forced from its position on Castle Hill. An attempt to retake it failed, during which Lieutenant Philip Curtis single-handedly destroyed an enemy machine-gun position, for which he was posthumously awarded the Víctoria Cross.

 

The Glosters' partial withdrawal to Hill 235

 

On April 23rd, attempts by the Fusiliers and forces from the U.S. 3rd Infantry Division's reserve to regain control of areas lost during the night failed. An attack by the U.S. 1st Battalion, 7th Infantry, on PVA forces near Hill 257 was ordered to support the Belgian withdrawal from the north bank of the Imjin River. Despite losing seven vehicles, the Belgian battalion successfully withdrew to the east and took up new positions south of the Glosters and the Fusiliers before moving to the vicinity of the 29th Brigade's command post.

 

On April 23rd, by around 2030 the Glosters' A Company was now at less than half strength. All of its officers were either killed or wounded. They fell back to Hill 235. A Company’s withdrawal left D Company's position exposed. With one of its platoons badly mauled in the overnight fighting, it too withdrew to Hill 235.

 

That same night of April 23rd and 24th, Glosters' B Company was outnumbered by eighteen to one and endured six assaults. It had been forced to call in artillery on their own position to break up the last of them. Low on ammunition and having taken many casualties, the seventh assault at 0810 forced them to abandon their position, and just 20 survivors made it to Hill 235, to which battalion HQ, the Support Company and C Company had already withdrawn.

 

As B Company fought for its life, the PVA 188th Division crossed the Imjin River and attacked the Fusiliers and the Rifles on the right of the 29th Brigade's line. The 187th Division also engaged the Brigade's battalions on the right, while the 189th Division kept up the pressure on the left. Most dangerous for the integrity of the 29th Brigade was the PVA’s deep penetration of the line between the Glosters and the Fusiliers, cutting off the Glosters.

 

To counter the PVA attack and protect the Glosters from being completely surrounded, the Philippine 10th Battalion Combat Team (BCT) was temporarily attached to the 29th Brigade. A combined force of M-24 tanks of the 10th BCT and Centurions of the 8th Hussars supported by infantry reached a point 2,000 yards from Hill 235. The column, however, failed to make contact. The lead tank was hit by PVA fire and knocked out, blocking the route and making any further advance against heavy resistance impossible. At this point, the brigade commander considered it unwise to continue the effort to relieve the Gloucester Battalion and withdrew the relief force.

 

A planned UN attack by the Puertorriqueños of the 1st and 3rd Battalions, 65th Infantry to relieve the Glosters was prevented due to continued PVA pressure on the UN forces along the Imjin. Two further attempts by a tank troop to link up with the Glosters were attempted but failed. Brigadier Brodie now left the decision as to whether to attempt a break-out or surrender to Lieutenant-Colonel Carne.

 

The Glosters stand on Hill 235

 

Next, at 08:00 on April 25th, I Corps issued the order to execute Plan Golden A, which called for a withdrawal of all forces to a new defensive position further south. In accordance with orders issued by I Corps, the Fusiliers, Rifles and Belgians, supported by the tanks of the 8th Hussars and the Royal Engineers of 55 Squadron, withdrew to the safety of the next UN position. The Belgians now occupied blocking positions west and southwest of the 29th Brigade's command post in order to allow the other units of the brigade to fall back through the Battalion's positions.

 

After it had received the order to retreat, the isolation of the 1st Battalion Gloucestershire Regiment on Hill 235 made it impossible for them to join the rest of the 29th Brigade. Even before the failed attempts to relieve the Battalion earlier, B and C Companies had already suffered such heavy casualties that they were merged to form one company.

 

By 09:00, on April 25th, the Glosters’ situation was one of being totally isolated on Hill 235 near Solma-ri, west of Route 5Y. The brigade's main line of retreat is Route 11. The Belgian battalion occupied blocking positions near the Brigade's command post, while RNF, RUR, and 8th Hussars were still further north. Additional support was provided by elements of the U.S. 65th Infantry. Attempts to supply the Battalion by air drop had also failed. Despite their difficult situation, the Glosters held their positions on Hill 235 throughout April 24th and the night of 24th and 25th. No further attempts were undertaken to relieve the Glosters.

 

By 09:00, on April 25th, the Glosters’ situation was one of being totally isolated on Hill 235 near Solma-ri, west of Route 5Y. The Brigade's main line of retreat is Route 11. The Belgian battalion occupies blocking positions near the Brigade's command post, while RNF, RUR and 8th Hussars are still further north. Additional support was provided by elements of the U.S. 65th Infantry.

 

On that morning, the Glosters were informed that the 45 Field Regiment could no longer provide artillery support. As Brigadier Brodie had already left the final decision to Lieutenant-Colonel Carne, the Glosters' CO "gave the order to his company commanders to make for the British lines as best as they could." Only the remains of D Company under the command of Major Mike Harvey successfully escaped from Hill 235, by then called Gloster Hill. They reached the safety of friendly lines after several days. The rest of the battalion was taken prisoner, including Lieutenant-Colonel Carne.

 

Aftermath

 

The withdrawal of the 29th Brigade had been made under intense PVA pressure. The fact that PVA forces dominated parts of the high ground along the line of retreat made the situation even more difficult. The PVA were able not only to observe the 29th Brigade’s movements, but also to inflict heavy casualties on the retreating units. Among those killed was the commanding officer of the Fusiliers, Lieutenant-Colonel Foster, who died when his jeep was hit by PVA mortar fire. The retreat was "one long bloody ambush." When B Company of the Ulsters which was the rear guard during the retreat reached the safety of the next UN line, all elements of the 29th Brigade except for the Glosters had completed the withdrawal.

 

Importance of the battle

 

At the Battles of Kapyong and the Imjin River the vastly outnumbered UN forces were able to check the PVA advance on Seoul. Had the Chinese achieved a breakthrough in the initial stages of their assault, they would have been able to outflank the ROKA 1st Division to the west and the U.S. 3rd Infantry Division to the east of the 29th Brigade. A PVA success would have threatened the stability of the UN line and increased the likelihood of a PVA advance on Seoul.

 

Two Commonwealth battalions, the 2nd Battalion of the Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry Regiment and the 3rd Battalion of the Royal Australian Regiment, repulsed an entire PVA division at Kapyong.

 

The British 29th Brigade’s 4,000 men staged a successful delaying action at the Imjin River against the PVA’s 63rd Army nearly 30,000 troops. Although the PVA initially benefited from the 29th Brigade's scattered deployment and lack of defensive preparations, they were nevertheless unable to take the positions before UN forces could check further advances. That determined resistance by the 29th Brigade severely disrupted the Chinese offensive, causing it to lose momentum, and allowed UN forces in the area to withdraw to the No-Name Line, a defensible position north of South Korean capital Seoul where they could consolidate their lines.

 

History records that in three days of fighting, the 1st Battalion, the Gloucestershire Regiment’s 650 men engaged in a Thermopylae-like stand against more than 10,000 Chinese infantry. While it is true that the overwhelming majority of the Glosters were either killed or captured, their sacrifice will always be remembered. Of the 29th Brigade’s 1,091 soldiers killed, wounded, or missing, 620 were from the Gloucestershire Regiment. It was only able to muster 217 men on April 27th. 522 soldiers of the Gloucestershire Regiment became prisoners of war. Of those taken prisoner, 180 were wounded and a further 34 died while in captivity. 59 soldiers of the Gloucestershire Regiment were killed in action.

 

Casualties

 

The British cabinet later stated on June 26, 1951 C.E. stated that the 29th Brigade suffered 1,091 casualties, including 34 officers and 808 other ranks missing. These casualties represented 20 to 25 percent of the Brigade's strength on the eve of battle.

 

Based on estimates, PVA casualties in the Battle of the Imjin River have been put at around 10,000. As a result of the casualties suffered during the battle, the PVA 63rd Army, which had begun the offensive with three divisions and approximately 27,000 men, had lost over a third of its strength and was pulled out of the front line.

 

On May 1, 1951 C.E., The U.S. government-sponsored Radio Free Europe began its broadcasts for the first time, from Munich to Eastern Europe.

 

Phil Sandoval was born 1933 C.E. He was U.S. ARMY PVT and casualty of the Korean War. He died in Korea on May 15, 1951 C.E. His home was in Bernalillo, New Mexico.

 

New Mexico U.S. Military Fatal Hispano Casualties of the Korean War

Name

Service

 Rank 

Birthdate (YYYYMMDD)

Home of Record:

City County

Incident or Death Date (YYYYMMDD)

Remains Recovered

Sandoval Phil

ARMY

PVT

19330000

Unknown

Bernalillo

19510515

Y

 

On May 18, 1951 C.E., the UN moved to its new headquarters in New York City, on Manhattan's East Side.

 

On May 23, 1951 C.E., one of the fighting Hispanic American Puertorriqueños, Demensio Rivera of Company G, 2nd Battalion, 7th Infantry Regiment, 3rd Infantry Division, won a Korean War Medal of Honor for services rendered during the Fighting at Changyong-ni, South Korea. He was born in Cabo Rojo, Puerto Rico to Demensio Rivera Y Negrón and Dolores Avilés de Rivera. When just a child his parents moved to New York City, where he was raised.

 

Alejandro Carrillo was born 1926 C.E. He was U.S. ARMY PFC and casualty of the Korean War. He died in Korea on May 24, 1951 C.E. His home was in Mckinley, New Mexico.

 

New Mexico U.S. Military Fatal Hispano Casualties of the Korean War

Name

Service

 Rank 

Birthdate (YYYYMMDD)

Home of Record:

City County

Incident or Death Date (YYYYMMDD)

Remains Recovered

Carrillo Alejandro

ARMY

PFC

19260000

Unknown

Mckinley

19510524

Y

 

Steven A. Maese García was born 1931 C.E. He was U.S. ARMY PFC with the 21st Infantry Regiment: C and casualty of the Korean War. He died in Korea on May 26, 1951 C.E. KIA. His home was in Otero, New Mexico.

 

New Mexico U.S. Military Fatal Hispano Casualties of the Korean War

Name

Service

 Rank 

Birthdate (YYYYMMDD)

Home of Record:

City County

Incident or Death Date (YYYYMMDD)

Remains Recovered

García Steven Maese A

ARMY

PFC

19310000

Unknown

Otero

19510526

Y

 

Eloy A. Chávez was born 1924 C.E. He was U.S. ARMY CPL and casualty of the Korean War. He died in Korea on May 28, 1951 C.E. His home was in Sierra, New Mexico.

 

New Mexico U.S. Military Fatal Hispano Casualties of the Korean War

Name

Service

 Rank 

Birthdate (YYYYMMDD)

Home of Record:

City County

Incident or Death Date (YYYYMMDD)

Remains Recovered

Chávez Eloy A

ARMY

CPL

19240000

Unknown

Sierra

19510528

Y

 

4.0 The Last Phase of the Korean War

 

By summer of 1951 C.E., talks for a Korean armistice began. Throughout mid-1951 C.E. through 1953 C.E., negotiation for a peace treaty stalled and reopened. A major issue that stalled negotiations was whether POWs should be repatriated on voluntary basis or not. In addition, accusations about war crimes committed by U.S. stalled negotiations.

 

Fighting continued with intensified guerilla warfare during these armistice talks. "Operation Ratkiller" was designed to counter these guerilla activities. Also, aerial bombing in North Korea intensified as the negotiations continued to intimidate her in order to end the war quickly. The use of nuclear weapons was also considered.

 

José P. Ruíz was born 1930 C.E. He was U.S. ARMY Corporal and casualty of the Korean War. He died in Korea on June 2, 1951 C.E. His home was in Mora, New Mexico.

 

New Mexico U.S. Military Fatal Hispano Casualties of the Korean War

Name

Service

 Rank 

Birthdate (YYYYMMDD)

Home of Record:

City County

Incident or Death Date (YYYYMMDD)

Remains Recovered

Ruíz José P

ARMY

CPL

19300000

Unknown

Mora

19510602

Y

 

Leo Cárlos Sánchez was born July 3, 1927 C.E. He was U.S. NAVY PO2 and casualty of the Korean War. He died in Korea on June 9, 1951 C.E. His home was in Belen, New Mexico.

 

Jacabo Luís Martínez was born December 22, 1930 C.E. He was U.S. Marine Corps Corporal and casualty of the Korean War. He died in Korea on June 9, 1951 C.E. His home was in Santa Fé, New Mexico.

 

New Mexico U.S. Military Fatal Hispano Casualties of the Korean War

Name

Service

 Rank 

Birthdate (YYYYMMDD)

Home of Record:

City County

Incident or Death Date (YYYYMMDD)

Remains Recovered

Sánchez Leo Cárlos

Navy

PO2

19270703

Belen

València

19510609

Y

Martínez Jacabo Luís

Marine Corps

CPL

19301222

Santa Fé

Santa Fé

19510609

Y

 

The Korean War Reaches a Stalemate

 

In July 1951 C.E., U.S. President Truman and his new military commanders started peace talks at Panmunjom, now located in Kaesong, North Hwanghae Province, in the DPRK. It was then a village just north of the de facto border between the DPRK and the ROK. Fighting continued along the 38th Parallel as these negotiations stalled. Both sides were willing to accept a ceasefire that maintained the 38th Parallel as the boundary between the DPRK and the ROK. Unfortunately, the parties could not agree on whether prisoners of war should be forcibly “repatriated.” The PRC and the DPRK wanted forcible repatriation. The Americans did not.

 

On July 10, 1951 C.E., truce talks between the UN and the Communists continued at Kaesŏng a city in North Hwanghae Province in the southern part of the DPRK. The negotiations did not mark an end to the war, as the fighting continued for two more years.

 

Hilario A. Maes was born 1932 C.E. He was U.S. ARMY PFC and casualty of the Korean War. He died in Korea on July 13, 1951 C.E. His home was in Otero, New Mexico.

 

New Mexico U.S. Military Fatal Hispano Casualties of the Korean War

Name

Service

 Rank 

Birthdate (YYYYMMDD)

Home of Record:

City County

Incident or Death Date (YYYYMMDD)

Remains Recovered

Maes Hilario A

ARMY

PFC

19320000

Unknown

Otero

19510713

Y

 

Richard López was born February 7, 1928 C.E. He was U.S. Marine Corps Corporal and casualty of the Korean War. He died in Korea on July 15, 1951 C.E.  His home was in Albuquerque Bernalillo, New Mexico.

 

New Mexico U.S. Military Fatal Hispano Casualties of the Korean War

Name

Service

 Rank 

Birthdate (YYYYMMDD)

Home of Record:

City County

Incident or Death Date (YYYYMMDD)

Remains Recovered

López Richard

Marine Corps

CPL

19280207

Albuquerque

Bernalillo

19510715

Y

 

Eloy E. López was born 1929 C.E. He was U.S. ARMY PFC and casualty of the Korean War. He died in Korea on July 20, 1951 C.E. His home was in Río Arriba, New Mexico.

 

New Mexico U.S. Military Fatal Hispano Casualties of the Korean War

Name

Service

 Rank 

Birthdate (YYYYMMDD)

Home of Record:

City County

Incident or Death Date (YYYYMMDD)

Remains Recovered

López  Eloy E

ARMY

PFC

19290000

Unknown

Río Arriba

19510720

Y

 

The Battle of Bloody Ridge took place from August 18th to September 5, 1951 C.E. It is located in the hills north of the 38th parallel north in the central Korean mountain range. The battle was fought between the Communist NKPA supported by PRC’s PVA forces and the UN forces consisting of ROKA units and the U.S. 2nd Infantry Division.

 

Background

 

During the summer of 1951 C.E., the Korean War had reached a stalemate as peace negotiations were going on at Kaesŏng. The two armies faced each other across a line a few miles north of the 38th Parallel. The Line ran from east to west through the middle of the Korean Peninsula and had many twists and turns along the way. UN and NKPA and PVA forces jockeyed for position along this line, clashing in several relatively small but intense and bloody battles.

