Chapter
Twenty-Seven - The de Riberas and the Korean War (June 25, 1950 C.E.-July 27, 1953 C.E.)
Thanks to all of those sources provided by the Internet and used in this chapter
With this submission of this my last chapter of
the family history of the de
Ribera’s, Chapter
Twenty-Seven - The de Riberas and the Korean War (June 25, 1950 C.E.-July
27, 1953 C.E.) - We fought for the Right reasons, at the Right time, in the Right place,
I’m saying good bye to many years of effort and the joy of finding
one’s ancestral roots. Like many of the hedonistic children of the
1950s C.E. and 1960s C.E., I gave little thought to my family’s past.
I lived in the present and planned for the future. Before this effort
the word “family” was just a cliché. The word family now has a
markedly different meaning for me.
What a gift this work has been. I can now
almost feel the presence of those many ancestors I researched. I feel
that I know them and have learned to love them. So here, I say “à
plus tard,” until later, rather than “Adieu,” to this work. It
would only be appropriate to thank Mimi Lozano
Holtzman and her husband Win of Somos
Primos E-Magazine fame for her kind support and insightful guidance
into the world of history and genealogy. I call Mimi “Dearest”
because she’s a dear soul! Without her this homage to my Mums family,
the de Riberas, would never
have been written.
Now to the de
Riberas and the Korean War!
As Chapter
Twenty-Seven - The de Riberas and the Korean War (June 25, 1950 C.E.-July
27, 1953 C.E.) is the last chapter of the book of the Family History of
the de Riberas of New Mexico,
I wish to present some personal insight as to why this Hispano
American family fought so willingly for the United States of America
(U.S.).
Firstly, I would suggest that it was the
yearning for “Freedom.” It should be remembered that the de Riberas and many of the other founding families of Nuevo
Méjico were Sephardim or Spanish Jews and also Conversos.
During the Spanish Period, they had escaped España
and its religious and political elite to the safety of the Nuevo Mundo, the Américas.
The family made its way ever northward within the Virrey of Nuéva España,
until reaching Nuevo Méjico.
In that desolate place they found safety as hidden Jews, away for
the Inquisición Española. It
was there that these Sefardita
Jews who immigrated into northern areas of the Virrey of Nuéva España
became los Manitos de Nuevo Méjico.
They then ventured to south and central Tejas,
and later to parts of southern Colorado
and beyond. They would
eventually be called, Los Tejanos
y los Manitos de Nuevo Méjico or The Texans and the brethren of New
Mexico. There in what is today the American Southwest the Sephardi
Españoles found the freedom they so desperately wanted.
The de
Ribera blood lines of the North American Continent began when el
Imperio Español sent an expedition under Don
Juan de Oñate to establish the Spanish provincia
de Santa Fé de Nuevo Méjico in 1598 C.E., with a capital founded near Ohkay
Oweenge Pueblo, which he
called San Juan de los Caballeros. De
Oñate later attempted to
establish a settlement in Arizona in 1599 C.E., but failed. They turned
back due to inclement weather. By 1610 C.E., Santa
Fé was founded, making it the oldest capital in U.S. After
arriving, these Españoles
took what they wanted from the indigenous without regard for their needs
and wants.
To be sure, during the 17th-Century C.E., they
would have heard the news of the de
Ribera family in the capital of
Nuéva España, Méjico
City, having been arrested in connection with the trial of Gabriel
de Granada by the Inquisición in Nuéva
España, now Méjico. In
that trial (1642 C.E.-1645 C.E.) there appeared as
"accomplices" in the observance of the Law of Moses and as
Judaizing heretics, the names of Doña
María, Doña Catalina, Clara, Margarita,
Ysabel, and Doña Blanca de
Rivera, all of whom seem to have been natives of Sevilla. Another person mentioned in the same connection is Diego
López Rivera, one of the Sefarditas
from his native Portugués.
The name is frequently written "Ribera."
The reality of religious intolerance and the
fear of the Inquisición Española
had never left them. These Sephardic families understood the
imperfections of el Imperio Español
and the orthodox Católicos of
the Church. The threat these powerful entities represented to the
precious freedom these Sefardí had
sought was palpable.
Almost immediately after the 1821 C.E. invasion
by the Méjicanos, the Españoles
could see the failings of el
Imperio
Méjicano, and
later its replacement governments called the Méjicano Republics. The de
Riberas were forced to accept their conquest and repression by a
foreign power. This continued until Méjico
lost the northern reaches of what had been once the Virrey of Nuéva España
to the Américanos in 1846 C.E.
By 1846 C.E., the Américanos arrived taking the land and making it part of the U.S. I
think that they understood and liked these strong, open, and resourceful
Américanos who were driven by
their “American Dream.” I believe this is why the de
Riberas accepted this new government and became Américanos. Over time, the many generations of the de
Ribera family were not unlike other Americans. To be sure, they
understood the difficulties of a nation that was ever changing and given
to mistakes, but also one which moved ever forward improving itself and
the lives of its people. This was also their dream. Now as Américanos,
they were free to live as they wanted.
I feel it was that belief in “freedom” and
in the “American Dream” that drove their ready participation in the
many American wars, in service to these ideals even, if the nation
itself had glaring faults.
Finally, the de Riberas had always been soldados.
They had served el Imperio Español,
el Imperio Méjicano and later its replacement governments,
and now they entered military service of this great nation, the U.S. of
America. The family served their new country in every war, including the
Korean War. Why would they have done this? I believe it was their love
of country, a belief in “freedom,” and faith in the “American
Dream.”
After 1920 C.E., the family like many other
Americans suffered and served through WWI, the bad economic conditions
of the Great Depression, and WWII. By the time of the Korean War in 1950
C.E., the de
Riberas of
New Mexico had generations of American military service. They understood
what was at stake. Once again, they were willing to serve and die if
necessary for the “Dream.” I am positive that they would have agreed
with this quote by Thomas Jefferson. “With all the imperfections of
our present government, it is without comparison the best existing, or
that ever did exist.” Thomas Jefferson also said this, “We will be
soldiers, so our sons may be farmers, so their sons may be artists.”
This the de Riberas had always done.
Here, I must say that I’ve been asked several
times why I refer to the de
Riberas of New Mexico as a “Clan.” The Rivera
(originally de Ribera) family
name is listed in the New Mexico Office of the State Historian as one of
the founding families of the state. Salvadór
Matías de Ribera (later spelled Rivera)
was the founding progenitor of the New Mexico Riberas.
Salvadór served in the
Spanish Military at the Presidio
in Santa Fé. He was born
in Puerto de Santa María in
Southwest España near Cádiz. The town of Ribera,
New Mexico, is named after him.
In New Mexico, those of the Spanish-speaking
population of colonial descent such as the de
Riberas are referred to by the predominant Spanish term Hispano.
This is analogous to those from California, Californio, and those
from Texas, or Tejano. In New
Mexico, this Spanish-speaking population was always proportionally
greater than those of California and Texas. The term is commonly used to
differentiate those who settled the area early, around 1598 C.E. to 1848
C.E., from later Mexican migrants.
Currently, the majority of the Hispano
population is distributed between New Mexico and Southern Colorado.
A community of people in Southern Colorado who migrated there in the
early 19th-Century C.E. are descended from Hispanos
from New Mexico. Most of New Mexico's Hispanos,
numbering in the hundreds of thousands, live in the northern half of the
state. The predominant ancestry claimed by the state's citizens is that
of descendants of Spanish settlers.
It is accepted that the de Riberas of New Mexico
and Colorado are a group of families the heads of which claim descent
from a common ancestor, Salvadór
Matías de Ribera. This group of people is of a common descent, a
family, a clan.
These are just a few of the de
Ribera Clan who fought in
both WWII
and Korea.
In Korea, “We fought for the Right reasons, at the Right time, in
the Right place”
One of the de Ribera Clan fought in both
WWII and Korea.
His name, U.S. ARMY S SGT Philip Fidel
Rivera Santa Fé, New Mexico,
enlisted on January 6, 1941 C.E.
Philip Fidel
Rivera Santa Fé, New
Mexico
Santa Fe National Cemetery
501 North Guadalupe Street
Santa Fé, NM 87501
Section: V
Site: 1873
Birth: May 1, 1918
Death: September 21, 1970
Age: 52
Branch: U.S. ARMY
Rank: S SGT
War: WORLD WAR II, KOREA
SANTA
FE NATIONAL CEMETERY
501 North Guadalupe Street Santa Fé,
NM 87501
A second member of the de Ribera Clan Porfirio
Estrada Rivera fought in both in WW II and Korea. In Korea he served
in the U.S. Navy.
Porfirio
Estrada Rivera Santa Fé, New Mexico
Santa Fe National Cemetery
501 North Guadalupe Street
Santa Fé, NM 87501
Section: 9
Site: 103
Birth: September 15, 1925
Death: July 10, 1995
Age: 69
Branch: US ARMY, US NAVY
Rank: CPL, AD3
War: WORLD WAR II, KOREA
Porfirio Rivera CPL,
AD3, Santa Fé, NM
SANTA
FE NATIONAL CEMETERY
|
501 North Guadalupe Street Santa Fé, NM 87501
|
RIVERA, PORFIRIO ESTRADA
|
AD3 U.S. NAVY
|
CPL U.S. ARMY
|
WORLD WAR II, KOREA
|
DATE OF BIRTH: 09/15/1925
|
DATE OF DEATH: 07/10/1995
|
BURIED AT: SECTION 9 SITE 103
|
A third member of the de Ribera Clan António
Rivera fought in both
Korea and Vietnam.
He served in the
U.S. Army.
SANTA FE NATIONAL CEMETERY
|
501 North Guadalupe Street Santa Fé,
NM 87501
|
RIVERA,
ANTÓNIO
|
SGT
U.S. ARMY
|
KOREA,
VIETNAM
|
DATE
OF BIRTH: 12/29/1927
|
DATE
OF DEATH: 07/20/2009
|
BURIED
AT: SECTION 20 SITE 1638
|
Another member of the de Ribera Clan Pete D. Rivera fought in both Korea and Vietnam. He served in the U.S. Navy.
SANTA
FE NATIONAL CEMETERY
|
501
North Guadalupe Street Santa
Fé, NM 87501
|
RIVERA, PETE D
|
YNC
CPO U.S. NAVY
|
KOREA,
VIETNAM
|
DATE
OF BIRTH: 11/05/1934
|
DATE
OF DEATH: 07/19/2001
|
BURIED
AT: SECTION 6 SITE 2159
|
Another of the de Ribera Clan who served in the Korea War was U.S. Army Private Gavino
J Rivera of Santa Fé,
New Mexico, born October
4, 1929 C.E. Rivera,
Gavino J, b. 10/04/1929, d. 08/17/1996, US Army, PVT,
Res: Albuquerque, NM, Plot: 9
0 2660, bur. 08/21/1996.
Corporal Eugene C. Rivera was another member of the de Ribera Clan from Santa Fé,
New Mexico, served in the Korea War. He was a Communications Chief and
U.S. Army Ranger serving with the 8th Ranger Company (Airborne) during
the Korean War. On April 25, 1951 C.E., the 8th Ranger Company found
itself heavily engaged with PAV forces as they provided forward
reconnaissance during the withdrawal of the U.S. 24th Infantry Division
near a Korean terrain feature designated Hill 628. Rivera
operating the only remaining radio adjusted artillery fire upon the
enemy. While doing so, the unit found itself trapped. Despite their best
efforts, friendly troops were unable to break through the Chinese lines
to reconnect with the isolated unit. As casualties mounted, the Rangers
were encouraged to, "Get out the best you can."
Not willing to abandon any soldier, the Rangers
prepared to make their final stand as CPL Rivera spotted American tanks. To save his fellow Rangers, CPL Rivera
of Santa Fé, New Mexico, bravely climbed a desolate hill, and while
under relentless fire from the enemy, established and maintained radio
contact with the U.S. Army tank platoon leader, Lieutenant David Teich.
Teich was in a tank company near the 38th parallel in 1951 when a radio
distress call came in from the Eighth Ranger Company. Wounded,
outnumbered, and under heavy fire, the Rangers were near Teich's tanks,
and facing 300,000 Communist troops, moving steadily toward their
position. Teich wanted to help, but was ordered to withdraw instead, his
captain saying "We've got orders to move out. Screw them. Let them
fight their own battles."
Teich went anyway and led four tanks over to
the Rangers' position. The tanks then took out so many Rangers on each
tank that they covered up the tank's turrets. Eugene C. Rivera’s selfless act allowed the M46 Patton, tiger-striped tanks
of the Sixth Tank Battalion to break the enemy encirclement and evacuate
the wounded.
Following are more members of the de
Ribera Clan from New Mexico, that served during the Korea War in the
armed forces branches of the U.S. Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air
Force:
SANTA
FE NATIONAL CEMETERY
|
501 North Guadalupe Street Santa Fé, NM 87501
|
RIVERA, ALEJANDRO E.
|
CPL
U.S. ARMY
|
KOREA
|
DATE
OF BIRTH: 10/27/1929
|
DATE
OF DEATH: 07/16/2002
|
BURIED
AT: SECTION 23 SITE 12
|
SANTA
FE NATIONAL CEMETERY
|
501
North Guadalupe Street Santa
Fé, NM 87501
|
RIVERA, ALFRED JR
|
PFC
U.S. ARMY
|
KOREA
|
DATE
OF BIRTH: 02/07/1929
|
DATE
OF DEATH: 06/08/2007
|
BURIED
AT: SECTION COL-2 SITE A30
|
SANTA
FE NATIONAL CEMETERY
|
501
North Guadalupe Street Santa
Fé, NM 87501
|
RIVERA, CARPIO
|
PV2
U.S. ARMY
|
KOREA
|
DATE
OF BIRTH: 09/26/1929
|
DATE
OF DEATH: 04/21/2006
|
BURIED
AT: SECTION 13 SITE 491
|
SANTA
FE NATIONAL CEMETERY
|
501
North Guadalupe Street Santa
Fé, NM 87501
|
RIVERA, CLEMENTE GENOVEVO
|
PFC
U.S. ARMY
|
KOREA
|
DATE
OF BIRTH: 04/15/1931
|
DATE
OF DEATH: 02/04/2002
|
BURIED
AT: SECTION 3 SITE 678
|
SANTA
FE NATIONAL CEMETERY
|
501
North Guadalupe Street Santa
Fé, NM 87501
|
RIVERA, FRANK AGUILINO
|
PV2
U.S. ARMY
|
KOREA
|
DATE
OF BIRTH: 06/04/1929
|
DATE
OF DEATH: 05/10/2007
|
BURIED
AT: SECTION V SITE 120
|
SANTA
FE NATIONAL CEMETERY
|
501
North Guadalupe Street Santa
Fé, NM 87501
|
RIVERA, MANUEL R ABAN
|
U.S.
NAVY
|
KOREA
|
DATE
OF BIRTH: 11/08/1932
|
DATE
OF DEATH: 10/13/1996
|
BURIED
AT: SECTION V SITE 1231
|
SANTA FE NATIONAL CEMETERY
|
501 North Guadalupe Street Santa Fé,
NM 87501
|
RIVERA,
ADOLFO JR
|
AB3 U.S. NAVY
|
KOREA
|
DATE OF BIRTH: 08/7/1930
|
DATE OF DEATH: 02/06/2014
|
BURIED AT: SECTION 24 SITE 875
|
SANTA
FE NATIONAL CEMETERY
|
501 North Guadalupe Street Santa Fé, NM 87501
|
RIVERA,
LALO MARTOLO
|
SN U.S. NAVY
|
KOREA
|
DATE OF BIRTH: 10/12/1931
|
DATE OF DEATH: 05/03/2015
|
BURIED AT: SECTION 25B SITE 28
|
SANTA
FE NATIONAL CEMETERY
|
501
North Guadalupe Street Santa
Fé, NM 87501
|
RIVERA, LUTHER L
|
SGT
U.S. MARINE CORPS
|
KOREA
|
DATE
OF BIRTH: 07/15/1931
|
DATE
OF DEATH: 08/09/2008
|
BURIED
AT: SECTION 19 SITE 55
|
SANTA
FE NATIONAL CEMETERY
|
501
North Guadalupe Street Santa
Fé, NM 87501
|
RIVERA, RICARDO
|
A2C
U.S. AIR FORCE
|
KOREA
|
DATE
OF BIRTH: 03/11/1937
|
DATE
OF DEATH: 12/09/1979
|
BURIED
AT: SECTION 3 SITE 663
|
SANTA FE NATIONAL CEMETERY
|
501 North Guadalupe Street Santa Fé, NM 87501
|
RIVERA,
BEN E
|
A1
U.S. AIR FORCE
|
KOREA
|
DATE
OF BIRTH: 10/26/1933
|
DATE
OF DEATH: 09/03/1985
|
BURIED
AT: SECTION 6 SITE 467
|
SANTA FE NATIONAL CEMETERY
|
501 North Guadalupe Street Santa Fé,
NM 87501
|
RIVERA,
JOSÉ ELOY (E.)
|
A3C
U.S. AIR FORCE
|
KOREA
|
DATE
OF BIRTH: 04/03/1934 Las Vegas, San Miguel County, New
Mexico, USA
|
DATE
OF DEATH: 05/06/2012
|
BURIED
AT: SECTION 24 SITE 688
|
The Hispano
Americans of New Mexico and other locales gave their all, and in some
cases, their lives during these wars. I often wonder what these men and
women would think of the 21st-Century C.E. if they were able to be
brought back to life. If they saw and heard this generation’s
questioning the need for patriotism and its mistrust of government and
its officials, and less than civil public discourse, would they be
confused or angered? Or would they agree?
I agree with President Theodore Roosevelt’s
statement when he said, “Patriotism means to stand by the country. It
does not mean to stand by the president or any other public official,
save exactly to the degree in which he himself stands by the country. It
is patriotic to support him insofar as he efficiently serves the
country. It is unpatriotic not to oppose him to the exact extent that by
inefficiency or otherwise he fails in his duty to stand by the country.
In either event, it is unpatriotic not to tell the truth, whether about
the president or anyone else.”
I.
Introduction
In this Chapter, I cannot hope do justice to
all of the men and women of all races and ethnicity who served in this
heroic effort. One would hope that others will attempt to write about
these other men and women. As this is the family history about a Hispano family, the de Riberas
of New Mexico, I have identified those fellow Hispanos from the state of New Mexico who were casualties of the
Korean War and placed their names and information in the months in which
they fell during the war.
As the de
Riberas are also Hispanic Americans, I chose to include other non-Hispano
Hispanic military personnel.
A.
The Power and Failure of the American Elite
The Korean War began when the ongoing civil war
escalated into open warfare. On June 25, 1950 C.E., Communist North
Korean People's Army (NKPA) forces supported by the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics (USSR) and China invaded the Democratic south. This
was in an effort to unite the entire peninsula under one Communist
government. This was not about freedom.
The Korea Peninsula had been ruled by Japan
from 1910 C.E. until the closing days of World War II. The Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) then an Allied power declared war
on Japan in August 1945 C.E. After having reached an agreement with the
U.S., the USSR then liberated Korea north of the 38th parallel. By
liberation, I mean to say that the Soviets liberated all possessions
from all parties and controlled the means of any and all production.
It should have been understood by the American
Elite that by allowing, giving, providing
the USSR Communists a foothold anywhere on the Korean Peninsula
was to pretend that what they were doing in Eastern Europe of the time
was a one-off situation. Clearly history proved the Elites wrong! The
Communists had every intention of subverting any authority that was not
acceptable to them. Does the term “Comintern” strike a familiar
note!
The Comintern or Communist International was
an international Communist organization founded by Vladimir
Lenin the Russian communist revolutionary and head of the Bolshevik
Party. He rose to prominence during the Russian Revolution of 1917
C.E. The Comintern was established in Moscow, USSR in 1919 C.E. It
was officially dissolved in 1943 C.E.
This ultra-radical organization degenerated under Joséph
Stalin who served as General Secretary of the Central
Committee of the Communist Party USSR from 1922 C.E. to
his death on March 5, 1953 C.E. The Comintern became a political instrument of USSR
which was used to unite Communist groups in various countries. In
effect, the Comintern continued the promotion of Revolutionary Marxism,
including on the Korea Peninsula.
By 1948 C.E., U.S. forces moved into the Korean
south. The splitting of Korea into two separate governments was a
product of the Cold War between the USSR and the U.S. Both governments
claimed to be Korea’s legitimate government. Also, neither side
accepted the existing border as permanent.
Here it is important to clarify that before and
after the Korean War, the American elite or upper-class controlled and
directed U.S.’ foreign and domestic policy. Good or bad, every nation
on the face of the earth has its elite. The American elite or
upper-class thought itself to be as an aristocratic group, controlling
society's means of production. This included those who gain this
position due to socioeconomic means and not personal achievement.
The idea that the American cosmopolitan elite having
controlled and dominated American foreign policy and diplomacy is a
reality. Why is this important? It was this social stratum of American
society, and not the average man on the street, that assessed, planned,
and implemented the military engagements of the Korean War.
For the purpose of this chapter, the term,
"elite" describes a person or group of people who are members
of the uppermost class of society. In the U.S., this archaic society was
based upon lineage from parents or grandparents of the Revolutionary War
and passed-on. American elitists for a time were almost exclusively,
White Anglo-Saxon Protestants (WASPs). They were the social group
of wealthy and well-connected white Americans of Protestant and
predominantly British ancestry, many of whom trace their
ancestry to the American colonial period.
The American elitist’s belief and attitudes
about themselves was that they were a select group of people of a
superior ancestry, of intrinsic quality, of high intellect, wealth,
special skills, or experience. As such, they felt that they were more
likely to be more constructive for society as a whole. Therefore, they
deserved more influence and greater authority than the common working
man.
It was to the elites that the American people
of the 1940s C.E. and 1950 C.E. willingly left the all important
decisions of war. That includes the Korean War. I am not for one moment
saying that to enter the Korean Peninsula in the defense of its people
was unwise or unwarranted. What I am saying is that the elite
decision-makers failed to understand the entire scope of the conflict
before entering into that civil war. The American Elite’s strategic
military approach became one of changing plans in mid-stream which
eventually resulted in a tactical stalemate.
This elitist control would continue until at
least the 1960s. The group dominated American society and culture and
dominated in the leadership of the Republican and Democratic parties.
They were very well placed in major financial, business, legal, and
academic institutions and had close to a monopoly of elite society due
to intermarriage and nepotism.
During the latter half of the 20th-Century C.E.,
others of different ethnic and racial groups would grow in influence and
WASP dominance would begin to weaken. These Elites of the WASP American
families would remain as "the Establishment,” however, their
historical dominance and control over the financial, cultural, academic,
and legal institutions of the U.S. would gradually decline.
As opposed to the Elite, the average American
who had little power or control in the U.S., simply fought and died in
Korea for ideals. The ideals of "Freedom” and the “American
Dream” are the national ethos of the U.S. It’s a set of ideals in
which freedom includes the opportunity for prosperity, success, and an
upward social mobility for the family and children. At its base is that
belief that it is achieved through hard work in a society with few
barriers. About these good souls, I agree with Sargent Shriver’s
comments. “The only genuine elite are the elite of those men and women
who gave their lives to justice and charity.”
II.
Hispanic American Patriotism and the Korean War
Hispanics have fought in every American war
since the Revolutionary War. Many Hispanic Americans would again come
forward during the Korean War. They would give their all despite the
racial and ethnic prejudice existing in the nation which negatively
impacted them.
Hispanics and other minority groups did not
suffer from naïveté. They understood that the Native Americans
had been placed on reservations and that African Americans were
relegated to the edge society. Hispanics had seen Asian Americans
deported or placed in detention camps, or allowed work as gardeners and
cooks. The Hispanics also had been isolated into their barrios
where they forgot their historical and cultural roots. In short, to be
an American, meant to be perfectly American and Hispanics were clearly
not. During that time, under the best of circumstances every non-White
racial and ethnic group was tolerated. American society created a place
for each group which was not necessarily equal.
Now I return to the proposition that when and
where practicable, as Américanos,
these Hispanics were free to live as they wanted. Their innate belief in
America, its sense of “freedom” and the “American Dream” is what
drove them to readily participate in the many American wars. Their
adherence to those ideals led the de
Riberas to service America in Korea. This they did despite
America’s glaring faults.
Unfortunately after World War II ended, the
regular U.S. military had been considerably downsized. General
MacArthur's request for more troops was approved, but in order to meet
his needs quota, it became necessary to activate thousands of National
Guardsmen from all across the U.S. From then on, our nation's
National Guard played an important role in the Korean War.
According to the National Guard Bureau in
Arlington, Virginia, when war be out in Korea about one third (138,600
men) of the Army Guard's total strength was mobilized. Forty-three
units, including two infantry divisions, actually served in Korea. Other
guard units were deployed to stateside and worldwide locations close to
and far away from Korea.
There was more than National Guard manpower
needed. Some 67 percent of the Army National Guard's equipment was
also mobilized for war. The Army National Guard and the Air
National Guard gave up motor vehicles, tanks, and other ground weapons,
and light aircraft. This included 156 M-26 tanks and some 592 M-4
medium tanks. The Air National Guard provided its F-84 and F-74 jet
fighter aircraft, spare parts for these aircraft including the F-51
aircraft, life vests, and life rafts for the active forces.
Elements of the Air National Guard would also
be deployed. By the fall of 1950 C.E., about one sixth of the Air
National Guard would be activated. During 1951 C.E., 22 of the 27
Air National Guard wings, with supporting units, would be called up. These
Guardsmen left post-World War II civilian jobs, new brides, young
children, college studies, and many hopes and dreams when their units
were activated for the war.
In the American Southwest, the War Department
had earlier directed the reorganization of the New Mexico Guard in March
1947 C.E. This order gave the State five separate Anti-Aircraft
Battalions, one Operations Detachment, two Signal Radar Units, one
Engineer Searchlight Maintenance Unit, and three Ordnance Companies.
The Korean War caused activation into Federal
service of the 716th AAA Gun Battalion along with the 726th and 394th
Signal Radar Maintenance Unit. The 188th was also activated during the
conflict. New Mexico units furnished individual members, many Hispanos, as replacements to units engaged in active combat.
One group of American Hispanics that heard the
nation’s call and reported for duty was the
Puertorriqueños. Puerto
Rico’s 65th Infantry in an exercise involving the 65th in February
1950 C.E. changed the minds of many Army leaders about the 65th's
usefulness. The 65th held off the entire 3rd Infantry Division in a
successful defense. Pentagon planners took note. With the outbreak of
the Korean War in June 1950 C.E., the 65th was ordered to Korea and
assigned to the 3rd Infantry Division. Brigadier-General Juan
Codero, Puerto Rico's Adjutant General commanded the 296th Infantry when it
was mobilized in 1950 C.E. and was one of the commanders of the 65th in
Korea, making him, perhaps, the only Guard member to command a regular
regiment in Korea.
While the 65th was on its way, its sister Puerto
Rico Guard unit, the 296th Infantry, was mobilized. Like many Guard
units, the 296th was tasked to provide replacements. Brigadier-General Juan
Codero commanded the 296th Infantry when it was mobilized in 1950
C.E. and was one of the commanders of the 65th in Korea, making him,
perhaps, the only Guard member to command a regular regiment in Korea.
The 65th Infantry had always lived up to its
motto of "Honor and Fidelity."
It would fight in some of the toughest battles of the Korean War.
The Unit would earn two U.S. Presidential Unit Citations, two Republic
of Korea (ROK) Presidential Unit Citations, two U.S. Meritorious Unit
Commendations, and the Greek Gold Medal of Bravery. Four of its soldiers
would be awarded the Distinguished Service Cross, the second highest
award for valor.
Shortly after the 65th arrived in ROK, its
commander, Colonel William Harris, was approached by Eight Army
commander Lieutenant-General Walton Walker. The general asked,
"Will the Puertorriqueños fight?"
"I and my Puertorriqueños
will fight anybody," replied Harris proudly. Walker then pointed to
a waiting northbound train and ordered, "Get on, and then go that
way." For the next three years the men of the 65th would fight
their way up and down the Korean Peninsula.
Any doubts about their fighting ability would
be quickly dispelled. The regiment would earn a distinguished combat
record. Fighting in some of the toughest battles of the Korean War, the
65th would earn two U.S. Presidential Unit Citations, two Republic of
Korea Presidential Unit Citations, two U.S. Meritorious Unit
Commendations, and the Greek Gold Medal of Bravery. Four of its soldiers
would be awarded the Distinguished Service Cross, the second highest
award for valor.
Colonel Harry Micheli, later the senior Army instructor at the Antilles
Military Academy in Puerto Rico,
reported to the 65th as a new second lieutenant in the fall of 1951 C.E.
He stated, "I remember that the 65th was reorganizing after a year
of heavy combat. Many of the old-time regulars had left as casualties.
They were replaced by Puerto Rico Guardsmen, non-Hispanic Guardsmen from various states,
and The Republic of Korea Army (ROKA) replacements from ROK.
We trained until we were a cohesive unit," he added, "and then
we reentered combat."
III. A prelude to the Korean War - U.S. Political Events 1940-1950
C.E.:
A.
The World of WWII
I provide the following so that the reader
might have a better understanding of America and the world at large
prior to the Korean War. I start after the Europeans had begun WWII and
continue until the start of the Korean War. The world during this period
was an ugly, vicious, and cruel place. All nations involved suffered.
Why? WWII started because
the great European powers had unnecessarily forgotten the lessons of
WWI. Just four years before the Europeans repeated the errors of WWI in
1939 C.E, Winston Churchill gave a speech attempting to remind his
audience of past mistakes which led to War earlier.
In a 1935 C.E. House of Commons speech
after the Stresa Conference, Churchill suggested that failure to
act quickly in considering the future, not necessarily a failure to
adequately ruminate upon the past, will result in history repeating
itself. Churchill said, "Want of foresight,
unwillingness to act when action would be simple and effective, lack of
clear thinking, confusion of counsel until the emergency comes, until
self-preservation strikes its jarring gong — these are the features
which constitute the endless repetition of history.” WWII was a
result of that repetition of history.
By 1940 C.E., with Europe at war, everything
had changed. European countries were desperate for goods to use in the
war effort. They spent millions of dollars on American steel,
ammunition, weapons, and food. Yet private businesses were slow to react
to the demands of war. Many manufacturers continued to make consumer
goods when military hardware was most needed. Shortages of raw materials
also held up the recovery. Rather than issuing government orders or
taking control of industries, the Roosevelt administration chose to
guide private industry into producing what was required. It struck deals
with private businesses to boost wartime production. This mixture of
private money and federal incentives became the model for the American
economy for the next thirty years. Yet that same year, the federal
government estimated that more than half the families in the U.S. were
below the poverty level.
Between 1940 C.E. and 1945 C.E., American
industry would produce eighty-six thousand tanks, thirty thousand
aircraft, and sixty-five hundred ships. U.S. Steel would make twenty-one
million helmets for the army. Quality improved as well. Aircraft would
fly farther and faster than ever. The General-Purpose vehicle, known in
soldier slang as the GP, or Jeep, grew tougher. Advances were made
during wartime that helped American industry reach its dominant postwar
position.
Though these wartime production levels had
finally put an end to the Great Depression, in 1941 C.E., eight
million Americans remained out of work. Another eight million made less
than the legal minimum wage. Nearly 40% of America lived in poverty. The
median salary was less than 2,000 dollars per year. Despite all
government efforts to keep supplies steady, the war continued to create
shortages. In order to make sure essential supplies were shared fairly,
many items, including meat, sugar, butter, and canned goods were
rationed. Every U.S. citizen was given a book of stamps. These stamps
had to be handed over by the customer when he or she bought rationed
goods. Many suppliers made extra money by illegally selling rationed
goods to customers who did not have enough stamps, charging them extra.