 

Manuel J. Romero was born 1927 C.E. He was U.S. ARMY Corporal with the 5th Infantry Regiment: Company: A RCT and casualty of the Korean War KIA. He died in Korea on August 3, 1951 C.E. His home was in Quay, New Mexico.

 

New Mexico U.S. Military Fatal Hispano Casualties of the Korean War

Name

Service

 Rank 

Birthdate (YYYYMMDD)

Home of Record:

City County

Incident or Death Date (YYYYMMDD)

Remains Recovered

Romero Manuel J

ARMY

CPL

19270000

Unknown

Quay

19510803

Y

 

The Battle of Bloody Ridge

 

On August 18th, the Battle of Bloody Ridge began as an attempt by UN forces to seize a ridge of hills which they believed were being used as observation posts to call in artillery fire on a UN supply road.

 

Action - Battle

 

The initial attack was fierce. After a week of fierce hand-to-hand fighting, the 36th ROKA Regiment captured most, but not all, of the ridge. Their triumph was short-lived. On the following day of August 19th, the NKPA and PRC forces recaptured the mountain in a fierce counterattack.

 

The UN’s U.S. 9th Infantry Regiment of the 2nd Division made the next assault on Bloody Ridge. The battle raged for ten days, as the NKPA and PVA forces repulsed one assault after another. The increasingly exhausted U.S. forces were repeatedly being driven back. Finally, after two days of heavy fighting the 9th succeeded in capturing one of the hill objectives. Constant rain now came, making operations almost impossible. The "rivers of mud" created difficulties for bringing in supplies through and up steep, slippery slopes. All of this greatly slowed the attacks.

 

Casualties mounted as fighting renewed. The UN’s 2nd Division's 23rd Infantry Regiment joined in the attack on the main ridge. The 38th Infantry Regiment, the 2nd's other infantry regiment, occupied positions immediately behind the main ridge threatening to cut off any NKPA and PVA retreat. The battle would ultimately be decided by combination of incessant bombardment by artillery, tanks and airstrikes, frontal attacks, and flanking movements. In one 24-hour period alone, over 14,000 artillery rounds were fired.

 

Outside of Korea, in San Francisco on September 1, 1951 C.E., the U.S., Australia, and New Zealand signed a mutual security pact, the ANZUS Treaty. The ANZUS is a collective security non-binding agreement between Australia and New Zealand and, separately, Australia and the U.S. The parties are to cooperate on military matters in the Pacific Ocean region. It provided that an armed attack on any of the three parties would be dangerous to the others, and that each should act to meet the common threat. A committee of foreign ministers was established to meet for consultation.

 

Back in Korea, the Battle of Bloody Ridge which had begun on August 18th was finally over. UN forces had succeeded in outflanking NKPA and PVA forces. On September 5th, NKPA and PVA forces abandoned Bloody Ridge. After their withdrawing from the Ridge, the NKPA/PVA set up new positions just 1,500 yards away on a seven-mile long hill mass that was soon to earn the name “Heartbreak Ridge.”

 

It was the American soldiers that named that piece of terrain they had taken "Bloody Ridge." 2,700 UN and perhaps as many as 15,000 NK and PVA soldiers were casualties. Almost all were killed or wounded. Only a few prisoners were taken by either side.

 

Outside of Korea in San Francisco, on September 8, 1951 C.E. forty-nine nations signed the Japanese Peace Treaty. It officially ended World War II and reestablished Japanese sovereignty.

 

John Jr. Montaño was born 1928 C.E. He was U.S. ARMY PFC and casualty of the Korean War. He died in Korea on September 13, 1951 C.E. His home was in Guadalupe, New Mexico.

 

New Mexico U.S. Military Fatal Hispano Casualties of the Korean War

Name

Service

 Rank 

Birthdate (YYYYMMDD)

Home of Record:

City County

Incident or Death Date (YYYYMMDD)

Remains Recovered

Montaño John Jr.

ARMY

PFC

19280000

Unknown

Guadalupe

19510913

Y

 

Back in the Korean, October brought peace talks between the UN and the Communists. They were relocated to the village of P'anmunjŏm.

 

Isaac Sandoval was born 1928 C.E. He was U.S. ARMY Corporal and casualty of the Korean War. He died in Korea on October 6, 1951 C.E. His home was in Sandoval, New Mexico.

 

New Mexico U.S. Military Fatal Hispano Casualties of the Korean War

Name

Service

 Rank 

Birthdate (YYYYMMDD)

Home of Record:

City County

Incident or Death Date (YYYYMMDD)

Remains Recovered

Sandoval Isaac

ARMY

CPL

19280000

Unknown

Sandoval

19511006

N

 

Enríque Vega Jr. was born 1933 C.E. He was U.S. ARMY PVT and casualty of the Korean War. Vega died in Korea on October 1, 1951 C.E. His home was in Doña Ana, New Mexico.

 

New Mexico U.S. Military Fatal Hispano Casualties of the Korean War

Name

Service

 Rank 

Birthdate (YYYYMMDD)

Home of Record:

City County

Incident or Death Date (YYYYMMDD)

Remains Recovered

Vega Enríque Jr.

ARMY

PVT

19330000

Unknown

Doña Ana

19511001

Y

 

Operation Commando

 

The UN offensive, Operation Minden, had been launched earlier between September 8th and September 12, 1951 C.E., as part of a general advance to extend the Wyoming Line. Unfortunately, a few hills south of Wyoming remained in PVA hands, threatening supply lines to Seoul.

 

From October 2nd through October 5, 1951 C.E., there would be a new UN offensive, Operation Commando. On October 3, 1951 C.E., the UN offensive began from the Wyoming Line which had been extended during Operation Minden. Operation Minden was the UN offensive which had occurred between September 8th and September 12, 1951 C.E. It was part of a general advance to extend the Wyoming Line. The seizing of these hills would require a later follow-up operation.

 

Action - Battle

 

During Operation Commando, the UN’s I Corps consisting of four U.S. Divisions, the 1st Commonwealth Division, and the 1st ROKA Division seized the Jamestown Line. It also destroyed the PVA’s 42nd, 47th, 64th, and 65th armies.

 

Aftermath

 

This action prevented the Communist forces from taking and blocking U.N. supply lines near Seoul.

 

Outside of Asia, the Mutual Security Act of 1951 launched a major American foreign aid program. Foreign aid grants to numerous countries would be provided from 1951 C.E. through 1961 C.E. It largely replaced the Marshall Plan. The main goal was to help poor countries develop and to contain the spread of Communism. It was a signed on October 10, 1951 C.E. by President Harry S. Truman. Annual authorizations were about $7.5 billion, out of a GDP of $340bn in 1951 C.E., for military, economic, and technical foreign aid to American allies. The aid was aimed primarily at shoring up Western Europe, as the Cold War developed.

 

Marquis H Oracion was born June 9, 1925 C.E. He was U.S. AIR FORCE Second Lieutenant and casualty of the Korean War. He died in Korea on October 14, 1951 C.E. His home was in Roswell Cháves, New Mexico.

 

New Mexico U.S. Military Fatal Hispano Casualties of the Korean War

Name

Service

 Rank 

Birthdate (YYYYMMDD)

Home of Record:

City County

Incident or Death Date (YYYYMMDD)

Remains Recovered

Oracion Marquis H

Air Force

2nd Lt.

19250609

Roswell

Cháves

19511014

Y

 

Operation Polecharge

 

Background

 

Between September 8th and September 12, 1951 C.E., Operation Minden a UN offensive had been undertaken. It was part of a general advance to extend the Wyoming Line. Unfortunately, a few hills south of Wyoming remained in PVA hands, threatening supply lines to Seoul. The seizing of these hills would require a later follow-up

 

From October 2nd through October 5, 1951 C.E., there would be a second UN offensive, Operation Commando had been launched. On October 3, 1951 C.E., the UN offensive began from the Wyoming Line which had been extended during Operation Minden.

 

During the Operation, the UN’s I Corps seized the Jamestown Line. It did not, however, take the hills south of Wyoming, which remained in PVA hands

 

Operation Polecharge was the UN offensive undertaken between October 15th and October 19, 1951 C.E., to form a line of defense just north of the 38th Parallel. It was also was intended to seize the hills south of Wyoming remain in PVA hands and take control of the high positions located there.

 

The 1st Cavalry Division’s 1st Cavalry Regiment and a Belgian battalion attached to the 3rd Infantry Division were tasked with the capture of Hills 346, 272 and 230. The 8th Cavalry Regiment would provide support if required.

 

Action - Battle

 

The operation began on October 15, 1951 C.E., with the seizure of Hill 346 by the 5th Cavalry. By October 18th, Hill 230 was captured with support from the 8th Cavalry after being strongly rebuffed. Hill 272 was also strongly defended by the PVA. It fell to UN forces on October 19th, marking the successful conclusion of Operation Polecharge.

 

Aftermath

 

As a result of this 6 miles advance, the badly mauled U.S. 1st Cavalry Division was withdrawn to Japan for refitting.

 

The hostilities ended on October 15, 1951 C.E., with the UN having successfully established the Jamestown Line.

 

The UN Korean offensive, Operation Commando Operation Commando ended on October 15th, with a few hills south of the line still in Communist hands. The Operation was the last action in the war of maneuvre, which had lasted sixteen months. It was replaced by a static war, characterised by fixed defenses, trench lines, bunkers, patrols, and wiring parties and minefields. Australian involvement in this operation is known by historians as the Battle of Maryang San.

 

On the world front, U.S. President Truman signed an act formally ending World War II on October 19, 1951 C.E.

 

Rudolfo Jr. Delgado was born 1933 C.E. He was U.S. ARMY PVT and casualty of the Korean War. He died in Korea on November 4, 1951 C.E. His home was in Guadalupe, New Mexico.

 

New Mexico U.S. Military Fatal Hispano Casualties of the Korean War

Name

Service

 Rank 

Birthdate (YYYYMMDD)

Home of Record:

City County

Incident or Death Date (YYYYMMDD)

Remains Recovered

Delgado Rudolfo Jr. 

ARMY

PVT

19330000

Unknown

Guadalupe

19511004

Y

 

Lorenzo Olivas was born 1929 C.E. He was U.S. ARMY PVT and casualty of the Korean War. He died in Korea on November 19, 1951 C.E. His home was in Mora, New Mexico.

 

New Mexico U.S. Military Fatal Hispano Casualties of the Korean War

Name

Service

 Rank 

Birthdate (YYYYMMDD)

Home of Record:

City County

Incident or Death Date (YYYYMMDD)

Remains Recovered

Olivas Lorenzo

ARMY

PVT

19290000

Unknown

Mora

19511119

Y


José C. Torres was born 1929 C.E. He was U.S. ARMY PFC and casualty of the Korean War. He died in Korea on April 10, 1952 C.E. His home was in Bernalillo, New Mexico.

 

New Mexico U.S. Military Fatal Hispano Casualties of the Korean War

Name

Service

 Rank 

Birthdate (YYYYMMDD)

Home of Record:

City County

Incident or Death Date (YYYYMMDD)

Remains Recovered

Torres José C

ARMY

PFC

19290000

Unknown

Bernalillo

19520410

Y

 

The occupation of Japan formally ended on April 28, 1952 C.E., after Japan signed the Treaty of Peace with its wartime antagonists (except for the USSR) on September 8, 1951 C.E. Firmly aligned with the West, Japan began a long, sustained period of economic growth.

 

The ANZUS Treaty entered into force on April 29, 1952 C.E. The treaty bound the signatories to recognize that an armed attack in the Pacific area on any of them would endanger the peace and safety of the others. It stated 'The Parties will consult together whenever in the opinion of any of them the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened in the Pacific'. The three nations also pledged to maintain and develop individual and collective capabilities to resist attack.

 

Louis Fernández Griego was born January 21, 1931 C.E. He was U.S. MARINE CORPS PFC and casualty of the Korean War. He died in Korea on May 17, 1952 C.E. His home was in Cíbola, New Mexico.

 

Leo Robert González was born June 30, 1932 C.E. He was U.S. MARINE CORPS PFC and casualty of the Korean War. He died in Korea on May 17, 1952 C.E. His home was in Santa Fé, Santa Fé, New Mexico.

 

New Mexico U.S. Military Fatal Hispano Casualties of the Korean War

Name

Service

 Rank 

Birthdate (YYYYMMDD)

Home of Record:

City County

Incident or Death Date (YYYYMMDD)

Remains Recovered

Griego Louis Fernández    

Marine Corps

PFC

19310121

grants

Cíbola

19520517

Y

González Leo Robert   

Marine Corps

PFC

19320630

Santa Fé

Santa Fé

19520517

Y

 

Fred Ernest Luna was born July 22, 1932 C.E. He was U.S. MARINE CORPS Corporal and casualty of the Korean War. He died in Korea on May 24, 1952 C.E.  His home was in Albuquerque, Bernalillo, New Mexico.

 

New Mexico U.S. Military Fatal Hispano Casualties of the Korean War

Name

Service

 Rank 

Birthdate (YYYYMMDD)

Home of Record:

City County

Incident or Death Date (YYYYMMDD)

Remains Recovered

Luna Fred Ernest

Marine Corps

CPL

19320722

Albuquerque

Bernalillo

19520524

Y

 

The Battle of Old Baldy

 

Background

 

In the Old Baldy area in early June 1952 C.E., Major General David L. Ruffner of the UN 45th Division holding the right flank of the I Corps' line was frustrated that PVA observers were emplaced to view of his Division's positions. One of the most prominent hills in the area came to be called "Old Baldy." It earned its nickname after artillery and mortar fire destroyed the trees on its crest. It was also the highest point on a prominent east-west ridge and it held strategic importance because it dominated terrain in three directions.

 

In preparation, Major-General Ruffner laid plans for Operation Counter. It was to be a two-phase operation. First, UN forces were to capture 12 PVA outposts a few thousand yards in front of the main line and then hold them.

 

Opposing the UN 45th Division from east to west were elements of the PVA 338th and 339th Regiments (113th Division, 38th Army), the 350th and 349th Regiments (117th Division, 39th Army), and the 344th Regiment (115th Division, 39th Army). The other infantry components of the 113th, 115th, and 117th Divisions were in reserve, as was the 116th Division, 39th Army. In addition, the PVA had over ten battalions of artillery positioned along the front in direct or general support roles.

 

Battle of Old Baldy

 

Action - Opening attack

 

During the daylight hours of June 6, 1952 C.E., several UN air strikes on known enemy strong points close to the outpost objectives took place. After dark, various UN units ranging from a squad to almost a company, advanced to take possession of the PVA outposts. The PVA were not anticipating the operation. UN attack units encountered little opposition except at Outpost 10 on Hill 255 and Outpost 11 on Hill 266. Outpost 10 on Hill 255, which was to become better known as Pork Chop Hill, was taken by two UN platoons from I Company, 180th Infantry Regiment. The UN platoons fought a 55-minute fire fight against two PVA platoons.

 

On Old Baldy, two UN squads from A Company, 180th Infantry, exchanged small arms and automatic weapons fire with two PVA squads. The UN troops then withdrew and directed artillery fire upon the PVA forces. It was an American Hispanic, PFC James Ortega, a forward observer for the 171st Field Artillery Battalion, jumped into a trench and directed the artillery concentration which pounded the top of the hill with 500 rounds.

 

When the artillery had ceased, A Company again probed the enemy's positions. They were met with intense fire. A UN squad reinforced by a BAR and machine gun made a sweep to the rear of the PVA, there they advanced to within 25-foot of the enemy before attacking. As the PVA resistance crumbled, A Company pushed its way toward the crest of Old Baldy. Once there, PVA artillery immediately began to come in. Despite the PVA fire, the A Company squads held and took possession of Old Baldy shortly after midnight.

 

With the Outposts were seized, the task of organizing them defensively got under way.

The 279th and 180th Infantry Regiments aided by Korean Service Corps personnel, brought up construction and fortification materials. They worked through the night building bunkers with overhead protection so that their own artillery could use proximity fuze shells. The proximity fuzes were set to detonate the shells automatically when the distance to the targeted the attacking PVA ground forces as drew close to the Outpost up to a predetermined distance for targeting. 

 

They also ringed the Outposts with barbed wire defensive obstacles to slow down the enemy’s approach. Mines were placed along the ground routes which the attacking PVA forces would take to access the UN positions. Defending positions were also covered by automatic weapons. Whenever possible, they sited their machine guns and recoilless rifles in fighting positions concealed from enemy observation in holes, hastily dug prone shelters, or a well-prepared positions with overhead cover. These also provided fire support to adjacent outposts where possible. Signal personnel were tasked to set up communications to the rear and laterally to other outposts by radio and wire. Porters brought in stockpiles of ammunition in preparation for the expected attacks.

 

On the main line of resistance (MLR) or extended front, UN infantry, tank, and artillery support weapons had drawn up fire plans to furnish the Outposts with protective fires. Reinforcing element were being pre-briefed and making preparations to go to the immediate assistance of each Outpost in the event of enemy attack. The MLR was the most important defensive position of UN forces facing the strong, well-armed, and experienced opposing PVA forces. This was the life line for the staggered Outpost.

 

Battle of Old Baldy

 

Action - UN seized 24-hour Old Baldy outposts

 

By the morning of June 7th, the newly UN seized, 24-hour, Old Baldy outposts were as prepared as possible to withstand PVA counterattacks. Garrison forces of 18 to 44 men were left behind. The bulk of the forces from the 279th and 180th Infantry Regiments withdrew to the MLR.

 

The Battle of Old Baldy, from June 26, 1952 C.E. to March 26, 1953 C.E.

 

Action - First battle of Old Baldy - Operation Counter

 

The two-phase plans for Operation Counter had been laid earlier by U.S. Major-General Ruffner. First had been the capture 12 Outposts a few thousand yards in front of the MLR on the most prominent hills called "Old Baldy." The second phase was to hold them against the PVA’s ten battalions of artillery positioned along the front in direct or general support roles.

 

On June 26, 1952 C.E., the contest for Old Baldy became very heated. Almost 1,000-foot west of the crest, PVA forces had established firing positions which posed a constant threat to the UN’s 45th Division Outpost and the 179th Infantry Regiment's troops in the area. UNC and its U.S. forces had determined to destroy these PVA positions.

 

Early in the morning, the 179th vacated its Outpost on Old Baldy. This would allow for air strikes, artillery, and mortar barrages on the PVA positions. Eight fighter-bombers from the 5th Air Force dropped bombs and strafed the positions with rocket and machine gun fire. Next, the UN 45th Division artillery and mortar units began to bombard the PVA positions.

 

The UN 179th Infantry Regiment’s reinforced C Company and the 180th Infantry Regiment’s F Company, attached to the 179th, attacked after the cessation of artillery and mortar fire. C Company began moving in from the left and F Company, supported by a tank, moved in from the right finger of Old Baldy. The UN assault forces soon ran into heavy small arms and automatic weapons fire from the defense force of two PVA companies. After an hour of fighting, the PVA suddenly pulled back. The PVA then directed artillery and mortar fire on the attacking UN units. When the fire ceased, the PVA quickly returned to the area and closed with the men of C and F Companies holding the trenches.

 

PVA machine guns had been making it difficult for C and F Companies to move over the crest of the hill. The UN attack force was now forces to regroup. F Company took over the holding of the left and right fingers of Old Baldy. The old Outpost 11 position was now held by C Company. During the afternoon, the 179th’s A Company came up to reinforce the UN attack force. It soon worked its way around the right flank of the PVA defenders and began its assault.

 

The battle continued for two hours, as PVA forces repelled each UN attempt to drive them from their positions. They were effectively using hand grenades and machine guns to do so. Late in the day, two tanks made their way up the hill with difficulty to help reduce PVA strong points. Once there, the tanks managed to inflict some damage before they were both put out of action. One of the tanks turned over. The second tank threw a track. Gradually the PVA forces evacuated their positions. The UN 179th was now able to send engineers and several more tanks up to the crest.

 

During the night of June 26th, and the following day of June 27th, three UN companies, the 179th's A and C companies and the 180th Infantry Regiment’s F Company, dug in. Their defense positions on Old Baldy were consolidated and ready.

 

The Battle of Old Baldy, from June 26, 1952 C.E. to March 26, 1953 C.E.

 

Action - First battle of Old Baldy

 

On the afternoon of June 27th, the 179th‘s L Company took over defense of the crest from the 180th‘s F Company which were then moved back to a supporting position. At this point, C Company and elements of A Company held the ground northwest of the crest. When night fell, PVA activity around Old Baldy had increased. The 179th‘s positions began taking mortar and artillery fire. Next, the PVA flares went up. The Chinese were on the move. By 22:00, L Company’s defense positions were struck from the northeast and southwest by an estimated reinforced PVA battalion. They continued to press toward the crest until it met a circle of UN defensive fire. From the UN MLR, artillery, mortar, tank, and infantry weapons covered PVA avenues of approach. L Company’s small arms, automatic weapons, and hand grenades were added to the circle which helped keep the PVA at bay.

 

By midnight, the PVA battalion was still unable to penetrate the UN forces defensive ring atop Old Baldy. The PVA forces soon withdrew to regroup.

 

During the early morning of June 28th, the second and third PVA attacks followed. Using their familiar pattern each lasted over an hour. On each attempt, the PVA failed to break through the wall of defensive fires.

 

Aftermath

 

After suffering casualties, the PVA broke off the fight. PVA casualties were estimated at between 250 and 325 men. The 179th reported six men killed and sixty-one wounded during the three engagements.

 

PVA artillery and mortar fire hit Old Baldy late in the evening of June 28th. It signaled the approach of another PVA attack. Next, four PVA squads reconnoitered the 179th’s positions in order to gain information about their enemy's strength and locations. At 22:00, UN and PVA forces exchanged automatic weapons and small arms fire.

 

About an hour later, a very heavy artillery and mortar barrage announced that the PVA’s main assault by a force estimated at two reinforced battalions had begun. They were moving in from the northeast and northwest. PVA forces soon penetrated Old Baldy’s outpost and crest perimeter. It was now hand-to hand fighting.

 

Shortly after midnight, a UNC flare plane arrived illuminating the battle area. Now, defensive fires from the MLR, in addition to a steady stream of small arms and automatic weapons fire from the 179th's three companies on the hill became more effective. By 0100 on June 29th, the PVA forces were forced to disengage and move northward.

 

Aftermath

 

The PVA had suffered more losses, estimated at close to 700 men. In return, they had fired over 4,000 rounds of artillery and mortar fire. The UN’s 179th had suffered 43 casualties, including 8 KIA.

 

UN’s 45th Division’s troops had lacked combat experience before the engagement for Old Baldy. Despite this handicap, it had acquitted itself well on the battlefield. As June ended, in the fight for the “Outposts” the UN’s 45th Division’s troops had withstood more than twenty PVA counterattacks. It had also inflicted upon the Chinese an estimated 3,500 casualties. The unit was also awarded a commendation from U.S. 8th Army commander General James Van Fleet.

 

Action - Second battle of Old Baldy

 

The scarred, crater marked, blood soaked, barren Old Baldy was about to experience yet one more contest between UN forces and a very determined PVA.

 

The Chinese were about to make one more attempt to wrest control of Old Baldy from the UN’s 45th hard won possession. On the night of July 3rd, three separate attacks were launched by the PVA. The last desperate attempt was of battalion strength. Each met the same fate as their predecessors. The concentration of UN defensive firepower blunted all their efforts. Finally, the PVA were forced to desist in their assaults.

 

The PVA would not attempted to take the hill again until the U.S. 2nd Division relieved the 45th. During mid-July, all of the U.S. 8th Army's corps followed a policy of periodically rotating their divisions on the line. The 45th Division had already spent over six months at the front. It was time for a change.

 

The Chinese would soon take advantage of the 45th's relief and challenge the U.S. 2nd Division’s fighting ability. On the night of July 17th, the PVA mounted two attacks. These were both in strengths exceeding a reinforced battalion. Understanding what was about to occur, the Old Baldy Outpost was quickly reinforcement. The 23rd Infantry Regiment’s E and F Companies who were defending the hill were prepared and waiting. With heavy close defensive fires they managed to repel the first PVA assault. On the second PVA assault, the 23rd was as fortunate. The PVA forces won a foothold on Old Baldy’s slopes. The PVA were quick to reinforce their positions. They would next exploit them.

 

Soon, PVA artillery and mortar fire became very intense, pounding the 23rd's defensive positions. Next, the Chinese infantry followed up swiftly making their way up Old Baldy’s slopes.

They seized the crest and held it. The UN’s 23rd counterattacked with support for MLR air strikes and artillery and mortar fire. Their efforts did not succeed in driving the PVA from the hard won positions.

 

By July 20th, the 2nd Division elements had only been able to regain a portion of the east finger of Old Baldy. With the onset of the rainy season, operations were made exceedingly difficult to carry out. The torrential downpours had converted the Korean battleground into a morass of soft, wet, slippery ground. In the last week of July, the UNC counted its losses for the month on Old Baldy.

 

Aftermath

 

Through July 21st, the tally showed 39 killed, 234 wounded, and 84 missing for the UNC. An estimated 1,093 PVA were killed or wounded.

 

Third battle of Old Baldy

 

During the Battle of Old Baldy, 38th Infantry Regiment, 2nd U.S. Infantry Division would engage the PVA. Hispanic American Private Eulogio Santiago-Figueroa, 38th Infantry Regiment, 2nd U.S. Infantry Division, was wounded by fragments from a PVA artillery shell and evacuated.

 

By the end of July, the rain had eased and the 23rd Infantry Regiment again sought to secure complete control of Old Baldy. The PVA forces located on the crest were thought to have an estimated defensive force of two platoons. The MLR began the assault with artillery and mortar preparatory fires on the PVA positions. Next, the UN’s 23rd Infantry Regiment sent two reinforced companies up the slopes for the assault. As the 2nd Division forces edged toward the PVA defenses, they used small arms fire and hand grenades as closed on the trenches. After bitter hand-to-hand combat, the two companies finally gained the crest of Old Baldy.

 

Early on August 1st, they dug in. In preparation for the customary PVA counterattack, 200 flares were distributed around the UNC positions. 42 UN air sorties were flown during the day in support of the UN defensive positions. That night, the PVA sent it first mortar onto Old Baldy. Next, their artillery fire was hitting the crest. The PVA forces dropped an estimated 2,500 rounds on the 23rd Regiment’s elements. PVA counterattacks on Old Baldy were driven off.

 

On August 2nd, UN forces buried mines, built bunkers, and placed additional barbed wire. The UN forces’ defensive positions were now strengthened to hold Old Baldy. By August 4th, extremely heavy and effective UN MLR artillery fire broke up another PVA assault on Old Baldy.

 

The Fourth battle of Old Baldy – October 5th-7th

 

The Fourth battle of Old Baldy fought from October 5th-through October 7th, was more of the same. Fighting, killing, and dying remained a constant.

 

Fifth battle of Old Baldy – March 23–26, 1953

The Colombiano Batallón or Battalion insignia used during the Korean War

 

Colombia was the only Latino Américano country that participated in the UN forces in Korea. A frigate, the ARC Almirante Padilla and an infantry batallón with 1080 men were sent to join the UN Forces in August 1951 C.E. The Colombiano ground forces had been awarded for their exemplary performance in previous fighting and combat, Operations Nomad, Thunderbolt, Climber (Hill 400) and Bárbula (Hill 180) with Presidential Unit Citations from the U.S. and South Korea and U.S. Legion of Merit, Silver Stars and Bronze Stars awarded to the men.

 

At the time of Old Baldy, the Colombiano Batallón was part of the 7th Division under Major-General Wayne C. Smith. The Colombiano unit was the fourth battalion in the 31st Regiment commanded by Colonel William Kern who had ordered Teniente-Coronel Alberto Ruíz Novoa, the Colombiano commander to relieve the Regiment's 1st Battalion on Old Baldy.

 

The Colombiano Batallón had just been engaged in the Battle of Yeoncheon Hill (Bárbula) in which its troops attacked the PVA’s outpost, 500m from the enemy's main defense line, while carrying out preliminary duties at Mageo-ri, northwest of Yeoncheon.

 

Action - Hill 180

 

At dawn the Colombiano Batallón Compañía C initiated an operation to capture Hill 180. The PVA outpost was strongly built and Compañía C faced stiff resistance. Regimental Intelligence had failed. The attack should have been carried out by at least one full battalion, not just one company.

 

Aftermath

 

Intercepted PVA communications had confirmed the struggle and hand-to-hand combat. Compañía C had been hit hard and suffered 11 men killed, 43 wounded, and 10 missing in action (MIA). After capturing Hill 180, Compañía C destroyed the PVA's defense facilities. The casualties had been too high for Compañía C. They could not hold the position and were ordered to retreat.

 

Two days later on August the 6th, the Batallón received orders for Old Baldy.

 

On their new defensive positions post, Compañía A was placed with Compañía D and Compañía B, going west to east. Compañía C was placed behind both, in an area located between them. The fourth Compañía of the Colombiano Batallón was used to fill in the missing men in the other three Compañías. This meant that the entire Batallón was deployed in the frontline. A concerned Teniente-Coronel Ruíz Novoa asked Colonel Kern for reserve troops. A U.S. Company from the Regiment was soon assigned to the Batallón as a reserve unit.

 

Teniente Alfredo Forero Parra, Compañía B on Old Baldy recounted what a U.S. soldier had told him. "Lieutenant, we've been here for five days and the troops we replaced lasted here just about the same. This is a real cemetery. It's been taken and recovered by us about a hundred times. Our men are rotated about every five to eight days because it's hit hard by enemy fire causing innumerable casualties, demoralization and sheer tiredness."

 

Yes, it was to be more of the same. The order of the day, every day on Old Baldy, would be fighting, killing, and dying.

 

Battle of Heartbreak Ridge

 

On August 10, 1952 C.E., the U.S. Army’s 27th Infantry Regiment near Heartbreak Ridge took advantage of the cover and concealment in tunnel positions located about 40 yards from the NKPA.

 

Oliver G. Martínez was born March 23, 1931 C.E. He was U.S. MARINE CORPS PFC and casualty of the Korean War. He died in Korea on August 13, 1952 C.E. His home was in Santa Fé, Santa Fé, New Mexico.

 

New Mexico U.S. Military Fatal Hispano Casualties of the Korean War

Name

Service

 Rank 

Birthdate (YYYYMMDD)

Home of Record:

City County

Incident or Death Date (YYYYMMDD)

Remains Recovered

Martínez Oliver G

Marine Corps

PFC

19310323

Santa Fé

Santa Fé

19520813

Y

 

Ismael A. Acosta was born 1927 C.E. He was U.S. ARMY Corporal and casualty of the Korean War. He died in Korea on August 14, 1952 C.E. His home was in Grant, New Mexico.

 

New Mexico U.S. Military Fatal Hispano Casualties of the Korean War

Name

Service

 Rank 

Birthdate (YYYYMMDD)

Home of Record:

City County

Incident or Death Date (YYYYMMDD)

Remains Recovered

Acosta Ismael A 

ARMY

CPL

19270000

Unknown

Grant

19520814

N

 

Eutiquio J. Luján was born 1926 C.E. He was U.S. ARMY Sergeant First Class and casualty of the Korean War MIA. He died in Korea on August 29, 1952 C.E. Declared Dead-12/31/53. His home was in Mora, New Mexico.

 

He enlisted in the Army and served during the Korean War. Luján held the rank of Sergeant First Class. Occupation or specialty was Light Weapons Assault Crewman. Service number was 38579608. He served with Company A, 1st Battalion, 5th Infantry RCT.

 

CASUALTY CIRCUMSTANCES: Luján was declared missing and ultimately declared dead on August 29, 1952. Incident location was North Korea. Recorded circumstances attributed to: "MIA Missing in Action Declared Dead."

 

REMEMBERED and MEMORIALS: Buried or memorialized at Courts of the Missing at the Honolulu Memorial.