Gasoline was also rationed, but in a different way. Every vehicle was
rated A to E, and carried a sticker in the window with a letter on it.
Those rated "A" were private automobiles, and were entitled to
very little gas. Emergency vehicles were rated "E," and could
take as much as they needed. Others fell in between. Before long, there
was a thriving black, or illegal, market in gasoline and other rationed
goods.
The 1940s C.E. would also witness a new regime
of Mexican expulsion or “Repatriation” from within the U.S. to
Mexico. Between 1941 C.E. and 1950 C.E., U.S. federal authorities would
deport more than 1.3 million Mexican nationals. Interestingly, this
included the time of WWII and the begining of the Korean War. By the
mid-1940s, continued annual arrests and expulsions of Mexicans illegally
present in the U.S. exceeded 60,000 per year. Did Hispanics understand
this was happening? The answer is, yes. Did they serve and fight in WWII
anyway? Again, the answer is, yes!
By 1943 C.E., the American economy was more
productive than it had ever been. Unfortunately, there were still
shortages at home.
Outside of the U.S., in some Latino
Américano countries the life of most inhabitants seemed little
changed in 1945 C.E., at the end of World War II, from what it had been
in 1910 C.E.
Latino
Américano economies remained hindered by backwardness. In
the Andean countries and Central
América, urban dwellers were a decided minority even at the end of
World War II, in 1945 C.E. Moreover, the usual pattern was that of a
single primate city vastly overshadowing lesser urban centers. Paraguay was still overwhelmingly rural and isolated, as was Honduras,
except for its coastal banana enclave. Even in Brasil,
the sertão, or semiarid
backcountry, was barely affected by changes in the coastal cities or in
the fast-growing industrial complex of São
Paulo. But in Latino América as
a whole more people were becoming linked to the national and world
economies, introduced to rudimentary public education, and
exposed to emerging mass media.
At the Yalta Conference in February
1945 C.E., Soviet leader Joséph Stalin pledged that his
nation would declare war on Japan exactly three months after Nazi
Germany was defeated.
By that time, Korea had been a Japanese
possession since the early-20th-Century C.E. During World War II,
the Allies, the U.S., USSR, China, and Great Britain (GB), made a
somewhat hazy agreement that Korea should become an independent country
following the WWII. As the war progressed, U.S. officials began to press
the USSR to enter the war against Japan.
The Korea of 1945 C.E. was still was a remote
country known only to a small number of missionaries and adventurous
businessmen. It held little importance in the official scheme of things.
Though the U.S. had proposed the thirty-eighth parallel as a dividing
line between the two occupation armies of the U.S. and the USSR, U.S.
policymakers still were unsure of the strategic value of ROK.
Formulating a U.S. policy for Korea was difficult due to the
intensification of the confrontation between the U.S. and the USSR and
the polarization of Korean politics between left and right. U.S. policy
toward Korea became even more uncertain after the deadlock of the
U.S.-USSR joint commission.
B.
The End of WWII
In Europe, German cities would be in need of
clean up and rebuilding. During the WWII, approximately 50 percent
of Nazi Germany's infrastructure was destroyed. Dresden was one of the
hardest hit cities. Eight square miles of Dresden, which had boasted
some of the most beautiful baroque architecture in Europe, were
destroyed when Allied bombers dropped more than 5,000 tons of high
explosives and incendiary bombs on the city in February 1945.
WWII was declared final or at its end on
victory in Europe Day on May 8, 1945 C.E. At this point the war in
the Pacific had not yet ended.
The Potsdam Conference (July 17, 1945 C.E.,-August
2, 1945 C.E.,) was held near Berlin. It was the last of the WWII
meetings held by the “Big Three” heads of state. Featuring U.S.
President Harry S. Truman, British Prime Minister Winston Churchill (and
his successor, Clement Attlee) and Soviet Premier Joséph Stalin, the
talks established a Council of Foreign Ministers and a central Allied
Control Council for administration of Germany. The leaders arrived at
various agreements on the German economy, punishment for war criminals,
land boundaries, and war reparations. Although talks primarily centered
on postwar Europe, the Big Three also issued a declaration demanding
“unconditional surrender” from Japan. That unconditional surrender
would bring further complication. Korea was to become such a
complication. In the years before and during WWII, both the U.S. and
USSR had worked to liberate the region from the Japanese.
Also at the Potsdam
Conference it was agreed that USSR troops would occupy the northern
portion of Korea, as Japan was then occupying the Korean Peninsula. The
USSR was to invade the northern half of Korea and take it from under
Japanese control as agreed during the Potsdam Conference. The
American forces would liberate the southern half of Korea soon
thereafter. This was to be done in order to secure the area and
liberate it from Japanese control. The occupations were to be temporary,
and Korea was to eventually decide its own political future. Also, a
date was not set for the end of the U.S. and USSR occupations. Thus the
upcoming conflict in Korea would have its beginnings in 1945 C.E.
Early in August 1945 C.E., two young State
Department aides, Dean Rusk and Charles Bonesteel, consulted a National
Geographic map of Asia to determine the postwar dividing line
between USSR and U.S. zones of control in Korea. Neither was an
expert on the country. Failing to find any obvious natural barrier
between the North and the South, they selected the 38th parallel.
This new post-WWII border which would become the dividing line between
U.S. and USSR control zones in Korea had been tentatively proposed
after the Potsdam Conference. The division placed the capital city
of Seoul in the American zone, just 35 miles south of the dividing
line. On August 8, 1945 C.E., the USSR declared war on Japan. By August
9th, USSR forces invaded northern Korea. A few days later on August 14,
1945 C.E., the Empire of Japan surrendered.
The People's Republic of Korea (PRK),
a short-lived Korean provisional government was organized on
that same day of August 14, 1945 C.E. The Provisional Government of the
Republic of Korea was a partially recognized Korean
government-in-exile, based in Shanghai, China, and later in Chungking,
during the Japanese Korean period of 1910 C.E. through 1945 C.E. On
April 11, 1919 C.E., the provisional constitution was enacted, and the
national sovereignty was called "Republic of Korea (KPG)" and
the political system was called "Democratic Republic." It
introduced the presidential system and established three separate
systems of legislative, administrative and judicial separation. The KPG
claimed that it inherited the territory of the former Korean
Empire. It actively began supporting an independence movement under the
Provisional Government. KPG received economic and military support from
the Kuomintang of China, the USSR, and France.
The Provisional Government resisted Japanese
colonial rule of Korea and coordinated the armed resistance against the
Japanese Imperial Army during the 1920s C.E. and 1930s C.E. This
struggle culminated in the formation of Korean Liberation Army in
1940 C.E., which brought together many if not all Korean resistance
groups in exile. With the liberation of Korea from Japanese
occupation at the end of World War II, the Korean Provisional Government
came to an end.
After the Surrender of Japan on
August 15, 1945 C.E., the Provisional Government of the KPG was
dissolved. Its members then returned to Korea, where they began to put
together their own political organizations in what came to be South
Korea and competed for power. On August 15, 1948 C.E., Syngman Rhee a
Korean a politician in the south, became the first president of the
Provisional Government of the KPG. The Constitution of South Korea
stated that the Korean people inherited the rule of the KPG.
C.
Post WWII World
1.0
The USSR Enters the Korean Peninsula
On August 18, 1945 C.E., several USSR
amphibious military landings were conducted ahead of the land campaign.
The three landings took place in northern Korea. One landing was
at South Sakhalin. A second landing took place in the Kuril
Islands, in preparation for USSR 25th Army troops coming overland. The
third landing was in South Sakhalin and the Kurils, located directly to
the north of Japan and east of Sakhalin. The purpose was
the establishment of USSR sovereignty. Next, the USSR military land
advance was stopped a good distance short of the Yalu River. There
the Korean Peninsula starts.
Over the next few years, the situation in Korea
would steadily worsen. A civil war between communist and nationalist
forces in southern Korea would result in thousands of people killed and
wounded. With forces in Korea, the USSR was able to establish control in
the Peninsula's northern area and immediately establish a headquartered
at P’yŏngyang for a period. In accordance with
arrangements made earlier with the American government to divide the
Korean Peninsula, USSR forces stopped at the 38th parallel, leaving the
Japanese still in control of the southern part of the Peninsula. They
had agreed to temporarily to divide Korea at the 38th parallel of
latitude north of the equator.
The USSR would continue in its steadfast
refusal to consider any plans for the reunification of Korea. This
policy division would eventually result in the formation of two
countries. In the north, above the 38th parallel was communist Korea
under the leadership of Kim Il-Sung supported by the Soviets. To the
south was to be a democratic Korea headed by Syngman Rhee supported by
the U.S. Like the American forces in the south, USSR troops remained in
Korea after the end of the war to rebuild the country. The Soviets were
also instrumental in the creation and early development of the NKPA and Korean
People's Air Force (KPAF), as well as for stabilizing the early years of
the Northern regime.
Japan formally signed surrender documents
on September 2, 1945 C.E., WWII was formally at an end. That same month,
in North Korea the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) was
established. Korean leaders and exiles abroad, mainly in China, had
earlier established self-governing bodies, or people's committees, and
organized the Central People's Committee. These exiles had sustained a
skeletal organization in other parts of China until 1945 C.E., awaiting
their return to Korea. These proclaimed the establishment of the
"Korean People's Republic" on September 6, 1945 C.E.
2.0
The U.S. Enters the Korean Peninsula
On September 7, 1945 C.E., U.S. General Douglas
MacArthur announced that Lieutenant-General John R. Hodge was
to administer South Korean affairs. Keeping to their part of the
bargain, U.S. forces entered southern Korea under Lieutenant-General
Hodge and landed in Inch’ŏn the following day of
September 8, 1945 C.E., the United States Army Military Government in Korea (USAMGIK)
was established as the official ruling body of the southern half of the Korean
Peninsula. With this in place, U.S. troops in Korea began their postwar
occupation.
The Lieutenant-General, commander of the U.S.
occupation forces in Korea would be obliged to work under a severe
handicap. His mission was to maintain peace and order until the
international conflict over Korea was resolved. His administration
possessed very limited resources, yet Hodge was expected to pursue the
"ultimate objective" of fostering conditions which would bring
about the establishment of a free and independent nation. In addition,
Lieutenant-General Hodge had to contend with hostile Korean political
groups.
The months after Hodge’s arrival, he would
witness a vast inflow of population. South Korea's population, estimated
at just over 16 million in 1945 C.E., would grow by 21 percent during
the following year.
The Provisional Government of the Republic
of Korea, sent a delegation with three interpreters to General Hodge,
but he refused to meet with them. The U.S. recognized neither the
republic nor the provisional government headed by Syngman Rhee, its
first president, and Kim Ku and Kim Kyu-sik, premier, and vice premier,
respectively. The U.S. would not recognize any group as a government
until an agreement was reached among the Western Allies. The exiles were
appeased by the favorable treatment they received when they returned to
South Korea, however, they were now incensed by the U.S. Military
Government in Korea's order to disband. The U.S. Army military
government that administered the American-occupied zone proceeded to
disband the local people's committees and impose direct rule, assigning
military personnel who lacked language skills and knowledge of Korea as
governors at various levels.
On September 12, 1945 C.E., the People's
Republic of Korea (PRK) was again proclaimed, as Korea was being
divided into two occupation zones, with the USSR occupying the north,
and the U.S. occupying the south. In the north, the Soviet authorities
co-opted the committees into the structure of the emerging DPRK (North
Korea). It was based on a network of people's committees and
presented a program of radical social change.
Although the U.S. and USSR occupations were
supposed to be temporary, the division of Korea quickly became
permanent. At this juncture, each side was willing to make
accommodations.
3.0
Ratification of the United Nations
In the world at large, the United Nations (UN)
Charter was ratified by its five permanent members the U.S., GB, France,
China (the non-Communist Republic of China), and the USSR on October 24,
1945 C.E. It was to become the international stage for resolving
disputes peacefully.
The Korean Communist Party was resuscitated in
October 1945 C.E. with the help of the Comintern. It had been a major
force behind the Central People's Committee and the "Korean
People's Republic." It quickly built a substantial following among
the workers, farmers, and students.
On November 13, 1945 C.E., the Free French
leader General Charles de Gaulle was named president of France's
Provisional Government of the French Republic (1944 C.E.-1946 C.E.).
With WWII over, France was ready to rebuild.
On November 20, 1945 C.E., the Nuremberg Trials
opened. For the next 10 months, a tribunal comprised of Allied jurists
would pass judgment on scores of Nazi war criminals.
4.0
The Moscow Conference and the Division of Korea
The decision for the final division of Korea
would be made at the Moscow Conference in December of 1945 C.E., between
the U.S., the USSR, GB, and the Republic of China. At that time, the Republic
of China was a sovereign state in East Asia founded in
1912 C.E., after the Qing dynasty, the last imperial dynasty, was
overthrown in the Xinhai Revolution. It occupied part of
territories within modern China, Mongolia, and Taiwan.
These parties would have Korea ruled over by a
trusteeship for five years starting in 1946 C.E. The eventual goal was
to be an entirely independent Korea.
The Americans selected the 38th Parallel
for the dividing of Korea when the onslaught of the USSR
offensives in Asia threatened to turn the whole peninsula of Korea into
a Communist state. It was believed that the USSR would attempt to take
the entire Korea Peninsula forcing the U.S. to leverage the fact that it
had fought for most in the Pacific and therefore deserved rights to the
entirety of Korea. This was the same argument the Soviets used with
Eastern Europe. The Soviets accepted this remedy. Why were the Soviets
so accepting of half of Korea rather than its entirety? It allowed the
Soviets to have a Communist partner in Asia. It should be remembered
that the Soviets to have even half a Communist country in Asia, was
better than having nothing at all. At that time, the Soviets were still
awaiting the outcome of the Chinese Civil War and Vietnam remained a
French colony. The USSR would later try to gain the entirety of Korea
through its backing of Kim il-Sung and the Korean War.
In international affairs, the U.S. government
committed to a multibillion-dollar loan to prop up the British economy
on December 6, 1945 C.E. U.S. President Truman ended the wartime Lend
Lease arrangements abruptly in August 1945 C.E. Suddenly, GB found it
did not have enough dollars to make expected payment for undelivered
supplies, bankruptcy loomed. As GB emergency measure, the government
sold gold and minerals, this GB could not do for long. GB attempted
negotiations on the matter expecting a gift in recognition of the
country's contribution to the war effort. Despite three months of hard
wrangling, the Anglo American Agreement produced a business loan instead
of a subsidy, with additional conditions in America’s favor. In
December 1945 C.E., the British Government succumbed, agreeing to not
only a U.S. loan of $4.34 billion, then double the size of the then
British economy, but also other onerous stipulations.
GB’s economy had been distorted by six years
of total war. GB had given her all for the freedom of the world. Both
blood and treasure had been expended in great amounts. During the war,
the British economy had been heavily geared towards war production, at
approximately 55 percent of her GDP. This was much greater than in the
USSR or America. The wartime U.S. Lend Lease arrangements started in
1941 C.E. had helped GB through her wartime difficulties. GB was now in
a precarious position. She was exporting only approximately a fifth of
what it had before the war and non-military imports were five times
higher than in 1938 C.E. 1.4 million people would remain in the armed
forces by 1946 C.E.
Meanwhile in Korea’s south, the U.S. military
government under Lieutenant-General John R. Hodge, administrator
of Korean affairs, refused to recognize the newly formed People's
Republic of Korea (PRK) and its People's Committees, and outlawed
it on December 12, 1945.
By December 17, 1945 C.E., at the Moscow
Conference, the Allies agreed that the U.S., the USSR, the Republic of
China, and GB would take part in a trusteeship over Korea. It
was to be for up to five years in the lead-up to independence. The Council
of Foreign Ministers agreed on Korea having a provisional
government, or temporary government, set up quickly before a real
government was ready. This would become difficult to do because of the
growing Cold War. Though the U.S. officials were pessimistic about
resolving their differences with the USSR, they remained committed to
the December 1945 C.E. decision of the Allied foreign ministers (made
during their Moscow meeting) that a trusteeship under four powers,
including China, should be established with a view toward Korea's
eventual independence. Thus, U.S. officials were slow to draw up
long-range alternative plans for South Korea.
Moreover, as the USSR consolidated its power in
North Korea and the Nationalist Party (Guomindang or Kuomintang--KMT)
government of Chiang Kai-shek began to falter in China, Theses and other
issues caused U.S. strategists to begin to question the long-run
defensibility of South Korea.
When the decision
to establish a five-year trusteeship in Korea was announced, it
exacerbated an already difficult situation. To the Koreans, many who had
anticipated immediate independence were humiliated. The initially warm
Korean welcome to U.S. troops as liberators cooled. Many Koreans began
demanding their independence immediately. The Korean Communist
Party, which was closely aligned with the USSR Communist party,
supported the trusteeship. Why? They believed that they could later take
by force what they wanted.
In the U.S. after 1945 C.E., America’s major
corporations began growing larger. With the pressure of growth,
corporate America was desperate to separate Americans from the $140
billion they had saved in times of shortage and rationing. Keeping that
spending under control would be one of the biggest challenges faced by
U.S. President Truman in the late-1940s C.E.
The automobile
industry was robust. The number of automobiles produced annually would
quadruple between 1946 C.E. and 1955 C.E. At the same time, a housing
boom was being stimulated in part by easily affordable mortgages for
returning servicemen. This also would fuel the expansion. The rise in
defense spending as the Cold War escalated would play a part in economic
growth.
Workers found their own lives changing as
industrial America changed. Fewer workers produced goods; more provided
services. Within the U.S., economic growth was being driven by different
sources. By 1946 C.E., unemployment was low, wages were at record
levels, and the economy was booming. Labor shortages caused by the war
meant that many women and teenagers had entered the labor market. Soon,
the returning soldiers would threaten to push unemployment back up after
the war. To mitigate this, U.S. President Truman, Roosevelt's successor,
used the GI Bill to put the soldiers through college instead.
This eased the pressure on the economy and produced a better-educated
workforce.
Also in 1946 C.E., the U.S. government
closed the internment camps in which some 120,000 ethnic Japanese in the
American West had been incarcerated since 1942 C.E. This issue continues
to haunt the U.S. even unto our day.
In Europe, after end of WWII, in 1946 C.E., the
eight square miles of Dresden ruins would be cleared and replaced by
modern structures. The Dresden Frauenkirche, a Lutheran church, was
an exception, as its decaying ruins were left untouched. After the
reunification of Germany, the church was restored for $175 million.
Homeless German children bartered and begged. Young
children sold or bartered whatever they could to survive on the streets
of Berlin. A black market developed in Berlin, with cigarettes, liquor,
and chocolate as three of the commodities most sought by Berliners from
occupation troops. For many months after the war, German children would
roam the streets scavenging or beg for food.
Regarding Asia, by early 1946 C.E. the USAMGIK
responsible for the governance of the south had come to rely heavily on
the advice and counsel of ideologically conservative elements within
Korea. These included landlords and other propertied persons.
A Joint USSR-U.S. Commission met in 1946 C.E.
and later in 1947 C.E. to work towards a unified Korea administration.
Unsurprisingly, it failed to make progress. This was due to increasing Cold
War antagonism and to Korean opposition to the trusteeship. Meanwhile,
the division between the two zones was deepening as the difference in
policy between the occupying powers led to a polarization of politics.
It was also to be the genesis of the future transfer of population
between North and South.
By 1947 C.E., these divisions in Korea were
causing social unrest. Only approximately half the Korean labor force of
10 million was gainfully employed. Labor strikes and work stoppages were
occurring. Demonstrations orchestrated by the communists against
USAMGIK's policies drew large crowds. Temporary stoppages of
electricity--supplied from the northern areas--in the early part of 1946
C.E. and later in late-1947 C.E., plunged the southern region of Korea
into darkness on both occasions. Also the economic situation was at this
point nearly as difficult in the north as it was in the south. During
Japanese occupation of the peninsula they had concentrated agriculture
in the south and heavy industry in the north. A complete transition of
the existing infrastructure was needed. There was a deepening despair
affecting the Korean people and they were becoming disillusioned and
disconcerted. Koreans began to pay close attention to political leaders
of various persuasions who offered new ways of solving the Korean
problem.
In Japan, on January 1, 1946 C.E., Emperor
Hirohito addressed his subjects and stated that he was not, contrary to
popular belief, a divine being. This proposition was unfathomable for
most Japanese to accept.
The Korean Communist Party had been taking
various stances on the idea of trusteeship. It once again changed its
stance on trusteeship and came out in support of it on January 3, 1946
C.E. The Party remained under the control of the USSR command in P’yŏngyang.
Should it be necessary for the Party to come into disagreement later, it
could be used to come into direct confrontation with the U.S. military
government.
On the world stage, on January 17, 1946 C.E., the
UN Security Council (UNSC) convened in London to agree on procedural
rules for the international body. A week later, on January 24, 1946 C.E., the
International Atomic Energy Commission was established to help regulate
emerging nuclear weapons technology.
In North Korea, in February 1946 C.E., a provisional
government called the Provisional People's Committee was formed
under Kim Il-sung Kim Il-sung (April 15, 1912-July 8, 1994). He had
spent the last years of WWII training with Soviet troops in Manchuria.
Conflicts and power struggles would later ensue at the top levels of
government in P’yŏngyang as different political aspirants
maneuvered to gain positions of power in the new government.
By March 1946 C.E., the Provisional People's
Committee instituted a sweeping land-reform program. Lands belonging to
Japanese and collaborator landowners was divided and redistributed to
poor farmers. The Communists next organized the many poor civilians and
agricultural laborers under the People's Committees. Soon, a nationwide
mass campaign began to control the old landed classes. Landlords were
allowed to keep only the same amount of land as poor civilians who had
once rented their land, thereby making for a far more equal distribution
of land. As a result, former village leaders were eliminated as a
political force without resort to bloodshed, precluding their return to
power. The new landowning farmers responded positively. This North
Korean land reform was achieved with little violence. Also, northern
Korean key industries were nationalized.
Many of the Japanese, collaborators, and former
landowners in the north fled to the south. The U.S. military government
estimated that 400,000 northern Koreans moved to the south as refugees.
There some of them obtained positions in the new South Korean
government.
In another part of Asia, on March 2, 1946 C.E., the
Communist revolutionary nationalist leader Hồ Chí Minh (May
19, 1890 C.E.-September 2, 1969 C.E.) became the Chairman and
First Secretary of the Workers' Party of Vietnam. Earlier,
following the August Revolution (1945 C.E.) organized by the
Việt Minh, Hồ Chí Minh had become Chairman of the
Provisional Government.
He was also President (1945 C.E.-1969 C.E.)
of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam). He was a key
figure in the foundation of the People's Army of Vietnam.
The intensification of the confrontation
between the U.S. and the USSR had only continued to worsen. The
Capitalist Western Bloc (the U.S, its allies, and others) now
understood the challenge being presented by the Communist Eastern Bloc
(the USSR, its satellite states, and the communists in China).
On March 5, 1946 C.E., former British Prime Minister Winston
Churchill delivered his seminal "Iron Curtain" speech at
Missouri's Westminster College. It is considered one of the most famous
orations of the Cold War period. Churchill condemned the USSR’s
policies in Europe and declared, “From Stettin in the Baltic to
Trieste in the Adriatic, an iron curtain has
descended across the continent.” This Churchill speech is
considered one of the opening volleys announcing the beginning of the
Cold War.
Frustrated by Japan's lack of progress with
creating a new constitution, U.S. General Douglas MacArthur assigned the
role to members of his own staff. The result was a constitution based
more on British parliamentary rule than on the U.S. model. The document
limited the “human” Emperor of Japan to a symbolic role. It also
gave women the right to vote. Women reacted enthusiastically. In April
1946 C.E., for the first time in their nation's history millions of
Japanese women voted in the election that gave Japan its first modern
prime minister, Yoshida Shigeru. Japanese women vote in Japanese
election. When Japan’s women cast their votes, it was perhaps the
most visible sign of Japan's postwar political transformation to the
modern age.
On April 28, 1946 C.E., the Allied
International Military Tribunal for the Far East indicted Japanese war
minister Tojo Hideki as a war criminal. It charged him with 55 counts.
He would later be sentenced to death in November 1948 C.E.
In May 1946, it was made illegal to cross
Korea’s 38th parallel without a permit. Both sides were
consolidating control of their borders. Also, in May of 1946 C.E. and
later, in April 1947 C.E., the U.S. supported the returned Korean exiles
and the conservative elements. To facilitate this, the U.S. military
government tried to mobilize support behind a coalition between the
moderate left represented by Yo Un-hyong, who had been the figurehead of
the Central People's Committee, and the moderate right, represented by
Kim Kyu-sik, vice premier of the exiled government.
During the movement to unify Korea’s
political left and the political right, Lyuh Woon-hyung represented the
center-left. Specifically, he occupied a position on the center between
the left and the right. Lyuh’s political stance was attacked by both
the extreme right and the extreme left. This made his efforts to pursue
a centrist position increasingly untenable by the political realities of
the time. As for Kim Kyu-sik of the right-wing group, this leader had
been the clear choice of the U.S. military government. He, however,
could not be dissuaded from his fruitless trip to P’yŏngyang in
the north, leaving in place a political standoff. These attempts only
intensified the existing splits within the left-wing and right-wing
camps. It produced no positive results.
During that month, there were many other
problems facing the U.S. South Korean left-wing and right-wing groups
frequently engaged in violent clashes and not only on ideological
grounds, but also because of their opposing views about the trusteeship
decision. The moderates took the position that Koreans should oppose the
trusteeship. This was unacceptable to the other parties. Communist
leaders were driven underground in May 1946 C.E. after the discovery of
a currency counterfeiting operation run by the Party.
By June 1946 C.E., the ardent anti-communist Syngman
Rhee wanted the immediate independence of Korea, even at the price of
indefinite division. He campaigned actively for this within Korea and
the U.S.
In the U.S. of the postwar years, the consumer
age had begun. Americans were buying huge numbers of cars,
refrigerators, televisions, and other household appliances. Price
controls imposed by the Office of Price Administration (OPA)
ended on July 1, 1946 C.E. Almost immediately, prices increased. This
time, American industry was ready to respond. It increased production of
consumer goods forcing prices back down.
Also on July 1, 1946 C.E., on the military
front the U.S. detonated a plutonium bomb "Able," off Bikini
Atoll. It was a part of Operation Crossroads, an effort to learn more
about the power of the atomic bomb. The U.S. postwar nuclear tests at
Bikini Atoll were designed to examine the effects of atomic bombs on
naval vessels. Bikini's 167 inhabitants had been forcibly relocated in
early-1946 C.E., and 71 surplus and captured ships were anchored in the
lagoon to serve as targets. Other targets included planes and 5,400
rats, goats, and pigs.
In Europe, a little after a years of the
War’s end, on July 4, 1946 C.E., a false kidnapping allegation fueled
an anti-Semitic pogrom in Kielce, Poland, claimed the lives of some 40
Jews. It is only fitting that their fellow travelers, forty-three
members of the Waffen-SS, were sentenced to death on July 16, 1946
C.E. for the December 1944 C.E. Malmedy Massacre of American
prisoners-of-war (POWs) during the Battle of the Bulge. They would
eventually be released.
In Korea, on July 19, 1947 C.E., Lyuh
Woon-hyung who represented Korea’s political center-left,
specifically, a position on the center between the left and the right,
was assassinated in Seoul by a 19-year-old man named Han Chigeun. The
19-year-old was a recent refugee from North Korea and an active member
of a nationalist right-wing group. There is no question in my mind that
the Communists orchestrated that foul act.
On July 25, 1946 C.E., a second U.S. nuclear
detonation, code-named "Baker," took place. The two separate
atomic blasts sank ships and left others heavily contaminated with
radiation. Whatever the scientific gains, the highly public tests only
exacerbated deteriorating relations between the U.S. and the USSR.
In September 1946 C.E., thousands of
Korean laborers and peasants rose up against the USAMGIK, but the
uprising was quickly quelled. Much to the communists’ chagrin it
failed to prevent scheduled October elections for the South Korean
Interim Legislative Assembly. Also that month, the ardent anti-communist Syngman
Rhee, and first president of the Provisional Government became the most
prominent politician in the South. He would later work as a pro-Korean
lobbyist in the U.S. pressuring the American government to abandon
negotiations for a trusteeship and create an independent Republic of
Korea in the south.
The communists in South Korea participated in
another serious riot in October 1946 C.E. Soon, most of their leaders
left for the north. Again, their attempt to stop the October elections
for the South Korean Interim Legislative Assembly failed.
In Europe, on October 1, 1946 C.E., high-ranking
Nazi officials, including Hermann Göring, Hans Frank, Joachim von
Ribbentrop, and Arthur Seyss-Inquart, were sentenced to hang by the
Allied court at Nuremberg. The Nazis were being given their well earned
rewards for the holocaust.
Only Göring would escape his fate by the
taking of his own life shortly before his scheduled execution.
November 3, 1946 C.E., a new Japanese
constitution, one that resolves that the nation will never again
"be visited with the horrors of war through the action of
government," was proclaimed by Emperor Hirohito. He was the very
person responsible for that horrible war in the Pacific and in Asia.
In December 1946 C.E., the USAMGIK established
the South Korean Interim Legislative Assembly. It was to formulate draft
laws which would be used as the basis for political, economic, and
social reforms. South Korea's substantial problems, however, required
solutions at a much higher level. Earlier during the Korean-Japanese
Period, Japan had developed Korea's economy as an integral part of their
empire, linking Korea to Japan and Manchuria. Even if the U.S. Military
occupation forces had arrived with a carefully developed economic plan,
the situation would have still been difficult. The division of the two
Koreas into two zones at an arbitrary line further aggravated the
situation. These and many other inherent problems in the building of a
self-sufficient economy in the southern half of the peninsula imposed a
great burden.
Most of the heavy industrial facilities were
located in northern Korea, in the USSR zone. These included the chemical
plants that produced necessary agricultural fertilizers. Southern
Korea’s light industries were dependent on electricity from the
hydraulic generators located on the Yalu River on the Korean-Manchurian
border. Electric generating facilities in the south supplied only 9
percent of the total need. Railroads and industries in the south also
had been dependent upon bituminous coal imported from Manchuria, Japan,
and the north.
These problems were aggravated by the fact that
most of Korea's mines and industries had been owned and operated by
Japan. In the months following the start of the American occupation, the
U.S. military government allowed 700,000 Japanese to depart from South
Korea. This left almost all of the mines and factories without managers,
technicians, and capital resources. This situation was now causing
severe problems of unemployment and material shortages.
The conservative Korean Democratic Party,
supported by landlords and small-business owners, opposed the assembly
because their principal leaders were excluded from it. Although many of
the assembly's forty-five elected members were conservatives, most of
the forty-five appointed members were moderates nominated by Kim Kyu-sik,
who had emerged as Hodge's choice for political leadership.
Unfortunately, Kim lacked dynamism and broad support among the masses.
These circumstances threw South Korea's economy into complete chaos. The
left-wing political groups being consolidated and trained by the South
Korean Workers' Party a communist party in South Korea
(1946 C.E. to 1949 C.E.), simply ignored the assembly.
On December 31, 1946 C.E., U.S. President
Truman issued a presidential proclamation declaring an official end to
WWII. With that war behind them, the Allies faced great almost
insurmountable economic problems. The European partner economies were in
a shattered state and their ability to help themselves out of this
crisis was negligible. It was now up to the U.S.!