 

AWARDS and COMMENDATIONS: Listed are some of the awards, medals and commendations that Sergeant First Class Luján either received or may have been qualified for:  Purple Heart  Combat Infantryman Badge Korean Service Medal  National Defense Service Medal  Republic of Korea Presidential Unit Citation Republic of Korea War Service Medal  UN Service Medal  Distinguished Unit Citation Good Conduct Medal

 

New Mexico U.S. Military Fatal Hispano Casualties of the Korean War

Name

Service

 Rank 

Birthdate (YYYYMMDD)

Home of Record:

City County

Incident or Death Date (YYYYMMDD)

Remains Recovered

Luján Eutiquio J

ARMY

SFC

19260000

Unknown

Mora

19520829

N

 

Juan Benito Córdova was born February 11, 1931 C.E. He was U.S. MARINE CORPS PFC and casualty of the Korean War. He died in Korea on September 5, 1952 C.E. His home was in Llano, Taos, New Mexico.

 

New Mexico U.S. Military Fatal Hispano Casualties of the Korean War

Name

Service

 Rank 

Birthdate (YYYYMMDD)

Home of Record:

City County

Incident or Death Date (YYYYMMDD)

Remains Recovered

Córdova Juan Benito

Marine Corps

PFC

19310211

Llano

Taos

19520905

Y

 

José González was born August 9, 1931 C.E. He was U.S. MARINE CORPS Sergeant and casualty of the Korean War. He died in Korea on September 10, 1952 C.E. His home was in Raton, Colfax, New Mexico.

 

Dennis Sisneros was born January 11, 1934 C.E. He was U.S. MARINE CORPS Corporal and casualty of the Korean War. He died in Korea on September 10, 1952 C.E. His home was in Bernalillo, Sandoval, New Mexico.

 

New Mexico U.S. Military Fatal Hispano Casualties of the Korean War

Name

Service

 Rank 

Birthdate (YYYYMMDD)

Home of Record:

City County

Incident or Death Date (YYYYMMDD)

Remains Recovered

González José    

Marine Corps

SGT

19310809

Raton

Colfax

19520910

Y

Sisneros Dennis

Marine Corps

CPL

19340111

Bernalillo

Sandoval

19520910

Y

 

Battle of Heartbreak Ridge September 13th-October 15, 1951 C.E.

 

The Battle of Heartbreak Ridge was fought from September 13th through October 15, 1951 C.E. It was to be one of several major engagements in the hills of North Korea. It took place a few miles north of the 38th parallel, near Chorwon. It was to be a month-long ordeal.

 

Background

 

After withdrawing from Bloody Ridge, NKPA forces had set up new positions just 1,500 yards away on a seven-mile long hill mass. NKPA defenses were even more formidable at this locale than they had been on Bloody Ridge.

 

The U.S. 2nd Infantry Division's acting commander, Brigadier-General Thomas deShazo, and his immediate superior, Major-General Clovis E. Byers, the X Corps commander, seriously underestimated the strength of the NKPA position. Brigadier-General deShazo had ordered a single infantry regiment, the 23rd Infantry Regiment, and its attached French Battalion, to make what would prove to be an ill-conceived assault straight up Heartbreak's heavily fortified slopes.

 

Actions - Initial attempts to take the ridge

 

All three of the 2nd Division's, the 9th, 23rd and 38th infantry regiments would participate. They would take the brunt of the combat, along with the attached French Battalion.

 

The attack began on September 13th and quickly deteriorated into a familiar pattern. First, American aircraft, tanks, and artillery pummeled the ridge for hours on end, turning the already barren hillside into a cratered moonscape. This was followed by the 23rd Infantry Regiment's infantrymen scrambling up the mountain's rocky slopes, attacking one enemy bunker after another by direct assault. Those lucky enough to have survived to reach the crest arrived exhausted and low on ammunition. Tired, hungry, and exhausted they waited for the next PVA onslaught.

 

Not long after, the inevitable NKPA counterattack would come. The UN forces would be hit by wave after wave of NKPA determined to recapture the lost ground at any cost. Many of these counterattacks were conducted at night. The NKPA were able to bring up fresh troops from under the shelter of neighboring hills. Battles were begun by bombings, shelling, and machinegun fire, were inevitably followed with grenades, rifles. Trench knives and fists were the final touch as the formal military engagements degenerated into desperate hand-to-hand combat. As the dawn broke, it revealed whether the defenders or attackers were in possession of the mountaintop.

 

The Battle of Heartbreak Ridge progressed for two weeks. UN units could only be committed piecemeal. Because of the constricting terrain and the narrow confines of the objectives, UN forces were sent in one platoon, a company, or a battalion at a time. Once a unit could no longer stand the strain, replacement units would take its place. This pace continued until, the 23rd Infantry Regiment as a whole, was fairly well shattered and just a shell of its former self.

 

Aftermath

 

Several units up to company size, consisting of 100-200 men, were completely wiped out. The UN employed massive artillery barrages, airstrikes, and tank shelling in attempts to drive the NKPA off the ridge. The NKPA proved extremely difficult to dislodge.

 

Luís Tapia Orlando was born 1931 C.E. He was U.S. ARMY PFC and casualty of the Korean War. He died in Korea on September 16, 1952 C.E. His home was in Guadalupe, New Mexico.

 

New Mexico U.S. Military Fatal Hispano Casualties of the Korean War

Name

Service

 Rank 

Birthdate (YYYYMMDD)

Home of Record:

City County

Incident or Death Date (YYYYMMDD)

Remains Recovered

Orlando Tapia Luís

ARMY

PFC

19310000

Unknown

Guadalupe

19520916

Y

Benito V. Valdéz was born 1929 C.E. He was U.S. ARMY PFC and casualty of the Korean War. He died in Korea on September 20, 1952 C.E. His home was in Santa Fé, New Mexico.

 

Alejandro González was born March 17, 1931 C.E. He was U.S. MARINE CORPS PFC and casualty of the Korean War. He died in Korea on September 20, 1952 C.E. His home was in Roy, Harding, New Mexico.

 

New Mexico U.S. Military Fatal Hispano Casualties of the Korean War

Name

Service

 Rank 

Birthdate (YYYYMMDD)

Home of Record:

City County

Incident or Death Date (YYYYMMDD)

Remains Recovered

Valdéz Benito V

ARMY

PFC

19290000

Unknown

Santa Fé

19520920

Y

González Alejandro

Marine Corps

PFC

19310317

Roy

Harding

19520920

Y

 

Willie N. Estrada was born 1929 C.E. He was U.S. ARMY Sergeant and casualty of the Korean War. He died in Korea on September 22, 1952 C.E. His home was in Otero, New Mexico.

 

New Mexico U.S. Military Fatal Hispano Casualties of the Korean War

Name

Service

 Rank 

Birthdate (YYYYMMDD)

Home of Record:

City County

Incident or Death Date (YYYYMMDD)

Remains Recovered

Estrada Willie N  

ARMY

SGT

19290000

Unknown

Otero

19520922

Y

 

Actions - Regroup and re-plan

 

Preliminaries

 

A new commander of 2nd Division called a halt to the failures of Heartbreak Ridge.

On September 27th, U.S. Major-General Robert Nicholas Young insisted that American planners reconsidered their strategy. Simply put, as long as the NKPA could continue to reinforce and resupply their garrison on the ridge, it would be nearly impossible for the Americans to take the mountain. The 2nd Division after recognizing its failures crafted a new plan. It called for a full division assault on the valleys and hills adjacent to Heartbreak. This was necessary to cut the ridge off from further reinforcement.

 

The 2nd Division's 72nd Tank Battalion was to spearhead the new offensive. Its mission was to push up the Mundung-ni Valley west of Heartbreak and destroy enemy supply dumps in the vicinity of the town of Mundung-ni.

The bold plan could not be accomplished until a way was found to get the 72nd's M4A3E8 Sherman tanks into the valley. The problem was with the only existing road. It was little more than a track which could not bear the weight of the tanks. In addition, it was heavily mined and blocked by a six-foot high rock barrier built by the NKPA. The 2nd Division's 2nd Engineer Combat Battalion were employed on the road project using explosives, shovels, and forced to brave NKPA fire while clearing the obstacles and building an improved roadway.

 

While the2nd Engineer Combat Battalion did its job, the 2nd Division's three infantry regiments, the 9th, 23rd, and 38th, launched coordinated assaults on Heartbreak Ridge and the adjacent hills.

 

Enríque Vigil was born January 5, 1931 C.E. He was U.S. MARINE CORPS PFC and casualty of the Korean War. He died in Korea on October 7, 1952 C.E. His home was in Española, New Mexico.

 

New Mexico U.S. Military Fatal Hispano Casualties of the Korean War

Name

Service

 Rank 

Birthdate (YYYYMMDD)

Home of Record:

City County

Incident or Death Date (YYYYMMDD)

Remains Recovered

Vigil Enríque

Marine Corps

PFC

19310105

Española

Multiple

19521007

N

 

Main thrust

 

By October 10th, all preparations had been made for the main operation. By October 11th, the U.S. 2nd Division’s convoy started advancing into the valley. It was led by more than 30 tanks and supported by artillery and UN aircraft. The NKPA forces were taken by surprise at the sudden onslaught of a battalion of UN tanks racing up the valley. By coincidence, this came just as the PVA’s 204th Division was moving up to relieve the NKPA on Heartbreak.

 

The PVA unit dispatched by the 68th Army’s Commander Niansheng Wen was the 610th Regiment of the 204th Division. It was to prevent the Americans from reaching the town of Mundung-ni at all costs. The regiment's mission included reinforcement of NKPA defense along the valley against a possible American armored offensive.

 

The U.S. 2nd Division began its attack before the PVA could dig in. They were caught in the open.

 

Aftermath

The PVA division suffered heavy casualties from the American tanks which caused great damage. This, as the armored vehicles penetrated to a depth of 6 km of the PVA defense lines. The PVA’s 610th Regiment did manage to damage five Sherman tanks before the UN forces halted their offensive.

Action - Battles for Hill 635.8 and Hill 709.6

 

On October 12th, the U.S. 2nd Division began an airborne and artillery bombardment of Hill 635.8 and Hill 709.6 which lasted for two hours. Next, the UN 23rd Infantry Regiment led by 48 tanks, assaulted PVA defensive positions. The PVA’s 610th Regiment had learned American battle tactics from the previous day. Previous to the battle, they had reinforced the anti-tank trenches flanking the road that runs through the Mundung-ni Valley. In addition, a battalion of anti-tank guns was assigned to the regiment. Other hardware including 49 infantry guns, recoilless guns, and rocket launchers were also distributed among the front-line soldiers. Soon, the PVA forces fired on the advancing American tanks at point-blank-range.

 

Aftermath

 

By 1600hrs, before the 23rd was able to halt the assault it had paid a high cost. PVA forces had destroyed or damaged 18 tanks. The 23rd Infantry Regiment did not assault the hills on the next day.

 

Action - Attack on hills 97, 742.8, 650, 932.8 and 922

 

Starting from October 13th, the ROKA 8th Division launched its attack on hills 97, 742.8, 650, 932.8 and 922. These battles were subsequently known to be brutal and costly. One example was a company of the PVA 610th Regiment defending hill 932.8. Under the attack of four ROKA battalions, the company resisted for four days to the last man before the ROKA took the hill on its 11th assault.

 

Aftermath

 

ROKA took hill 932.8.

 

The UN French forces had been fighting hard before they captured the last communist bastion on the ridge on October 13th.

 

Action – Battles in Mundung-ni Valley

 

On October 14th, eight Sherman tanks in arrow formation attacked the NKPA positions along Mundung-ni Valley. The crossfire of PVA anti-tank guns knocked out all of the UN tanks.

 

Isidro E. Trujillo was born 1927 C.E. He was U.S. ARMY Sergeant and casualty of the Korean War. He died in Korea on October 14, 1952 C.E. His home was in Guadalupe, New Mexico.

 

New Mexico U.S. Military Fatal Hispano Casualties of the Korean War

Name

Service

 Rank 

Birthdate (YYYYMMDD)

Home of Record:

City County

Incident or Death Date (YYYYMMDD)

Remains Recovered

Trujillo Isidro E

ARMY

SGT

19270000

Unknown

Guadalupe

19521014

N

 

Lee R. Martínez was born 1930 C.E. He was U.S. ARMY PFC and casualty of the Korean War. He died in Korea on October 16, 1952 C.E. His home was in Curry, New Mexico.

 

New Mexico U.S. Military Fatal Hispano Casualties of the Korean War

Name

Service

 Rank 

Birthdate (YYYYMMDD)

Home of Record:

City County

Incident or Death Date (YYYYMMDD)

Remains Recovered

Martínez Lee R

ARMY

PFC

19300000

Unknown

Curry

19521016

Y

 

Juan B. Vigil was born 1931 C.E. He was U.S. ARMY Corporal and casualty of the Korean War. He died in Korea on October 17, 1952 C.E. His home was in Río Arriba, New Mexico.

 

New Mexico U.S. Military Fatal Hispano Casualties of the Korean War

Name

Service

 Rank 

Birthdate (YYYYMMDD)

Home of Record:

City County

Incident or Death Date (YYYYMMDD)

Remains Recovered

Vigil Juan B

ARMY

CPL

19310000

Unknown

Río Arriba

19521017

Y

 

On October 19th, two more Sherman tanks were lost due to mines.

 

During these five days of action, the UN tanks made their way up and down the Mundung-ni Valley. They over-ran supply dumps and pounded PVA troop concentrations. The UN tanks also destroyed approximately 350 bunkers on Heartbreak and in the surrounding hills and valleys. A smaller tank-infantry team scoured the Sat'ae-ri Valley to the east of the ridge completed an encirclement, eliminating any hope of reinforcement for the beleaguered NKPA on Heartbreak.

 

Aftermath

 

After 30 days of combat, the Americans and French eventually gained the upper hand and secured Heartbreak Ridge. These armored tank thrusts had turned the tide of the battle, though 38 of the armored vehicles were destroyed and nine were damaged. The Sherman tanks had been unable to penetrate through the Mundung-ni Valley and reach the town of Mundung-ni. In reality, the failure of the Allied UN offensive inside the valley and on the heights above gave to the NKPA one of the few victorious actions during the last phase of the war.

The defense of the Mundung-ni Valley is known today in the DPRK as the Battle of Height 1211. It is celebrated today as a great DPRK victory which claims an inflated total of 29,000 enemy casualties, 60 tanks destroyed, and 40 airplanes shot down. In actuality, both sides suffered high casualties. There were more than 3,700 American and French casualties and an estimated 25,000 NKPA and PVA casualties.

 

These losses made a deep impression on the UN and U.S. commands and they came to a decision. Battles like Heartbreak Ridge were not worth the high cost for the relatively small amount of terrain captured.

 

The UN offensives, however, were to continue with equally high casualty rates for the 1st Cavalry in Operation Commando, and the 24th Division in Operation Nomad-Polar, which was the last major offensive conducted by UN forces in the Korean War.

 

Joe F. González was born 1930 C.E. He was U.S. ARMY PFC and casualty of the Korean War. He died in Korea on October 28, 1952 C.E. His home was in Mckinley, New Mexico.

 

Jenaro R. Calderon was born 1930 C.E. He was U.S. ARMY PFC and casualty of the Korean War. He died in Korea on October 28, 1952 C.E. His home was in Grant, New Mexico.

 

New Mexico U.S. Military Fatal Hispano Casualties of the Korean War

Name

Service

 Rank 

Birthdate (YYYYMMDD)

Home of Record:

City County

Incident or Death Date (YYYYMMDD)

Remains Recovered

González Joe F

ARMY

PFC

19300000

Unknown

Mckinley

19521028

Y

Calderon Jenaro R   

ARMY

PFC

19300000

Unknown

Grant

19521028

Y

 

At Eniwetok Atoll in the Pacific Ocean, the first hydrogen bomb, named Mike, is exploded on November 1, 1952 C.E.