The year 1947 C.E., has commonly been
established as the beginning of the Cold War. It is believed that it
began with the announcement of the Truman Doctrine, a U.S.
foreign policy pledging to aid nations threatened by USSR
expansionism. The capitalist Western Bloc had little choice but to act.
The Communist Comintern was active everywhere.
During President Truman’s administration, the
U.S. embarked upon economic reforms in occupied territories to promote a
wide distribution of ownership of the means of production. It believed
that economic equity would fend off revolutionary sentiment and
undergird democracy. The U.S. conducted these programs in Korea to stop
the expansion of revolutionary appeals and laying groundwork for
democracy to thrive. Plans for U.S.-sponsored land reform policies in
South Korea should be understood in the context of the 1947C.E.-1948 C.E.
period of Cold War which brought a needed clampdown on burgeoning
left-wing revolutionary radicalism.
The U.S. Supreme Commander for the Allied
Powers (SCAP) and South Korean authorities began carrying out a land
reform. Its intent was to retain the institution of private property.
They confiscated and redistributed all land held by the Japanese
colonial government, Japanese companies, and individual Japanese
colonists. The Korean government also carried out a reform whereby
Koreans with large landholdings were obliged to divest most of their
land. Under the economic program of land reform land was sold
cheaply to tenants, who represented nearly half of all farmers. This
program fostered economic growth. SCAP tried to break up the large
corporations, but fewer than 30 of the originally targeted 1,200 were
dissolved. Anti-monopoly and fair trading laws were passed to promote
industrial change. Some labor reform was enacted, such as independent
labor unions.
Due to the Cold War’s political competition,
on February 17, 1947 C.E., The U.S. launched its “Voice of
America,” a pro-West radio station, to broadcast to the USSR and
Eastern Europe. This was to keep the politically and physically
controlled peoples informed. The Voice of America was then an arm of the
U.S. State Department. Much of the first program offered brief summaries
of current events, a discussion of how the U.S. federal budget and
political system worked.
Even with the pressures of the Cold War, the
disbanding of the WWII Empire of Japan had to be addressed. It involved
the demilitarization, dismantling armaments industries, and the
demobilizing the armed forces. It also placed great importance upon
purging 200,000 wartime government officials. As a part of this massive
military restructuring, 25 war leaders were being brought to trial for
war crimes. In addition, it was essential for the democratization of
Japan that a new constitution, effective from May 1947 C.E., be
implemented. The constitution renounced war and armed forces. During
this time the emperor lost his divine status and Universal suffrage was
enacted. Social legislation benefited women, as the civil code announced
equality between the sexes and equal inheritance rights. Coeducation
became the norm, and education was democratized and generally improved
at all levels.
In Europe, on June 14, 1947 C.E., the
Auschwitz-Birkenau Memorial and Museum was opened for its first
permanent exhibition on the seventh anniversary of the arrival of the
Nazi camp's first prisoners.
In Korea, the moderate left-wing camp was in
disarray after their leader, Lyuh Woon-hyung, was assassinated on July
19, 1947 C.E. Woon-hyung was one of the Korean politicians who argued
that Korean independence was essential to world peace. He had also been
advocating for the independent reunification of Korea since its national
division in 1945 C.E. Clearly the USSR and Korean Communists had been
unhappy with his efforts.
In July 1947 C.E., in an article printed
in the journal Foreign Affairs, senior U.S. State Department
official George Kennan (under the alias "X") expressed his
theory for containing USSR expansion. This policy of “containment”
would become the basis of the Truman Administration's foreign policy.
The blueprint for U.S. policy for the Cold War was now in place.
On the world front, in an effort to stem the
tide of Jewish nationalism in GB's Palestinian mandate, on July 18, 1947
C.E., the British navy sent the ship President Warfield and
its 4,500 Jewish refugee passengers back to Germany. That same month in
India, the fight for independence from GB continued. Indian
statesmen and National Congress Party leaders Jawaharlal Nehru and
Mohandas Gandhi viewed WWII as an opportunity to shed the yoke of
British colonialism and establish an independent India.
Earlier in 1939 C.E., the British
governor-general used his own authority to bring India into the war. At
the time, Indian leaders pushed for self-government in exchange for
cooperation. By 1942 C.E., the British Cripps Mission instituted an
interim government and promised full independence after the end of WWII.
More than two million Indians eventually served on the Allied side
during the war, and 24,000 were killed. When the war ended in 1945 C.E.,
Indians pressed for the independence that was promised. On August 15,
1947, power was finally transferred and India was declared a free
nation.
At the final meeting of the Joint Commission in
September 1947 C.E., USSR delegate Terentii Shtykov proposed
that both USSR and U.S. troops withdraw and allow the Korean people an
opportunity to form their own government. This was rejected by the U.S.
and was a clear failure by the Joint Commission to make progress on
Korea. The U.S. next submitted the Korean problem before the UN
that month. Additionally, in an atmosphere of scarcities of food and
other commodities and runaway inflation in Korea the U.S. was forced to
scuttle its earlier plan to provide $500 million over five years for
South Korean development.
In November 1947 C.E., the UN General Assembly
recognized Korea's claim to independence. It also began making
preparations for the establishment of a government and the withdrawal of
occupation forces. The USSR was opposed any such UN involvement in
Korea. At that time, with the U.S. having more influence over the UN
than the USSR, the UN passed a resolution on November 14, 1947 C.E.,
declaring that free elections should be held and foreign troops should
be withdrawn. It also established that a UN commission for Korea, the UN
Temporary Commission on Korea (UNTCOK), should be created. The USSR
boycotted the voting and did not consider the resolution to be binding,
arguing that the UN could not guarantee fair elections. In the absence
of USSR cooperation, it was decided to hold UN-supervised elections in
the south only.
UN efforts were being made across the globe.
For the Middle East the body had a partition plan for Palestine. UN
Resolution 181 was passed and approved by the General Assembly on
November 29, 1947 C.E. The Arab states would later invade the new Jewish
state on May 15, 1948 C.E.
In 1948 C.E., the rebuilding of post-WWII
Europe was an important issue. U.S. President Truman signed into law
legislation for the Marshall Plan. Quite simply, a weak Europe meant a
strong and dangerous USSR. That
same year, the USSR implemented the Berlin blockade. The action
underscored the problems arising from the Cold War. It was now clear to
all that the Cold War geopolitical tensions between
powers of the Eastern Bloc and powers in the Western Bloc
were growing. These tensions would eventually split the temporary WWII
alliance which had been created to war against Nazi Germany.
After WWII, the USSR and the U.S. were the only superpowers. Unfortunately,
they had profound economic and political differences. It dramatically
emphasized the need for the democracies to remain strong.
In Korea, after more than a millennium of being
unified was now officially split into two halves along the 38th parallel
with separate governments. This north and south division was seen as
controversial and temporary by both regimes. From 1948 C.E. until
the start of the civil war on June 25, 1950 C.E., the armed forces of
each side would engage in a series of bloody conflicts along the border.
North Korea would soon be led into war by Kim Il-Sung, who ruled over
the country as a communist dictator. South Korea would be forced to
fight for its existence as an independence democracy with President
Syngman Rhee, an anti-communist statesman, at its head.
The U.S. again offered to hold Korean national
elections in 1948 C.E. The USSR refused the offer. Despite this,
UN-supervised elections were held that year in the U.S.
occupied south. Syngman Rhee won the election and his
government received a popular mandate. This led to the establishment of
the Republic of Korea (ROK) in South Korea.
The USSR refused to recognize Rhee’s
government and insisted that Kim Il-Sung in the north was the true
leader of all Korea. The decision to proceed with separate elections was
unpopular among many Koreans, who rightly saw it as a prelude to a
permanent division of the country. General strikes in protest against
the decision began in February 1948 C.E. This was promptly followed by
the establishment of the DPRK in the North with Kim Il-sung appointed
as its leader. The U.S. now supported the South and the USSR supported
the North, with each government claiming sovereignty over the whole
Korean peninsula. Having secured the establishment of a communist
government in North Korea, Soviet troops soon withdrew.
In April, Jeju islanders rose up against
the looming division of the country. ROKA troops were sent to quell the
rebellion on the island which lies in the Korea Strait, south of South
Jeolla Province. Tens of thousands of islanders were killed and by one
estimate, 70% of the villages were burned by the ROKA troops. The
uprising would flare up later with the outbreak of the Korean War.
Also in April 1948 C.E., a conference of Korean
organizations from the north and the south met in P’yŏngyang
the capital of the north. The right-wing southern politicians Kim
Kooand Kim Kyu-sik attended the conference and boycotted the
elections in the south, as did other politicians and parties. The
conference called for a united government and the withdrawal of foreign
troops. Syngman Rhee of the south and U.S. General Hodge denounced
the conference. Kim Koo would be assassinated the following year.
On April 3, 1948 C.E., the U.S. Marshall Plan was signed into law by
President Truman. It would ultimately provide more than $13 billion for
the reconstruction of war-torn Europe. Why? With the Cold War growing
colder, the U.S. and its allies of WWII wanted a strong Europe as a
bulwark against USSR communist expansionism. The USSR would now need to
formulate a response!
In May 1948 C.E., the UN’s UNTCOK arrived to
supervise the election of a national assembly which was to be held. The
USSR objected to the UN resolution and refused to admit the commission
to the USSR-controlled zone in the north. It was becoming increasingly
clear that two separate regimes would be established on the peninsula.
The prospect of perpetuating the division of Korea catapulted some of
the southern political leaders to action, significantly altering the
political landscape there. The choice they faced was between immediate
independence at the price of indefinite division, or postponement of
independence until the deadlock between the U.S. and the USSR was
resolved.
Rhee had been campaigning actively within Korea
and the U.S. for the first alternative since June 1946 C.E. Other major
figures in the right-wing camp, including Kim Ku and Kim Kyu-sik,
decided to oppose the "separate elections" in the south,
hoping to resolve the international impasse by holding talks with their
northern counterparts.
Communists in the south also boycotted the May
1948 elections, and were discredited when P’yŏngyang the capital
of North Korea cut off electricity, leaving the anti-communist dictator
Syngman Rhee a clear field though he lacked grass roots support apart
from the Korean Democratic Party. By this time, the communists in the
south had lost much of their political following, particularly after a
serious riot in October 1946 C.E.; most of their leaders congregated in
the north.
On May 10, 1948 C.E., Korea’s south held its
general election. It took place despite widespread violence,
intimidation, and a boycott by opponents of Syngman Rhee. Soon
thereafter, the elected National Assembly adopted a constitution setting
forth a presidential form of government and specifying a four-year term
for the presidency. Syngman Rhee, whose supporters had won the
elections, became head of the new assembly.
On May 14, 1948 C.E., GB's mandate to
govern Palestine expired. Palestine is divided into the State of Israel
and an Arab state. The Jewish National Council then proclaimed the
independent State of Israel. The next day on May 15, 1948 C.E., Egyptian,
Syrian, and Jordanian forces invade the one-day-old State of Israel.
Israel resisted and soon went on the offensive.
This was yet one more manifestation of the Cold
War. The official USSR ideological position on Zionism condemned
the movement as bourgeois nationalism. Lenin had rejected Zionism
as a reactionary movement, "bourgeois nationalism,"
"socially retrogressive," and a backward force that deprecates
class divisions among Jews. Soviets believed that the main objective of
the Zionist movement was to bring about a mass immigration of Jews from
countries where they had been scattered among the general population
into Israel. Under Stalin's rule limited emigration of Jews from the
USSR into Israel was initially accepted. This was done in order to
invest in what he hoped for would be a socialist Israel. Later,
with the exodus of Jews from the USSR Jewish emigration to Israel was
interpreted as a damaging due to the loss of Jewish intellectual capital
negatively affecting the communist nation.
On June 25, 1948 C.E., U.S. President
Truman signed the Displaced Persons Act which allowed more than 200,000
European refugees to settle in the U.S. Clearly it was a stop-gap
measure to lessen the economic burden on European nations until the
Marshall Plan could take effect. The USSR was unhappy with the U.S.’s
decision to rebuild Europe. It much preferred a weak Europe to a strong
one which was seen as more dangerous to it. Two days later, the Western
Blok countries of the U.S., GB, and France were forced to respond to the
USSR’s blockade of Berlin on June 27, 1948 C.E. They immediately
implemented an airlift of supplies to the two million people in the
city's western sector.
5.0
The ROK and the DPRK Proclaimed
The "ROK (South Korea)" was
proclaimed and formally took over power from the USAMGIK with Syngman
Rhee as the first president on August 15, 1948 C.E. Four days after the
proclamation, Communist authorities completed the severing of
north-south ties by shutting off power transmission to the south. Within
less than a month, on September 9th, a communist regime, the DPRK, would
be proclaimed under Premier Kim Il Sung as prime minister. He then
claimed authority over the entire country. This he stated was by virtue
of elections conducted in the north and the underground elections
allegedly held in the south. The ROK would scarcely have time to get its
political house in order before North Korea launched its attack on South
Korea less than one year later.
After the election’s unrest had continued in
the South. In October 1948 C.E., the Yeosu–Suncheon Rebellion took
place in the southern part of the peninsula in Yeosu, Suncheon,
and various surrounding towns in the South Jeolla province of South
Korea. The rising anti-government sentiment towards the Syngman
Rhee regime finally ignited into a rebellion.
Some ROKA regiments based in the Yeo-Sun area with left-leaning
soldiers raised arms in opposition to the Rhee government's handling of
the Jeju Uprising, which occurred just months earlier in April.
About 2,000 soldiers rebelled against the government. This
Communist-led revolt by some army regiments consumed much of the army's
attention and resources.
Later in the aftermath of that revolt, a
massive purge would weaken the South’s entire military establishment.
Given South Korea's precarious future and continuing communist victories
in China, the U.S. was no longer as eager to continue providing Korea
with support.
After Truman's November 1948 C.E. election
victory, Dean Gooderham Acheson (April 11, 1893 C.E.-October 12, 1971
C.E.) would become his secretary of state on January 21, 1949 C.E. He
was an anti-Communist who believed in patience. Acheson was an American
statesman and lawyer who had earlier helped to design the Marshall
Plan and was a key player in the development of the Truman
Doctrine. As U.S. Secretary of State in the
administration of President Truman from 1949 C.E. to 1953 C.E.,
he would play a central role in defining American foreign policy during
the Cold War and the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO). The North Atlantic Treaty establishing
NATO would be signed on April 4, 1949 C.E. Acheson's most famous
decision would be convincing President Truman to intervene in the Korean
War.
December 9, 1948 C.E., the UN General
Assembly (UNGA) enacted the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment
of the Crime of Genocide. Three days later on December 12, 1948 C.E.,
the UNGA accepted the report of UNTCOK and declared the Republic of
Korea to be the "only lawful government in Korea." None
of the members of UNTCOK considered the election as having established a
legitimate national parliament. For one, the Australian government,
which had a representative on the commission declared that it was
"far from satisfied" with the election.
After Nazi Germany's collapse earlier in 1945
C.E., it had transformed the face of Post-WWII Europe. As a result of
Germany's fall, Europe's new boundaries were redrawn and Germany
was partitioned into four zones of occupation. Millions became refugees
as national boundaries were created. The Allied Zones merged into the
Federal Republic of Germany in 1949 C.E., while the USSR occupied zone
became the German Democratic Republic. In the east, the USSR expanded
its borders at the expense of a now defunct Nazi Germany, Finland, and
Poland. They also annexed the Baltic countries of Latvia, Estonia, and
Lithuania. These new Communist states in the east as part of the Eastern
Bloc would soon confront the western democracies. Communism in Europe
was on the march.
In 1949 C.E., while the U.S. continued training
and supplying South Korea’s military, Washington did not want the ROK
making trouble by invading the North. To prevent such an invasion of the
North it kept the ROKA's military capacity limited. It left Syngman
Rhee's government with just enough military strength and resources to
combat leftist communist guerrillas fighting his government in the
South.
That same year of 1949 C.E., South Korea’s
Syngman Rhee government established the Bodo League in order
to keep an eye on its political opponents. The majority of the Bodo
League's members were innocent farmers and civilians who were forced
into membership. The registered members or their families would be
executed later at the beginning of the Korean War. Having secured the
establishment of a democratic government in South Korea, U.S. troops
withdrew that same year. The USSR took notice as did the communists in
China.
The trial of Axis Sally, a Nazi propagandist to
American troops in Europe, began on January 25, 1949 in Washington,
D.C. Born Mildred Elizabeth Sisk (November 29, 1900 C.E.-June
25, 1988 C.E.) in Portland, Maine, she took the surname Gillars in
1911 C.E. after her mother remarried. Mildred Elizabeth Gillars would
be convicted of treason by the U.S. in 1949 C.E. following her
capture in post-war Berlin. On March 10, 1949 C.E., a jury would
convict Gillars on just one count of treason for making the Vision
of Invasion broadcast. She was sentenced to 10 to 30 years in
prison and given a $10,000 fine. By 1950 C.E., a federal appeals
court would uphold the sentence. Gillars served her sentence at the Federal
Reformatory for Women in Alderson, West Virginia. She would be
become eligible for parole in 1959 C.E., but would not apply until 1961
C.E. She would later be released on June 10, 1961 C.E.
In 1918 C.E., Mildred Elizabeth Gillars
enrolled at Ohio Wesleyan University to study dramatic arts,
but left without graduating. In 1934 C.E., she moved to Dresden,
Germany, to study music, and was later employed as a teacher of English
at the Berlitz School of Languages in Berlin.
By 1940 C.E., she obtained work as an announcer
with the Reichs-Rundfunk-Gesellschaft (RRG), German State
Radio.
In 1941 C.E., the U.S. State Department was
advising American nationals to return home. However, Gillars chose to
remain because her fiancé, Paul Karlson, a naturalized German citizen.
He had told her that he would never marry her if she returned to the
U.S. Shortly afterwards, Karlson was sent to the Eastern Front, where he
was killed in action.
Axis Sally’s became an American broadcaster
employed by the Third Reich in Nazi Germany to
disseminate propaganda during World War II. He career
changed in 1942 C.E., when Max Otto Koischwitz, the program
director in the USA Zone at the RRG, cast Gillars in a new show called Home
Sweet Home. She soon acquired several names amongst her GI audience,
including the Berlin Bitch, Berlin Babe, Olga, and Sally, but the one
most common was "Axis Sally."
In Tokyo, Japan, General Douglas MacArthur,
commander of the U.S. forces in the Pacific, wanted Washington to give
more importance to developments in Asia. He saw communism as more of a
threat in Asia than it was in Europe. In March, 1949 C.E., seven months
before Mao Zedong proclaimed the People's Republic of China (PRC),
MacArthur had described the U.S. defense parameter in the Far East as
starting in the Philippines, running through Okinawa and the
other Ryukyu islands to Japan and then to the Aleutian Islands
and Alaska. Unfortunately, MacArthur had left China and Korea on the
Asian continent outside of the U.S. defense parameter in the Far East. The
communists took notice and misread U.S. military defense policy and the
intent of his statements regarding Korea. They believed that the U.S.
might not defend Korea if invaded.
6.0
The New North Atlantic Treaty Organization
In 1949 C.E. talks soon began on a new
intergovernmental military alliance which between North America’s U.S.
and Canada, and several Western European nations. Earlier in 1948 C.E.,
the Treaty of Dunkirk, a Treaty of Alliance and Mutual
Assistance, had been expanded to include the Benelux countries,
in the form of the WU. The WU or the Brussels Treaty
Organization (BTO) was a European military alliance
established between France, GB and the three Benelux countries
earlier in September 1948 C.E. in order to implement the Treaty of
Brussels signed in March the same year. Earlier, on March 4, 1947
C.E., the Treaty of Dunkirk was signed by France and
the United Kingdom as a Treaty of Alliance and Mutual
Assistance in the event of a possible attack by Germany or the USSR
in the aftermath of World War II.
NATO became a reality with the signing of the North
Atlantic Treaty on April 4, 1949 C.E. by the member states of the
Western Union (WU) and the U.S., Canada, Portugal, Italy, Norway,
Denmark and Iceland. The new NATO organization would constitute a system
of collective defense whereby its independent member states
agreed to a mutual defense in response to an attack by any external
party. It was to be a bulwark against communist aggression. NATO would
eventually become a military alliance between 29 North American and
European countries.
The Western Bloc Cold Warriors were now
establishing a cohesive, coordinated military defense posture and an
organization to carry it off.
By May 1949 C.E., the USSR now realized
that their blockade of western Berlin had only strengthened the resolve
of the other former WWII Allies and led directly to the formation and
establishment of NATO. The Soviets then decided to lift it. Again, they
had misread the stability and fortitude of the Western Bloc nations. The
Cold War was now beyond a thaw.
Israel signed the third of three armistice
agreements, with Syria, to end the 1948 War, on July 20, 1949 C.E.
Agreements with Egypt, Lebanon, and Transjordan had been signed earlier
in the year. Communist USSR had failed to bring down the new state of
Israel.
Regarding Korea, the Russians had announced the
pull out of their troops from North Korea back in late-1948 C.E. By now,
the Truman administration was eager to pull its troops out of South
Korea and give the ROK an image of greater independence. By June 29,
1949 C.E., the majority of U.S. military occupation forces were
withdrawn and only an advisory group of about 500 military advisers left
there. It must be remembered that the ROK had earlier been placed
outside of the U.S. defense perimeter. What the USSR and the rising
communists of China saw was a U.S. in retreat!
Soon, North Korea's communist leader, Kim
Il-sung, journeyed to Moscow, USSR, to meet with its dictator Joséph
Stalin. There, he requested aid so he could unite Korea by force. In
response to Stalin’s blunt questions, Kim replied that he was
confident that he could defeat the forces of South Korea. At that time,
Stalin advised against it as he did not want to provoke the Western
Bloc. He told Kim that it was important that the division between the
North and the South at the 38th parallel remain peaceful.
B.
The USSR has the Atomic Bomb
On August 29, 1949 C.E., the USSR
detonated its first atomic bomb at its Kazakhstan test site. This
changed everything. It came as a great shock to the U.S., as she did not
expect the USSR to possess nuclear weapon knowledge that soon. This USSR
atomic bomb explosion brought with it military parity, a game changer.
Why? The USSR’s Communist Party dominated the economy, the military,
the press, and many other organizations. Outside of Russia it controlled
the other satellite states in the Eastern Bloc. At this time, the USSR
was also funding communist parties around the world, sometimes in
competition with communist China. It wanted and needed to be in
possession of the atomic bomb which gave the USSR more military stature
and parity with the U.S. It also sent the message that it was ready to
compete with the U.S. on a more equal footing. The Cold War had just
become even colder.
The U.S. Western Bloc stood in
opposition to the USSR Eastern Bloc. These two blocs were also
political and ideological opponents. The U.S. is a federal republic with
a two-party presidential system. The First World nations
of the Western Bloc were generally liberal democratic countries
with a free press and independent organizations. These were economically
and politically entwined with a network of republics and some
authoritarian regimes throughout the Third World. Most of these Third
World nations had previously been former colonies of Western Bloc
members. There was also a Neutral Bloc of nations which came about
which sought good relations with both Blocs known as the Non-Aligned
Movement.
These two superpowers had never engaged
directly in full-scale armed combat. For a time, only the U.S. had
Nuclear weapons. Now with the Soviets having the bomb, the Western Bloc
was more vulnerable. This was on the chessboard of military supremacy a
“Checkmate.” In the geopolitical game between the U.S. led
Western Bloc and the USSR led Eastern Bloc this new USSR game
position placed the U.S.’s king (being the only holder of a nuclear
weapon) in check. Simply put, once the USSR had this weapon there was no
way to remove the threat without an all out war. Having checkmated the
Americans the Soviets won this game.
C.
China now a Communist Nation
October 1, 1949 C.E., China's Communist
Party achieved a resounding victory over Chiang Kai-shek's Kuomintang
regime. Support from the Allies had been enough to prop up Chiang Kai-shek
in the face of eight years of Japanese aggression. Clearly, however, the
Western Blok was not as fortunate. The Kuomintang Nationalist economy
was now ravaged by inflation. It infrastructure had been devastated
during WWII and the communist movement had regained new strength during
that war. The two generations of civil war finally ended with a
Kuomintang withdrawal to Taiwan, leaving the communists in control of
the mainland. It was then that Chairman Mao Zedong proclaimed the
founding of the PRC in Beijing. The communists had taken control in
China. Now that China was a communist nation, U.S. President
Harry Truman became concerned that other countries around the PRC might
also become communist. The Cold War was now further intensified and the
environment of political weather was decidedly not getting warmer.
The PRC and the DPRK exchanging
diplomatic recognition on October 6, 1949 C.E. was purposeful. It was a
signal to the USSR and the U.S. that it had an interest in its Asian
neighbor.
The ongoing aggression by the USSR during
the Cold War would become an important cause of the Korean War.
Relations between the two occupying powers, the U.S. and USSR, had
become steadily worse. Now, five years after WWII, the American Army was
about one twelfth of the size it had been. Joséph Stalin had
recently lost a Cold War dispute over the Berlin Blockade and
subsequent airlift and wanted revenge. With Mao Zedong’s victory in
China, Stalin needed to immediately improve his standing in the
communist world.
With the Communists having acquired power in
China, in December 1949 C.E. the U.S. Secretary of State Dean Acheson
stated that this new China situation was something that Americans would
need to accept for at least a while. He also said that people should
learn to live with evil and observed that it had been around since the
fall of Adam and Eve. This gave little comfort to the member states of
the Western Bloc.
On December 24, 1949, the ROKA massacred
citizens or their family of Mungyeong suspected of being Communist
sympathizers. They then affixed the blame to Communists.
By the end of the decade of the 1940s C.E.,
there were now two competing states on the Korean Peninsula separated by
the border of the 38th parallel. In the south, the anti-communist
dictator Syngman Rhee enjoyed the support of the American government. In
the north, the Communist dictator Kim Il Sung enjoyed the support of the
Soviets. Unfortunately, neither dictator was content to remain on his
side of the border. With border skirmishes having been common for some
time, nearly 10,000 North and ROKA soldiers had been killed in battle
before the upcoming Korean War had even begun.
In the 1950s C.E., another wave of America’s
major corporations growing larger would occur. New conglomerates, firms
with holdings in a variety of industries, would lead the way. Large
corporations also developed holdings overseas, where labor costs were
often lower.
Unlike the Eastern Bloc countries and the other
Communists states, as the Cold War unfolded in the half decade after
World War II, the U.S. experienced phenomenal economic growth. The war
brought the return of prosperity, and in the postwar period the U.S.
consolidated its position as the world's richest country. It’s Gross
National Product, a measure of all goods and services produced in the
U.S., jumped from about $200 thousand-million in 1940 C.E. to $300
thousand-million in 1950 C.E.
Also by 1950 C.E., the U.S. poverty rate was
about 30 percent. About one-half of American seniors would remain in
poverty in the early-1950s C.E.
In 1950 C.E., arrests of Mexicans living
illegally in the U.S. reached 458,000 individuals. Here we must remember
that just as had happened the period just before America’s entrance
into WWII, Hispanic Americans were aware of this current intensely
difficult issue of “Repatriation.” Once again, Hispanics were
expected to accept injustices. This they did for love of country.
That year, the fear of Communist expansion had
reached a fevered pitch. Many believed that sedition and treason were
everywhere within the U.S. After all, Eastern Europe had fallen and so
had China. Stoking these fears was the Republican U.S. Senator from the
state of Wisconsin Joséph McCarthy. He was gaining political
power, and McCarthyism (1950 C.E.-1954 C.E.) had begun.
McCarthyism would become the practice in the U.S. of making accusations
of subversion or treason without proper regard for evidence. The term
refers to U.S. senator Joséph McCarthy and had its origins in the
period in the U.S. known as the Second Red Scare, lasting from the
late-1940s C.E. through the 1950s C.E. It was characterized by
heightened political repression as well as a campaign spreading fear of
Communist influence on American institutions and of espionage by Soviet
agents. It would later become known as the McCarthy era. Was it factual?
The American left says no! Were there communist in the U.S. government?
The answer was proven to be, yes!
In
Latino América things had
improved little economically. In Argentina, Brasil, and Cuba
the number of immigrants had been significant up to the time of the
Great Depression. In Cuba’s case, they arrived from the neighboring West Indies and,
above all, from España.
Population growth continued to be mainly from natural increase. It
was still not explosive. While birth rates in most countries remained
high, death rates had not yet been sharply reduced by advances in public
health. But it was steady. The total Latino
Américano population rose from roughly 60 million in 1900 C.E. to
155 million at mid-20th-Century C.E. The urban proportion had reached
about 40 percent, though proportion differed among countries.
The U.S. was seen by Latino Américanos as their only possible hope for stability through
commerce, trade, and their resulting jobs.
By 1950 C.E., South Korea’s economy was under
stress. More than 1 million workers had returned to Korea from Japan,
120,000 from China and Manchuria, and 1.8 million from the North Korea
to the south. The annual rate of increase of births over deaths
continued at about 3.1 percent. At the time, rural areas were
inhospitable to newcomers, as a result most of the refugees settled in
urban areas. Seoul received upwards of one-third of the total. An
already difficult situation was further aggravated by the scarcity of
food and other commodities. There was also runaway inflation caused in
part by the fact that the departing Japanese had flooded Korea with
newly printed yen.
By January 1950 C.E., The USSR and the
newly minted Communist China recognize the Communist Democratic Republic
of Vietnam. These two military powerhouses were intent upon the gradual
takeover of Southeast Asia. The U.S. did have a response? Yes,
partially!
That response was a document fundamental to the
Truman Administration’s foreign policy. It was the National Security
Council (NSC) 48/2. The document focused on stopping communist expansion
by giving economic and military aid to various countries. Support would
be given to France for their fight against Ho Chi Minh, to the
Philippines government for in struggle with the Huk guerrillas, and to
GB for their in their efforts against guerrillas in Malaya. In the
document there was no mention of U.S. military intervention anywhere
including defending Chiang's Taiwan military forces. This was another
American international military policy faux pas.
On January 10, 1950 C.E., after the UN
retained Nationalist China as the holder of China's UNSC seat, the USSR
delegate walked out of the UNSC in disgust. It was yet one more
Communist ruse meant for public consumption. The USSR hardly expected
the U.S. and its allies to hand over the seat to a Communist China.
Two days later on January 12, 1950 C.E., in a
speech to the National Press Club briefing, U.S. Secretary of State Dean
Acheson outlined current U.S. Pacific defense posture, spoke of American
interests in the Far East, and described a defense parameter that was
similar to MacArthur's. In his presentation he included Japan and the Philippines, but
not South Korea explicitly. Acheson said nothing about defending South
Korea from an attack by North Korea, but he believed this was needed no
more than he had to mention defending New Zealand or Australia. In
short, this was interpreted as implying that South Korea is not under
the protection of the U.S.
The understanding gained by of the communists
of the USSR, China, and North Korea of the Acheson speech was that
apparently Washington would not be sending troops to defend the Republic
of Korea. Soon, Kim Il-sung
the Supreme Leader of North Korea was complaining to the
USSR that peaceful reunification of the Korean Peninsula was impossible.
He had been encouraged by the Communist victory in China. Kim Il-sung’s
position was that the Korean people want liberation and would not
understand why the opportunity to have it was missed. Soviet premier Joséph
Stalin was also impressed by the Communist Chinese victory. Perhaps
with his newly possessed atomic bomb, he was interested in having
another success for anti-capitalism.