On November 4, 1952 C.E., the popular newcomer to American politics, General Dwight D. Eisenhower the former WWII European commander, gained an easy victory over his Democratic challenger for President of the U.S. Adlai E. Stevenson. The Electoral College vote was 442 to 89. Many believed that he won due to his role in winning World War II.

Manuel Mendoza was born June 26, 1933 C.E. He was U.S. MARINE CORPS PFC and casualty of the Korean War. He died in Korea on November 18, 1952 C.E. His home was in Silver City, Grant, New Mexico.

 

New Mexico U.S. Military Fatal Hispano Casualties of the Korean War

Name

Service

 Rank 

Birthdate (YYYYMMDD)

Home of Record:

City County

Incident or Death Date (YYYYMMDD)

Remains Recovered

Mendoza Manuel  

Marine Corps

PFC

19330626

 Silver City

Grant

19521118

Y

 

Abel Baca was born 1931 C.E. He was U.S. ARMY PFC and casualty of the Korean War. He died in Korea on November 19, 1952 C.E. His home was in Santa Fé, New Mexico.

 

New Mexico U.S. Military Fatal Hispano Casualties of the Korean War

Name

Service

 Rank 

Birthdate (YYYYMMDD)

Home of Record:

City County

Incident or Death Date (YYYYMMDD)

Remains Recovered

Baca Abel   

ARMY

PFC

19310000

Unknown

Santa Fé

19521119

Y

 

Herman Chávira was born April 13, 1931 C.E. He was U.S. MARINE CORPS Corporal and casualty of the Korean War. He died in Korea on November 22, 1952 C.E. His home was in Albuquerque, Bernalillo, New Mexico.

 

New Mexico U.S. Military Fatal Hispano Casualties of the Korean War

Name

Service

 Rank 

Birthdate (YYYYMMDD)

Home of Record:

City County

Incident or Death Date (YYYYMMDD)

Remains Recovered

Chávira Herman

Marine Corps

CPL

19310413

Albuquerque

Bernalillo

19521122

N

 

President-elect Dwight D. Eisenhower traveled to Korea to try and end the conflict on November 29, 1952 C.E.

Alfredo B. Olguín was born 1931 C.E. He was U.S. ARMY PFC and casualty of the Korean War. He died in Korea on January 6, 1953 C.E. His home was in València, New Mexico.

 

New Mexico U.S. Military Fatal Hispano Casualties of the Korean War

Name

Service

 Rank 

Birthdate (YYYYMMDD)

Home of Record:

City County

Incident or Death Date (YYYYMMDD)

Remains Recovered

Olguín Alfredo B

ARMY

PFC

19310000

Unknown

València

19530106

Y

 

Pablo Torres was born December 24, 1929 C.E. He was U.S. MARINE CORPS PFC and casualty of the Korean War. He died in Korea on February 3, 1953 C.E. His home was in Mountainair, Torrance, New Mexico.

 

New Mexico U.S. Military Fatal Hispano Casualties of the Korean War

Name

Service

 Rank 

Birthdate (YYYYMMDD)

Home of Record:

City County

Incident or Death Date (YYYYMMDD)

Remains Recovered

Torres Pablo

Marine Corps

PFC

19291224

Mountainair

Torrance

19530203

Y

 

Eppie J Ortega was born 1931 C.E. He was U.S. ARMY PFC and casualty of the Korean War. He died in Korea on February 8, 1953 C.E. His home was in Bernalillo, New Mexico.

 

New Mexico U.S. Military Fatal Hispano Casualties of the Korean War

Name

Service

 Rank 

Birthdate (YYYYMMDD)

Home of Record:

City County

Incident or Death Date (YYYYMMDD)

Remains Recovered

Ortega Eppie J

ARMY

PFC

19310000

Unknown

Bernalillo

19530208

Y

 

Gilberto Montoya was born 1931 C.E. He was U.S. ARMY PVT and casualty of the Korean War. He died in Korea on February 22, 1953 C.E. His home was in Bernalillo, New Mexico.

 

New Mexico U.S. Military Fatal Hispano Casualties of the Korean War

Name

Service

 Rank 

Birthdate (YYYYMMDD)

Home of Record:

City County

Incident or Death Date (YYYYMMDD)

Remains Recovered

Montoya Gilberto

ARMY

PVT

19310000

Unknown

Bernalillo

19530222

Y

 

The Colombiano Battalion on Old Baldy

 

On March 20th, artillery fire was felt all over the 31st Regiment. The Colombiano Batallón was on Old Baldy in the middle with 2nd Battalion to its left and 3rd Battalion was on Pork Chop Hill. Intercepted communications from the PVA command and deserters confirmed the imminence of the attack, Colonel William Kern remained skeptical of the Colombianos’ fighting ability.

 

On March the 21st, five bodies, four Colombianos and an American, were exposed by the PVA on the crest of Hill 180. The PVA wanted to tempt the Colombianos in trying to recover them. The Colombiano Comandante ordered a rescue mission by volunteers from Compañía C. Privado Alejandro Martínez Roa reached the crest, deactivated a mine under one of the bodies, descended with one of the corpses, escaped enemy fire and when he encountered other Colombiano tropas, returned to the crest with Cabo Pedro Limas Medina and the patrol and rescued the others. The heroic action was rewarded with four Silver Stars.

 

On the 22nd the undermining of the Colombiano position on Old Baldy was increased by the PVA. More than 2000 rounds of cannon fire was dropped over the area.

 

Action - Fifth battle of Old Baldy – March 23rd-March 26, 1953 C.E.

 

Hiliberto García was born 1930 C.E. He was U.S. ARMY Corporal and casualty of the Korean War. He died in Korea on March 23, 1953 C.E.  His home was in Mora, New Mexico.

 

New Mexico U.S. Military Fatal Hispano Casualties of the Korean War

Name

Service

 Rank 

Birthdate (YYYYMMDD)

Home of Record:

City County

Incident or Death Date (YYYYMMDD)

Remains Recovered

García Hiliberto

ARMY

CPL

19300000

Unknown

Mora

19530323

Y

 

Louis Martínez was born 1930 C.E. He was U.S. ARMY PFC and casualty of the Korean War. He died in Korea on March 25, 1953 C.E. His home was in Colfax, New Mexico.

 

New Mexico U.S. Military Fatal Hispano Casualties of the Korean War

Name

Service

 Rank 

Birthdate (YYYYMMDD)

Home of Record:

City County

Incident or Death Date (YYYYMMDD)

Remains Recovered

Martínez Louis

ARMY

PFC

19300000

Unknown

Colfax

19530325

N

 

By March the 23rd, Compañía B had been on the line of fire for 11 days. Due to this, Colonel Kern ordered a rotation of Compañía B with Compañía C. Teniente-Coronel Ruíz objected to the order citing his concern that with a PVA attack expected on Old Baldy he considered it a mistake to move his tropas. Ruíz also knew that Compañía C had earlier been hit very hard on Hill 180 and he did not want to expose them yet, to more heavy fire. But Kern kept the order and the Companies started rotation. At about 15:00, the rotation movement began. Men were eager to rotate as soon as they heard the new orders. Heavy enemy fire made it difficult for Compañía C to advance toward its new position. Once again, Compañía C began receiving heavy losses.

 

Meanwhile, Compañía B was completely demoralized. It had been under constant artillery fire since its arrival. Teniente Alfredo Forero Parra reported that "By that day our positions were seriously weakened by the enemy artillery fire. The position for my men was on the crest of Old Baldy. We were the Second Pelotón or Platoon in Compañía B.

 

Past noon, I received orders to prepare my men to be relieved by Compañía C, next to us. All of us, from our combat positions were anxious to be relieved, but Compañía C did not arrive. I was convinced we were in for a major attack so I went and spoke with American tank commander which supported our position, and I convinced him to give us a .30 machine gun in order to enhance our defense. We had everything ready, including the flamethrower assigned to us."

 

The PVA 141st Division, 423rd Regiment’s 1st Battalion was selected to assault Old Baldy. Commanded by Hou Yung-chun, The Unit's 3rd Company would lead the attack. The PVA Unit was situated directly facing the battered Colombian Compañía B. At 20:30, Compañía A on Dale was under attack from heavy fire. With support from Compañías B and C, after a tenacious resistance Compañía A had to give up its position.

 

Action - Pork Chop Hill

 

PVA Attack

 

Using the same heavy fire power, the PVA hit Pork Chop Hill hard. Soon, the U.S. 3rd Battalion could not hold its position and lost Pork Chop. Now, thinking that the main objective of the PVA’s attack had been Pork Chop Hill, Colonel Kern sent in two companies to reinforce the men of the 3rd Battalion. Two hours later, the fighting at Pork Chop diminished.

 

Aftermath

 

With the reinforcements received from the Regiment Command the 3rd Battalion had retaken its position on the Hill.

 

Action - Old Baldy

 

"Forty minutes after the attack on Dale and Pork Chop Hill, tremendously heavy artillery and mortar fire fell on Old Baldy. The earth shook as if in an earthquake accompanied by flashing and deafening explosions all around Compañía B's position. The fleeting silhouettes of men, weapons and weakened fortifications seemed ghosts within the enemy bursts. Cries of anguish and agony mingled with our own and enemy machine gun rattle. The battle raged at every moment. We could hear at a short distance the firing of 60 and 82 mm. mortars from the enemy. Communications were lost, no one answered, not even the escuadrón comandantes.

 

Suddenly, I was reported the death of my Pelotón Sargento or Sergeant replacement, Azael Salazar Osorio, then the commander of the third escuadrilla or squad, Cabo José Narváez Moncayo, who had been severed by the waist and shouted near death, to be lifted by the feet to relieve his suffering. Nothing could be done for him. At my battle station the death of Cabo Ernesto González Varela, Comandante of the second escuadrón, was atrocious. We were almost touching elbows. He fired his machine gun on an onslaught of Chinese who came upon us when a bazooka shell hit him on the face, leaving his head tangling on his back. I thought I was living a nightmare or horror movie until new explosions on my bunker brought me back to reality. I encouraged my men and I continued to communicate with machine guns and gave instructions for a Cabo to take out the flamethrower and prepare himself to shoot the enemy when they appeared."

 

The attack was unsuccessful.

 

The PVA were attacking again. "A few minutes later, two soldados came running to my trench shouting, the Chinese are coming, the Chinese are coming! The enemy was trying to overcome our position shouting and shooting their machine guns and throwing grenades." They began breaking through the defense and heading for Compañía B’s trenches. At that moment, Compañía C was arriving to relieve Compañía B with no knowledge of the ammo deposits, trench and foxhole distribution, and defense sectors. Compañía B still had command over the position on the crest of the hill, but half of the men were now Compañía C. The men of Compañía C been hit hard earlier on Hill 180. These men remained under the influence of that nightmare. Now, on Old Baldy they were unable to fully come to occupy their combat positions.

 

Teniente-Coronel Ruíz had been right. The main attack was not Pork Chop Hill, but Old Baldy, as Colonel Kern had believed.

 

Action - PVA Moves Against Hill Dale and Old Baldy

 

Meanwhile, a PVA regiment had launched an attack on Hill Dale. Regimental command was still distracted by a previous attack that touched the U.S. battalion adjacent to the Colombiano Compañía. Soon, in the darkness, another PVA regiment began its move toward Old Baldy.

 

Action - PVA Attack on Old Baldy

 

The previous days’ bombings of Old Baldy had weakened the Colombiano positions there. It had destroyed much of the defensive positions’ barbed wire barrier and mines. In short, the defenses were now open to a direct attack. The situation for the Colombiano units’ defense positions could not be weaker. The battle began as the Colombianos were taking their assault positions. A new rain of artillery shells fell upon Compañía B's position on the crest of the hill. The attack was being conducted by a full PVA Battalion, reinforced by two additional companies. Only three Compañías of the Colombiano Battalion stood against them, A, B, and C.

 

All night, these UN forces fought fiercely against too great a PVA force. They did so in the midst  of confusion brought on by darkness and of two recently combined Colombiano units, half of Compañía B and half of Compañía C, unfamiliar with one another. Understanding his battle conditions, Teniente-Coronel Ruíz advised his superiors of his intention to use the U.S. reserve company assigned to the Batallón in order to counterattack. This he felt would protect the tropas engaged in combat and allow him to retake the lost positions. The U.S. liaison officer advised that the reserves had been used to contain a PVA penetration on Pork Chop Hill. With no reserves with which to counterattack and fight back, the Colombiano Batallón was now on its own.

 

With the ferocity of the attack which had preceded this one on Old Baldy, Compañía A had been earlier forced to retreat. Yet, it remained determined to recover their lost defensive positions from the PVA. This they would attempt despite the lack of any backup or reinforcements. Compañías B and C, having been caught in the middle of the confusion of the rotation, could do nothing but try to survive.

 

Despite all of this adversity, the Colombiano tropas almost broke the force of the PVA’s assault. This was proven later by a communication intercepted by Division Intelligence. The PVA battalion commander, Hou Yung-chun, stated that the assault was unsuccessful and the capture of Hill 266, Old Baldy, was impossible. The PVA high command responded with orders to Hou Yung-chun to take the Hill or suffer the consequences. Moments later, they announced the dispatch of reinforcements.

 

As the number of PVA attackers increased, the defenders’ numbers were being reduced by casualties. Yet, the Colombianos fought on. The tremendous PVA numerical superiority’s advantages took hold it eventually wore down the efforts of the defending Colombiano tropas’. Their positions were depleted dramatically. But still, the PVA had to conquer the defensive positions’ trench-by-trench in fierce hand-to-hand combat.

 

At midnight, only one platoon had managed to reach the West View. It tried to help contain part of the ongoing attack. There the surviving Colombianos awaited reinforcements to retake the lost position, reinforcements which would never arrive.

 

By about 01:00, both parties believed that the other had captured the Hill and began bombing with heavy artillery fire. Both armies’ men were stranded on the battleground locked in hand-to-hand combat trying to maintain their positions. Despite the reality of having troops continuing to fight there the armies downloaded shells on them. Both friendly and enemy fire alike brought more casualties.

 

Alfredo Forero stated that "At 4:30 AM, we were only six men left in Compañía B's Second rifle Pelotón, with exhausted ammunition and harassed by the enemy. We made our way towards the tank path, losing three more men due to the continuous artillery fire."

 

"Before midnight, PVA tanks in the valley were removed, leaving free entrance to the enemy. A truck with our ammunition stopped at the entrance of the position on road in the valley. From it descended Tenientes Leónidas Parra and Miguel Ospina Rodríguez, the sappers and transmission officers, as a heavy fog covered the morning and we could hear sporadic gunshots and screams." Teniente Ospina had arrived with orders to try to restore communications with Batallón Command. The stark reality of Old Baldy’s condition nothing could be done.

 

At 8:00 a.m., the Colombianos asked a U.S. platoon which had just arrived for fire support in order to retake the lost hill, but after a short reconnaissance they withdrew. It was at this point, that the command of the Division ordered the hill abandoned and soon bombardment began on Old Baldy.

 

Aftermath

 

The Colombiano Batallón had been unable to get back its men behind lines, stranded, wounded or dead. The Batallón casualties were 95 killed, 97 wounded, and 30 missing. This constituted over 20% of the Batallón. The 7th Division estimated that the U.S. forces lost there were 307 killed. Its estimate of Chinese killed on Old Baldy was 750. Chinese forces claimed to have suffered 311 dead. The PVA 3rd company, 423rd regiment, 141st division were awarded the title "Hero Company of Old Bald Mountain."

 

In the end, both sides lost many men. From a strategic perspective, the battle lines ended up back to where they were in May 1952 C.E., before the first battle.

 

Lorenzo Baca was born November 26, 1928 C.E. He was U.S. MARINE CORPS PFC and casualty of the Korean War. He died in Korea on April 6, 1953 C.E. His home was in Albuquerque, Bernalillo, New Mexico.

 

New Mexico U.S. Military Fatal Hispano Casualties of the Korean War

Name

Service

 Rank 

Birthdate (YYYYMMDD)

Home of Record:

City County

Incident or Death Date (YYYYMMDD)

Remains Recovered

Baca Lorenzo 

Marine Corps

PFC

19281126

Albuquerque

Bernalillo

19530406

Y

 

Charlie D. Quintana was born 1930 C.E. He was U.S. ARMY PFC and casualty of the Korean War. He died in Korea on April 16, 1953 C.E. His home was in Curry, New Mexico.

 

New Mexico U.S. Military Fatal Hispano Casualties of the Korean War

Name

Service

 Rank 

Birthdate (YYYYMMDD)

Home of Record:

City County

Incident or Death Date (YYYYMMDD)

Remains Recovered

Quintana Charlie D

ARMY

SGT

19300000

Unknown

Curry

19530416

Y

 

Action - Outpost Harry

 

Background

 

Outpost Harry was a remote station located in an area approximately 60 miles north of Seoul. It was the most direct route to the ROK’s capital. Harry also blocked the PVA’s observation down the Kumwha Valley. More importantly, the Outpost’s position ensured the shielding of that portion of the MLR located in the Kumwha Valley from enemy direct fire. This made Harry a strategic "military Hot Spot." As a result, the PVA high command dearly desired it. The UNC viewed its defense and preservation as critical. If the UN forces were to lose the Outpost, the U.S. 8th Army would have had to withdraw to the next defensible line which was approximately 6 miles away

 

Politically speaking, should there be a PVA victory at Outpost Harry the Chinese appetite for more war might be whetted. At this point in time, the Korean War had disheartened the American public. It was at a place where it might accept an armistice on term less favorable to the Americans than would eventually the case.

 

Outpost Harry was located east of the Chorwon Valley in what was commonly referred to as the "Iron Triangle." Harry, which was over 400 yards from the MLR, was also higher than the MLR and located atop a tiny hill at an elevation of approximately 1,280 feet. This made supplying it much more difficult. A service road wound up to it from the MLR along an intermittent stream which led to the rear of the Outpost. There, a medical aid station and a supply point were located. From the supply point forward, some 400 yards to the top Harry, was the communication trench line. This communication line was joined to another trench which made a complete loop or circle around the Outpost. The line had a finger running along the Kumwha Valley’s eastern ridge, above the floor for about 100 yards. The trench line was deep enough for infantrymen to walk unseen by the enemy around the perimeter. It was also fortified with reinforced fighting bunkers, a command post, and a forward observation bunker. The Trench could accommodate approximately 150 infantrymen.

 

Harry’s sister outposts, Dick and Tom, were to the west. Outpost Dick was situated about 100 yards in front of the MLR. Tom was situated about 250-300 yards in front and below the MLR. There below the MLR was the floor of the valley. It was positioned some 320 yards south of a larger landmass occupied by the Chinese PVA called "Star Hill." It was also some 425 yards northeast of UNC positions.

The access route from the MLR to Harry was under constant enemy observation and fire. Harry received less close supporting fire from the MLR. Company 60mm mortars and the heavy machine guns did not have enough range to assist Harry. It was forced to rely more on artillery and heavy mortar companies. Dick and Tom could be provided with supporting MLR fire.

 

Each night, Outpost Harry was defended by only a single company of American or Greek soldiers. The Greek Expeditionary Force soldiers of the Sparta Battalion adapted the name Harry and called it Outpost "Haros." This is the modern day Greek equivalent of Charon Greek mythology's ferryman to the underworld of Hades. Five UNC companies, four U.S. and one Greek, took turns in defending the Outpost. Harry was seen by the PVA command as an easy capture, or so it was anticipated. It was on this terrain, under these battle conditions, and with these armaments and men that Harry was to be defended.

 

UN aerial reconnaissance of June 1st through June 8, 1953 C.E. indicated that the Chinese were building up PVA forces for a major offensive. These units were identified as the 74th Division’s 22nd and 221st Regiments.

 

During the 4 to 5 days before the initial Chinese attack of June 10, 1953 C.E. on Harry, PVA artillery and mortar fire increased on the Outpost during daylight hours. By the 5th day, artillery and mortar fire was up to an average 670 rounds from 275 five days earlier.

 

Rudolph R. Orozco was born 1932 C.E. He was U.S. ARMY PFC and casualty of the Korean War. He died in Korea on June 8, 1953 C.E. His home was in Bernalillo, New Mexico.

 

New Mexico U.S. Military Fatal Hispano Casualties of the Korean War

Name

Service

 Rank 

Birthdate (YYYYMMDD)

Home of Record:

City County

Incident or Death Date (YYYYMMDD)

Remains Recovered

Orozco Rudolph R

ARMY

PVT

19320000

Unknown

Bernalillo

19530608

Y

 

Also by June 8, 1953 C.E., the basic agreement over the Korean War POW issue was settled. Both sides in the Korean conflict agreed on the principle of voluntary repatriation.

 

Action - Initial Chinese Attack on Outpost Harry

 

When the PVA attack began there was fierce fighting over a period of eight days through June 18th. Most of this fighting occurred at night, under heavy mortar fire. More than 88,000 rounds of PVA artillery eventually fell on Harry. Waves of PVA forces, some 13,000 soldiers, moved into the Outpost's trench lines.

 

During the daylight hours, the UNC forces usually spent its time evacuating the dead and wounded, replacing the defending company’s forces, sending up resupplies, and repairing the fortified defensive positions. The daylight hours also brought PVA artillery, mortar, and sniper fire making repairs and reinforcement of defensive positions a dangerous task.

 

Early on June 10th, commander of the 15th Infantry Regiment’s K Company, Captain Martin A. Markley, had been briefed on an imminent attack. Ammo and communications were checked. Particular attention was paid to final protective fires ("FPF"). The MLR’s tactical plan for Unit was to set up FPF to be used in support of the infantry defensive positions at Outpost Harry, to protect it against the presumed oncoming, overwhelming PVA attack by the 74th Division’s 22nd and 221st Regiments.

The FPF "fire mission" request for artillery support was planned for the possibility of the Unit being overrun. All understood that this type of FPF was of absolute priority over any other kind of request. Given the size of the attacking force and its fighting capabilities, the MLR insisted upon a FPF as an immediately available preplanned barrier of direct and indirect fire. It was designed to provide Harry with close protection to its defensive positions and installations. The FPF was intended to impede the PVA 74th Division from movement into the UN defensive areas.

 

When the first attack occurred during that night, the Chinese reinforced PVA regiment of approximately 3,600 troops outnumbered Harry's defenders by 30 to 1 as they stormed the slopes of the Outpost. Soon, the PVA forces were penetrating its trenches, this despite an intense barrage of UN defensive firepower and the detonation of napalm. Now, K Company was forced undercover in bunkers. As agreed to earlier, Variable Time (VT) UN artillery was called in to stop the attacking PVA force.

 

Harry’s commander had set up the Final Protective Line. Pre-registered final protective fire coordinates were given so as to impede the assaulting force which at that point was about to overrun Harry’s defensive positions. All available artillery was to conduct Flash Fires directly onto the Outpost Hill using VT fuze shells. Once the barrage started, the artillery fuze munition would initiate an explosive function to detonate or release its contents, when its activation conditions were met. These artillery rounds exploded in the air rather than on impact. Once within proximity to Outpost Harry’s defensive positions, the PVA would take the brunt of it. Flash Fires and fierce hand-to-hand combat finally drove the PVA Chinese from Harry for the remainder of that night.

 

By the next morning of the 11th, only a dozen of Harry’s defenders were left that could still fight. All the other K Company troops had been severely wounded or killed. At this point, K Company was so depleted that they were immediately reinforced by a reserve platoon. Soon, they were replaced by another company of the 3rd Battalion. In addition to the 3rd battalion composite reserve, the 15th Infantry’s Companies "E" and "C" were committed to reinforce. A diversionary force, consisting of one platoon of tanks from Heavy Tank Company, 15th Infantry, and one platoon of infantry were also committed to the valley east of Harry to confuse the enemy. This tank-infantry team would later prove to be of great value in channeling the enemy attack.

 

During the battle, Company C exceeded the 2nd Chemical Mortar Battalion's record for the number of rounds fired in a single engagement, with a total of 6,082 rounds.

 

On the night of the 11th, the PVA began with another massive artillery and mortar barrage, this time on the 15th's Baker (B) Company and of the 5th RCT’s Baker (B) Company defended Harry. It continued through most of the night as PVA infantry crept in close through the artillery fire. They soon gained the trenches on the rear of the Outpost, bringing on bitter hand-to-hand fighting. The 5th RCT’s Company B was used to reinforce the defenders, as the PVA attempted to reinforce the initial successful assault through the night. By daybreak, at approximately 05:45, the Chinese again called off their assault and withdrew.

 

On the night of June 12 at 22:00, PVA artillery and mortar fire preceded an attack on the Outpost with the 5th RCT’s Able (A) Company and the 15th Infantry Regiment’s Love (L) Company defended Harry. A detachment from the 10th Combat Engineer Battalion was trapped on the Outpost while on a mine laying detail, acted in supported of these forces. The PVA finally made it into the Outpost trench, but could only remain there for a short time. They were eventually broken up by UNC defensive fires. The PVA were then forced to withdraw. Fighting ceased at 22:47.

 

At 02:08, PVA forces attacked again, but this time from the north, hitting northeast and northwest of the Outpost. Bitter hand-to-hand combat began fighting as the PVA gained the trench on the northern slope of the Outpost. Love Company soon reinforced the Outpost.

 

A platoon of tanks from the 64th Tank Battalion and one platoon of infantry which had been dispatched to the valley east of Outpost Harry operated successfully as a diversionary force. By 04:50 hours, the PVA were driven from the Outpost trenches and forced to withdraw. All action ceased with the exception of UNC counter battery and counter mortar fire.

 

The next day, the 5th RCT’s Charlie (C) Company took responsibility for Harry. On June 14th, very early that morning at approximately 02:55, PVA artillery and mortar fire open up on the Outpost. It preceded a PVA screening action against the Outpost from the east and west to provide a security operation to screen as an early warning to protect the assaulting force. This security operation failed to provide early and accurate warning of UN operations against the PVA troops assigned to recovery of their dead. The screening force was broken up by UNC defensive fires. Action became sporadic, with light PVA artillery and mortar fire falling on the Outpost and MLR. By 04:40 the PVA withdrew and all action ceased.

 

On June 15th, the 15th infantry’s Company G had their opportunity to defend Outpost Harry. It was about 01:25 when the PVA moved through friendly artillery and defensive fires and gained the trenches on the rear of the Outpost. Intense hand-to-hand fighting followed. By 02:22, UNC forces were still holding the Outpost, though the PVA had been further reinforced while a bitter hand-to-hand action was underway. The 15th Infantry’s Company E was then committed to reinforce Company G. One platoon from Heavy Tank Company and one platoon of Infantry were again dispatched as diversionary force. By 03:45 the PVA withdrew and action ceased. That same day, 15th Infantry’s Company A was committed to the defense of the Outpost. Fortunately, for them it turned out to be a quiet night.

 

The morning of the 16th, the regimental commander placed the Greek Expeditionary Forces "Spartan" Battalion in the area of the Outpost Harry sector. He did this in order to allow his U.S. battalions to refit and reorganize, as they had all suffered heavy casualties. During the night of June 16th, there was no significant action. This permitted much-needed engineer work on the outpost to be accomplished by Company P, Sparta Battalion.

During the day of the 17th, with assistance from 10th Combat Engineer Battalion’s Company B, engineering work continued on the Outpost. The engineers did not remain on the outpost overnight.

 

On June the 17th, agreement on the final Korean truce-demarcation line was finalized. Everyone but Syngman Rhee was pleased with the negotiations.

 

As a result, Syngman Rhee was pleased with the Korean truce negotiations and jeopardized them when he allowed the release and escape of twenty-seven thousand Korean POWs on June 18th. This angered North Koreans who wanted U.S. to take the responsibility to ensure that the negotiations would be carried out by Rhee. In one final offensive attack where seven thousand four hundred South Koreans were killed and U.S. forces endangered, the U.S. agreed to take responsibility in enforcing the agreement of the armistice.

 

Action - Outpost Harry

 

At around midnight on the morning of June 18th, the PVA returned. This time, they attacked Outpost Harry from the northeast and northwest. Once again, they moved through their own and UNC artillery and mortar fire. Soon, they were repelled and forced to withdraw, but they stayed in the area.

 

In the United States, the Rosenbergs were about to get their just rewards. The U.S. Federal Bureau of Prisons did not operate an execution chamber when the Rosenbergs were sentenced to death. They had to be transferred to New York State's Sing Sing Correctional Facility in Ossining, New York, for execution. Julius and Ethel Rosenberg were executed by electrocution by executioner Joséph Francel at sundown on June 19, 1953 C.E.

 

Julius and Ethel Rosenberg the parents of two young boys were executed for espionage. Their crime was conspiracy to commit espionage. Julius, a leader in the Young Communist League in the 1930s C.E., was first recruited by Russian agents in 1943 C.E. He recruited a number of other Americans, including Ethel's brother, David Greenglass. Julius and Greenglass provided the Russians with top-secret information, including details about the Manhattan Project. Greenglass, who was arrested in 1950 C.E., implicated Julius and Ethel. The couple's conviction was based largely on his testimony. Years later, Greenglass confessed that he had lied about his sister's involvement to save the lives of his wife and himself.

Marcus Tullius Cicero put it nicely when he said, “A nation can survive its fools, and even the ambitious. But it cannot survive treason from within. An enemy at the gates is less formidable, for he is known and carries his banner openly. But the traitor moves amongst those within the gate freely, his sly whispers rustling through all the alleys, heard in the very halls of government itself.” The Rosenbergs would whisper no more treason!

 

Action - Outpost Harry

 

At 02:40 the CPV attacked again from the north, once again under intense UN artillery and mortar fire. By 03:13, the PVA had made their way into the Outpost’s trenches on the northern slope. Soon, bitter hand-to-hand fighting began. The PVA continued making numerous attempts to reinforce through the protective artillery ring. The Sparta Battalion’s Company N was then committed to reinforce. The 15th Infantry Regiment’s Heavy Tank Company’s one platoon of tanks and Spartan Infantry’s one platoon were dispatched to the valley east of Outpost Harry as a diversionary force. By 04:02 the PVA were forced out of the Outpost’s trenches and all action ceased. The PVA then withdrew after having fired 22,000 rounds in support of this attack.

 

Aftermath

 

The Chinese PVA forces employed against Outpost Harry were tabulated by U.S. Intelligence Sections:

·       June 10 and June 11: one reinforced regiment (approximately 3,600 troops)

·       June 11 and June 12: one regiment (approximately 2,850 troops)

·       June 12 and June 13: one reinforced regiment

·       June 13 and June 14: an estimated 100 troops

·       June 14 and June 15: an estimated 120 troops

·       June 17 and June 18: one reorganized and reinforced regiment (approximately 3,000 troops)

 

During this period the entire PVA 74th Division had been committed against Outpost Harry. By the end of the engagement, it was considered combat ineffective. Rounds fired in support of their attack amounted to 88,810 rounds over 81mm in size. UNC mortar and artillery units in conjunction with friendly tank fires expended 368,185 rounds over 81mm in size.

 

Casualties

 

The 15th Infantry Regiment had 68 KIA, 343 WIA, 35 MIA. The KATUSA had 8 KIA, 51 WIA, 7 MIA. The Greek Expeditionary Force Sparta Battalion lost 15 KIA, 36 WIA, 1 MIA. Attached and supporting units of the 5th RCT suffered 13 KIA, 67 WIA, 1 MIA. The 10th Engineer Battalion lost 5 KIA, 23 WIA and the 39th FA lost 5 KIA, 13 WIA.

 

According to Chinese sources, the PVA 74th Division and other two divisions of 24 corps suffered total 2,038 casualties from May 27th through June 23rd.

Eladio M. Ortega was born 1932 C.E. He was U.S. ARMY Corporal and casualty of the Korean War. He died in Korea on June 24, 1953 C.E. His home was in Taos, New Mexico.