Concerns about the USSR and China taking an
overt anti-capitalist stance which included military interventions
caused the U.S. to change course. After Acheson's comments on January
12th came signs of Washington changing its strategy regarding the Far
East. Two days later on January 14, 1950 C.E., the U.S. recalled all
consular officials from China after the seizure of the American consul
general in Peking.
Things regarding Korea had changed rapidly. On
January 17, 1950 C.E., North Korean leader Kim Il-Sung proposed
the “liberation” of South Korea to Soviet officials. Following weeks
of telegram exchanges between Beijing, Moscow, and P'yŏngyang by
March in early spring, Kim would secure assurances of support for his
invasion of South Korean from Soviet premier Joséph Stalin and
Chinese leader Mao Zedong.
In the Middle East, Israel's Knesset proclaimed
Jerusalem the capital of Israel on January 23rd by a vote of 60-2 with
members of Mapam and Herut abstaining. Interestingly, during the vote,
an amendment was proposed by Herut. The amendment would have made the
resolution applicable to all of Jerusalem, including the Old City which
at the time was occupied by Transjordan. It was defeated. The two
members who voted against the proposal were from the Communist party
which supported an International trusteeship for the city as had
been proposed by the UN. Evidently, the USSR was behind yet another
divide and conquer scheme, this time in the Middle East.
Off-the-record testimony was given by General
Omar Bradley of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the U.S. Senate Foreign
Relations Committee two days later on January 25th. He stated that a
potential enemy, Communist China, possessing Taiwan would be a threat to
America's position in the Pacific. This clearly was an indication that
the Americans were coming to understand the threats to democracy in Asia
and beyond.
On that same day, January 25th, U.S.
government official Alger Hiss, an alleged USSR spy who escaped a
treason trial earlier due to the expiration of the statute of
limitations, was sentenced to five years for perjuring himself while
under investigation. Hiss an American government official had been
accused by Whittaker Chambers, a former U.S. Communist Party member
of being a Soviet spy on August 3, 1948 C.E. Chambers
testified under subpoena before the House Un-American Activities
Committee (HUAC) that Hiss had secretly been a Communist while in
federal service. Called before HUAC, Hiss categorically denied the
charge.
Chambers produced new evidence during the
pretrial discovery process indicating that he and Hiss had
been involved in espionage, which both men had previously denied under
oath to HUAC. A federal grand jury then indicted Hiss on two
counts of perjury. Chambers admitted to the same offense. As a
cooperating government witness, he was never charged.
It should be noted that, before Hiss was tried
and convicted, he was involved in the establishment of the UN both
as a U.S. State Department official and as a U.N. official. Thus,
there were communists in the U.S. government. He was one!
January 27th, Emil Julius Klaus Fuchs a
German theoretical physicist who had helped the U.S. and GB build
atomic bombs, confessed to passing nuclear secrets to the USSR. While at
the Los Alamos National Laboratory, Fuchs was responsible for many
significant theoretical calculations relating to the first nuclear
weapons and, later, early models of the hydrogen bomb. He
would later be convicted of supplying to the USSR during and
shortly after the Second World War information from the American,
British, and the Canadian Manhattan Project. After spending nine
years' imprisonment in GB, Fuchs would immigrate to Communist East
Germany where he would resume his career as a physicist and
scientific leader.
D.
USSR Agrees to Help the DPRK with its Plan of Attack on the ROC and to
Unify Korea
On January 30th, USSR Premier Stalin informed
Kim Il-sung in a telegram that he was now willing to help Kim in his
plan of attack on the south to unify Korea. In the discussions with Kim
that followed, Stalin suggested that in return for his support he would
like a yearly minimum of 25,000 tons of lead. He also advised the
Supreme Leader of North Korea to minimize his risk. Stalin
apparently believed that it was possible to win a quick victory in Korea
and present the world with a fait accompli.
His fledgling competition within the communist
world, Chinese leader Mao Zedong and his associates concurred in
this. Mao had advised Stalin that the U.S. would not intervene in Korea.
A quick victory in Korea would further his advance against his enemy
Chiang Kai-shek, now in Taiwan which he saw as a part of China. The
Chinese leader also believed that the U.S. would not intervene in a
Taiwan military intervention by China.
The alliance between China and the USSR was
signed in February. It alarmed U.S. strategists in Washington, so much
so that a revised bill on Korean aid reached Congress and was signed
into law by President Truman later that February. The Chinese were now
making the Cold War even colder!
On February 9th, in a speech in Wheeling,
West Virginia, U.S. Senator Joséph McCarthy (R-WI) asserted that
Communists had infiltrated the State Department. This played to concerns
held by the American public that saw signs of these activities as
reported earlier by the press. Her it must be said that, the past of the
American “Left” had been largely unexamined about its collaboration
with the Communist Marxist-Leninism in the 1930s C.E., 1940s C.E., and
up to the 1950s C.E. It would appear that while anti-communist liberals
and leftists condemned the communists, there was a formulaic,
transparent insincerity about much of left-liberal anti-communism.
In April, Former Nazi scientist Wernher
Magnus Maximilian Freiherr von Braun was appointed director of
development operations of the U.S. Redstone Arsenal's Army Ballistic
Missile Agency in Huntsville, Alabama. He had been a German aerospace
engineer and space architect. Von Braun had been the leading
figure in the development of rocket technology in Germany. While in his
twenties and early thirties, von Braun worked in Nazi Germany's
rocket development program. He helped design and develop the V-2
rocket at Peenemünde during World War II. He would
later be considered the father of rocket technology and space science in
the U.S. The Cold War had made fast friends of enemies of an
earlier time.
In April 1950 C.E., a U.S. National Security
Council (NSC) report known as NSC-68 recommended that the U.S. use
military force to “contain” communist expansionism anywhere it
seemed to be occurring, “regardless of the intrinsic strategic or
economic value of the lands in question.” There was no longer a
question of which Western democracy was to be attacked, or why, it was
only a question of when the communists would strike next. The Cold War
was now frozen in place.
April 1, 1950 C.E., the 1950 Census count found
the U.S. a population to be over 150 million people. The 14% increase
since the last census now showed a count of 150,697,361. The most
populous state in the U.S. was New York, now followed by California. The
geographic center of the U.S. population had now moved west into
Richland County, Illinois, 8 miles north-northwest of Olney. The U.S.
was thriving.
In May 1950 C.E., North Korea's Prime minister Kim
Il-sung secretly visited Beijing to brief the Chinese
Communist Party chairman Mao Zedong and other Chinese
leaders on his Korean War plans for the South.
In early June, the Acheson State Department
sent its bi-partisan Republican operative, John Foster Dulles, to South
Korea. His trip reflected increasing concerns over Korea. Dulles was
ordinary American. He was a grandson of the former Secretary of State John
Watson Foster and the nephew of Woodrow Wilson’s Secretary of
State Robert Lansing. Dulles had been surrounded by members of the
foreign affairs community from an early age. In short, he was a member
of the American Elite. Dulles would later be appointed Secretary of
State by President Dwight Eisenhower on January 21, 1953 C.E.
On June 6th, SCAP Douglas MacArthur banned
communists from public service positions in Japanese government. The
following day, of June 7th, in Tokyo, Japan, General MacArthur ordered
the Japanese Government to remove from public life the seventeen top
members of the staff of the Communist party's official propaganda organ
Akhata or Red Flag. The Americans were no longer tolerating the
maneuvers of the Comintern in their Bloc.
Republican John Foster Dulles was invited to
the 38th parallel on June 17th, on behalf of the U.S. State Department
and there he spoke of America's determination to stand by South Korea.
On this mission to Korea, he was to assess the situation there. The
crucial question was whether the U.S. was now, should include Korea
within its region of interest. He would carry out several important
diplomatic missions for the Truman administration.
Back in the U.S., on June 17th, Julius
Rosenberg was arrested on suspicion of espionage, based on David
Greenglass' confession. The American citizens Julius and Ethel Rosenberg
had been suspected of spying, with others, for the USSR. Later, they
would be tried, convicted, and executed by the federal government of the
U.S. They were accused of providing top-secret information about radar,
sonar, jet propulsion engines, and transmitting nuclear weapon designs
to the USSR. At the time of their treason the U.S. was the only country
in the world with nuclear weapons. To say that this helped world
communism would be an understatement.
At this juncture, we should pause to consider
the reality of the world of 1950 C.E. The Cold War was an
incontrovertible truth. The Comintern was an active, worldwide communist
conspiracy to bring down all non-communist nations and their
governments. They and their adherents were actively destabilizing
governments both from within and from without. These communists and
their intellectually sympathetic fellow travelers were actively
practicing sedition and inciting those that they could against the
status quo of capitalism, authority, and order in targeted countries.
They were challenging the establishment wherever and whenever possible.
They were also treasonous, involving themselves in collusion with any
anti-national force available through the providing of material support
to people and groups working against any nation which was not under
communist control and domination. Their every action had been, and was,
to undermine and weaken democracies and other forms of government before
they took armed action.
As for the U.S., it was not prepared for war.
American military and civilian leaders were caught by surprise. Their
only recourse was to intervene in Korea with poorly trained and equipped
U.S. garrison troops from occupied Japan. Why? Because immediately after
WWII the armed forces of the U.S. were vastly reduced in number and
defense spending was dramatically cut. Despite this, the American
military establishment remained confident in its capabilities.
Unfortunately, it also had little knowledge of NKPA and Chinese
Communist forces or military doctrine. This intertwined with a
well-known disregard for the Asians and the Chinese as soldiers became
the basis for the American military’s approach to the Korean War.
There were also strategic intelligence blunders.
American civilian and military leaders involved
were all products of WWII. The earlier attack on Pearl Harbor had
clearly demonstrated the requirement for intelligence collection and
analysis. The answers to why it happened were simple and they held
lessons for America. The role of intelligence in America’s national
security existed within the context of domestic U.S. political
perception. With the defeat of Japan five years earlier, American
historical isolationism moved quickly inward again. U.S. intelligence
resources had been reduced at the end of the war. The looming conflict
with Communism was seen as being focused on Europe, our traditional
geographic area of interest.
To add to this dilemma, U.S. and USSR troops
had been withdrawn from their respective parts of Korea. The USSR,
however, left behind a well-equipped and trained NKPA. On the other
hand, the U.S. had provided its South Korean ROKA military forces with
only light weapons and little training. The one bright spot was that as
U.S. forces withdrew, General MacArthur had instructed General Charles
A. Willoughby to establish a secret intelligence office in Seoul. This
was known as the Korean Liaison Office (KLO). Its responsibility was to
monitor troop movements in the North and the activities of Communist
guerrillas operating in the South.
By late 1949 C.E., the KLO was reporting that
the Communist guerrillas represented a serious threat to the ROK. The
office had also noted that many of the guerrillas were originally from
the South, and thus were able to slip back into their villages when
hiding from local ROKA security forces. In short, the U.S. was not
prepared or capable of defending the ROK! While all along communist
North Korea had been preparing for this adventure.
By June of 1950 C.E., humanity at large was
under the cloud of the Cold War. Less than five years after WWII, the
political and economic world was divided into two competing entities,
the U.S.’s capitalist Western Bloc and the USSR’s communist Eastern
Bloc. At risk were the Non-Aligned Bloc and those other countries which
the two Bloc which were in the process of defending and or fighting
over. The USSR, then the dominant communist state, jealously guarded its
leadership position within the communist camp against the newly created
PRC. The USSR led the communist worldwide campaign to overthrow any
country which it sought after. While not directly confronting the West,
it became adept at the use of political and military surigates to
achieve its ends.
In the beginning of the Korean War the USSR
chose to promote the war between the north and south through subterfuge,
the providing of armaments, and with some air cover. It would not place
boots on the ground other than advisors. Later, the PRC would enter upon
the scene with men and arms when the NKPA was faltering and in danger of
defeat. It would then move to directly challenge the forces of the UN,
which included the U.S. The PVA troops would prove formidable!
Our American soldiers, including the de
Ribera Clan’s soldados and those of its extended families of New Mexico, were
about to face their worse military nightmares. They were out classed,
out gunned, out generaled, and out of luck even before they set foot on
the Korean Peninsula. The only thing, the greatest thing they had going
for them was being Americans, and Americans never gave up!
IV.
The Korean War
On June 25, 1950 C.E., the communist North
Koreans attacked South Korea in a surprise onslaught. From that day
until the armistice on July 27, 1953 C.E., Koreans would endure mass
destruction, pain, and suffering. The events of the Korean War would
also reveal the continued evil and darkest of man’s heart. By the end
of the war, more than three million Koreans would be dead. Millions of
refugees would remain homeless and distraught. About one million Chinese
would sacrifice their lives during that war. American casualties would
number fifty-four thousand two hundred and forty-six dead.
“If the best minds in the world had set out
to find us the worst possible location in the world to fight this
damnable war,” U.S. Secretary of State Dean Acheson (1893
C.E.-1971 C.E.) once said, “… the unanimous choice would have been
Korea.”
The Korean War can be viewed in three parts.
·
The
First Phase began on June 25,
1950 C.E., and ended on the day UN forces moved into North Korea's
territory.
·
The
Second Phase was essentially
the South Korea’s attack and retreat from North Korea.
·
The
Last Phase of the war saw
"see-saw" fighting on the thirty-eighth parallel, stalemate,
and negotiation talks.
A.
The Korean War begins
1.0
Background
The Korean
War would be the first major conflict following the end of World
War II. It would also be the first war of the Cold War and a
proxy war between the U.S. and USSR. At the point of the
unwarranted attack, the U.S. had little choice but to intervene
militarily in Korea. The U.S.’s “Containment Policy” against USSR
Communism had to be upheld for the purpose of doing everything possible
to keep Communism from spreading around world. There was also the
“Domino Theory.” It was a popular belief within the U.S. which
would be accepted from the 1950's C.E., until the end of the Cold War.
The theory held the idea that if USSR Communism was able to spread into
a single country, then it had the potential to spread to all of the
other surrounding countries. At its base was the idea that the
America needed to prevent the first domino from falling to the spread of
communism. If a country in a given area or region turned to communism,
others in the area would follow.
By June of 1950 C.E., the conflicts along the
North-South border had escalated dramatically prior to the North Korean
forces invading South Korea, triggering the Korean War. At this
point in time, the NKPA military forces totaled nearly 200,000 soldiers
including a tank division and an air force division. In comparison,
Republic of Korea Army (ROKA) forces totaled less than 100,000 and
lacked any tanks. They had a small air force that paled in
comparison to the North Korean Air Force (NKAF).
2.0
The First Phase of the Korean War
On June 25, 1950, at 4 a.m., the Korean War began when seventy thousand NKPA troops of the
DPRK supported by the USSR and China launched a full-scale invasion of
the nation's neighbor to the south, the pro-Western Republic of Korea.
Ten divisions moving in six columns poured across the 38th parallel
invading South Korea. Backed by USSR weaponry, the NKPA utilized a
blitzkrieg style invasion using T-34 tanks supported by artillery
catching the Republic of Korea Armed Forces (South) by surprise. When a
massive NKPA artillery barrage began the incursion quickly
escalate into open warfare.
The NKPA strategy was to aggressively pursue
ROKA forces on all avenues of approach to the south and engage them.
From their initial offensive in July, and through early-August, the NKPA
would use flanking tactics to defeat the ROKA forces and later the UN
forces they encountered and push the ever southward. They attacked from
the front and initiating a double envelopment of both flanks of the
defending units, which allowed the NKPA to surround and cut off the
opposing ROKA troops, forcing them to retreat in disarray.
At this juncture,
it should be obvious that the North Korean invasion came as an alarming
surprise to American government officials. As far as they were
concerned, this was no longer a simply a border dispute between two
unstable dictatorships on the other side of the globe. American
officials believed it was now a war against the forces of international
communism itself. Many feared it was the first step in a communist
campaign to take over the world. For this reason, nonintervention was
not considered an option by many top decision-makers. “If we let Korea
down,” President Harry Truman said, “the Soviet[s] will
keep right on going and swallow up one [place] after another.”
President Truman immediately appealed to the UN
to take "Police Action" against the "unwarranted"
North Korean attack. This led to the UNSC recognizing the act as a
North Korean invasion of South Korea. The UNSC then adopted
Resolution 83 on June 27, 1950 C.E. It authorized UN member
states to provide military assistance to South Korea and intervene and
assist South Korea in the conflict. The UN next set about creating
a force to intervene in the region. It authorized the formation of
UN forces and dispatched them to South Korea to repel the North
Korean invaders. Twenty-one countries of the UN would eventually
contribute to the UN force, with the U.S. providing around 90% of the
military personnel.
The USSR could
have vetoed the UN resolution. But at the time, they were boycotting the
proceedings because the Nationalist Chinese government on Taiwan still
occupied the “China seat” on the UNSC.
On that same day of June 27, 1950 C.E.,
understanding the greater Communist plan for world domination,
thirty-five U.S. military advisors were sent to South Vietnam to give
military and economic aid to the anti-Communist government.
Meanwhile in South Korea, as the ROKA forces
blew up the bridge across the Han River, they trapped their own soldiers
and killed hundreds of refugees evacuating the city of Seoul. The South
Koreans had no method of stopping the onslaught of the T-34 tanks as
they lacked anti-tank weapons and had no tanks of their own, resulting
in a rout. The NKPA captured portions of South Korea's capital of Seoul
by June 28th, forcing the government and its shattered army retired in
good order in retreat further south.
Here it is important to remember that the
initial attacks by NKPA forces were successful against the south due to
their overwhelming military advantage. The NKPA was larger and
better equipped than the ROKA. Stalin had supported the war effort
by sending hundreds of advisors in the form of Soviet Generals who had
extensive experience from World War II. The smaller ROKA suffered
from widespread lack of organization and equipment, and was unprepared
for war. The numerically superior NKPA forces destroyed isolated
resistance from the 38,000 ROKA soldiers on the front before it
began moving steadily south. Most of ROKA forces retreated in the face
of the invasion.
On June 29th, the NKPA captured all of Seoul
and pressed southward.
Under the "name of the United
Nations," just three days after the resolution was passed, on June
30, 1950 C.E., the U.S. President Harry S. Truman dispatched land, sea,
and air forces to the peninsula to beat back the NKPA attack and to
prevent South Korea's collapse. The U.S.' Seventh Fleet dispatched Task
Force 77, led by the fleet carrier USS Valley Forge; the British Far
East Fleet dispatched several ships, including HMS Triumph, to provide
air and naval support. Although the navies blockaded North Korea and
launched aircraft to delay the NKPA forces these efforts alone did not
stop the NKPA juggernaut on its southern advance.
J.R.R. Tolkien, in his the second volume
of the high fantasy novel, The Lord of the Rings, The Two Towers, said
it best. “War must be, while we defend our lives against a destroyer
who would devour all; but I do not love the bright sword for its
sharpness, nor the arrow for its swiftness, nor the warrior for his
glory. I love only that which they defend.”
By June 30th, U.S. ground forces and air
strikes were approved against North Korea. President Truman orders U.S.
President Truman ordered ground troops into the country to supplement
the air support. In Tokyo on that same day, Division commander,
Major-General William F. Dean of U.S. 8th Army determined that the 21st
Infantry Regiment was the most combat-ready of the 24th Infantry
Division's three regiments. Dean decided to send the 21st Infantry's 1st
Battalion from the formation because its commander, Lieutenant-Colonel
Charles Bradford Smith, was the most experienced leading man, having
experience at the Battle of Guadalcanal during World War II. General
MacArthur then instructed Lieutenant-General Walton H. Walker, U.S. 8th
U.S. Army commander, to order the 24th Infantry Division, stationed on
Kyushu, to Korea at once. It must be stated that the strength of U.S.
forces in the Far East had steadily declined since the end of World War
II and the closest unit was the 24th Infantry Division of the U.S. 8th
Army, headquartered in Japan. Cuts in U.S. military spending had
resulted in the Division’s being under strength and using outdated
equipment.
Major-General William F. Dean, commander of the
24th Infantry Division, was to send a delaying force of about 500 men
immediately to Korea. He had C-54 Skymaster transport aircraft airlift
one battalion from the Division garrison under Major-General Smith's
command into Korea (Task Force Smith). The battalion was to be deployed
quickly to block advancing NKPA forces and perform a holding action
while the remainder of the Division could be moved to South Korea by
sea. Major-General Dean's orders to Major-General Smith, “When you get
to Pusan, head for Taejon. We want to stop the NKPA as far from Pusan as
we can. Block the main road as far north as possible. Make contact with
General Church. If you can't find him, go to Taejon and beyond if you
can. Sorry I can't give you more information - that's all I've got. Good
luck, and God bless you and your men!”
The first units of the 24th Infantry Division,
Task Force Smith, named for its commander Major-General Smith left
Itazuke Air Base in Japan arrived in South Korea on June 30th. The Task
Force consisted of 406 men of the 1st Battalion, 21st Infantry Regiment,
as well as 134 men of A Battery, 52nd Field Artillery Battalion under
the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Miller O. Perry. The forces were both
poorly equipped and under strength. 1st Battalion, 21st Infantry had
only two companies of infantry (B and C Company), as opposed to the
regulation three for a U.S. Army battalion.
The 1st Battalion had only half of the required
number of troops in its headquarters company, half of a communications
platoon, and half of a heavy weapons platoon, which was armed with six
obsolescent M9A1 Bazooka rocket launchers, two 75mm recoilless rifles,
two 4.2 inch mortars, and four 60mm mortars. Much of this equipment was
drawn from the rest of the under strength 21st Infantry. A Battery,
which formed the entire artillery support for the Task Force, was armed
with six 105mm howitzers. These howitzers were equipped with 1,200 high
explosive (HE) rounds, but these were incapable of penetrating tank
armor. Only six high explosive anti-tank (HEAT) rounds were issued to
the battery, all of them allocated to the number six howitzer sited
forward of the main battery emplacement. A Battery also had four .50
caliber M2 Browning heavy machine guns.
To make matters worse, most of the soldiers of
the Task Force were teenagers with no combat experience and only eight
weeks of basic training. Only one in six enlisted soldiers had combat
experience. The soldiers were each equipped with only 120 rounds of
ammunition and two days of C-rations. Only one third of the officers in
the task force had combat experience from World War II. Many of them
nevertheless volunteered to join the task force.
Task Force Smith order of battle
1st Battalion, 21st Infantry
Headquarters Platoon
B Company
C Company
Heavy Weapons Platoon
52nd Field Artillery Battalion
A Battery
The mission was to get the Communists out of
South Korea. Given the UN’s military disadvantages, the war was to
begin for the Allies as a defensive one. The NKPA were so successful
that they were able to push back South Korean and later the Task Force
Smith American troops to the Pusan Region in southeast Korea and came
dangerously close to capturing the entire Korean peninsula.
By July, more American troops entered the war
on South Korea’s behalf. Rhee’s ROKA forces, were by contrast
frightened, confused, and seemed inclined to flee the battlefield at any
provocation. It was also one of the hottest and driest summers on
record. In the begining, the desperately thirsty American soldiers were
often forced to drink water from rice paddies that had been fertilized
with human waste. The result was dangerous intestinal diseases and other
illnesses being a constant threat.
By July 1, 1950 C.E., a complete Task Force
Smith arrived in South Korea and briefly established a headquarters in
Taejon. The Task Force soon after began moving north by rail and truck
to oppose the NKPA. Task Force Smith took the initial "shock"
of NKPA advances, delaying much larger NKPA units with the goal of
buying time to allow more U.S. units into Korea. Its mission was to move
as far north as possible and begin engaging the NKPA to stem their
advance so that the rest of the 24th Infantry Division could be moved
into South Korea to reinforce it.
It was the 24th Division’s commander, William
F. Dean, who personally ordered Smith to stop the NKPA force along the
highway from Suwon and "as far from Pusan" as possible.
The
Battle of Osan
The Battle of Osan would be one of the first
Korean War engagements. It would be fought in the village of Osan was.
On July 4, 1950 C.E., Task Force Smith’s was one of the first Korean
War engagements. The force was moved to Osan, south of the South Korean
capital Seoul, and ordered to fight as a rearguard to delay advancing
NKPA forces while additional U.S. troops arrived in the country to form
a stronger defensive line to the south.
Task Force Smith consisted of 400 infantry
supported by an artillery battery dug in on two hills straddling the
road north of the village of Osan, 6 miles south of Suwon and about 25
miles south of Seoul. These ridges rose up to 300 feet above the
road, providing visibility almost the entire distance to Suwon. The
battalion set up a 1 mile long line over these ridges.
Task Force Smith artillery contingents were
placed along the road with the infantry formations on the two hills,
five of the howitzers sited 1 mile behind the infantry, and the
sixth with its six HEAT shells positioned halfway between the infantry
and the other five field artillery pieces.
As they waited to meet the advancing NKPA
forces heavy rain made air support impossible so Smith and Perry
pre-registered the artillery battery in the hope that that target
registration point (TRP) for that special location on the
battlefield for an artillery strike would be just as
effective. That TRP's exact location and distance was known to both the
spotters and the firing element. This would allow 52nd Field Artillery
guns to place fire there with almost no time spent once they receive the
orders to fire.
The task force lacked both anti-tank guns and
effective infantry anti-tank weapons, having been equipped with
obsolescent 2.36-in. rocket launchers and a few 57 mm recoilless
rifles. Aside from a limited number of HEAT shells for the unit's 105-mm
howitzers, crew-served weapons capable of defeating the T-34 Soviet tank
had not been distributed to U.S. Army forces in Korea. This was a recipe
for disaster.
In the very first encounter, a NKPA tank column
equipped with ex-Soviet T-34/85 tanks overran the Task Force Smith and
continued its advance southward. After the NKPA tank column had breached
U.S. lines the Task Force opened fire on a force of some 5,000 NKPA
infantry approaching its position, temporarily holding up the NKPA
advance. NKPA troops eventually flanked and overwhelmed American
positions and the remnants of the task force retreated in disorder.
Eloy
Herrera was born 1928 C.E. He was U.S. ARMY PFC and
casualty of the Korean War. He died in Korea on July 5, 1950 C.E. His
home was in Union, New Mexico.
U.S. ARMY PFC Eloy Herrera, who joined the U.S. Army from New Mexico, served with
Task Force Smith. On July 5, 1950 C.E., Task Force Smith, the first
U.S. ground element to engage NKPA troops, was defending a position
north of Osan, South Korea. The Task Force’s goal was to delay enemy
forces by blocking their movement down the road south from Suwon to
Taejon, which was a major avenue of advance for the NKPA. That morning,
the Task Force was engaged by a column of enemy tanks. The anti-tank
weapons that the infantrymen employed were ineffective, and a large
number of tanks broke through their position. Task Force Smith was
forced to withdraw to the south, suffering heavy casualties in the
process.
New Mexico U.S. Military Fatal
Hispano Casualties of the Korean War
|
Name
|
Service
|
Rank
|
Birthdate (YYYYMMDD)
|
Home of Record:
|
City County
|
Incident or Death Date (YYYYMMDD)
|
Remains Recovered
|
Herrera
Eloy
|
ARMY
|
PFC
|
19280000
|
Unknown
|
Union
|
19500705
|
Y
|
At around 0730 on July 5th, Task Force Smith
spotted a column of eight NKPA T-34/85 tanks of the 107th Tank Regiment,
NKPA 105th Armored Division heading south toward them. The NKPA forces,
driving south from Seoul, were in pursuit of retreating ROKA forces.
At 0816 the 52nd Field Artillery Battalion‘s,
A battery fired its first rounds at the advancing NKPA tanks. The
tanks were approximately 1.2 miles from the U.S. infantry force
when hit with numerous 105mm howitzer rounds, but were unaffected. When
the tanks closed to 2,300 feet of the U.S. force the 75mm
recoilless rifles fired, scoring direct hits on the lead tanks. No
damage was done to them. The NKPA tanks returned fire, but they were
unable to locate the American positions and gun emplacements, and their
fire was ineffective.
Once the NKPA tanks reached the infantry line,
the U.S. troops fired some 22 2.36-inch rockets at a range of 15 yards
from his M9A1 launcher tube. Some of these rockets failed to ignite. The
remainder did and several struck the rear plate armor of several T-34s,
where their armor was thinnest. Unfortunately, the warheads failed to
penetrate the armor. Without damage, the NKPA tanks continued their
advance, ignoring the roadblock and continuing down the road. The
operators assumed the roadblock was manned by ROKA troops, and ignored
it since it did not pose them a serious threat. When the tank column
came over the crest of the road, the forward howitzer, commanded by
Corporal Herman V. Critchfield, Chief of Section and 5 cannoneers, fired
its HEAT rounds, damaging the first two tanks and setting one of them on
fire. One of the crew members of the burning tank emerged with a PPSh-41
and killed a member of an American machine gun crew before being killed
himself. That American became the first casualty of Korean War ground
combat.
The howitzer, depleted of HEAT rounds, began
firing high explosive rounds before being destroyed by the third T-34.
The tanks then advanced, continuing to ignore the American howitzer and
bazooka fire. U.S. forces managed to disable another NKPA T-34 when a
105mm shell struck and damaged its tracks. Unfortunately, the tracks of
the T-34 tanks cut communication signal wires between the U.S. infantry
and artillery forces, further compounding the confusion.
Lieutenant-Colonel Perry was wounded in the leg by NKPA small arms fire
as he was attempting to get the crew of the disabled tank to surrender.
His artillery Section continued firing at the NKPA tanks with no effect.
A second column of 25 NKPA T-34 tanks
approached the Task Force within an hour. This second T-34 formation
advanced singly or by twos, and threes, close together with no apparent
formal organization. The A Battery’s howitzer hit another tank from
this column in its tracks, disabling it, and damaged three more. The
NKPA tanks destroyed the forward number six howitzer and wounded one of
its crew members. They also killed or wounded an estimated twenty
infantrymen and had destroyed all the parked vehicles behind the
infantry line. At the main battery position one of the five remaining
105mm guns had been slightly damaged by a near-hit. Several of the men
in the 52nd Field Artillery Battalion began deserting their positions
but Perry managed to convince most of them to return.
The ineffectiveness of the 2.36-inch bazooka
had been demonstrated repeatedly during World War II against German
armor. Post-WWII peacetime defense cutbacks resulted in the 24th
Infantry Division having never received improved U.S. M20 3.5-inch
bazookas with M28A2 HEAT antitank ammunition, capable of defeating USSR
tanks.
After the last NKPA tanks passed the U.S.
lines, no NKPA forces were spotted for around an hour. At approximately
11:00, three more NKPA tanks were sighted advancing from the north.
Behind them was a column of trucks 6 miles long under the command of
Major General Lee Kwon Mu which were advancing from Seoul. These carried
two full infantry regiments, the 16th Infantry Regiment and the 18th
Infantry Regiment of the NKPA 4th Infantry Division, amounting to almost
5,000 troops. The column apparently was not in communication with the
tanks that had preceded it and the NKPA infantry was not aware of the UN
troop's presence.
At 11:45, when the NKPA column had advanced to
within 1,000 yards of the U.S. troops, Major-General Smith gave the
order for the Task Force to open fire with everything it had. The
mortar, machine gun, artillery, and rifle fire destroyed several trucks,
scattering the column. The three lead tanks moved to within 980 feet
of Task Force Smith and opened fire. Behind them, around 1,000 of the
NKPA infantry formed in the rice paddies to the east of the road in an
attempt to envelop the U.S. forces but were repulsed. Smith attempted to
order artillery fire on the NKPA force but runners were unable to get
back to the field artillery positions, and so he assumed they had been
destroyed by the tanks.
Within 45 minutes, another enveloping NKPA
force formed to the west of the road, forcing Smith to withdraw a
platoon to the east side of the road. Quickly thereafter the U.S.
infantry began taking mortar and artillery fire from the NKPA.