 

José A. Archuleta was born 1931 C.E. He was U.S. ARMY PFC and casualty of the Korean War. He died in Korea on June 24, 1953 C.E. His home was in Mora, New Mexico.

 

New Mexico U.S. Military Fatal Hispano Casualties of the Korean War

Name

Service

 Rank 

Birthdate (YYYYMMDD)

Home of Record:

City County

Incident or Death Date (YYYYMMDD)

Remains Recovered

Ortega Eladio M

ARMY

CPL

19320000

Unknown

Taos

19530624

Y

Archuleta José A  

ARMY

PFC

19310000

Unknown

Mora

19530624

Y

 

Manuel Torrio Romero was born 1932 C.E. He was U.S. ARMY PFC and casualty of the Korean War. He died in Korea on July 10, 1953 C.E. His home was in Eddy, New Mexico.

 

New Mexico U.S. Military Fatal Hispano Casualties of the Korean War

Name

Service

 Rank 

Birthdate (YYYYMMDD)

Home of Record:

City County

Incident or Death Date (YYYYMMDD)

Remains Recovered

Romero Manuel Torrio 

ARMY

PFC

19320000

Unknown

Eddy

19530710

N

 

A Hispanic American Colonel Jonathan de Sola Méndes, and also a Sephardim, was an exemplary member of Congregation Shearith Israel, the Spanish and Portuguese Synagogue, for the Sephardim community. De Sola Méndes had become a combat pilot during World War II (100 missions; two Air Medals). He flew again for his country during the Korean War (70 missions; 8 Air Medals, including the Distinguished Flying Cross), where he flew the last U.S. Marine Corps mission on July 27, 1953 C.E., on the last day of the war.

 

Korean War fighting ceased when on July 27, 1953 C.E., the UNC, including the U.S., and the combatants DPRK and the PRC sign an armistice agreement. Mark W. Clark for the UNC, General Peng Dehuai for the Chinese, and Kim Il-Sung for DPRK were among those who concluded the armistice. Finally, after more than two years of negotiations, the adversaries signed an armistice. President Syngman Rhee of the ROK announced his acceptance of the agreement, but no representative of ROK ever signed the document. The agreement allowed the POWs to stay where they liked, it drew a new boundary near the 38th parallel which allowed South Korea an extra 1,500 square miles of territory, and it created a 2-mile-wide “demilitarized zone” that still exists today.

 

The remaining years of the battle saw the two sides develop a stalemate along the 38th Parallel. Neither side captured much territory from the other. While fighting still occurred from 1951 C.E. to 1953 C.E., commanders on both sides sought to reach a ceasefire. The war in Korea was finally over on July 27th, 1953 C.E. with the signing of the armistice.

 

V. The Korean War Armistice 

With the armistice, the two sides agreed to several things, including the creation of a demilitarized zone between DPRK and ROK near the 38th Parallel, and how to handle the exchange of prisoners of war.

 

Following the signing of the Korean War Armistice in July 27, 1953 C.E., PRC, along with members of the Eastern Bloc led by the USSR, provided extensive economic assistance to  P’yŏngyang to support the reconstruction and economic development of DPRK.

 

Operation Glory

 

Operation Glory took place from July through November 1954 C.E. during which the dead of each side were exchanged. The remains of 4,167 U.S. soldiers were exchanged for 13,528 DPRK and PRC dead. In addition, 546 civilians who died in UN prisoner-of-war camps were turned over to the South Korean government. After Operation Glory, 416 Korean War "unknowns" were buried in the National Memorial Cemetery of the Pacific (the "Punchbowl Cemetery" in Honolulu, Hawaii).

 

According to a Defense Prisoner of War/Missing Personnel Office (DPMO) white paper, 1,394 names were also transmitted from the PRC and DPRK during the operation, of which 858 proved to be correct. The 4,167 returned remains were found to be 4,219 individuals, of whom 2,944 were found to be Americans, with all but 416 identified by name. Of the 239 Korean War unaccounted for, 186 are not associated with the Punchbowl Cemetery unknowns. From 1990 to 1994, DPRK excavated and returned more than 208 sets of remains, which possibly include 200 to 400 U.S. servicemen, but very few have been identified due to the comingling of remains. From 2001 to 2005, more remains were recovered from the Chosin Battle site, and around 220 were recovered near the PRC border between 1996 and 2006.

 

Korean War Outcome assessment

 

The Korean War was an important world event for several key reasons. Firstly, it was a focal point for the expanding tensions between the U.S. and USSR during the larger “Cold War.” When the two superpowers finally faced off against each other through the conflict in Korea War it was done as a proxy war.

Second, with the Korean War’s end, the two sides remained a divided country which still exists in our day. The DPRK and ROK are still very much separated along the ideological lines of communism and democracy and face conflict with each other intermittently.

 

For political reasons, both sides claim victory. Ultimately though, the PRC’s PVA 9th Army held the battlefield after having achieved a "geographic victory" which ejected X Corps from the DPRK. These it accomplished at some expense. Official PRC history states that despite the heavy casualties the PVA 9th Army earned its victory. This it did by successfully protecting the PVA force’s eastern flank in Korea and inflicting over 10,000 casualties on UN forces.

 

In all fairness, the U.S.’ X Corps did defeat the 9th Army in a series of battles. These successes enabled the UN to withdraw most of its forces as an effective tactical unit of some battle capability. It should also be noted that the UN forces possessed a determined, capable leadership and good soldier morale. From a larger perspective, the campaign gave the UN confidence that it had the ability defeat the PVA’s forces despite their superior numbers.

 

Here, it should be offered that the PVA failed to achieve its main stated objective that of destroying the U.S. 1st Marine Division during its Dunkirk-like evacuation and retreat from Chosin. To place the retreat in its proper perspective, it did follow a "massive strategic victory" by the PRC. For some, however, it represents a moment of heroic history for the UN forces. The PRC would argue that the Battle of Chosin was still a retreat, not a victory. A harsher evaluation would suggest that the battle was a terrible defeat for the Americans.

 

The fact of the matter is that the retreat from Chosin was a UN victory, inflicting such heavy losses upon the PVA 9th Army Group that it was put out of action for some three months, until March 1951 C.E. It has been said that ultimately, the PVA 9th Army Group became a giant hospital after failing to destroy the numerically inferior UN forces at Chosin.

 

The U.S. Marines who had evacuated from the DPRK spent January and most of February 1951 C.E. rebuilding and pursuing communist guerrillas in Pohang. When they returned to regular duty they saw heavy action on February 21st in Operation Killer.

 

Wider effect on the war

 

The PRC's intervention in the Korean War ended the UN force's expectation of total victory. This meant that the UN could not liberate the DPRK nor reunify the Peninsula. By the end of 1950 C.E., communist forces recaptured the DPRK. It next pushed UN forces southward below the 38th Parallel. At this point in time, serious consideration was given to the evacuation of all U.S. forces from the Korean Peninsula.

 

On the other hand, the intervention affected the PRC in two ways. Both of which would ultimately have the result of helping the UNC secure its position in ROK, though losing DPRK. The heavy losses suffered by the PRC’s PVA ultimately enabled the UN forces to maintain its foothold in Korea.

 

Casualties of the Korean War

 

The Korean War was a brutal and deadly war that saw many people die or be wounded. It has been estimated that nearly 3 million Korean civilians died in the war, making it a particularly bloody war. In all, some 5 million soldiers and civilians were reportedly lost during the war.

 

American Korean War Casualties

War/Conflict

Branch of Service

Number Serving

Total Deaths

Battle Deaths

Other Deaths

Wounds Not Mortalb

Korean War

Total

5,720,000

36,574

33,741

2,833

103,284

1950-1953k

Army

2,834,000

29,856

27,731

2,125

77,596

 

Navy

1,177,000

658

506

152

1,576

 

Marines

424,000

4,508

4,266

242

23,744

 

Air Force

1,285,000

1,552

1,238

314

368

 

After the Korean War, the Cold War would continue in earnest, with President Dwight D. Eisenhower approving a top secret document stating that the U.S. nuclear arsenal was to be expanded to combat the communist threat around the world. In 1954 C.E., with the detonation of "Bravo," a 15 megaton Hydrogen bomb on Bikini Atoll an announcement was made. The U.S. military was getting bigger and better. The bomb was 1,000 times more powerful than the Hiroshima and Nagasaki weapons.

 

Here, I must state that for Hispanic Americans, 1954 C.E. became an ugly reminder of the racial and ethnic prejudices of past, and in some cases of the present. How and why this is, can only be explained by those who hold these feelings. For some Operation Wetback was such a reminder.

 

In early 1954 C.E., the planning for Operation Wetback began. The Operation was a system of tactical control and cooperation within the U.S. Border Patrol in concert with the Mexican government for immigration law enforcement. President Eisenhower and the Mexican government implemented it in May 1954 C.E. using special tactics to deal with illegal border crossings into the United States by Mexican nationals. The program would become a contentious issue in Mexico-United States relations.

 

Before leaving this discussion of Operation Wetback, it is worth noting that sovereignty is the power by which an independent state is governed. For that power remain it must be seen as supreme, absolute, uncontrollable for from all of these its specific political powers are derived.

The intentional independence of a state is maintained through the right and power of regulating its own internal affairs without foreign interference. Thus, the sovereignty of a state is the power to do everything necessary to govern itself. This includes but is not limited to, the making, executing, applying laws, imposing and collecting taxes, making war and peace, the forming of treaties, and engaging in commerce with foreign nations.

 

In order to protect this sovereignty, a nation must establish borders. These are the geographic boundaries of these political entities or legal jurisdictions. Borders are established through agreements between political entities that control those areas. The creation of these agreements is called boundary delimitation. When these borders are violated by a nation, group, or individual the matter must be dealt with.

 

In Southeast Asia, the Cold War was rearing its ugly head. A multinational military venture on behalf of the Viet Minh forces under Võ Nguyên Giáp, with the support and assistance of the PRC and the USSR. The Battle of Diên Biên Phủ was to be the climactic confrontation of that communist, multinational military, Cold War intervention. That First Indochina War between the French and Viet Minh communist-nationalist revolutionaries was about to begin. It would last from March 13th-May 7, 1954 C.E. and culminate in a comprehensive French defeat.

 

The French Union's French Far East Expeditionary Corps with support from U.S. financing and Indochinese allies would make decisions ending in blunders. The initial French strategy was for a set piece battle to draw out the Vietnamese and destroy them with superior firepower. It was to begin with an operation for the insertion of a French force into a hostile area at Điện Biên Phủ, a small village, far from everything deep in the hills of northwestern Vietnam. Its location is about 10 miles north of the Lao border and 175 miles west of Hanoi. Unfortunately, for the French the plan was based on the misguided belief that the Viet Minh had no anti-aircraft capability.

 

The Viet Minh battle strategy under General Võ Nguyên Giáp was to surround and besiege the French. The Viet Minh also brought in vast amounts of heavy artillery and antiaircraft guns. The artillery pieces were moved through difficult terrain up the rear slopes of the mountains surrounding the French positions and placed overlooking the French encampment. With the Viet Minh now occupying the highlands around Điện Biên Phủ, they soon began bombarding the French positions with massive artillery. After several days, the French artillery commander, unable to respond with any effective counterbattery fire, committed suicide.

 

The Viet Minh then assaulted the French defensive positions repeatedly and were repulsed. Soon, the key French positions were overrun and the French perimeter contracted. Fewer and fewer of supplies reached the French. The garrison was overrun in May after a two-month siege, and most of the French forces surrendered. A few of them escaped into Laos. The French government in Paris then resigned, and the new Prime Minister, the left-of-centre Pierre Mendès France, supported French withdrawal from Indochina. Unfortunately, for France, this catastrophic failure would negatively influence negotiations underway at Geneva among several nations over the future of Indochina.

 

The war ended shortly after the Battle of Điện Biên Phủ. With the signing of the 1954 C.E. Geneva Accords, France agreed to withdraw its forces from all its colonies in French Indochina. It was also stipulated that Vietnam would be temporarily divided at the 17th Parallel. Control of the north would be given to the Viet Minh as the Democratic Republic of Vietnam under Ho Chi Minh. The south was to become the State of Vietnam, nominally under Emperor Bảo Đại. The agreement prevented Ho Chi Minh from gaining control of the entire country.

 

Casualties and losses for the French were 1,571-2,293 dead, 5,195-6,650 wounded, 1,729 missing, and 11,721 captured of which 4,436 wounded. Sixty-two aircraft and ten tanks lost 
and 167 aircraft damaged. Vietnamese figures were 4,020 dead, 9,118 wounded, 792 missing. The French estimate Vietnamese of losses was 8,000 dead and 15,000 wounded.

 

May 17, 1954 C.E., racial segregation in U.S. public schools was declared unconstitutional by the U.S. Supreme Court in Brown vs. the Board of Education. The ruling of the court stated that racial segregation violated the 14th Amendment's clause that guaranteed equal protection. The Monroe School in Topeka, Kansas had segregated Linda Brown in its classes. What this represented the “Better Angels” of America’s nature. Step-by-step the government improved the lives of its people. This was one of those!

 

The Operation Wetback Program was formally announced in May 1954 C.E. By May 17th, command teams of 12 Border Patrol agents, using buses, planes, and temporary processing stations began their efforts. The Program stated locating, processing, and deporting Mexicans who had entered the U.S. illegally. Those deported were handed off to Mexican officials, who in turn moved them into central Mexico where there were many labor opportunities. The Operation included the cities of Los ÁngelesSan Francisco, and Chicago. But its main targets were the border areas of Texas and California. Overall, there were 1,074,277 "returns," in the first year of Operation Wetback. This process was defined as the "confirmed movement of an inadmissible or deportable alien out of the U.S. not based on an order of removal." This included many illegal immigrants who fled to Mexico for fear of arrest. Over half a million left from Texas alone.

 

Aristotle once said, “At his best, man is the noblest of all animals; separated from law and justice he is the worst." In the case of Operation Wetback, the law was used and justice served. I don’t at this time have a concrete answer as to how these activities were conducted and whether their outcomes were appropriate for all parties involved.  

 

Suffice it to say, these American laws and actions were among a long line of activities found necessary over a protracted period of time. This was due in the main because of the inadequacy of past efforts to maintain the integrity of the border. The rights and privileges granted to those who enter the United States remain the lawful responsibility of its government and people, and to no other. Thus, those who choose to break these laws, still remain subject to them despite their reasons for doing so.

 

Sovereignty is the power by which an independent state is governed. That power is seen as supreme, absolute, and uncontrollable and from which all specific political powers are derived.

The intentional independence of a state is maintained through the right and power of regulating its own internal affairs without foreign interference. Thus, the sovereignty of a state is the power to do everything necessary to govern itself. This includes but is not limited to, the making, executing, applying laws, imposing and collecting taxes, making war and peace, the forming of treaties, and engaging in commerce with foreign nations.

 

In order to protect this sovereignty, nations establish borders. These are the geographic boundaries of these political entities or legal jurisdictions. Borders are established through agreements between political entities that control those areas. The creation of these agreements is called boundary delimitation. On these matters of sovereignty, a nations borders, and its laws I agree with Robert Kennedy when he said, “The glory of justice and the majesty of law are created not just by the Constitution - nor by the courts - nor by the officers of the law - nor by the lawyers - but by the men and women who constitute our society - who are the protectors of the law as they are themselves protected by the law.”

The Cold War remained in effect in September 8, 1954 C.E., when in Bangkok, Thailand, the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization was formed by the U.S., GB, Australia, New Zealand, France, the Philippines, Pakistan, and Thailand creating a mutual defense pact.

 

As this is the last chapter of the Family History of the de Riberas, I will not be covering the Vietnam Period or further. I will, however, provide a brief summary and the names of the Hispano American fallen. 