American
withdrawal
Soon, soldiers of the U.S. 21st Infantry
Regiment, 24th Division, were captured and executed by NKPA forces. This
outright murdering of Americans tells a great deal about what these Hispano
Americans were up against. The NKPA were butchers, pure and simple!
Then the retreat of the U.S. force began which
quickly became a confused and a disorganized rout. Task Force Smith
suffered its highest casualties during this withdrawal as its soldiers
were most exposed to enemy fire. The surviving members of Task Force
Smith reached Battery A's position. The artillerymen disabled the five
remaining howitzers by removing their sights and breechblocks and
retired in good order the northern outskirts of Osan with the remains of
the Task Force on foot. There most of the unit's hidden transport
vehicles were found intact. The vehicles, unmolested by the NKPA forces,
departed for Pyongtaek and Cheonan, picking up stragglers along the way.
Eventually joining units of the U.S. 24th Infantry Division would
establish a second line of defense.
Two-hundred fifty of Task Force Smith's force
had returned to the American lines before nightfall. About 150 of the
force were either killed, wounded or missing. Most of the other
stragglers found their way into the American lines over the next several
days. The last stragglers from 2nd Platoon, B Company, reached Chonan
five days later, only 30 minutes ahead of the NKPA army. Task Force
Smith suffered 60 dead, 21 wounded and 82 captured, 32 of whom would
eventually die in captivity. This casualty count accounted for 40
percent of Task Force Smith.
Later, U.S. troops advancing northward during
the Pusan breakout offensive would discover a series of shallow graves
containing the bodies of several soldiers of the 24th Infantry Division.
All had been their hands bound behind their backs with communications
wire and shot in the back of the head. This continued butchery by the
NKPA should dispel any notions that the communists were anything less
than evil! The Americans would see a great deal more of this type of war
crime.
The NKPA casualties were approximately 42 dead
and 85 wounded, with four tanks destroyed or immobilized. The NKPA
advance was delayed for approximately seven hours.
Aftermath
The Battle of Osan showed the U.S. forces to be
weak, unprepared for the war, were provided with only outdated weapons
which were insufficient to overcome NKPA armor, poorly trained, and the
inexperienced. U.S. units were at that point no match for better-trained
NKPA troops. These undisciplined U.S. troops had abandoned their
positions prematurely, leaving equipment and wounded for NKPA troops to
capture. The force had also stayed too long in its position, allowing
NKPA troops to envelop the force. It was all of this that caused heavy
casualties as it retreated. These types of weaknesses would play out
with other U.S. units for the next month as NKPA troops pushed the U.S
forces further back. The disparity in the number of troops engaged by
the NKPA certainly had a profound effect on the outcome of this and
future battles.
Though the Task Force Smith was badly defeated
it accomplished its mission of delaying NKPA forces from advancing for
several hours. During the battle, the 24th Infantry Division's 34th
Infantry Regiment was able to set up in Pyeongtaek, 15 miles to the
south. Over the next month, the U.S. 24th Infantry Division would fight
in numerous engagements to delay NKPA forces with similar results. The
NKPA, overwhelming U.S. forces time and again, would be able to push the
U.S. 8th Army all the way back to Pusan, where the Battle of the Pusan
Perimeter would culminate in the eventual defeat of the NKPA .
In the Middle East, on July 5th, the Law of
Return, which opened Israel to worldwide Jewish immigration, was passed
by the Israeli Knesset. This threatened her Islamic neighbors and
played into the hands of the USSR.
The Battle
of Pyongtaek July 6, 1950 C.E.
The Battle of Pyongtaek was the
second engagement between UN and NKPA forces during
the Korean War. It occurred on July 6, 1950 C.E. in the village of Pyongtaek in
western South Korea. There, the U.S. Army's 34th Infantry
Regiment, 24th Infantry Division was assigned to delay
elements of the NKPA's 4th Infantry Division as it
advanced south following its victory at the Battle of Osan the
day before. The regiment emplaced at Pyongtaek and Ansong would
form a line to hold the NKPA in an area where the terrain formed a
bottleneck between mountains and the Yellow Sea.
Soon half of the Regiment's strength was
ordered to retreat from its position before the NKPA force was
encountered, leaving the flank open for the remaining force, 1st
Battalion at Pyongtaek. The Battalion encountered NKPA forces the
morning of July 6th. After a brief engagement it was unable to repel
them effectively. The Battalion then mounted a disorganized retreat to Cheonan several
miles away.
Aftermath
The Regiment had failed to significantly delay
the NKPA forces in their movement south. The fight ended in a North
Korean victory following unsuccessful attempts by American forces to
inflict significant damage or delays on advancing NKPA units, despite
several opportunities to do so.
Planned
Assault on Inchŏn Code Name Operation Bluehearts Abandoned
On July 10th, General of the Army Douglas
MacArthur, General J. Lawton Collins the Army Chief of Staff, and
Admiral Forrest Sherman Chief of Naval Operations held a meeting in
Tokyo, Japan, to convince other military leaders that an assault on Inchŏn
was necessary. The planned assault on Inchŏn code named Operation
Bluehearts was abandoned when it became clear that the 1st Cavalry
Division would be needed on the Pusan Perimeter.
Ernest
Montoya was born 1916 C.E.
He was U.S. ARMY Sergeant with the 21st Infantry
Regiment: A. He was a casualty of the Korean War KIA. He
died in Korea on July 10, 1950 C.E. KIA. His home was in Bernalillo,
New Mexico.
New Mexico U.S. Military Fatal
Hispano Casualties of the Korean War
|
Name
|
Service
|
Rank
|
Birthdate (YYYYMMDD)
|
Home of Record:
|
City County
|
Incident or Death Date (YYYYMMDD)
|
Remains Recovered
|
Montoya
Ernest
|
ARMY
|
SGT
|
19160000
|
Unknown
|
Bernalillo
|
19500710
|
Y
|
Gilbert Gutiérrez
was born
1930 C.E. He was U.S. ARMY Private With the 21st
Infantry Regiment: L and a casualty of the Korean War KIA. He died
in Korea on July 7, 1950 C.E. His home was in Bernalillo,
New Mexico.
New Mexico U.S. Military Fatal
Hispano Casualties of the Korean War
|
Name
|
Service
|
Rank
|
Birthdate (YYYYMMDD)
|
Home of Record:
|
City County
|
Incident or Death Date (YYYYMMDD)
|
Remains Recovered
|
Gutiérrez
Gilbert
|
ARMY
|
PVT
|
19300000
|
Unknown
|
Bernalillo
|
19500711
|
Y
|
Manuel A. Barraza was born 1931 C.E. He was U.S. ARMY
Private with the 21st Infantry Regiment: I and a casualty of the Korean
War KIA. He died in Korea on July 12, 1950 C.E. His home was in Grant,
New Mexico.
New Mexico U.S. Military Fatal
Hispano Casualties of the Korean War
|
Name
|
Service
|
Rank
|
Birthdate (YYYYMMDD)
|
Home of Record:
|
City County
|
Incident or Death Date (YYYYMMDD)
|
Remains Recovered
|
Barraza
Manuel A
|
ARMY
|
PVT
|
19310000
|
Unknown
|
Grant
|
19500712
|
Y
|
Battle
of Taejon which lasted from July 14th through July 21, 1950 C.E.
Servando González
was born 1929 C.E. He was U.S. ARMY PFC with the 3rd Engineer’s and
a casualty of the Korean War KIA. He died in Korea on July 16, 1950 C.E.
His home was in Bernalillo,
New Mexico.
New Mexico U.S. Military Fatal
Hispano Casualties of the Korean War
|
Name
|
Service
|
Rank
|
Birthdate (YYYYMMDD)
|
Home of Record:
|
City County
|
Incident or Death Date (YYYYMMDD)
|
Remains Recovered
|
González
Servando
|
ARMY
|
PFC
|
19290000
|
Unknown
|
Bernalillo
|
19500716
|
Y
|
The U.S. 24th Infantry Division was again
defeated by the NKPA during the Battle of Taejon which lasted
from July 14th through July 21, 1950 C.E.
The Battle of Taejon was another
early battle of the Korean War between UN and NKPA
forces. Forces of the U.S. Army attempted to defend the
headquarters of the U.S. 24th Infantry Division. The entire 24th
Division was gathered to make a final stand around Taejon, holding a
line along the Kum River to the east of the city. The 24th’s
troops were already exhausted from the previous two weeks of delaying
actions to stem the advance of the NKPA. The Division was also hampered
by a lack of communications, equipment, and a shortage of heavy weapons
to match the KPA's firepower. This was the plight of the outnumbered,
ill-equipped, and untrained American forces.
As the battle progressed at the riverbank near
the City of Taejon, after several days, the the 24th Infantry Division
was overwhelmed and pushed back by a militarily and numerically superior
force of NKPA. What followed was the fighting of an intense urban
battle to defend that major city and transportation hub of Taejon.
After a fierce three-day struggle, the UN forces withdrew.
Aftermath
Unfortunately, during the action the NKPA
captured Major-General William F. Dean, the commander of the
U.S. 24th Infantry Division, and highest ranking American prisoner during
the Korean War. Although the 24th could not hold the city, it achieved a
strategic victory by delaying the NKPA. This at least provided time for
other U.S. divisions to establish a defensive perimeter around
Pusan further to the south. The delay imposed at Taejon probably
prevented what could have been a U.S. rout during the subsequent Battle
of Pusan Perimeter.
Pre-battle
Preparations for the Battle of Inchŏn
The landing at Inchŏn was not the first
large-scale amphibious operation since World War II. That distinction
belonged to the UN landing that took place on July 18, 1950 C.E. at
Pohang, South Korea. That operation, however, was not made in NKPA-held
territory and was unopposed. This would not be the case with the Inchŏn
landings.
Days after the beginning of the Korean War,
General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, the U.S. Army officer in command
of all UN forces in Korea, envisioned an amphibious assault to retake
the Seoul area. The city had fallen in the first days of the war in the
First Battle of Seoul. MacArthur later wrote that he thought the ROKA
would push the NKPA Army back far past Seoul. He also said he decided
days after the war began that the battered, demoralized, and
under-equipped ROKA, many of whom did not support the ROK government put
in power by the U.S., could not hold off the NKPA forces even with U.S.
support. MacArthur felt that he could turn the tide if he made a
decisive troop movement behind NKPA lines, and preferred Inchŏn
over Chumunjin-up or Kunsan as the landing site. He had originally
envisioned such a landing, code named Operation Bluehearts, for July
22nd, with the U.S. Army's 1st Cavalry Division landing at Inchŏn.
Louis V.
Acevedo was born
1930 C.E. He was U.S. ARMY PFC and casualty of the Korean War. He with
the Unit 21st Infantry Regiment: C and died of wounds in
Korea on July 20, 1950 C.E. His home was in Cháves,
New Mexico.
Joe L.
Madril was born on
September 3, 1930 C.E. He was U.S. ARMY PFC with the 19th Infantry
Regiment: H and a casualty of the Korean War. He was Declared Dead on
July 20, 1950 C.E. His home was in Torrance,
New Mexico.
Joe E. Montoya
was born
1927 C.E. He was U.S. ARMY PFC with the 19th Infantry Regiment: H and a
casualty of the Korean War. He was KIA, Declared Dead died in Korea on
July 20, 1950 C.E. His home was in San Miguel,
New Mexico.
New Mexico U.S. Military Fatal
Hispano Casualties of the Korean War
|
Name
|
Service
|
Rank
|
Birthdate (YYYYMMDD)
|
Home of Record:
|
City County
|
Incident or Death Date (YYYYMMDD)
|
Remains Recovered
|
Acevedo
Louis V
|
ARMY
|
PFC
|
19300000
|
Unknown
|
Cháves
|
19500720
|
Y
|
Madril
Joe L
|
ARMY
|
PFC
|
19300903
|
Unknown
|
Torrance
|
19500720
|
N
|
Montoya
Joe E
|
ARMY
|
PFC
|
19270000
|
Unknown
|
San
Miguel
|
19500720
|
Y
|
Code-name
Operation Chromite a New Plan for an Amphibious Assault of Inchŏn
On July 23rd, MacArthur formulated a new plan,
code-named Operation Chromite, calling for an amphibious assault of Inchŏn
by the U.S. Army's 2nd Infantry Division and the U.S. Marine Corps's 5th
Marine Regiment in mid-September 1950 C.E. This too fell through as both
units were moved to the Pusan Perimeter. MacArthur decided instead to
use the U.S. Army's 7th Infantry Division, his last reserve unit in East
Asia, to conduct the operation as soon as it could be raised to wartime
strength.
Rudy Velásco
Trujillo Mesa was
born 1931 C.E. He was U.S. ARMY Private and casualty of the Korean War.
He died in Korea on July 27, 1950 C.E. His home was in Grant, New Mexico.
Ernesto Jr. García was born 1930 C.E. He was U.S. ARMY PFC
with the 29th Infantry Regiment:
and
casualty of the Korean War. He was MIA on July 27, 1950 C.E. till 11/04/50
and
died in Korea KIA. His home was in Mora, New
Mexico.
New Mexico U.S. Military Fatal
Hispano Casualties of the Korean War
|
Name
|
Service
|
Rank
|
Birthdate (YYYYMMDD)
|
Home of Record:
|
City County
|
Incident or Death Date (YYYYMMDD)
|
Remains Recovered
|
Trujillo
Mesa Rudy Velásco
|
ARMY
|
PVT
|
19310000
|
Unknown
|
Grant
|
19500727
|
N
|
García
Ernesto Jr.
|
ARMY
|
PFC
|
19300000
|
Unknown
|
Mora
|
19500727
|
Y
|
Juan Quintana was born April 4,
1929 C.E. He was U.S. ARMY PFC and casualty of the Korean War. He died
in Korea on July 28, 1950 C.E. His home was in Quay,
New Mexico.
New Mexico U.S. Military Fatal
Hispano Casualties of the Korean War
|
Name
|
Service
|
Rank
|
Birthdate (YYYYMMDD)
|
Home of Record:
|
City County
|
Incident or Death Date (YYYYMMDD)
|
Remains Recovered
|
Quintana
Juan
|
ARMY
|
PFC
|
19290429
|
Unknown
|
Quay
|
19500728
|
N
|
Reynaldo Sedillos was born 1927 C.E.
He was U.S. ARMY Private was with the 52nd Field Artillery: A and a
casualty of the Korean War. He died in Korea on July 30, 1950 C.E. KIA.
His home was in Grant, New
Mexico.
New Mexico U.S. Military Fatal
Hispano Casualties of the Korean War
|
Name
|
Service
|
Rank
|
Birthdate (YYYYMMDD)
|
Home of Record:
|
City County
|
Incident or Death Date (YYYYMMDD)
|
Remains Recovered
|
Sedillos
Reynaldo
|
ARMY
|
PVT
|
19270000
|
Unknown
|
Grant
|
19500730
|
Y
|
With the establishment of the UN Pusan
Perimeter in August, UN forces held a continuous line which the NKPA
could not flank. The NKPA advantages in numbers decreased daily as the
superior UN logistical system brought in more troops and supplies to the
UN forces.
In preparation for the Inchŏn invasion,
General MacArthur activated the U.S. 8th Army's X Corps to act as the
command for the landing forces, and appointed Major-General Almond, his
chief of staff, as corps commander, anticipating the operation would
mean a quick end to the war.
Throughout August, General MacArthur faced the
challenge of re-equipping the U.S. 7th Infantry Division as it had sent
9,000 of its men to reinforce the Pusan Perimeter and was far under
strength. He also faced the challenge that the U.S. Marine Corps,
reduced in size following World War II, had to rebuild the U.S. 1st
Marine Division, using elements of the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade
fighting at Pusan as well as the 1st U.S. Marine Regiment and the 7th
Marine Regiment, which pulled U.S. Marines from as far away as the
Mediterranean Sea to Korea for the task. MacArthur ordered Korean
Augmentation to the U.S. Army (KATUSA) troops, ROKA conscripts assigned
to U.S. Army units, to reinforce the U.S. 7th Infantry Division, while
allocating all equipment coming into Korea to U.S. X Corps, despite it
being crucially needed by the U.S. 8th Army on the front lines.
Herman J. Luján
was born
1930 C.E. He was U.S. ARMY PFC and casualty of the Korean War. He died
in Korea on August 2, 1950 C.E. His home was in Quay,
New Mexico.
New Mexico U.S. Military Fatal
Hispano Casualties of the Korean War
|
Name
|
Service
|
Rank
|
Birthdate (YYYYMMDD)
|
Home of Record:
|
City County
|
Incident or Death Date (YYYYMMDD)
|
Remains Recovered
|
Luján
Herman J
|
ARMY
|
PFC
|
19300000
|
Unknown
|
Quay
|
19500802
|
Y
|
When the NKPA approached the Pusan Perimeter on
August 5th, they attempted
the same frontal assault technique on the four main avenues of approach
into the perimeter. Throughout the remainder of August, they conducted
direct assaults resulting in the First Battle of Naktong Bulge, the
Battle of Taegu, Battle of Masan, the Battle of the Bowling Alley, and
the Battle of Battle Mountain.
The
First Battle of Naktong Bulge fought from August 5th through August 19,
1950 C.E.
The First Battle of Naktong Bulge was
an engagement between United States and NKPA forces
August 5th through August 19, 1950 C.E. in the vicinity of Yongsan and
the Naktong River in South Korea. It was a part of the Battle
of Pusan Perimeter, and was one of several large engagements fought
simultaneously.
On August 5th, the NKPA 4th Infantry
Division crossed the Naktong River in the vicinity of Yongsan,
attempting to cut U.S. supply lines to the north as well as gaining a bridgehead into
the Pusan Perimeter. Opposing it was the U.S. 24th Infantry
Division of the U.S. 8th Army. Over the next two weeks, U.S.
and NKPA forces fought a bloody series of engagements inflicting heavy
casualties on one another in a confusing series of attacks and
counterattacks. Neither side was able to gain the upper hand. In the
end, the U.S. forces, aided by reinforcements, air support and heavy
weapons, destroyed the invading NKPA force which was hampered by
lack of supply and high desertion rates.
Aftermath
The battle ended in a victory for the U.S.
after large numbers of U.S. reinforcements destroyed an attacking NKPA
division. The battle was a turning point in the war for NKPA forces,
which had seen previous victories owing to superior numbers and
equipment. The U.S. forces now had a numerical superiority and more
equipment, including tanks and weapons capable of defeating the NKPA T-34 tanks.
The
Battle of Taegu fought from August 5th through August 20, 1950 C.E.
The Battle of Taegu was an engagement
around the city of Taegu, South Korea, between UN and NKPA
forces. The fighting would continue from August 5th through August 20,
1950 C.E. It was a part of the Battle of Pusan Perimeter, and was
one of several large engagements fought simultaneously.
Right at the center of the Pusan Perimeter,
Taegu stood at the entrance to the Naktong River valley. It was also the
major transportation hub and last major South Korean city aside from
Pusan itself remaining in UN hands. There, Commander of the
U.S. 8th, Army Lieutenant-General Walton Walker, had
established Taegu as the 8th's headquarters. The natural
barriers provided by the Naktong River to the south and the mountainous
terrain to the north converged around Taegu. Unfortunately, it was an
area where NKPA forces could advance in large numbers in close support.
From south to north, the city was defended by
the U.S. 1st Cavalry Division, and the ROKA II Corps’ ROKA
1st Division and ROKA 6th Division. 1st Cavalry Division was
spread out along a long line along the Naktong River to the south, with
its 5th Cavalry Regiment and 8th Cavalry Regiment
holding a 79,000 foot line along the river south of Waegwan,
facing west. The U.S. 7th Cavalry held position to the east in
reserve, along with artillery forces, ready to reinforce anywhere a
crossing could be attempted. The ROKA 1st Division held a
northwest-facing line in the mountains immediately north of the city
while the ROKAA 6th Division held position to the east, guarding the
narrow valley holding the Kunwi road into the Pusan Perimeter
area.
Five KPA divisions, the 10th, 3rd, 15th, 13th, and 1st
Divisions, amassed to oppose the UN at Taegu. From south to north, these
five KPA divisions occupied a wide line encircling Taegu from
Tuksong-dong and around Waegwan to Kunwi. The KPA planned to use
the natural corridor of the Naktong valley from Sangju to
Taegu as its main axis of attack for the next push south, so the
divisions all eventually moved through this valley, crossing the Naktong
at different areas along the low ground. Elements of the DPRK
105th Armored Division also supported the attack.
In a series of engagements, each of the NKPA
divisions attempted to cross the Naktong and attack the defending
forces. The success of these NKPA attacks upon UN forces varied by
region. But attacks in the U.S. 1st Cavalry Division sector were
repulsed and the attacks in the ROKA sector were more successful.
During the battle on August 17th, however, NKPA
troops were able to surprise U.S. troops on Hill 303 and capture them.
Late in the battle, these troops were machine gunned in the Hill
303 massacre. On Hill 303 at Waegwan, on a hill above Waegwan, South
Korea, forty-one U.S. Army POWs were shot and killed by
troops of the NKPA during one of the numerous smaller
engagements of the Battle of Pusan Perimeter. Operating near Taegu during
the Battle of Taegu elements of the U.S. Army's 2nd Battalion, 5th
Cavalry Regiment, 1st Cavalry Division, were surrounded by
NKPA troops crossing the Naktong River at Hill 303. While
most of the U.S. troops were able to escape, one platoon of mortar
operators misidentified NKPA troops as ROKA reinforcements and
was captured. NKPA troops held theses Americans on the hill and
initially did try to move them across the river and out of the battle.
Unfortunately, they were unable to do so because of a heavy U.S.
counterattack. U.S. forces eventually broke the NKPA advance,
routing the force. As the NKPA began their retreat one of the
officers ordered the POWs to be shot so they would not slow the
NKPA down.
Here, I must stress that killing one’s enemy
when wounded and helpless has been done in all wars. There is the
desperation of combat, the lack of provisions for caring for the
wounded, and often no troops to spare to guard them. Some would say that
this is a practical necessity, however horrible. For most soldiers,
there is an enormous difference between killing during the confusion and
peril of combat and the murder of a fellow soldier when safe from
retribution. The latter is simply unforgiveable.
Despite these setbacks, the UN forces were
successful in driving most of the NKPA away, but the decisive battle to
secure the city would occur during the Battle of the Bowling Alley.
Aftermath
The battle ended in a victory for the UN after
their forces were able to drive off an offensive by NKPA divisions
attempting to cross the Naktong River and assault the city.
The
Battle of Masan fought between August 5th and September 19, 1950 C.E.
The Battle of Masan was an engagement
between UN and NKPA forces, which took place between August
5th and September 19, 1950 C.E., in the vicinity of Masan and
the Naktong River in South Korea. It was part of the Battle
of Pusan Perimeter, and was one of several large engagements fought
simultaneously. Operating as the extreme southern flank of the Pusan
Perimeter, the U.S. Army's 25th Infantry Division placed
its regiments around the South Korean city of Masan, with the U.S.
24th Infantry Regiment and U.S. 5th Regimental Combat Team based
in Haman and nearby Sobuk-san, and the U.S. 35th
Infantry Regiment based along the Nam River to the west
of the city. Throughout the six-week battle, the NKPA 6th and 7th
Divisions attacked the U.S. 25th Division's regiments in an attempt
to break through the UN forces and attack Pusan.
An initial UN counteroffensive out of Masan
proved ineffective in stopping the NKPA from advancing. In the
subsequent fight, the U.S. 35th Infantry was able to repel the NKPA at
the Battle of Nam River and were highly regarded for these
actions. However, the U.S. 24th Infantry performed very poorly at the
battles of Blue Mountain and Haman, forcing the U.S. 25th
Division to muster reserves to counter the NKPA gains against the U.S.
24th.
Aftermath
The UN units were able to defeat and repel the
NKPA repeatedly, including through a coordinated offensive across
the entire perimeter. In delaying and pushing back the NKPA, the U.S.
25th Infantry Division was able to buy time for the buildup of UN forces
to in the Pusan Perimeter and the mounting of the counterattack at
Inchŏn.
The battle ended in a victory for the UN after
large numbers of U.S. and ROKA troops were able to repel the
repeated attacks of two NKPA divisions.
Juan Luján
was born 1932 C.E. He was U.S. ARMY PFC the 34th Infantry Regiment:
HMtr, part of the 24th Division, and a casualty of the Korean War KIA.
He died in Korea on August 6, 1950 C.E. His home was in Bernalillo,
New Mexico.
New Mexico U.S. Military Fatal
Hispano Casualties of the Korean War
|
Name
|
Service
|
Rank
|
Birthdate (YYYYMMDD)
|
Home of Record:
|
City County
|
Incident or Death Date (YYYYMMDD)
|
Remains Recovered
|
Luján
Juan
|
ARMY
|
PFC
|
19320000
|
Unknown
|
Bernalillo
|
19500806
|
Y
|
Casimiro Pachéco was born 1928 C.E.
He was U.S. ARMY PFC with the 34th Infantry Regiment: Company L, part of
the 24th Division, and a casualty of the Korean War KIA. He died in
Korea on August 8, 1950 C.E. His home was in Mora, New
Mexico.
New Mexico U.S. Military Fatal
Hispano Casualties of the Korean War
|
Name
|
Service
|
Rank
|
Birthdate (YYYYMMDD)
|
Home of Record:
|
City County
|
Incident or Death Date (YYYYMMDD)
|
Remains Recovered
|
Pachéco
Casimiro
|
ARMY
|
PFC
|
19280000
|
Unknown
|
Mora
|
19500808
|
Y
|
On August 11, 1950 C.E., Ethel Rosenberg was
arrested after a grand jury appearance.
José l.
Archuleta was born September 10, 1929 C.E. He was U.S.
ARMY Private and casualty of the Korean War. He died in Korea on August
11, 1950 C.E. His home was in Taos, New
Mexico.
New Mexico U.S. Military Fatal
Hispano Casualties of the Korean War
|
Name
|
Service
|
Rank
|
Birthdate (YYYYMMDD)
|
Home of Record:
|
City County
|
Incident or Death Date (YYYYMMDD)
|
Remains Recovered
|
Archuleta
José l
|
ARMY
|
PVT
|
19290910
|
Unknown
|
Taos
|
19500811
|
N
|
The Battle
of the Bowling Alley took place from August 12th through August 25,
1950 C.E.
The Battle of the Bowling Alley took
place from August 12th through August 25, 1950 C.E. UN forces
engaged the NKPA near the city of Taegu, South Korea. The
battle took place in a narrow valley, dubbed the "Bowling
Alley," which was north of Taegu. It followed a week of fighting
between the NKPA’s 13th Division and the ROKA 1st
Division along the latter's last defensible line in the hills north
of the city. Reinforcements, including the U.S. Army's 27th and 23rd
Infantry Regiments were committed to bolster the South Koreans'
defenses. This battle and several others were smaller engagements of the Battle
of Pusan Perimeter.
For another week, NKPA divisions launched all
the troops they had in massed attacks against the ROKA and U.S. lines.
Their attacks, which usually occurred at night and were supported by
armor and artillery, advanced with infantry and tanks in close support
of one another. Each NKPA attack ran into well-established UN lines,
where U.S. tanks, mines and entrenched infantry were positioned to
counter them. Strikes by U.S. aircraft ravaged the attacking NKPA. The
fighting was fierce with many casualties on both sides, particularly
where the North and South Koreans fought one another.
Aftermath
The repeated attacks eventually broke and
pushed back the NKPA forces. They continued their push against the Pusan
Perimeter until they were outflanked in the Battle of Inchŏn.
The Battle of Battle Mountain from August 15th
through September 19, 1950 C.E.
The Battle of Battle Mountain was an
engagement between UN and NKPA forces from August 15th through
September 19, 1950 C.E., on and around the Sobuk-san mountain
area in South Korea. It was one of several large engagements fought
simultaneously during the Battle of Pusan Perimeter.
Operating in defense of Masan, the U.S.
Army's 25th Infantry Division placed its 24th Infantry
Regiment and 5th Infantry Regiment on Sobuk-san to defend
its two peaks, P'il-bong and Hill 665, which would later be known as
"Battle Mountain." What followed was a month-long struggle
with the NKPA's 6th Division, in which Battle Mountain changed
hands 20 times. During the deadlock, neither side was able to secure a
definite victory in capturing the mountaintop.
Aftermath
The U.S. forces succeeded in their mission. The
battle ended in a victory for the UN after large numbers of U.S.
and ROKA troops were able to prevent a NKPA division from capturing
the mountain area and from advancing beyond Battle Mountain. This helped
pave the way for the NKPA eventual defeat and withdrawal from the area
after the Battle of Inchŏn.
Xavier P. Martínez was born 1930 C.E. He was U.S. ARMY PFC
with
the 5th Infantry Regiment: Company B
RCT
and casualty of the Korean War KIA. He died in Korea on August 22, 1950
C.E. His home was in Doña Ana,
New Mexico.
New Mexico U.S. Military Fatal
Hispano Casualties of the Korean War
|
|
Name
|
Service
|
Rank
|
Birthdate(YYYYMMDD)
|
Home of Record:
|
City County
|
Incident or Death Date (YYYYMMDD)
|
Remains
Recovered
|
Martínez
Xavier P
|
ARMY
|
PFC
|
19300000
|
Unknown
|
Doña
Ana
|
19500822
|
Y
|
The
Battle of P'ohang-dong from August 5th-August 20, 1950 C.E.
At the Battle of P'ohang-dong from August
5th through August 20, 1950 C.E., on the east coast of the Korean
Peninsula. It was a part of the Battle of Pusan Perimeter, and was
one of several large engagements fought simultaneously. ROKA forces
supported by the U.S. Navy and U.S. Air Force defended
the eastern coast of the country as a part of the Pusan Perimeter.
The area contained the vital supply line to the main UN force at Taegu.
When several divisions of NKPA crossed through mountainous terrain
to push the UN forces back, a complicated battle ensued in the rugged
terrain around P'ohang-dong. The engagement was continuous for 5
days around the town of P'ohang-dong, South Korea.
For two weeks, NKPA and ROKA ground units
fought in several bloody, back-and-forth battles. During the fight,
there was the taking and retaking of the same ground, with neither side
able to gain the upper hand. Finally, following the breakdown of the
NKPA supply lines and amidst mounting casualties, the exhausted NKPA
troops were forced to retreat.
Aftermath
The battle ended in a victory for the UN after
its forces were able to drive off an attempted offensive by three NKPA
divisions in the mountainous eastern coast of the country. The battle
was a turning point in the war for North Korean forces, which had seen
previous victories owing to superior numbers and equipment, but the
distances and demands exacted on them at P'ohang-dong rendered their
supply lines untenable.
All along the front NKPA attacks stalled as UN
forces repelled these attacks. The NKPA troops reeled from these defeats
the first time in the war NKPA tactics had failed.
Late August, finally brought some hope to the
leadership of UN forces in the shape of a plan code named Operation
Chromite. On August 23rd, the U.S. commanders held an amphibious assault
of Inchŏn meeting at MacArthur's headquarters in Tokyo. The Battle
of Inchŏn was to be an amphibious invasion involving 261 naval
vessels. Chief of Staff of the U.S. Army General Joséph Lawton Collins,
Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Forrest Sherman, and U.S. Air Force
operations deputy Lieutenant-General Idwal H. Edward all flew from
Washington, D.C., to Japan to take part in the briefing; Chief of Staff
of the U.S. Air Force General Hoyt Vandenberg did not attend. The
responsible U.S. Marine Corps staff to lead the amphibious assault of
Inchŏn and landing was not invited to the briefing. This was to
become a contentious issue.
General MacArthur had earlier decided to use
the Joint Strategic and Operations Group (JSPOG) of his U.S. Far East
Command (FECOM). The initial amphibious assault of Inchŏn plan was
met with skepticism by the other generals because Inchŏn's natural
and artificial defenses were formidable. The approaches to Inchŏn
were two restricted passages, which could be easily blocked by naval
mines. The current of the channels was also dangerously quick – three
to eight knots. Finally, the anchorage was small and the harbor was
surrounded by tall seawalls. U.S. Navy Commander Arlie G. Capps noted
that the harbor had "every natural and geographic handicap."
U.S. Navy leaders favored a landing at Kunsan, but MacArthur overruled
these because he did not think they would be decisive enough for
victory. MacArthur also felt that the NKPA, who also thought the
conditions at the channel of Inchŏn, would make a landing
impossible, would be surprised and caught off-guard by the attack.
During the briefing, nine members of the staff
of U.S. Navy Admiral James H. Doyle spoke for nearly 90 minutes on every
technical and military aspect of the landing. MacArthur told the
officers that though a landing at Kunsan would bring a relatively easy
linkup with the U.S. 8th Army, it "would be an attempted
envelopment that would not envelop" and would place more troops in
a vulnerable pocket of the Pusan Perimeter. MacArthur won over Sherman
by speaking of his affection for the U.S. Navy and relating the story of
how the Navy carried him out of Corregidor
to safety in 1942 C.E. during World War II. Sherman agreed to support
the Inchŏn operation, leaving Doyle furious.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff approved MacArthur's
plan on August 28th. President Truman also provided his approval.
Pete Torres
was born
1932 C.E. He was U.S. ARMY PFC and casualty of the Korean War. He died
in Korea on August 31, 1950 C.E. His home was in Bernalillo,
New Mexico.
New Mexico U.S. Military Fatal
Hispano Casualties of the Korean War
|
Name
|
Service
|
Rank
|
Birthdate (YYYYMMDD)
|
Home of Record:
|
City County
|
Incident or Death Date (YYYYMMDD)
|
Remains Recovered
|
Torres
Pete
|
ARMY
|
PVT
|
19320000
|
Unknown
|
Bernalillo
|
19500831
|
Y
|
By the end of August, General MacArthur was
continuing to defend the major strongholds in South Korea and had
managed to halt the advance of the NKPA troops and their allies. They
had reached their
farthest point inside of South Korea. The NKPA forces had also been
pushed beyond their limits. Many of the original units were at far
reduced strength and effectiveness. Logistic problems wracked the NKPA,
and shortages of food, weapons, equipment, and replacement soldiers
proved devastating for NKPA. The NKPA force, however, retained high
morale and enough supplies to allow for one more large-scale offensive.
By the time, the NKPA invasion force for the offensive reached the
“Pusan Perimeter,” its strength had been cut nearly in half and it
was almost entirely lacking in armor.
For the UN forces, months of fighting had
reduced the area under their control to a 5,000-square-mile rectangle in
the ROK centered on the critical southeastern port of Pusan. The
only bright side was that thousands of additional UN troops had arrived
to reinforce the Perimeter.
At this juncture, there was no certainty within
the UN high command that the military security situation at the Pusan
Perimeter was controllable or tenable. The arrogance and hubris the UN,
U.S., and ROK political and military leadership had diminished. Any
reliance on the traditional Western view that the Asians, other than the
Japanese, were inferior and could not fight let alone beat a White army
was forever discarded. Within a very short period, the NKPA had driven
the mighty UN forces almost to the end of the Peninsula. They had proven
that they could fight, had fought, and would continue to fight both
efficiently and effectively. It was now time for a UN gamble which would
place its military back in the game. That gamble was to be Operation
Chromite.
North
Korea Naval mine clearance
The UN forces only became aware of the presence
of mines in North Korean waters in early September 1950 C.E. This
revelation raised fears that this would interfere with the proposed Inchŏn
invasion. Within weeks of the outbreak of the Korean War, the USSR had
shipped naval mines to North Korea for use in coastal defense, with USSR
naval mine warfare experts providing technical instruction in laying and
employment of the mines to North Korean personnel. Some of the mines
were shipped to Inchŏn. It was now too late for the UNC to
reschedule the landings. Fortunately, the North Koreans had laid
relatively few and unsophisticated mines at Inchŏn.
Destroyers in the UN assault force visually
identified moored contact mines in the channel at low tide and destroyed
them with gunfire. It was believed that when the UN invasion force
passed through the channel at high tide to land on the assault beaches,
it would pass over any remaining mines without incident.
In early September of 1950 C.E., a U.S. Air
Force 3rd Bombardment Group (Light) B-26 Invader conducted a rocket
attack on the rail yard at Iri, South Korea, near Songhak-ri, as part of
deception operations to draw NKPA attention away from the planned Inchŏn
landings.
With men, supplies, and ships obviously
concentrating at Pusan and in Japanese ports for a major amphibious
operation, the Japanese press began referring to the upcoming landings
as "Operation Common Knowledge." The UN Command (UNC) now
feared that it would fail to achieve surprise in the Inchŏn
landings. Exacerbating this fear, the leader of a North Korean-Japanese
spy ring was arrested in Japan in early September 1950 C.E. In his
possession was a copy of the plan for Operation Chromite, and the UN
forces did not know whether he had managed to transmit the plan to North
Korea before his arrest.
In one last bid to break the Pusan Perimeter,
the NKPA threw its entire military into the Great Naktong Offensive on
September 1st. It was a five-pronged simultaneous attack across the
entire Pusan Perimeter. NKPA troops attacked Kyongju and surrounded
Taegu and Ka-san. They also re-crossed the Naktong Bulge, threatening
Yongsan. Then they continued their attack at Masan, focusing on Nam
River and Haman. The attack caught UN forces by surprise and almost
overwhelmed them. Despite the NKPA efforts, however, in one of the most
brutal fights of the Korean War, the NKPA were unsuccessful. They simply
could not hold their gains. Upon their retreat from the offensive, the
NKPA was a much weaker force and now vulnerable to counterattack.
Inchŏn
infiltration
Before the main land battle at Inchŏn, UN
forces would land spies in Inchŏn and bombard the city's defenses
via air and sea. Deception operations were also carried out to draw NKPA
attention away from Inchŏn.
On September 1st, fourteen days before the
landing at Inchŏn of September 15th, a reconnaissance team was
placed in Inchŏn Harbor to obtain information on the conditions
there. The team, led by U.S. Navy Lieutenant Eugene F. Clark, landed at
Yonghung-do, an island in the mouth of the harbor. From there, they
relayed intelligence back to the UNC. With the help of locals, Clark,
gathered information about tides, beach composition, mudflats, and
seawalls. A separate reconnaissance mission, codenamed Trudy Jackson,
was mounted by the U.S. military. Trudy Jackson also dispatched
Lieutenant Youn Joung of the ROK Navy and ROKA Army Colonel Ke In-Ju to
Inchŏn to collect further intelligence on the area of Inchŏn.
Detailed reports were provided on NKPA
artillery positions and fortifications on the island of Wŏlmi-do,
at Inchŏn, and on nearby islands. The tides at Inchŏn have an
average range of 29 feet and a maximum observed range of 36 feet, making
the tidal range there one of the largest in the world and the littoral
maximum in all of Asia. Clark observed the tides at Inchŏn for two
weeks and discovered that American tidal charts were inaccurate, but
Japanese charts were quite good. During the extensive periods of low
tide they located and removed some North Korean naval mines, but,
critically to the future success of the invasion, Clark reported that
the North Koreans had not in fact systematically mined the channels.
When the NKPA discovered that the agents had
landed on the islands near Inchŏn, they made multiple attacks,
including an attempted raid on Yonghung-do with six junks. Clark mounted
a machine gun on a sampan and sank the attacking junks. In response, the
NKPA killed perhaps as many as 50 civilians for helping Clark.
Gilberto J. Padilla was born 1929 C.E. He was U.S. ARMY PFC
and casualty of the Korean War. He died in Korea on September 1, 1950
C.E. His home was in Bernalillo,
New Mexico.
New Mexico U.S. Military Fatal
Hispano Casualties of the Korean War
|
Name
|
Service
|
Rank
|
Birthdate (YYYYMMDD)
|
Home of Record:
|
City County
|
Incident or Death Date (YYYYMMDD)
|
Remains Recovered
|
Padilla
Gilberto J
|
ARMY
|
PFC
|
19290000
|
Unknown
|
Bernalillo
|
19500901
|
Y
|
Lupe R. Rodríguez
Jr. was born 1931 C.E. He was U.S. ARMY Corporal with
5th Infantry
Regiment: F Company RCT and a
casualty of the Korean War KIA. He died in Korea on September 2, 1950
C.E. His home was in Doña Ana, New
Mexico.
New Mexico U.S. Military Fatal
Hispano Casualties of the Korean War
|
Name
|
Service
|
Rank
|
Birthdate (YYYYMMDD)
|
Home of Record:
|
City County
|
Incident or Death Date (YYYYMMDD)
|
Remains Recovered
|
Rodríguez
Lupe R Jr.
|
ARMY
|
CPL
|
19310000
|
Unknown
|
Doña
Ana
|
19500902
|
Y
|
The U.S. Navy was also active on behalf of the
upcoming Inchŏn landings. U.S. Navy patrol aircraft, surface
warships, and submarines were operating in the Sea of Japan (East Sea)
and the Yellow Sea to detect any reaction by North Korean, USSR, or PRC
military forces. On September 4, 1950 C.E., F4U Corsair fighters of
Fighter Squadron 53 (VF-53) operating from the aircraft carrier U.S.S. Valley
Forge (CV-45) shot down a USSR Air Force A-20 Havoc bomber after it
opened fire on them over the Yellow Sea as it flew toward the UN naval
task force there.
On the Inchŏn landings front, UN forces
staged an elaborate deception operation in order to ensure surprise
during the landings and to draw NKPA attention away from Inchŏn by
making it appear that the landing would take place 105 miles to the
south at Kunsan.
By September 5, 1950 C.E., aircraft of the U.S.
Air Force's Far East Air Forces began attacks on roads and bridges to
isolate Kunsan, typical of the kind of raids expected prior to an
invasion there.
James Aragón
Jr. was
born 1929 C.E. He was U.S. Marine
Corps Corporal and casualty of the Korean War. He
died in Korea on September 5, 1950 C.E. His home was in Paguate,
Cíbola, New Mexico.
New Mexico U.S. Military Fatal
Hispano Casualties of the Korean War
|
Name
|
Service
|
Rank
|
Birthdate (YYYYMMDD)
|
Home of Record:
|
City County
|
Incident or Death Date (YYYYMMDD)
|
Remains Recovered
|
Aragón
James Jr.
|
Marine
Corps
|
CPL
|
19290213
|
Paguate
|
Cíbola
|
19500905
|
Y
|
A naval bombardment of Kunsan followed on
September 6th and on September 11th U.S. Air Force B-29 Superfortress
bombers joined in an aerial campaign, bombing NKPA military
installations in the area.
José P.
Montoya was born 1914 C.E. He was U.S. ARMY PFC and
casualty of the Korean War. He died in Korea on September 6, 1950 C.E.
His home was in Colfax,
New Mexico.
New Mexico U.S. Military Fatal
Hispano Casualties of the Korean War
|
Name
|
Service
|
Rank
|
Birthdate (YYYYMMDD)
|
Home of Record:
|
City County
|
Incident or Death Date (YYYYMMDD)
|
Remains Recovered
|
Montoya
José P
|
ARMY
|
PFC
|
19140000
|
Unknown
|
Colfax
|
19500906
|
Y
|
Cárlos Y.
Morales was
born 1928 C.E. He was U.S. ARMY PFC and casualty of the Korean War. He
died in Korea on September 8, 1950 C.E. His home was in Doña Ana,
New Mexico.
New Mexico U.S. Military Fatal
Hispano Casualties of the Korean War
|
Name
|
Service
|
Rank
|
Birthdate (YYYYMMDD)
|
Home of Record:
|
City County
|
Incident or Death Date (YYYYMMDD)
|
Remains Recovered
|
Morales
Cárlos Y
|
ARMY
|
PFC
|
19280000
|
Unknown
|
Doña
Ana
|
19500908
|
Y
|
Five days before the Inchŏn landing, on
September 10, 1950 C.E. 43 UN warplanes flew over Wŏlmi-do,
dropping 93 napalm canisters. Its mission was to "burn out"
its eastern slope in an attempt to clear the way for American troops.
By September 12, 1950 C.E., NKPA forces
attempted to advance further and were completely halted. It was then
that General MacArthur decided to launch an attack at Inch’ŏn.
Some 150 miles behind enemy lines, MacArthur knew that the attack at
Inch’ŏn would cut off all of the supply lines for the NKPA and
force them to retreat even further. The hope was to relieve the pressure
in the Pusan region and begin the process of forcing the NKPA out of
South Korea.
The flotilla of UN ships that were to land and
support the amphibious force during the battle was commanded by Vice
Admiral Arthur D. Struble. He was an expert in amphibious warfare.
Struble had participated in amphibious operations in World War II,
including the Normandy landings and the Battle of Leyte. He got underway
for Inchŏn in his flagship, the heavy cruiser U.S.S. Rochester (CA-124),
on September 12, 1950 C.E.
Among his ships were the Gunfire Support Group,
consisting of Rochester, the heavy cruiser U.S.S. Toledo (CA-133),
the British light cruisers HMS Jamaica and HMS Kenya, and the
six U.S. destroyers of Task Element 90.62, made up of U.S.S. Collett (DD-730),
U.S.S. De Haven (DD-727), U.S.S. Gurke (DD-783),
U.S.S. Henderson (DD-785), U.S.S. Lyman K. Swenson (DD-729),
and U.S.S. Mansfield (DD-728).
As the landing groups neared, cruisers and
destroyers from the U.S. and Canada shelled the NKPA fortifications on Wŏlmi-do
and checked for mines in Flying Fish Channel. The first Canadian forces
entered the Korean War when the Royal Canadian Navy destroyers HMCS
Cayuga, HMCS Athabaskan, and HMCS Sioux bombarded the coast. The UN Fast
Carrier Force offshore flew fighter cover, interdiction, and ground
attack missions. Hundreds of Korean civilians were killed in these
attacks on the lightly defended port.
UN forces took other measures to focus NKPA
attention on Kunsan. In addition to aerial and naval bombardment, on the
docks at Pusan, U.S. Marine Corps officers briefed their men on an
upcoming landing at Kunsan within earshot of many Koreans. On the night
of September 12th-September 13, 1950 C.E. the Royal Navy frigate HMS Whitesand
Bay (F633) landed U.S. Army special operations troops and Royal
Marine Commandos on the docks at Kunsan, making sure that NKPA forces
noticed.
Before the actual invasion, UN forces also
conducted a series of drills, tests, and raids elsewhere on the coast of
Korea, where conditions were similar to Inchŏn. These drills were
used to perfect the timing and performance of the landing craft, but
also were intended to confuse the NKPA further as to the location of the
invasion. The port city of Kunsan in particular was subject to a number
of UN air strikes.
Bombardments
of Wŏlmi-do and Inchŏn
At 07:00 on September 13th, the U.S. Navy's
Destroyer Squadron Nine, headed by the destroyer U.S.S Mansfield steamed
up Eastern Channel and into Inchŏn Harbor. There it fired upon NKPA
gun emplacements on Wŏlmi-do. Between them, the Canadian and U.S.
destroyers fired over a thousand 5-inch shells, inflicting severe damage
on Wŏlmi-do's fortifications. The attacks tipped off the NKPA that
a landing might be imminent, and the NKPA officer in command on Wŏlmi-do
assured his superiors that he would throw their enemies back into the
sea.
NKPA artillery returned fire, inflicting
significant damage on three of the attacking warships, killing one
sailor and wounding six others. The U.S.S destroyer Gurke sustained
three shell hits resulting in light damage and no casualties. The U.S.
Navy destroyer U.S.S. Collett (DD-730) was among the ships
damaged during the Wolmi-do bombardment. She received the most damage,
taking nine 75-millimeter-shell hits, which wounded five men. These
American destroyers then withdrew after bombarding Wŏlmi-do for an
hour. The U.S.S. Rochester, U.S.S. Toledo, HMS Jamaica, and
HMS Kenya then proceeded to bombard the NKPA batteries for the next
three hours from the south of the island.
Meanwhile, back at Inchŏn Lieutenant Clark
and his ROKA squad watched from hills south of Inchŏn, plotting
locations where NKPA machine guns were firing at the flotilla. They
relayed this information to the invasion force via Japan in the
afternoon.
During the night of the 13th and 14th of
September, Vice Admiral Struble decided on another day of bombardment
for Wŏlmi-do Island.
Esmeal López
was born 1931 C.E. He was U.S. ARMY PFC and casualty of the Korean
War. He died in Korea on September 13, 1950 C.E. His home was in Quay,
New Mexico.
New Mexico U.S. Military Fatal
Hispano Casualties of the Korean War
|
Name
|
Service
|
Rank
|
Birthdate (YYYYMMDD)
|
Home of Record:
|
City County
|
Incident or Death Date (YYYYMMDD)
|
Remains Recovered
|
López
Esmeal
|
ARMY
|
PFC
|
19310000
|
Unknown
|
Quay
|
19500913
|
Y
|
The U.S. Navy's Destroyer Squadron Nine
destroyers moved back up the channel off Wŏlmi-do Island on the
14th of September. They and the cruisers bombarded the island again that
day. UN Aircraft Carrier Task Force 77 bombed and strafed the harbor at
Inchŏn. It was comprised of three U.S. Navy Essex-class
aircraft carriers. They were the U.S.S. Valley Forge (CV-45), the
U.S.S. Philippine Sea (CV-47), the U.S.S.
Boxer (CV-21). Valley Forge and Philippine Sea each
carried two squadrons of F9F "Panther" jet fighters and two of
propeller-driven F4U "Corsair" fighter bombers, plus a
squadron of the heavier AD "Skyraider" attack planes. The
Boxer had an all-propeller air group: four squadrons of F4Us and
one of ADs. Also present was one British carrier, HMS Triumph, with
two squadrons of propeller-driven planes. In addition plus the American
escort carriers U.S.S. Badoeng Strait (CVE-116) and U.S.S.
Sicily (CVE-118), each providing a base for Marine Corps' F4Us,
specialists in close-air support for ground forces. Soon, a U.S. tank
landing ship entered the harbor at Inchŏn before the landings.
The
Inchŏn Landing
The U.N forces had been on the defensive until
September 15th. At that time, UN forces under the command of General
MacArthur and led by U.S. Major-General Edward M. Almond, staged
the successful amphibious landing at Inch’ŏn, near Seoul.
The battle began on September 15th as a surprise amphibious assault when
U.S. X Corps landing some 75,000 troops on the Korean coast.
It would end 4 days later on September 19, 1950
C.E., as an unqualified, resounding success for the UN and the most
decisive and important UN victory of the Korean War. It ended a string
of victories by the NKPA. It also partially severed the NKPA's supply
lines in South Korea and resulted in a strategic reversal in favor of
the UN.
At 00:50 on 15 September 1950 C.E., Lieutenant
Clark and his ROKA squad activated the lighthouse on Palmido Island in
Jung-gu. Later that morning, the ships carrying the amphibious force
followed the destroyers toward Inchŏn and entered Flying Fish
Channel, and the U.S. Marines of the invasion force got ready to make
the first landings on Wŏlmi-do Island.
The NKPA had not been expecting an invasion at
Inchŏn they continued to believe that the main invasion would
happen at Kunsan. As a result, only a small NKPA force of the 22nd
Infantry Regiment was diverted to Inchŏn before dawn on September
15, 1950 C.E. Unfortunately, for the NKPA the troops already stationed
at Inchŏn had been weakened by Clark's guerrillas and napalm
bombing runs had destroyed key ammunition dumps. In total, 261 ships
took part.
On the day of the invasion, NKPA forces at Wŏlmi-do
Island were outnumbered by more than six to one by the UN troops. At
06:30 on September 15, 1950 C.E., the lead elements of U.S. X Corps, and
later the others, landed from tank landing ships (LSTs) at "Green
Beach" on the northern side of Wŏlmi-do. The landing force
consisted of the U.S. 3rd Battalion, 5th Marine Regiment, led by
Lieutenant-Colonel Robert Taplett and nine M26 Pershing tanks from the
U.S. Marine Corps' 1st Tank Battalion. One tank was equipped with a
flamethrower and two others had bulldozer blades. The entire island was
captured by noon at the cost of just 14 UN casualties. NKPA casualties
included over 200 killed and 136 captured, primarily from the 918th
Artillery Regiment and the 226th Independent Marine Regiment.
For Red Beach and Blue Beach, Vice Admiral
James H. Doyle, Commander of an amphibious ready group, announced that
the time of landing or H-Hour, would be 17:30.
The forces on Green Beach would have to wait until 19:50 for the tide to rise
allowing the other waves to come ashore at "Red
Beach" and "Blue
Beach." During this time, extensive shelling and bombing, along
with anti-tank mines placed on the only bridge, kept the small NKPA
force from launching a significant counterattack.
The NKPA 22nd Infantry Regiment would retreat
to Seoul after the main landing that evening.
Red
Beach
Late on the afternoon of September 15th, the
LSTs approached Red Beach and as the lead ships they came under heavy
mortar and machine gun fire from NKPA defenders on Cemetery Hill.
Despite the concentrated fire, they disembarked assault troops and
unloaded vital support equipment. In addition, their guns wiped out NKPA
batteries on the right flank of Red Beach. Three (LST 857, LST 859 and
LST 973) of the eight LSTs took some hits from mortar and machine gun
fire, which killed a sailor and injured a few others.
The Red Beach forces were made up of the
Regimental Combat Team 5, which included the 3rd Battalion of the ROK
Marine Corps (MC) or ROKMC. They used ladders to scale the sea walls.
Lieutenant-Colonel Raymond L. Murray, serving as Commanding Officer of
the U.S. 5th Marines, had the mission of seizing an area three thousand
yards long and a thousand yards deep, extending from Cemetery Hill
(northern) at the top down to the Inner Tidal Basin (near Tidal Basin at
the bottom) and including the promontory in the middle called
Observatory Hill. The 1st Battalion would be on the left, against
Cemetery Hill and northern half of Observatory Hill. The 2nd Battalion
would take the southern half of Observatory Hill and Inner Basin.
Hispanic American Lieutenant Baldomero
López of the U.S. Marine Corps scaled a seawall after landing on
Red Beach on September 15th. He was killed after covering a live grenade
with his body. He was posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor.
López
was born on August 23, 1925 C.E., in Tampa, Florida, and grew up in the
neighborhood of Ybor City. His father, also named Baldomero López, had emigrated to the U.S. from the Astúrias
region of España as a young man. The younger López attended Hillsborough High School, where he was an
accomplished basketball player and a regimental commander in the
school's Junior Reserve Officers' Training Corps program. He enlisted in
the U.S. Navy on July 8, 1943 C.E., shortly after graduating from high
school, and served until June 11th of the next year.
He was selected to attend the U.S. Naval
Academy in the midst of World War II, and because of the ongoing war he
and his classmates were placed in an accelerated three-year program.
Upon graduating on June 6, 1947 C.E., he was commissioned a second
lieutenant in the Marine Corps. He attended The Basic School at
Quantico, Virginia, after which he became a platoon commander in the
Platoon Leaders Class Training Regiment.
In 1948 C.E., López went to China, where he served as a mortar section commander
and later as a rifle platoon commander at Tsingtao and Shanghai. On his
return from China he was assigned to Camp Pendleton, California. He was
serving there when, shortly after the outbreak of the Korean War, he
volunteered for duty as an infantry officer in Korea. He was promoted to
the rank of first lieutenant on June 16, 1950 C.E.
Red Beach forces had suffered eight dead and 28
wounded.
After neutralizing NKPA defenses at Inchŏn
on the night of September 15th, UN forces opened the causeway to Wolmi-do
Island, allowing the ROKMC 3rd Battalion of the U.S. 5th Marines
Regiment and the tanks from Green Beach to enter the battle at Inchŏn.
In the aftermath of the Pusan Perimeter battle,
of the 70,000 NKPA troops around Pusan, NKPA casualties from September
1st through September 15th ranged from roughly 36,000 to 41,000 killed
and captured, with an unknown total number of wounded. Because UN forces
had concentrated on taking Seoul rather than cutting off the NKPA's
withdrawal north, the remaining 30,000 NKPA soldiers escaped to the
north. They were soon reconstituted there as a cadre for the formation
of new NKPA divisions hastily re-equipped by the USSR.
After
NKPA resistance was extinguished in Inchŏn
Immediately after NKPA resistance was
extinguished in Inchŏn, at the Beachhead the supply and
reinforcement process began. Seabees and Underwater Demolition Teams
that had arrived with the U.S. Marines constructed a pontoon dock on
Green Beach and cleared debris from the water. The dock was then used to
complete the unloading of the LSTs and clearing the beach at high tide
early on September 16th.
That same morning, Lieutenant-Colonel Murray
and Colonel Lewis Burwell "Chesty" Puller had their
operational orders from General Oliver P. Smith. The U.S. 1st Marines
and 5th Marines began moving along the Inchŏn-Seoul road. The U.S.
5th Marines (Red and Green Beaches forces) entered the city of Inchŏn,
taking it by the afternoon.
That same day, realizing their blunder, sent
six columns of T-34 tanks to the beachhead. The columns were without
infantry support were spotted by a strike force of F4U Corsairs at the
village of Kansong-ni, east of Inchŏn and two flights of F4U
Corsairs from U.S. Marine Fighter Squadron 214 (VMF-214). The UN
aircraft bombed the attackers and the armored columns suffered extensive
damage, while the U.S. forces lost one airplane. A quick counter-attack
by M26 Pershing tanks destroyed the remainder of the NKPA armored
division and cleared the way for the capture of Inchŏn.
The 1st U.S. Marine Regiment under the command
of Colonel Puller landing at Blue Beach, but was much farther south of
the other two beaches and was last to reach the shore. Their mission was
to take the beachhead and the road to Yongdungpo and Seoul. The 2nd
Battalion would land on the left at Blue Beach One and ROKMC 3rd
Battalion would land on Blue Beach Two. A little cove around the corner
south of Blue Beach Two was called Blue Beach Three. As they approached
the coast, the combined fire from several NKPA gun emplacements sank one
LST. UN destroyer fire and bombing runs eliminated the NKPA defenses.
When the Blue Beach forces finally arrived, the NKPA forces at Inchŏn
had already surrendered. The U.S. 1st Marine Regiment spent much of its
time strengthening the beachhead and preparing for the inland invasion.
Air
attack on U.S.S. Rochester and HMS Kenya
Just before daylight at 05:50 on September
17th, two USSR-made NKPA aircraft attacked the U.S.S. Rochester
while she was anchored off Wolmi-do. Initially the aircraft were thought
to be friendly until they dropped four bombs over the American ship. All
but one missed and the one that did hit dented Rochester's crane and
failed to detonate. There were no American casualties in the skirmish.
After the aircraft attacked Rochester, she and the nearby HMS Jamaica
opened fire on them with antiaircraft guns. The Il-2 then strafed HMS
Kenya, killing one sailor and wounding two. At about the same time, fire
from Jamaica hit the Il-2 and it crashed into the water. The Yak-9 fled
after losing its partner. Rochester's crew later painted a Purple Heart
on her damaged crane.
That same day, the U.S. 5th Marines ambushed a
column of 6 NKPA T-34 tanks and 200 infantry, inflicting heavy
casualties on the NKPA.
Capture
of Kimpo airfield
As the work of the UN forces continued on
September 17th, General MacArthur made an extremely urgent request for
the early capture of Kimpo airfield, the largest and most important in
Korea. It was determined that when it was secured, the U.S. Fifth Air
Force could bring fighters and bombers over from Japan to operate more
efficiently and effectively against NKPA. As a result, the U.S. 2nd
Battalion, 5th Marines were ordered to attack Kimpo airfield that night.
The NKPA forces there were under the command of
Brigadier General Wan Yong, commander of the NKAF. He had already begun
organizing their defense of the airfield. By that time, several NKPA
troops had already fled across the Han River toward Seoul to escape the
upcoming fight. What troops he had left were a combination of partially
trained combat and service forces. The NKPA defenses and defenders were
almost as bad as the morale. The NKPA realized that no help was coming
from the North Korean officials at Seoul.
By the night of the 17th, much of Kimpo
Airfield had been taken. By that next morning of the 18th, the NKPA were
all gone and Kimpo airfield was securely in the hands of the U.S.
Marines. Fortunately, Kimpo airfield remained in excellent shape. The
NKPA had been unable to do any major demolition. In fact, several NKAF
planes were still on the field.
The U.S. Marines were now fully in control of
Kimpo Airfield and it would now become the center of UN Allies
land-based air operations. Transport planes immediately began flying in
gasoline and ordnance for the aircraft stationed there.
Narcisso Pachéco
was born 1930 C.E. He was U.S. ARMY Corporal and casualty of the Korean
War. He died in Korea on September 18, 1950 C.E. His home was in Eddy, New
Mexico.
New Mexico U.S. Military Fatal
Hispano Casualties of the Korean War
|
Name
|
Service
|
Rank
|
Birthdate (YYYYMMDD)
|
Home of Record:
|
City County
|
Incident or Death Date (YYYYMMDD)
|
Remains Recovered
|
Pachéco
Narcisso
|
ARMY
|
CPL
|
19300000
|
Unknown
|
Eddy
|
19500918
|
Y
|
Battle
of Seoul
Though warned that the process of taking Seoul
would allow remaining NKPA forces in the south to escape, General
MacArthur felt that he was bound to honor promises given to the South
Korean government to retake the capital as soon as possible. The General
then personally oversaw the U.S. 1st Marine Regiment’s fight through
NKPA positions on the road to Seoul. The NKPA attempted to stall the UN
offensive to allow time to reinforce Seoul and withdraw troops from the
south. In contrast to the quick victory at Inchŏn, the advance on
Seoul was slow and bloody. The NKPA launched another T-34 attack, which
was trapped and destroyed, and a Yak bombing run in Inchŏn harbor,
which did little damage.
Now having arrived at the battle staging areas,
control of Operation Chromite was given to Major-General Almond, the
U.S. X Corps commander. Almond now pressed for the capture Seoul by
September 25th, exactly three months after the NKPA assault across the
38th parallel.
Before the battle, NKPA had just one under
strength division in the City of Seoul. The majority of its forces were
south of the capital. The U.S. Marines armed with an M1 rifle and an
M1918 Browning Automatic Rifle would engage them in urban warfare during
the battle for Seoul, on streets where Korean civilians died in the
battle.
On the second day, vessels carrying the U.S.
Army's 7th Infantry Division arrived in Inchŏn Harbor. Almond was
eager to get the division into position to block a possible NKPA
movement from the south of Seoul. On the morning of September 18th, the
division's 2nd Battalion of the 32nd Infantry Regiment landed at Inchŏn
and the remainder of the regiment went ashore later in the day.
In Europe, the next day of September 19,
1950 C.E. Communist Party members employed by the West German government
were fired from their jobs. The Cold War was now causing removal of
communists from sensitive position in the Western Bloc nations.
Back in Korea, on that same day, after having
recently surprised the NKPA with the Inchŏn Landings, two UN forces
were on a new offensive pushing the NKPA back. UN forces under the
command of the U.S. 8th Army, advancing from the south, would meet up
with forces of U.S. X Corps, advancing from the north at Osan. This
offensive would eventually culminate in a complete defeat of the NKPA in
the south.