 

It would not be long before America’s involvement in Vietnam would begin. Due to the Cold War which some date as begining in 1947 C.E., America defined its position as one of resisting communism wherever it might be found to be destabilizing sovereign governments. By the 1950’s C.E. John Foster Dulles the U.S. Secretary of State had already formulated the Domino Theory. In it he stated that if one country fell to communism, then its neighbor would, and then the neighbor to that country would also fall. This ongoing expansion of communist influence throughout the world and in Southeast Asia in particular, was unacceptable to the American government.

 

Earlier, in 1950 C.E., the first shipment of American military aid was sent to the French colonial administration in Vietnam in an effort to prop it up against communist subversion. This was not to be! That First Indochina War was fought between the French and Viet Minh communist-nationalist revolutionaries was to last from March 13th-May 7, 1954 C.E. It culminated in a comprehensive French defeat.

 

With the signing of the 1954 C.E. Geneva Accords, France withdrew its forces. Vietnam was then temporarily divided at the 17th Parallel. The Viet Minh as the Democratic Republic of Vietnam under Ho Chi Minh now had control of the north. The south was now the State of Vietnam, nominally under Emperor Bảo Đại. The agreement had prevented Ho Chi Minh from immediately gaining control of the entire country.

 

One year later, in 1955 C.E., President Eisenhower sent the first U.S. military advisors to South Vietnam to train the South Vietnamese Army. From its begining on November 1, 1955 C.E. through its end on April 30, 1975 C.E., the Vietnam War America would sustain a total of 58,220 casualties of all races, ethnicity, and gender. As for Hispanic-American casualties, the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) contains no information on them. This is due to the fact that Hispanic Americans can be of any race. In a massive sampling of the DOD database researchers were able to establish that between 5.0 and 6.0 of the casualties had Hispanic surnames. These represented military members which were Méjicanos, Puertorriqueños, Cubanos, and other Latino-Américanos with ancestries based in Central and South America. Using the 1970 C.E., U.S. Census as a Vietnam era population base, it has been estimated that Hispanic-Americans were then 4.5% of the U.S. population.

 

Thus, one can safely say that Hispanic-Americans were over-represented among Vietnam War casualties, at an estimated rate of 5.5% of the total number of casualties, this against 4.5% of the total population in 1970 C.E. The studies suggest Hispanic-American casualties came largely from California and Texas. Lesser numbers are attributed to Colorado, New Mexico, Arizona, Florida, New York, with some from many states across the nation.

 

As this is a family history of a New Mexico family, the de Riberas, I list a member of the de Ribera Clan who died in Vietnam. Private First Class António Ribera served in the Army of the United States in the HHC, 1ST BN, 2ND INFANTRY, 1ST INF DIV, USARV. He was born in Raton, New Mexico, on May 07, 1937 C.E. and died António died while helping his comrades in arms on to July 18, 1967 C.E. "PFC Ribera was killed in action while serving with 1st Bn 2 Inf First Infantry Division... He was treating a wounded soldier during a battle on 07/18/67 and was posthumously awarded the Silver Star. I was there. I have never met a man who could smile when facing adversity like he could." He is remembered by those he served.

 

In addition, I’m providing a listing of only the Hispano Vietnam War casualties from New Mexico. This I do in remembrance of these, the fallen Hispano-Americans who died in Vietnam.

 

Vietnam War casualties

ALAMOGORDO, NEW MEXICO:

LCPL IGNACIO BARELA

PO3 HOWARD MICHAEL MEUTE

PFC JUAN FEDERICO GUTIÉRREZ

ALBUQUERQUE, NEW MEXICO:

CPL ANTHONY WILLIAM ARELLANO

PFC FRANK CHARLES ARMIJO

SP4 ISIDRO SIGFREDO BAZAN

PFC PAUL BUSTAMANTE

PFC DANIEL JOSEPH CHÁVEZ

SGT CHARLES DOMINIC CASERIO

LCPL FREDDIE PAUL CHÁVEZ

CPL LOUIS MAGIN GARCÍA

SP4 ISIDRO GARCÍA

SSG RAMÓN GARCÍA

SP4 RICHARD ALBERT GURULÉ

SFC FREDERICK DANIEL HERRERA

PO3 RAMÓN LEYBA

PFC ROBERT CHARLES LÓPEZ

SP4 RUDOLPH DANIEL LOVATO

PFC ENRÍQUE LUJÁN

SP4 JULIAN ERNEST MÁRQUEZ

PFC JUAN HENRY MARTÍNEZ

SP4 BILLY RICHARD MARTÍNEZ

SGT PEDRO PADILLA

SP6 JUANITO PERÉA

SP5 CHARLES ANTHONY ROMERO

PO3 CRES PADILLA SALAZAR

2LT MEL ERNEST SALAZAR

LCPL UVALDO SÁNCHEZ

PFC JUAN DIEGO SÁNCHEZ

SP4 CAMILO JAMES SÁNCHEZ

PFC BENNY SENA

SP4 JOHN OLIVIO TAFOYA

SGT FLORENTINO TAFOYA Jr

SP4 GREGORIO TRUJILLO Jr

PFC FRANK VALDÉZ

ALCALDE, NEW MEXICO:

LCPL NARCISO FRANCIS HERRERA

ANTHONY, NEW MEXICO:

SSGT SALOME HERNÁNDEZ

ANTÓN CHICO, NEW MEXICO:

PFC ROMÁN SISNEROS

ARTESIA, NEW MEXICO:

PFC SAMUEL MEDINA RAMÍREZ

AZTEC, NEW MEXICO:

BELEN, NEW MEXICO:

PVT EDDIE LEÓNARD GARCÍA

LCPL LUPERTO GARCÍA

PFC MICHAEL LEÓN LOVATO

PFC EDDIE ANTHONY MARTÍNEZ Jr

PFC HILARIO MORENO

SGT MARK ALVAN TAFOYA

BERNALILLO, NEW MEXICO:

PFC EUSEBIO MONTOYA

SP4 FRED ROMÁN SAIZ

BLOOMFIELD, NEW MEXICO:

CANONCITO, NEW MEXICO:

PFC RAYMOND PLATERO

CAPITAN, NEW MEXICO:

CARLSBAD, NEW MEXICO:

LCPL ANDRÉS GARCÍA

SFC RICARDO GONZÁLEZ DAVIS

SP5 MIGUEL F MONTAÑEZ

CARRIZOZO, NEW MEXICO:

SP5 CÁRLOS ZAMORA Jr

CEDAR CREST, NEW MEXICO:

PFC JOE CECILIO GARCÍA

CERRO, NEW MEXICO:

PFC CHARLES CASTULO CISNEROS

CHAMISAL, NEW MEXICO:

SP4 JIM DANIEL MARTÍNEZ

CHURCH ROCK, NEW MEXICO:

CLAYTON, NEW MEXICO:

CLOVIS, NEW MEXICO:

SGT DANIEL TIOFILIO MARTÍNEZ

SGT RUBÉN RUBÍO

CONTINENTAL DIVIDE, NEW MEXICO:

CROWN POINT, NEW MEXICO:

LCPL JOHNNIE ANTÓNIO Jr

CUBERO, NEW MEXICO:

SP4 GERALD GREGORY CHINO

DEMING, NEW MEXICO:

HN STEVE GONZÁLES DURÁN

SP4 VÍCTOR MUÑOZ  ROMÁN

PFC RICHARD SAENZ

GYSGT JOSEPH FÉLIX TRUJILLO

DEXTER, NEW MEXICO:

SP4 JOSÉ L SÁNCHEZ

CPL ARTURO SYLVESTER SISNEROS

DIXON, NEW MEXICO:

HN PHIL ISADORE VALDÉZ

DULCE, NEW MEXICO:

SGT FLOYD SAMUEL ATOLE

PVT DANIEL HAROLD MUÑÍZ

ENCINO, NEW MEXICO:

SGT SAM TENORIO

ESPAÑOLA, NEW MEXICO:

ESTANCIA, NEW MEXICO:

EUNICE, NEW MEXICO:

FAIRACRES, NEW MEXICO:

FAIRVIEW, NEW MEXICO:

FARMINGTON, NEW MEXICO:

SGT HERBERT ARVISO

PFC FILEMON SERRANO

FORT WINGATE, NEW MEXICO:

SGT BOBBY JOE MARTÍNEZ

FRUITLAND, NEW MEXICO:

GALISTEO, NEW MEXICO:

CPL GEORGE MICHAEL ANAYA

GALLUP, NEW MEXICO:

CPL JERRY DELBERT ABEYTA

CPL EDWARD ALBERT CABRERA

SGT JOSEPH DANIEL HURTA

GLENCOE, NEW MEXICO:

PFC GLEN ALEX CHÁVEZ

GRANTS, NEW MEXICO:

SGT JOSÉ AUDINO MONTOYA

LCPL PATRICK SALAZAR

HIDALGO LOOP, NEW MEXICO:

HOBBS, NEW MEXICO:

SP4 JAIME PACHÉCO

HN JIMMIE LEÓN PLATO

HOLLOMAN AFB, NEW MEXICO:

SP5 PETER KALANI MIRANDA

HOLLYWOOD, NEW MEXICO:

HURLEY, NEW MEXICO:

JAL, NEW MEXICO:

JARALES, NEW MEXICO:

TSGT SECUNDINO BALDONADO

JÉMEZ PUEBLO, NEW MEXICO:

PFC GEORGE LEÓNARD FRAGUA

PFC FRANK TAFOYA

SP4 THOMAS AMBROSE TOLEDO

PVT ANTÓNIO TONY TOSA

LA JOYA, NEW MEXICO:

PFC GEORGE ELOY TAFOYA

LAKE ARTHUR, NEW MEXICO:

PFC ABELARDO ARAUJO

LAS CRUCES, NEW MEXICO:

PFC WALTER CLIFFORD BUNYEA Jr

CPL ANDY ANASTACIO CABRERA

SSG DAVID CRUZ CHÁVEZ

SGT RICHARD LOSOYA DURÁN

SP5 CHARLES CÓRDOVA FLÓREZ

SGT GABRIEL HERNÁNDEZ MADRID

PVT ANDRÉS MORENO Jr

CPL JUAN MANUEL ALBA ZAMORA

LAS VEGAS, NEW MEXICO:

SP4 JOSEPH MICHAEL ARCHULETA

SP5 JERRY FLÓREZ

SP4 JOSÉ BENJAMIN HERRERA

PFC HENRY LEROY TEJADA

LITTLE WATER, NEW MEXICO:

PFC FÉLIX DOHALTAHE BEGAYE

LORDSBURG, NEW MEXICO:

LCPL MAGDALENO TARANGO

LOS ALAMOS, NEW MEXICO:

LOS CÓRDOVAS, NEW MEXICO:

PFC VÍCTOR HIPOLITO MONTOYA Jr

LOS LUNAS, NEW MEXICO:

SP4 DANIEL FERNÁNDEZ

PFC JOSÉ BERNARDINO GONZÁLES

LOVINGTON, NEW MEXICO:

LCPL REYNALDO GUZMÁN

MAYHILL, NEW MEXICO:

MELROSE, NEW MEXICO:

MESILLA PARK, NEW MEXICO:

MEXICAN SPRINGS, NEW MEXICO:

MONTEZUMA, NEW MEXICO:

SFC BENJAMIN JOHN BENAVIDEZ

SP4 JOHN PEÑA

MORA, NEW MEXICO:

CPL CHARLES ANTHONY SÁNCHEZ

SP4 LEROY FRANK VALDÉZ

MORIARTY, NEW MEXICO:

MOSQUERO, NEW MEXICO:

SP4 CHRIS B CÓRDOVA

MOUNTAINAIR, NEW MEXICO:

SP4 RAYMOND SERNA

OCATE, NEW MEXICO:

PFC LAURENCIO VIGIL

ORGAN, NEW MEXICO:

PEÑASCO, NEW MEXICO:

PVT JOSÉ SCOTTY SIMBOLA

PICACHO, NEW MEXICO:

SP4 GEORGE HENRY NÚÑEZ

PORTALES, NEW MEXICO:

PUERTO DE LUNA, NEW MEXICO:

SP4 FRANK DODGE MADRID

RAMAH, NEW MEXICO:

CPL EDDIE CHARLES BEGAYE

RANCHOS DE TAOS, NEW MEXICO:

PVT ALEX EZEQUIEL MARTÍNEZ

SP4 MANUEL ANTÓNIO TORREZ

RATON, NEW MEXICO:

SP4 SAM CRUZ

PFC ANTÓNIO RIBERA

SGT GABRIEL TRUJILLO

PVT PAUL TRUJILLO

RIBERA, NEW MEXICO:

LCPL JESUS GRIEGO

ROSWELL, NEW MEXICO:

SP4 LARRY PAUL CAMPOS

PFC MELVIN CARRILLO

SP4 SAMMY CHACON ROMERO

PFC TRINE ROMERO Jr

PFC HECTOR MARIO SAENZ

PFC CRESENCIO PAUL SÁNCHEZ

ROY, NEW MEXICO:

RUIDOSO, NEW MEXICO:

PFC ROBERT GONZÁLES MONTOYA

SAN JUAN PUEBLO, NEW MEXICO:

CPL JOE NED MONTOYA

SANTA CRUZ, NEW MEXICO:

PFC GABRIEL BACA

SANTA FE, NEW MEXICO:

PFC PEDRO ASCENSIÓN DELORA

SGT DAVID JOSÉ GARCÍA

SP4 RICHARD EDWARD GRIEGO

CPL JOHN FRANK RAY GRIEGO

PFC JOSEPH ARTHUR JACQUES

CPL WILLIE DANIEN MARTÍNEZ

1LT JOE HERMAN MONTOYA

SFC GILBERT MORALES

CPL FRANCIS XAVIER NAVA

PFC SANTIAGO V E QUINTANA

CPL PHILLIP JAMES SANDOVAL

PFC MANUEL TIODORO SEGURA

SSG ROBERT STEVEN TRUJILLO

GYSGT ENRÍQUE VALDÉZ

SANTA RITA, NEW MEXICO:

SP4 ANTÓNIO ÁLVARADO ESQUEDA

LCPL DAVID CENTENO GRIJALVA

PFC OCTAVIANO MARTÍNEZ HARVEY

PFC ÁNGEL ALARID QUEVEDO

SANTA ROSA, NEW MEXICO:

SP4 RAFAEL GABRIEL TENORIO

SANTO DOMÍNGO PUEBLO, NEW MEXICO:

SP4 ARTHUR CRESPÍN

SAPELLO, NEW MEXICO:

LCPL ALCADIO NORBERTO MASCARENAS

SERAFINA, NEW MEXICO:

SP4 SAMUEL MORALES

SHIPROCK, NEW MEXICO:

SP4 CALVIN DAVID LARGO

SILVER CITY, NEW MEXICO:

LCPL CÁRLOS CRUZ AGUIRRE

SOCORRO, NEW MEXICO:

PFC ISIDRO BACA

TAOS, NEW MEXICO:

PFC JOHNNY LAWRENCE BACA Jr

LCPL ANDREW COCA

SGT TIMOTEO FRED ROMERO

TAOS PUEBLO, NEW MEXICO:

PO1 MANUEL MARTÍNEZ

TATUM, NEW MEXICO:

TEXICO, NEW MEXICO:

THOREAU, NEW MEXICO:

TIJERAS, NEW MEXICO:

PFC BILLY MC CALL REA

TINNIE, NEW MEXICO:

TOHATCHI, NEW MEXICO:

TRUTH OR CONSEQUENCES, NEW MEXICO:

TUCUMCARI, NEW MEXICO:

SP4 FRANCISCO M GARCÍA Jr

PFC ANDREW JOSÉ PACHÉCO

SSG RAMÓN FÉLIX ORTEGA Jr

TULAROSA, NEW MEXICO:

PFC STEPHEN OROSCO

VAUGHN, NEW MEXICO:

PFC FRANK JESSE LEE MADRID

WHITE SANDS MISSILE RANGE, NEW MEXICO:

WILLARD, NEW MEXICO:

SGT JULIAN VÍCTOR VELÁZQUEZ

ZUNI, NEW MEXICO:

SP4 ERNEST DELBERT PEINA

 12/04/2018 08:54 PM