That morning, the U.S. 2nd Battalion moved up
to relieve a U.S. Marine battalion occupying positions on the right
flank south of Seoul. Meanwhile, the U.S. 7th Division's 31st Regiment
came ashore at Inchŏn. Responsibility for the zone south of Seoul
highway was then passed to U.S. 7th Division at 18:00. The 7th Infantry
Division then engaged in heavy fighting with NKPA soldiers on the
outskirts of Seoul.
That same day of September 19th, U.S. engineers
repaired the local railroad up to eight miles inland. The
UNC was already planning for future military actions.
António Sandoval was born 1930 C.E.
He was U.S. ARMY PVT and casualty of the Korean War. He died in Korea on
September 22, 1950 C.E. His home was in Harding, New Mexico.
Jesús Rivas was born 1922 C.E.
He was U.S. ARMY PVT and casualty of the Korean War. He died in Korea on
September 22, 1950 C.E. His home was in Hidalgo,
New Mexico.
New Mexico U.S. Military Fatal
Hispano Casualties of the Korean War
|
Name
|
Service
|
Rank
|
Birthdate (YYYYMMDD)
|
Home of Record:
|
City County
|
Incident or Death Date (YYYYMMDD)
|
Remains Recovered
|
Sandoval
António
|
ARMY
|
PVT
|
19300000
|
Unknown
|
Harding
|
19500922
|
Y
|
Rivas
Jesús
|
ARMY
|
PVT
|
19220000
|
Unknown
|
Hidalgo
|
19500922
|
Y
|
By September 22nd, the UN forces, U.S. Marines,
had also been continuing the unloading of necessary supplies and
reinforcements. They would finally unload 6,629 vehicles and 53,882
troops, along with 25,512 tons of supplies. That same day, the
determined U.S. Marines entered Seoul to find it fortified. Casualties
mounted as the forces engaged in grueling house-to-house combat to clear
the city of the NKPA.
Back in the U.S., on September 23, 1950 C.E.
the McCarran Internal Security Act, which called for the registration of
all Communist organizations, was passed by Congress over Truman's veto.
The Cold War was becoming a deep freeze and communist infiltration of
U.S. institutions was now greatly feared.
The 1950 Mckoffie Internal Security Act or
Internal Security Act was passed on September 23, 1950 C.E. This was
during the height of anti-Communist hysteria in the U.S. But was it
hysteria? Was the Comintern not real? Were the USSR and China not
engaged geopolitical undermining of legitimate governments in Eastern
Europe, Asia, Southeast Asia, and the Middle East? Were not the Western
Bloc nations finding communist infiltration in every one of their
governments?
The act was therefore aimed at furthering a
necessary conservative anti-Communist agenda. It sought to eliminate
Communist influence in American politics and society through what some
on the left described as coercion. The act found it necessary to place
some restrictions on particular freedoms such as speech and association
due to their connection to sedition and treasonist acts. The left
claimed that it was an attempt to criminalize a particular ideology,
Communism, and also an assault on private associations that involved no
provable criminal activity.
The Internal Security Act made it illegal to
pursue a Communist or totalitarian political agenda and required all
Communist organizations to register with the U.S. Attorney General. Any
organizations that failed to register could be brought before the
Subversive Activities Control Board (SACB) and forced to register as
Communist. Registered organizations were required to label their
publications and broadcasts as originating from a Communist
organization. Furthermore, members of registered organizations were
denied employment in the government or in private firms with federal
defense contracts and were prohibited from applying for or using
passports.
The act also contained a number of provisions
dealing with immigration and naturalization. Aliens who were at any
time members of or affiliated with a Communist or totalitarian party
were denied entry to the U.S. Those already in the U.S. could be
deported without a hearing. Naturalized citizens could have their
citizenship revoked if they joined a registered Communist organization
within five years of becoming a citizen. Additionally, aliens who were
members of newly registered Communist organizations could be denied
naturalization unless they were able to prove that they had left the
organization within three months of its being registered.
Finally, judicial standards for search and
seizure, the use of informants, wiretapping, and other forms of
surveillance were relaxed. The act also allowed the president to declare
an “internal security emergency,” during which time the Attorney
General was empowered to detain anyone who “probably would engage in,
or conspire to engage in, acts of espionage or sabotage.” There were
provisions for administrative hearings, but not court trials. In this
way, Communist organizations remained formally legal, but mechanisms
were institutionalized that allowed the indefinite detention of their
members without any criminal act being committed and with limited
judicial oversight. For some, these were necessary evils given the Cold
War. The Cold War had just heated up!
Roberto Rocha Delgado
was born 1929 C.E. He was U.S. Marine Corps
PFC and casualty of the Korean War. He died in Korea on September 23,
1950 C.E. His home was in Mesilla Doña Ana,
New Mexico.
New Mexico U.S. Military Fatal
Hispano Casualties of the Korean War
|
Name
|
Service
|
Rank
|
Birthdate (YYYYMMDD)
|
Home of Record:
|
City County
|
Incident or Death Date (YYYYMMDD)
|
Remains Recovered
|
Rocha
Roberto Delgado
|
Marine
Corps
|
PFC
|
19301229
|
Mesilla
|
Doña
Ana
|
19500923
|
Y
|
At the end of the summer, President Truman and
General MacArthur, the commander in charge of the Asian theater, had
decided on additional war aims. Now, for the Allies, the Korean War was
to be an offensive one. It was to be a war to “liberate” the North
from the communists. Why? It was now clear to all that the communists
had every intention of taking over the entire peninsula. They were not
interested in peaceful coexistence. Thus, the north had to be freed.
Initially, their new strategy had been a
success. An amphibious assault at Inchŏn pushed the NKPA out of
Seoul and back to their side of the 38th parallel. As American troops
crossed the boundary and headed north toward the Yalu River, the border
between North Korea and Communist China, the Chinese became
concerned. They now felt it necessary to protect their country from what
they called “armed aggression against Chinese territory.” Chinese
leader Mao Zedong then sent troops to North Korea and warned
the U.S. to keep away from the Yalu boundary unless it wanted full-scale
war
This was something that President Truman and
his advisers did not want. They were concerned that such a war would
lead to Soviet aggression in Europe, the deployment of atomic weapons,
and millions of senseless deaths. To General MacArthur, however,
anything short of this wider war represented “appeasement,” an
unacceptable surrender to the communists.
Rumaldo Vásquez was born 1931 C.E.
He was U.S. ARMY PFC and casualty of the Korean War. He died in Korea on
September 24, 1950 C.E. His home was in Luna,
New Mexico.
New Mexico U.S. Military Fatal
Hispano Casualties of the Korean War
|
Name
|
Service
|
Rank
|
Birthdate (YYYYMMDD)
|
Home of Record:
|
City County
|
Incident or Death Date (YYYYMMDD)
|
Remains Recovered
|
Vásquez
Rumaldo
|
ARMY
|
PFC
|
19310000
|
Unknown
|
Luna
|
19500924
|
Y
|
Major-General Almond declared Seoul liberated
the evening of September 25th, a claim repeated by General MacArthur the
following day. At the time of Almond's declaration, however, the NKPA
remained in most of the city and U.S. Marines were still engaged in
house-to-house combat with them.
The next day on September 26th, the Hotel Bando
(which had served as the U.S. Embassy) was cleared by Easy Company of
2nd Battalion, 1st U.S. Marine Regiment. During this fight several
marines were wounded.
Juan A. Griego
was born 1931 C.E. He was U.S. ARMY PFC and casualty of the Korean
War. He died in Korea on September 27, 1950 C.E. His home was in Sandoval,
New Mexico.
New Mexico U.S. Military Fatal
Hispano Casualties of the Korean War
|
Name
|
Service
|
Rank
|
Birthdate (YYYYMMDD)
|
Home of Record:
|
City County
|
Incident or Death Date (YYYYMMDD)
|
Remains Recovered
|
Griego
Juan A
|
ARMY
|
PFC
|
19310000
|
Unknown
|
Sandoval
|
19500927
|
Y
|
It was not until September 28th that the last
of the NKPA elements were driven out of Seoul or destroyed.
Pusan
Perimeter breakout
Meanwhile, U.S. 5th Marines came ashore at Inchŏn.
The last NKPA troops in South Korea still fighting were defeated when
Walton H. Walker's U.S. 8th Army broke out of the Pusan Perimeter,
joining the U.S. Army's X Corps in a coordinated attack on NKPA forces.
The end of the First Phase of the Korean War
was complete. By the end of that phase of the Korean War, one hundred
and eleven thousand South Koreans had died and fifty-seven thousand were
missing.
3.0
The Second Phase of the Korean War
The PRC had been watching the events and
waiting to see what the Americans would do next. They patiently refused
to enter the Korean War before American forces under the command of
General MacArthur had retaken Seoul. When they next crossed the
thirty-eighth parallel on September 30th, the Chinese contemplated their
next decision. Whet their assessment told them was that the UN now had
other, larger intentions. Perhaps, their real target was China? This
brought the PRC leadership to a decision point. They were now awake!
Napoléon Bonaparte the French warrior and
great student of history understood China said, “China is a sleeping
giant. Let her sleep, for when she wakes she will move the world.”
Even in his day, China saw itself as most superior and special in every
way while it saw other nations as backwards. She also had a huge
population and a respect for learning and knowledge. When she was
awakened, what else would that overly proud nation do after regaining
its footing? The world was about to see!
In October 1950 C.E., the PRC was only one year
old, and the Beijing regime faced daunting tasks of regime consolidation
and economic reconstruction. As a result, the U.S. Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA) which had been established earlier in January 1946 C.E.
consistently predicted that China would not enter the Korean War, even
if the U.S. crossed the 38th parallel. This was to prove to be an
egregious error.
Both Stalin and Kim Il-Sung sent messages to
Mao in October of 1950 C.E. requesting the PRC’s military assistance
in Korea. Stalin wanted to avoid the USSR from getting involved in
the conflict and facing off directly against the U.S. Kim Il-Sung was
desperate for any assistance he could obtain due to his mounting losses. As
a result, this ultimately led to the PRC entering the Korean War on the
side of the North Koreans.
The U.S. Government acting on the CIA’s
prediction, sent additional American forces into North Korea on October
8, 1950 C.E. C.E. the PRC would prove the CIA’s analysis wrong when it
sent masses of troops into Korea late in October, pushing the U.S. force
back and south of the 38th parallel before the end of 1950 C.E. Why did
the PRC intervene despite all the odds against Beijing?
By mid-October 1950 C.E., after the successful
landing at Inchŏn by the U.S. X Corps and the subsequent
destruction of the NKPA, the Korean War appeared to be all but over. UN
forces were rapidly advancing further into North Korea with the
intention of reuniting North and South Korea before the end of 1950 C.E.
Unfortunately for the UN North Korea is divided through the center by
the impassable Taebaek Mountains. It was this geography which separated
the UN forces into two groups. The U.S. 8th Army advanced north through
the western coast of the Korean Peninsula, while ROKA I Corps and the
U.S. X Corps advanced north on the eastern coast.
Mao Zedong had been reported as saying that the
PRC would enter the conflict in Korea militarily if need be. Why?
Because Mao wanted to prevent foreign forces, such as the Americans,
from occupying territory adjacent to the PRC’s border. These
warnings should have made it clear to the UN that the Chinese intended
to fight!
Just two weeks after MacArthur, with the
support of Defense Secretary George Marshall, had decided it was time to
move his troops on the offensive inside North Korea to force the NKPA
past the 38th parallel and deep into North Korea, UN forces managed to
capture P’yŏngyang, the capital of North Korea, on October 19th,
1950 C.E.
Now, believing his troops had the momentum to
carry the battle forward, MacArthur expressed his intentions to carry
the war into China. While MacArthur was posturing, PRC officials were
busy helping fund and supply the NKPA.
On that same day, following setbacks sustained
by the NKPA and the UNC’s crossing of the 38th
parallel, the awakened giant, China, entered the Korean War in
support of North Korea. In addition to dispatching the PVA to
Korea to fight against the UNC, the PRC also received North Korean
refugees and students and provided economic aid during the war. Large
formations of Chinese PVA troops secretly crossed the border into North
Korea. One of the first PVA units to reach the Chosin Reservoir area was
the PVA 42nd Corps, and it was tasked with stopping the eastern UN
advances.
Nelson R. Romero
was born
1929 C.E. He was U.S. ARMY PFC and casualty of the Korean War. He died
in Korea on October 21, 1950 C.E. His home was in Bernalillo,
New Mexico.
New Mexico U.S. Military Fatal
Hispano Casualties of the Korean War
|
Name
|
Service
|
Rank
|
Birthdate (YYYYMMDD)
|
Home of Record:
|
City County
|
Incident or Death Date (YYYYMMDD)
|
Remains Recovered
|
Romero
Nelson R
|
ARMY
|
PFC
|
19290000
|
Unknown
|
Bernalillo
|
19501021
|
Y
|
By October 25, 1950 C.E., having destroyed the
bulk of the NKPA, the now confident UN troops continued their push
deeper into North Korea. With NKPA forces in retreat, ROKA forces were
approximately twenty-five miles north of the parallel. They captured
Wonson the port city of Wonsan, located on the eastern side of North
Korea. Thereafter, they marched toward the Yalu River with almost no
resistance from the NKPA units. As the UN ROKA I Corps troops approached
the Yalu River they made contact with the PVA 9th Army and halted
at Funchilin Pass, south of the Chosin Reservoir.
Mao was also unpleasantly surprised by the U.S.
Marine landing at Wonsan. In a telegraph to Commander Song Shilun of the
PVA 9th Army on October 31st, he immediately called for the destruction
of the ROKA Capital Division, ROKA 3rd Infantry Division, U.S. 1st
Marine Division, and U.S. 7th Infantry Division.
Still, the UN assault forces continued north to
the Yalu River having no knowledge that the Chinese PVA forces had
secretly crossed the Yalu River into North Korea in late October. The
major intervention by the PRC in the war was to begin in November 1950
C.E. This unexpected decision of PRC's entry into the war in early
October would turn the tide of the war. The Northern units, consisting
of Sino (PVA)-Korean (NKPA) troops, would send the U.N. forces
retreating again.
With the USSR providing air support, the
Sino-Korean troops engaged American forces in a surprise attack on
November 1st. Sino-Korean troops under veteran commander General Peng
Dehuai inflicted serious losses on the lead units of the UN
advance. After being encircled by advancing Sino-Korean troops, the U.S.
8th Cavalry Regiment was forced to retreat to Ch’ongch’on River in
North Korea while the Sino-Korean troops withdrew into mountain
hideouts. This sudden appearance of Sino-Korean forces sent the main
body of UN forces reeling back to the south bank of the Ch’ŏngch’ŏn
River, this within days of attack into North Korea by UN forces.
That same day in Washington, the second of two
assassination attempts on U.S. President Harry S. Truman occurred on
November 1, 1950 C.E. It was carried out by militant Puertorriqueño
pro-independence activists Oscar
Collazo and Griselio Torresola while the President resided at Blair House during
the renovation of the White House. Both men were stopped before gaining
entry to the house. Torresola
mortally wounded White House Police officer Leslie Coffelt, who killed
him in return fire. Secret Service agents wounded Collazo.
President Harry S. Truman was upstairs in the house and not harmed.
Whether communists were involved one can only guess. Given the state of
the Cold War and the stakes involved, Comintern agents may have
infiltrated the Puertorriqueño pro-independence
parties and in a clandestine fashion had some responsibility in the
affair.
Meanwhile in Korea, after the landing at
Wonsan, the U.S. 1st Marine Division of the U.S. X Corps engaged the
defending PVA 124th Division on November 2nd. The ensuing battle caused
heavy casualties among the Chinese.
Elias Eli Torres was born 1931 C.E.
He was U.S. ARMY PFC and casualty of the Korean War. He died in Korea on
November 5, 1950 C.E. His home was in Mora,
New Mexico.
New Mexico U.S. Military Fatal
Hispano Casualties of the Korean War
|
Name
|
Service
|
Rank
|
Birthdate (YYYYMMDD)
|
Home of Record:
|
City County
|
Incident or Death Date (YYYYMMDD)
|
Remains Recovered
|
Torres
Elias Eli
|
ARMY
|
PFC
|
19310000
|
Unknown
|
Mora
|
19501105
|
N
|
On November 6th, the PVA 42nd Corps ordered a
retreat back to the north with the intention of luring the UN forces
into the Chosin Reservoir.
Under the PRC Chairman Mao's urgent orders to
destroy of the ROKA Capital Division, ROKA 3rd Infantry Division, U.S.
1st Marine Division, and U.S. 7th Infantry Division, the PVA 9th Army
was rushed into North Korea by November 10th.
The PVA 9th Corps was one of China's elite
formations, composed of veterans and former POWs from the Huaihai
Campaign. But it did have several deficiencies which hampered its
ability during the upcoming battle. Initially, the PVA 9th Army was
intended to be outfitted in Manchuria during November. This was before
Mao suddenly ordered it into Korea. The outfitting did not happen. As a
result, the PVA 9th Corps Army had almost no winter clothing for the
harsh Korean winter. Similarly, poor logistics forced the PVA 9th Corps
Army to abandon heavy artillery, while working with little food and
ammunition. The food shortage forced the PVA 9th Corps Army to initially
station a third of its strength away from the Chosin Reservoir in
reserve. Since foraging was not an option in the sparsely populated
starvation and exposure soon broke out among the PVA units. By the end
of the battle, more Chinese troops would die from the cold than from
combat and enemy air raids.
On November 14, 1950 C.E., a cold front from
Siberia descended over the Chosin Reservoir, and the temperature plunged
to as low as −35 °F. The weather was accompanied by frozen
ground. It also created considerable danger of frostbite casualties, icy
roads, weapon malfunctions, and medical supplies froze. Morphine
syrettes, devices for injecting liquid through a needle were a closed
flexible tube much like a typical tube of toothpaste, had to be
defrosted in a medic's mouth before they could be injected. Frozen blood
plasma was useless on the battlefield. The cutting off of clothing to
deal with a wound caused risks of gangrene and frostbite. Batteries used
for the Jeeps and radios quickly ran down and did not function properly
in the cold temperature. The lubrication in the guns gelled and rendered
them useless in battle. Likewise, the springs on the firing pins would
not strike hard enough to fire the round, or would jam.
Undetected by UN Intelligence, the PVA 9th Army
quietly entered the Chosin Reservoir area on November 17th, with the
20th Corps of the 9th Army relieving the 42nd Corps near Yudami-ni.
Manuel A. López was born 1922 C.E. He was U.S. ARMY
Sergeant and casualty of the Korean War. He died in Korea on November
19, 1950 C.E. His home was in Doña Ana,
New Mexico.
New Mexico U.S. Military Fatal
Hispano Casualties of the Korean War
|
Name
|
Service
|
Rank
|
Birthdate (YYYYMMDD)
|
Home of Record:
|
City County
|
Incident or Death Date (YYYYMMDD)
|
Remains Recovered
|
López
Manuel A
|
ARMY
|
SGT
|
19220000
|
Unknown
|
Doña
Ana
|
19501119
|
Y
|
Faced with the sudden attacks by PVA forces in
the U.S. 8th Army sector Chosin Reservoir, General MacArthur ordered the
8th to launch the Home-by-Christmas Offensive. To support the offensive,
MacArthur ordered the U.S. X Corps to attack west from the Chosin
Reservoir and to cut the vital Manpojin-Kanggye-Huichon supply line. As
a response, Major-General Almond formulated a plan on November 21st. It
called for the U.S. 1st Marine Division to advance west through
Yudami-ni, while the U.S. 7th Infantry Division would provide a
regimental combat team to protect the right flank at Sinhung-ni. The
U.S. 3rd Infantry Division would also protect the left flank while
providing security in the rear area. By then the U.S. X Corps was
stretched thin along a 400-mile front.
The UN mission responded with MacArthur’s
“Home-by-Christmas” offensive on November 24th. It was
MacArthur’s hope that the offensive would force the PVA to withdrawal
their army from the war and bring an end to the Korean War. In
reality, the PRC’s leadership undertook their own offensive campaign
called the “Second Offensive Campaign” against the advancing UN
forces. The majority of the fighting occurred along the valley of
the Ch’ongch’on River between the PVA 13th Army and U.S. 8th Army.
While this time, the Americans were able to avoid being encircled, they
still suffered heavy losses. As a result, the
“Home-by-Christmas” offensive failed. Even with this U.S. forces
defeat, on that same day, the U.S. 1st Marine Division occupied both
Sinhung-ni on the eastern side of the Chosin Reservoir, and Yudami-ni on
the west side of the reservoir.
By November 26, 1950 C.E., Chinese PVA forces
opened a counteroffensive in the Korean War while the UN forces were in
retreat southward toward the 38th parallel. This PRC action halted any
thought of a quick resolution to the conflict.
Blas W. A. Luján
was born 1930 C.E. He was U.S. ARMY Corporal and casualty of the
Korean War. He died in Korea on November 26, 1950 C.E. His home was in Santa
Fé, New Mexico.
New Mexico U.S. Military Fatal
Hispano Casualties of the Korean War
|
Name
|
Service
|
Rank
|
Birthdate (YYYYMMDD)
|
Home of Record:
|
City County
|
Incident or Death Date (YYYYMMDD)
|
Remains Recovered
|
Luján
Blas W A
|
ARMY
|
CPL
|
19300000
|
Unknown
|
Santa
Fé
|
19501126
|
N
|
The
Battle of Chosin Reservoir between November 27th and December 13th
Prelude
- Location, terrain, and weather
Chosin Reservoir is a man-made lake located in
the northeast of the Korean peninsula and the area around it sparsely
populated. The Battle was fought over some of the roughest terrain in
Korea and some of the harshest winter weather conditions. The Battle's
main focus was around the 78-mile long road that connects Hungnam and
Chosin Reservoir, which served as the only retreat route for the UN
forces. Through these roads, Yudami-ni and Sinhung-ni, located at the
west and east side of the reservoir respectively, are connected at
Hagaru-ri. From there, the road passes through Kot’o-ri and eventually
leads to the port of Hungnam. The road had been created by cutting
through the hilly terrain of Korea, with steep climbs and drops.
Dominant peaks, such as the Funchilin Pass and the Toktong Pass,
overlook the entire length of the road. The road's quality was poor, and
in some places it was reduced to a one lane gravel trail.
Forces
and strategies
Map of the Battle of the Chosin Reservoir
Under the best of conditions the Battle of
Chosin Reservoir would have been a difficult undertaking. Given the need
for the battle commanders to be trusting and supportive of each other,
anything else would be detrimental. Unfortunately, Major-General Almond
of the U.S. X Corps and Major-General Oliver P. Smith of the U.S. 1st
Marine Division shared a mutual loathing of each other. The dislike
dated back to a meeting before the landing at Inchŏn, when
Major-General Almond had spoken of how easy amphibious landings are even
though he had never been involved in one.
Major-General Smith believed there were large
numbers of PVA forces in North Korea despite the fact that higher
headquarters in Tokyo said otherwise. Major-General Almond felt Smith
was overly cautious. The mutual distrust between the commanders and
their differing assessments of the enemy troop strength caused Smith to
slow the U.S. 1st Marine Division's advance towards the Chosin Reservoir
in violation of Almond's instructions. Along the way toward Chosin, the
cautious Smith established supply points and airfields at Hagaru-ri and
Kot’o-ri.
As the U.S. X Corps was pushing towards the
reservoir, the PVA were formulating their battle strategy. It was based
upon their experiences earlier during the Chinese Civil War. PVA
planners worked from the assumption that only a light UN presence would
be at the reservoir. Given this, the PVA 9th Corps would first to
destroy the UN garrisons at Yudami-ni and Sinhung-ni and then push
towards Hagaru-ri. The PVA planners also believed the bulk of the U.S. X
Corps would then move to rescue the destroyed UN units. The 9th Army
would then move to block and trap the main UN forces on the road between
Hagaru-ri and Hungnam. Initially, the 9th Army committed eight divisions
for the battle, with most of the forces concentrated at Yudami-ni and
Sinhung-ni.
The lack of accurate intelligence about the UN
forces left the PVA plan flawed. It is true that the U.S. X Corps was
stretched thin over northeast Korea making for difficult defense. The
slowness of the U.S. Marine advance, however, allowed the bulk of the
U.S. 1st Marine Division, including the U.S. 5th, 7th and 11th Marines,
to be concentrated at Yudami-ni where the PVA 9th Army’s eight
divisions were.
Smith’s cautiousness and his placement of an
airfield and supply dump at strategically important Hagaru-ri was about
to pay off. The C-47-capable airfield was under construction and a
supply dump being prepared. These sites were only being lightly defended
by the U.S. 1st and 7th Marines. Only Regimental Combat Team 31
(RCT-31), an under strength and hastily formed regimental combat team of
the U.S. 7th Infantry Division, was thinly spread along the eastern bank
of the reservoir. Those units would later take the brunt of the Chinese
assaults. None of this was a priority for the PVA forces.
As for the UN forces, the U.S. 1st Marine
Division had an effective strength of 25,473 men at the start of the
battle, and it was further reinforced by the British 41 Royal Marine
Commando and the equivalent of two regiments from the U.S. 3rd and 7th
Army Infantry Divisions. This gave the UN forces a combined strength of
about 30,000 men during the course of the battle. There was another act
up the UN’s sleeve. The UN forces at Chosin were also to be supported
by one of the greatest concentrations of air power during the Korean
War. The 1st U.S. Marine Aircraft Wing was stationed at Yonpo Airfield.
Five aircraft carriers from the U.S. Navy's Task Force 77 were also
available and capable of launching 230 sorties daily which would provide
close air support during the battle. In addition, the U.S. Air Force Far
East Combat Cargo Command in Japan had a capacity of airdropping 250
tons of supplies per-day to resupply the trapped UN forces.
The Chinese PVA’s strength for the battle was
estimated at 120,000 troops. This was due to the 9th Army being composed
of 12 divisions with the strength of over 10,000 men per-division.
Before arriving in Korea, however, the PVA 9th Corps Army was
reinforced. Each of its three corps now had four divisions instead of
the usual three. Infantry from two formerly surrendered Nationalist
divisions had been absorbed earlier. This brought each infantry company
up to strength. Some companies had approximately 150 men, but other
companies were reinforced with more than 200 men. On average, each
division of the 9th Army had more infantry troops than other PVA
divisions.
Eventually, all 12 divisions of the PVA 9th
Corps Army would be deployed. Eight divisions of the PVA 20th and 27th
Corps served as the main attacking force. Four divisions of the PVA 26th
Corps initially were held back in reserve, and deployed after 20th and
27th Corps exhausted all their available strength.
Battle
of Chosin Reservoir
The Battle of Chosin Reservoir took place about
a month after the PRC entered the conflict and sent the PVA 9th Army to
infiltrate the northeastern part of North Korea. It would be a decisive
battle in the Korean War. Between November 27th and December 13th,
30,000 UN troops under the field command of Major-General Oliver P.
Smith were encircled and attacked by about 120,000 Chinese troops under
the command of Song Shilun who had been ordered by Mao to destroy the UN
forces.
The PVA had set its battle plans in motion. The
UN forces were now assessed and appropriate PVA actions and forces
applied. The PVA commanders understood the ancient Chinese military
strategist Sun Tzu very well. They had studied his ancient Chinese
military treatise The Art of War dating roughly from 771 to
476 BC. “If your enemy is secure at all points, be prepared for
him… If your opponent is temperamental, seek to irritate him… If his
forces are united, separate them… Attack him where he is unprepared,
appear where you are not expected.”
On November 27, 1950 C.E., PVA forces surprised
U.S. Major-General Almond’s command at the Chosin Reservoir area. A
brutal 17-day battle in freezing weather followed. The UN forces were
eventually able to break out of the encirclement and to make a fighting
withdrawal to the port of Hungnam, inflicting heavy casualties on the
PVA. U.S. Marine units were supported in their withdrawal by the U.S.
Army's RCT-31 to their east, which suffered heavy casualties and the
full brunt of the PVA offensive. Following the retreat of the U.S. 8th
Army from northwest Korea in the aftermath of the Battle of the
Ch'ongch'on River, the evacuation of the U.S. X Corps from the port of
Hungnam in northeast Korea marked the complete withdrawal of U.S. troops
from North Korea.
The PVA’s 20th and 27th Corps of the 9th
Corps Army launched multiple attacks and ambushes along the road between
the Chosin Reservoir and Kot'o-ri on the night of November 27th. At
Yudam-ni, the U.S. 5th, 7th and 11th Marines were surrounded and
attacked by the PVA‘s 79th and 89th Divisions, while the 59th Division
attacking the road between Yudam-ni and Hagaru-ri to cut off
communication. Similarly, U.S. Army unit RCT-31, later to be called
RCT-31, was isolated and ambushed at Sinhung-ni by the PVA 80th, 81st
and 94th Divisions. At Hagaru-ri, the U.S. 1st Marine Division command
headquarters was attacked by the PVA’s 58th Division. Finally, the
PVA’s 60th Division surrounded elements of the U.S. 1st Marines at
Kot'o-ri from the north.
Actions
at Yudam-ni - Chosin Reservoir
Acting on Major-General Almond's instruction,
Smith ordered the U.S. 5th Marines to attack west toward Mupyong-ni on
November 27th. The attack was soon stalled by the Chinese PVA 89th
Division and forced the U.S. Marines to dig in on the ridges surrounding
Yudam-ni. As night came, three PVA regiments of the 79th Division
attacked the ridges on the north and northwest of Yudam-ni, hoping to
annihilate the garrison in one stroke. Close range fighting soon
developed as the attackers infiltrated U.S. Marine positions, but the
U.S. 5th and 7th Marines held the line while inflicting heavy casualties
on the PVA.
Actions
East of the reservoir
RCT-31, later known as "Task Force
Faith," was a hastily formed regimental combat team from the U.S.
7th Infantry Division that guarded the right flank of the U.S. Marine
advance towards Mupyong-ni. Before the battle, RCT-31 was spread thin,
with main elements separated on the hills north of Sinhung-ni, the
Pyungnyuri Inlet west of Sinhung-ni, and the town of Hudong-ni south of
Sinhung-ni. This placed them in two separate positions along a 10-mile
stretch down the east side of the reservoir. Although the PVA believed
RCT-31 to be a reinforced regiment, the Task Force was actually under
strength, with one battalion missing, due to the bulk of the U.S. 7th
Infantry Division being scattered over northeast Korea.
On the night of November 27th, three regiments
from the PVA 80th Division attacked the northern hills and the
Pyungnyuri Inlet, completely surprising the UN defenders. The ensuing
battle inflicted heavy casualties on the U.S. 1st Battalion, 32nd
Infantry, to the north of Sinhung-ni, while the 57th Field Artillery
Battalion and the U.S. 3rd Battalion, 31st Infantry, were almost overrun
at the Pyungnyuri Inlet to the west of Sinhung-ni. The PVA also sent the
242nd Regiment of the 81st Division towards Hill 1221, an undefended
hill that controlled the road between Sinhung-ni and Hudong-ni. As the
night's fighting ended, "RCT-31" had been separated into three
elements. Believing that the UN defenders had been completely destroyed
at the Pyungnyuri Inlet, the PVA stopped its attacks and proceeded to
loot the U.S. positions for food and clothing.
As morning came on November 28th, the U.S. 3rd
Battalion, 31st Infantry (3/31st) Infantry counterattacked the PVA 239th
Regiment at the Pyungnyuri Inlet, sending the surprised 239th back in a
complete rout.
In the afternoon, U.S. Army Major-General
Almond flew into the Sinhung-ni perimeter of U.S. Army unit RCT-31. He
was convinced that it was strong enough to begin its attack north and
deal with whatever "remnants" of PVA forces in their way.
Almond ordered Colonel Allan D. Maclean, the commander of RCT-31, to
resume the offensive north while presenting Silver Stars to three of
Maclean's officers. In disgust, Lieutenant-Colonel Don C. Faith, Jr.,
the commander of the 1/32nd Infantry, threw his medal into the snow.
On the night of November 28th, the PVA 80th
Division attacked again with four regiments. With devastating fire from
the UN force’s M16 and M19 anti-aircraft (AA) guns attached to the
57th Field Artillery Battalion, they swept the PVA ranks at the
Pyungnyuri Inlet. The Chinese assault became a disaster as their
communications broke down. After the fighting, the PVA 238th and the
239th Regiment together had fewer than 600 soldiers left.
On the other hand, attacks by the PVA 240th
Regiment had RCT-31 under siege. Almond finally instructed the U.S. 1st
Marine Division to rescue RCT-31 by breaking out of Yudam-ni, an
impossible order for Major-General Oliver P. Smith to implement. Only
the 31st Tank Company was able to attempt to rescue of the RCT-31 by
attacking Hill 1221 from Hudong-ni that day. But without infantry
support, the armored attack was stalled by slippery roads, rough
terrain, and close infantry assaults.
Actions
at Yudam-ni - Chosin Reservoir
While the battle was underway at Yudam-ni, the
PVA 59th Division blocked the road between Yudam-ni and Hagaru-ri by
attacking the defending Charlie and Fox Companies of the U.S. 7th
Marines. The successful assault forced Charlie Company to retreat into
Yudam-ni, which left Fox Company commanded by Captain William E. Barber
isolated on a hill overlooking the Toktong Pass, a vital pass that
controlled the road.
On November 29th, several efforts by the U.S.
7th Marines failed to rescue Fox Company, despite inflicting heavy
casualties on the PVA. Aided by artillery from Hagaru-ri and Marine
Corsair fighters, Fox Company managed to hold out for five days while
enduring constant attacks by the PVA 59th Division.
Actions
at Sinhung-ni - Chosin Reservoir
On November 29th, the U.S. 1st Battalion
managed to break through the PVA blockade and
Colonel Maclean ordered a retreat from the
northern hills towards Sinhung-ni. After reaching the Sinhung-ni
perimeter, Colonel Maclean was lost when he mistook some Chinese
soldiers for Americans.
By the night of November 29th, the PVA finally
stopped their attacks and waited for fresh reinforcements.
Order
to break out from Yudam-ni to Hagaru-ri Chosin Reservoir
The U.S. 8th Army on the Korean Western Front
was forced into full retreat at the Battle of the Ch'ongch'on River, and
General MacArthur ordered Major-General Almond to withdraw the U.S. X
Corps to the port of Hungnam. Acting on the instruction of Almond and
Smith, Lieutenant-Colonel Raymond L. Murray and Colonel Homer L.
Litzenberg, commanders of the U.S. 5th and 7th Marines, respectively,
issued a joint order to break out from Yudam-ni to Hagaru-ri on November
30th. Faced with tough fighting between the blocking PVA divisions and
the withdrawing U.S. Marines, Smith remarked, "Retreat, hell! We're
not retreating we're just advancing in a different direction."
For the breakout, the U.S. Marines formed into
a convoy with a single M4A3 Sherman tank as the lead. The plan was to
have 3rd Battalion, U.S. 5th Marines (3/5) as the vanguard of the
convoy, with three battalions covering the rear. At the same time, U.S.
1st Battalion, 7th Marines (1/7) would attack towards Fox Company in
order to open the road at Toktong Pass. To start the breakout, U.S. 3rd
Battalion, 7th Marines (3/7) had to first attack south and capture Hills
1542 and 1419 in order to cover the road from Chinese attacks. The
breakout was carried out under the air cover of the U.S. 1st Marine Air
Wing.
Raymundo Holguín
was born 1930 C.E. He was U.S. ARMY PFC and casualty of the Korean War.
He died in Korea on November 30, 1950 C.E. His home was in Doña Ana,
New Mexico.
Cárlos B. Moya was born 1927 C.E. He was U.S. ARMY PFC
and casualty of the Korean War. He died in Korea on November 30, 1950
C.E. His home was in Santa Fé,
New Mexico.
Alberto S. Ramírez was born 1931 C.E. He was U.S. ARMY PFC
and casualty of the Korean War. He died in Korea on November 30, 1950
C.E. His home was in Grant,
New Mexico.
Silva Jesús Aragón was born 1930 C.E.
He was U.S. ARMY Corporal and casualty of the Korean War. He died in
Korea on November 30, 1950 C.E. His home was in Doña Ana,
New Mexico.
New Mexico U.S. Military Fatal
Hispano Casualties of the Korean War
|
Name
|
Service
|
Rank
|
Birthdate (YYYYMMDD)
|
Home of Record:
|
City County
|
Incident or Death Date (YYYYMMDD)
|
Remains Recovered
|
Holguín
Raymundo
|
ARMY
|
PFC
|
19300000
|
Unknown
|
Doña
Ana
|
19501130
|
N
|
Moya
Cárlos B
|
ARMY
|
PFC
|
19270000
|
Unknown
|
Santa
Fé
|
19501130
|
N
|
Ramírez
Alberto S
|
ARMY
|
PFC
|
19310000
|
Unknown
|
Grant
|
19501130
|
N
|
Aragón
Silva Jesús
|
ARMY
|
CPL
|
19300000
|
Unknown
|
Doña
Ana
|
19501130
|
Y
|
Action
at Hudong-ni - U.S. Forces Left Stranded
By November 30th, the U.S. forces evacuated
Hudong-ni in order to defend Hagaru-ri, leaving the rest of RCT-31
completely stranded.
Action
at Sinhung-ni - U.S. Forces Unable to Breakout
On November 30th, Major General David G. Barr,
the commander of the U.S. 7th Infantry Division, flew into Sinhung-ni
and met with Lieutenant-Colonel Don C. Faith, Jr., who by now had
assumed command of RCT-31. Faith expressed the difficulties for a
breakout, particularly the 500 wounded that RCT-31 had to bring along.
On the same day, parts of the Chinese PVA 94th
Division and the rest of the 81st Division arrived as reinforcements for
the 80th Division. By midnight, six PVA regiments renewed their attacks,
and Zhan Danan, the commander of the 80th Division, ordered the complete
destruction of RCT-31 before dawn. Again, the U.S. 57th Battalion's AA
guns held the PVA at bay, but the shell supplies were running
desperately low.
Actions
at Hagaru-ri
To support the U.S. Marine attack towards
Mupyong-ni, Hagaru-ri became an important supply dump with an airfield
under construction. Major-General Oliver P. Smith and U.S. 1st Marine
Division headquarters were also located at Hagaru-ri. With the bulk of
the U.S. 1st Marine Division gathered at Yudam-ni, Hagaru-ri was lightly
defended by two battalions from the U.S. 1st and 7th Marines, the rest
of the garrison being composed of engineers and rear support units from
both the U.S. Army and the U.S. Marine Corps.
The original PVA plan called for the 58th
Division to attack Hagaru-ri on the night of November 27th, but the
division became lost in the countryside due to the outdated Japanese
maps it used. It was not until the dawn of November 28th that the 58th
Division arrived at Hagaru-ri.
Actions
at Yudam-ni - Chosin Reservoir
Caught by complete surprise on the night of
November 27th, the UN forces at Chosin Reservoir were cut off at
Yudam-ni, Sinhung-ni, Hagaru-ri, and Kot'o-ri by 28 November. As day
broke on November 28th, the Chinese and Americans were locked in a
stalemate around the Yudam-ni perimeter in the Battle of Chosin
Reservoir.
During the Battle of Chosin Reservoir, after
the heavy losses suffered by the PVA 79th Division at Yudam-ni, the PVA
9th Corps Army headquarters realized that the bulk of the U.S. 1st
Marine Division was stationed at Yudam-ni, with a garrison strength that
was double the initial estimate. Believing that any further assaults
would be futile, Song Shilun ordered the PVA 9th Army to switch their
main attacks toward Sinhung-ni and Hagaru-ri, leaving Yudam-ni alone
from November 28th through the 30th.
Actions
at Hagaru-ri
Meanwhile, the UN garrison at Hagaru-ri had
noticed from the fighting and ambushes that had occurred the previous
night that there were PVA forces around them. Lieutenant-Colonel Thomas
L. Ridge, commander of U.S. 3rd Battalion, 1st Marines (3rd/1st),
predicted the PVA attack would come on the night of November 28th.
Almost everyone, including rear support units with little combat
training, was pressed into service on the front line due to the manpower
shortage, and the entire perimeter was on full alert by 21:30.
It was not long before the PVA 173rd Regiment
attacked the western and the southern perimeter of Hagaru-ri, while the
172nd Regiment struck the hills on Hagaru-ri’s northern perimeter.
Despite the preparations, the under strength UN garrison with only two
battalions from the U.S. 1st and 7th Marines was overwhelmed. The PVA
soon opened several gaps in the defenses and reached the rear areas. The
resulting chaos, however, caused a breakdown in discipline among the PVA
soldiers, who began looting food and clothing instead of exploiting the
situation. The defending Americans managed to destroy the PVA forces in
counterattacks, while a breakdown of communications between the PVA
regiments allowed the gaps to close. When the fighting stopped, the PVA
172nd Regiment had only gained the East Hill on the northern perimeter.
Another Chinese PVA attack on Hagaru-ri was
planned for the night of November 29th, but air raids by the U.S. Marine
VMF-542 Night Fighter Squadron broke up the PVA formations before it
could be carried out.
Given the critical manpower shortage at
Hagaru-ri, on November 29th, Smith ordered Colonel Lewis
"Chesty" Puller of the U.S. 1st Marine Regiment to assemble a
task force to be sent north from Kot'o-ri to open the road south of
Hagaru-ri. A task force was formed with 921 troops from the 41 Royal
Marine Commandos, G Company of the U.S. 1st Marines, and B Company of
the U.S. 31st Infantry. It was dubbed "Task Force Drysdale"
after its commander, Lieutenant-Colonel Douglas B. Drysdale, who also
commanded 41 Royal Marine Commandos.
On the afternoon of November 29th, Task Force
Drysdale pushed north from Kot’o-ri, while under constant attack from
the PVA 60th Division. The Task Force's harrowing experience later
earned the road the nickname "Hell Fire Valley." As the PVA
attacks dragged on, the Task Force became disorganized, and a destroyed
truck in the convoy later split the Task Force into two segments.
That night, despite suffering 162 dead and
missing and 159 wounded, Task Force Drysdale managed to bring in 300
badly needed infantrymen for the defense at Hagaru-ri. Although the lead
segment of the PVA fought its way into the lightly defended Hagaru-ri on
the night of November 29th, the rear segment was destroyed.
As more reinforcements arrived from Hudong-ni
on November 30th, the garrisons at Yudam-ni and Hagaru-ri attempted to
recapture the East Hill. All efforts failed, despite the destruction of
a PVA company. When darkness settled, the PVA gathered its remaining
1,500 soldiers in a last-ditch attempt to capture Hagaru-ri. The
reinforced UN defenders annihilated most of the attacking forces, with
only the defenses around the East Hill giving way. On the next day of
the 31st, as the PVA 58th Division tried to advance from the East Hill
they were cut down.
Responding to Peng's concern over the troops'
conditions, Mao limited the scope of the Third Phase Campaign the Third
Battle of Seoul to pin down the ROKA forces along the 38th parallel
while inflicting as much damage as possible. Upon noticing that the U.S.
units were not interspersed between the ROKA formations, therefore
unable to support the South Koreans, Mao ordered the PVA 13th Army to
destroy the ROKA 1st Infantry Division, the ROKA 6th Infantry Division
and the ROKA III Corps. Following Mao's instruction, Peng placed the PVA
38th, 39th, 40th and 50th Corps of the 13th Army in front of the ROKA
1st and 6th Infantry Division, while the 42nd and the 66th Corps of the
13th Army were moved into ROKA III Corps' sector. The start date of the
offensive was set to December 31st in order to take advantage of the
night assault under a full moon and the anticipated low alertness of the
UN soldiers during the holiday. For the same reasons Ridgway had
predicted that December 31st would be the likely time for the new
Chinese offensive. Believing that the destruction of the ROKA forces at
the 38th parallel would render the UN forces incapable of counterattacks
in the future, Mao promised to pull all Chinese troops off the front
line for rest and refit by the end of the campaign.
On December 1, 1950 C.E., President Truman
created the Federal Civil Defense Administration under the Office of
Emergency Management. The purpose of the FCDA, according to President
Truman’s order, “shall be to promote and facilitate the civil
defense of the United States in cooperation with several States.” The
Cold War now called for special emergency powers for the FCDA and the
President in the event of a national crisis. According to President
Truman, the act established a “basic framework for preparations to
minimize the effects of an attack on our civilian population, and to
deal with the immediate emergency conditions which such an attack would
create.” Fears of a USSR attack on Europe and the U.S. while
America’s military was involved in North Korea prompted many of these
types of action.
Action
- Chosin Reservoir Hills 1542 and 1419
On the morning of December 1st, U.S. 3rd/7th
Marines engaged the PVA 175th Regiment of the 59th Division at Hills
1542 and 1419. By the afternoon, the UN convoy passed the U.S. 3rd/7th's
position at Hills 1542 and 1419. At that time, the U.S. 1st/7th Marines
were trying to break the PVA blockade at Hill 1419. Despite being badly
reduced by combat, hunger and frostbite, the PVA 59th Division sent in
its last five platoons and refused to yield Hill 1419. The PVA defenders
soon forced the U.S. Marines to dig in on the slopes between the road
and the peaks. As night approached, the U.S. 1st/7th finally captured
the peak at the blockade at Hill 1419 and started to march through the
hills on the east side of the road. Relying on the element of surprise,
they managed to destroy several PVA positions along the road.
Action
Chosin Reservoir - at Yudam-n and Kot'o-ri
With Hagaru-ri still not captured, the PVA High
Command scrambled the 79th Division to resume attacks on Yudam-ni, while
the 89th Division rushed south towards Kot'o-ri. The PVA struck at night
on December 1st and the ferocity of the fighting forced the rear U.S.
covering forces to call in night fighters, fighter aircraft adapted for
use at night or in other times of bad visibility, to suppress the
attacks.
By December 1st, the PVA 58th Division after
having tried to advance from the East Hill was virtually destroyed, with
the remainder waiting for reinforcements from the 26th Corps of the 9th
Army. Much to the frustration of General Song Shilun commander of the
PLA 9th Army Group, the 26th Corps did not arrive before the U.S.
Marines broke out of Yudam-ni.
Smith having refused to abandon his
division’s equipment chose the Yudam-ni–Hagaru-ri movement at a
critical stage. Hagaru-ri had become an important supply dump with an airfield.
Once the two groups had united at Hagaru-ri, they could absorb
ammunition and replacements by air and evacuate the worst wounded and
frozen casualties. The airfield was opened to traffic on December
1st, allowing UN forces to bring in reinforcements and to evacuate the
dead and wounded.
Action
- Chosin Reservoir RCT-31 ordered to Breakout of Sinhung-ni
On the day of December 1st, Lieutenant-Colonel
Faith finally ordered RCT-31 to breakout from Sinhung-ni and to withdraw
to Hagaru-ri. The breakout began that day as soon as the weather allowed
the U.S. 1st Marine Aircraft Wing to provide air cover. As the soldiers
formed a convoy and tried to leave the Sinhung-ni perimeter, the PVA
241st Regiment immediately swarmed over the American forces, with three
other regiments closing in. Left with no choice, the covering aircraft
dropped napalm right in front of RCT-31, causing casualties among both
PVA and U.S. troops. The resulting firestorm wiped out the blocking PVA
Company and allowed the convoy to advance. As the front of RCT-31 made
their way forward, heavy small arms fire caused many members of the rear
guard to seek shelter below the road instead of protecting the trucks.
PVA fire also killed or wounded those already in the trucks as well as
the drivers, who viewed the job as a form of suicide.
Slowly, the convoy from Sinhung-ni to Hagaru-ri
approached a roadblock under Hill 1221 in the late afternoon. Several
parties tried to clear Hill 1221, but after taking part of the hill, the
leaderless soldiers continued out onto the frozen reservoir instead of
returning to the UN Column. As Lieutenant-Colonel Faith led an assault
on the roadblock under Hill 1221, he was hit by a PVA grenade and
subsequently died of his wounds. It was then that the RCT-31 became Task
Force Faith.
The convoy from Sinhung-ni managed to fight
past the first roadblock, but as it reached the second at Hudong-ni,
RCT-31 disintegrated under PVA attacks. Out of the original 2,500
soldiers, about 1,050 managed to reach Hagaru-ri, and only 385 survivors
were deemed able-bodied. The remnants of RCT-31 were formed into a
provisional army battalion for the rest of the battle.
Celestino Chávez
was born 1931 C.E. He was U.S. ARMY CPL and casualty of
the Korean War. He died in Korea on December 2, 1950 C.E. His home was
in Mckinley, New
Mexico.
Primero R. Martínez was born 1931 C.E. He was U.S. ARMY PFC and casualty of
the Korean War. He died in Korea on December 2, 1950 C.E. His home was
in Bernalillo,
New Mexico.
George Torres
was born
1930 C.E. He was U.S. ARMY CPL
and casualty of the Korean War. He died in Korea on December 2, 1950
C.E. His home was in Luna, New
Mexico.
New Mexico U.S. Military Fatal
Hispano Casualties of the Korean War
|
Name
|
Service
|
Rank
|
Birthdate (YYYYMMDD)
|
Home of Record:
|
City County
|
Incident or Death Date (YYYYMMDD)
|
Remains Recovered
|
Chávez
Celestino
|
ARMY
|
CPL
|
19310000
|
Unknown
|
Mckinley
|
19501202
|
N
|
Martínez
Primero R
|
ARMY
|
PFC
|
19310000
|
Unknown
|
Bernalillo
|
19501202
|
N
|
Torres
George
|
ARMY
|
CPL
|
19300000
|
Unknown
|
Luna
|
19501202
|
N
|
Action
- Chosin Reservoir Taking of Toktong Pass and withdrawal from Yudam-ni
On the morning of December 2nd, Fox Company and
the U.S. 1st/7th Marines made a joint attack on the Toktong. The
fighting lasted well into the morning. Having secured the Toktong Pass,
the road between Yudam-ni and Hagaru-ri was open. Although the road had
been opened between Yudam-ni and Hagaru-ri, the UN convoy from Yudam-ni
still had to fight through the numerous PAV positions on the hills
overlooking the road until all the U.S. Marines managed to withdraw from
Yudam-ni on their way to Hagaru-ri.
On that first night of the retreat from
Yudam-ni, the PAV struck the UN convoy in force and inflicted heavy
casualties on the U.S.3rd/5th Marines. Although strong air cover
suppressed most of the PAV forces for the rest of the march, the cold
weather, harassing fire, raiding parties, and roadblocks slowed the
retreat to a crawl, while inflicting numerous casualties.
Action
- Chosin Reservoir UN Convoy Reaches Hagaru-ri
Despite those difficulties, the UN convoy from
Yudam-ni reached Hagaru-ri in an orderly fashion on the afternoon of
December 3rd.
With the U.S. Marines at Yudam-ni having
completing their withdrawal to Hagaru-ri on December 4th, the trapped UN
forces could finally start their breakout towards the port of Hungnam.
On December 6th, the Communist forces retook
P’yŏngyang. That same day, U.S. Marines at the Chosin
Reservoir began their “attack in a different direction” as they
engage in a fighting retreat to the Port of Hŭngnam.
Breakout
The breakout began on December 6th, with the
U.S. 7th Marines as the advance guard of the retreating column from the
Changjin (Chosin) Reservoir. The U.S. 5th Marines were detailed to bring
up and protect the rear of the force. At the same time, the much-delayed
PVA 26th Corps arrived at Hagaru-ri with its 76th and 77th Divisions to
relieve the 58th and 60th Divisions. The U.S. 7th Marines continued
their advance and pushed aside the PVA 76th Division south of Hagaru-ri.
The U.S. 5th Marines protecting the rear of the force broke off and took
over the Hagaru-ri perimeter and recaptured the East Hill from the PVA
76th Division.
That night, using the normal battle tactic of
the PVA, the PVA 76th and 77th Division launched an attack on the
Hagaru-ri perimeter from all directions to stop the UN force’s
breakout towards the port of Hungnam. It was a last effort to stop the
breakout. The U.S. 5th Marines repulsed the attacks, inflicting heavy
casualties.
Meanwhile, the 7th U.S. had captured the high
ground surrounding the road between Hagaru-ri and Kot’o-ri opening the
road. This was not to last long. As soon as the U.S. Marines pulled out,
the PVA 77th Division returned to the peaks. They soon began attacking
the retreating UN column from the Chosin Reservoir. As chaotic fighting
broke out, the retreat was slowed to a crawl. The U.S. Marine night
fighters, however, returned to suppress the PVA forces. Most of the
blocking PVA troops were eliminated.
Finally, on December 7th the remainder of the
U.S. Marines Chosin Reservoir column managed to reach Kot'o-ri with
little difficulty. Some of its last elements reached Kot'o-ri later that
night.
By now, the Chinese PVA forces were suffering
from logistics problems and exhaustion after their earlier victories and
there were arguments against continuing the ongoing Third Phase
Campaign. The PVA logistics system was based on the concept of People's
War with the native population supplying the army. Korean population
living near the 38th parallel had become indifferent and sometimes
hostile giving little. The Chinese were now suffering from hunger and
the lack of winter clothing. PVA Commander General Peng Dehuai
telegraphed to Mao that the PVA needed at least three months rest, to
replace its casualties, to be resupplied, and reorganized.
The PVA High Command’s reaction to the
failure of the 26th Corps at Hagaru-ri, ordered the 26th and 27th Corps
to chase down and destroy the escaping UN force. The 20th Corps was
assigned to block the U.S. Marines’ escape route. But with most of the
20th Corps destroyed at Yudam-ni and Hagaru-ri, the only forces between
Kot'o-ri and Hungnam were the remnants of the 58th and 60th Divisions.
In desperation, General Song Shilun commander of the PLA 9th Army Group
ordered these troops to dig in at Funchilin Pass. They were also ordered
to blow up the vital concrete Treadway Bridge spanning the treacherous
mountain gorge at Funchilin Pass. This was to be done in the hope that
the terrain and other obstacles would allow the PVA’s 26th and 27th
Corps to overcome the retreating UN forces. The PVA 180th Regiment that
occupied Hill 1081 had blown up the original concrete bridge and two
improvised replacements in succession.
Back in the United States, on December 8, 1950
C.E., shipments to Communist China were banned by the U.S. Why did the
U.S. government ban shipments to Communist China on December 8, 1950
C.E.? During 1950 C.E. China had been earning monies through foreign
exchange by trading with Hong Kong. Hong Kong was also provided
restricted currency and military supplies to China. Thus, the U.S.
Government imposed a total embargo on American trade and payment
transactions with the PRC. In May 1951 C.E., the U.N. General Assembly
would adopt a resolution recommending that every country impose an
embargo on shipments of military weapons and strategic materials to
areas under the control of China and the DPRK.
On that same day, General MacArthur ordered the evacuation of the U.S. X
Corps in order to reinforce the U.S. 8th Army, which by then was badly
depleted and retreating rapidly towards the 38th parallel. The
importance to the continued retreat of the escaping UN forces from the
Chosin Reservoir and other locations cannot be overstated. The PVA’s
resources were of such a level that they could given adequate time
rapidly reinforce and reconstitute commands.
According to Chinese archives, about 73 percent
of Chinese infantry forces, 67 percent of Chinese artillery forces, 100
percent of Chinese armored forces and 52 percent of Chinese air forces
were deployed in Korea at one point or another, alongside 600,000
civilian laborers – in total more than three million civilian and
military personnel.
As of November 10, 1950 C.E., the PLA 9th Army
entered Korea in order to reinforce Chinese forces on the east side of Taebaek
Mountains. This development brought the total PVA strength to
450,000, including 380,000 combat personnel.
Now, there was the possibility that the PVA
might blow up the vital concrete Treadway Bridge spanning the
treacherous mountain gorge at Funchilin Pass a key part of the escape
route. It was necessary for the U.S. 1st Battalion, 1st Marines (1/1) to
attack Hill 1081 from the south. At the same time, the U.S. 7th Marines
and RCT-31 attacked the Treadway Bridge from the north, only to
encounter defenders who were already frozen in their foxholes. Both
locations were captured on December 9th, though the dug in remnants of
the 58th and 60th Divisions defenders fought to the last man.
The UN forces found a 29-foot gap in the
concrete bridge which had to be repaired. It not repaired immediately or
the retreating U.S. Marines would have to abandon all of their vehicles,
and carrying out their wounded and dead under fire would be a nearly
impossible task. With the path to Hungnam blocked at Funchilin Pass,
eight C-119 Flying Boxcars flown by the U.S. 314th Troop Carrier Wing
were used to drop portable bridge sections by parachute. The bridge,
consisting of eight separate 18 ft long, 2,900 lb sections,
was dropped one section at a time, using a 48 ft parachute on each
section. Four of these sections, together with additional wooden
extensions were successfully reassembled into a replacement bridge by
Marine Corps combat engineers and the U.S. Army 58th Engineer Treadway
Bridge Company on that day, enabling UN forces to proceed.
Though the PVA 58th and 60th Divisions had been
outmaneuvered by the Funchilin Pass replacement bridge, they still tried
to slow the UN advance with ambushes and raids. Fortunately for the UN
forces, after weeks of non-stop fighting, the two Chinese divisions
combined had only 200 soldiers left. The last UN forces left Funchilin
Pass by December 11th.
They would still have one last engagement
during the UN forces withdrawal. They were ambushed at Sudong by the
pursuing PVA 89th Division. Task Force Dog of the 3rd Infantry Division
repulsed it with little difficulty. The Task Force's reconnaissance
platoon, artillery battalion, and G Company of the 65th Infantry were
involved in several actions against the enemy in that area.
The UN forces finally reached the Hungnam
perimeter by 21:00 on December 11th.
By the time the UN forces arrived at Hungnam, following General
MacArthur orders, the ROKA I Corps, the ROKA 1st Marine Regiment and the
U.S. 3rd and 7th Infantry Divisions had set up defensive positions
around Hungnam's port. There were some skirmishes that broke out between
the defending U.S. 7th, 17th and 65th Infantry and the pursuing PVA 27th
Corps. Fortunately, strong UN naval gun fire support provided by U.S.
Navy Task Force 90 badly mauled PVA 9th Army Group. This left PVA forces
unable to approach the Hungnam perimeter.
Aftermath
Two entire Chinese armies had been tasked with
the destruction of the U.S. 1st Marine Division. They only succeeded in
driving the American force from North Korean territory. During the
Chosin Reservoir action, the PVA paid an enormous price. 80,000 Chinese
troops were killed or wounded. The PVA Ninth Army Group was rendered
combat-ineffective for months. The Battle of Chosin Reservoir
became one of the most-storied episodes in U.S. Marine Corps
history.
On that same day of December 11, 1950 C.E., at
the UN, a ceasefire was proposed to China along the 38th parallel. It
was offered in order to avoid any further escalation of hostility
between China and the U.S.
By December 15, 1950 C.E., the ROKA 1st
Infantry Division had retreated back to the town of Choksong on the
southern bank of the Imjin River where its original defensive position
at the start of the Korean War had been located. On the right flank of
the ROKA 1st Infantry Division, the ROKA 6th Infantry Division was
located at the north of Dongducheon along the southern bank of the
Hantan River. The ROKA 1st Infantry Division planned to defend the Imjin
River by placing its 11th and 12th Regiments at the west and the east
side of Choksong respectively. The ROKA 6th Infantry Division was tasked
with defending Route 33 at the Hantan River by placing its 7th and 19th
Regiments on each side of the road. Both the ROKA 15th Regiment of the
1st Infantry Division and the ROKA 2nd Regiment of the 6th Infantry
Division were placed in the rear as reserves. The ROKA had also
constructed numerous bunkers, barbed wire obstacles, and minefields on
both banks of the river in order to strengthen defenses and to maintain
troop morale. Faced with the ROKA defense, the Chinese had prepared for
well over a month for the offensive.
In the weeks before the operational orders for
the Third Phase Campaign were issued by PVA High Command, the advance
elements of the PVA 39th Corps had been conducting detailed
reconnaissance on ROKA defenses. The ROKA positions were then thoroughly
analyzed by PVA commanders, engineers, and artillery officers. The PVA
"thrust" companies, which were composed of specially trained
assault and engineer teams, were also organized to lead the attack
across the Imjin and Hantan River. During the preparation, the PVA
artillery units had suffered heavy losses under UN air attacks, but PVA
Deputy Commander Han Xianchu still managed to bring up 100 artillery
pieces for action against the ROKA fortifications.
Actions
- Third Battle of Seoul Forces and strategies
By December 22, 1950 C.E., the U.S. 8th Army's
front had stabilized along the 38th parallel. Just days before his
death, General Walton Walker had placed the U.S. 8th Army’s I Corps,
the U.S. IX Corps, and the ROKA III Corps along the 38th parallel to
defend Seoul. The U.S. 8th’s I and IX Corps were to defend the Imjin
and Hantan River respectively, with the ROKA III Corps guarding the
areas around Chuncheon. The boundary between the U.S. 8th’s I Corps
and the IX Corps was marked by Route 33. It was defended by the ROKA 1st
Infantry Division on the west side and the ROKA 6th Infantry Division on
the east side.
That day, the Chinese PVA High Command issued
the operational orders that signaled the start of the Third Phase
Campaign and for the Third Battle of Seoul. The PVA 39th and 50th Corps
were tasked with the destruction of the ROKA 1st Infantry Division,
while the 38th and the 40th Corps were tasked with the destruction of
the ROKA 6th Infantry Division.
On December 23, 1950 C.E., PRC's Foreign
Minister Zhou Enlai formally rejected the earlier proposed UN ceasefire.
They also demanded that all UN forces to be withdrawn from the Korean
Peninsula. Commander of the U.S. 8th Army, General Walton Walker, was
killed when a civilian truck collided with his jeep in a traffic
accident on that same day, on December 23, 1950 C.E. Was the USSR
once again up to its old tricks?
Just five years earlier, on December 9, 1945
C.E. a collision occurred when a two and a half ton GMC Army truck,
which had been parked facing U.S. General Patton's car, roared into life
and suddenly and inexplicably careening directly into the opposite lane
and violently collided with the General’s staff car. The actions
of the truck driver seemed designed to intentionally injure, or kill,
the General. Both the driver of the truck and his two passengers quickly
vanished. No criminal charges were ever filed. No accountability was
ever recorded. The official accident reports and key-witnesses went
missing. It should be noted that U.S. Army Intelligence warned General
Patton earlier that his life was in danger from the People's
Commissariat for Internal Affairs (NKVD). USSR Marshall Stalin had
ordered Patton to be assassinated.
Action
- Chosin Reservoir Evacuation at Hungnam
The last UN unit left at 14:36 on December
24th, and the Port Hungnam was destroyed to deny its use to the enemy.
The U.S. military evacuation movement by sea was conducted by a 193-ship
armada. It was assembled at the Port and evacuated not only the UN
troops, but also their heavy equipment and roughly a third of the Korean
refugees.
About 105,000 soldiers, 98,000 civilians,
17,500 vehicles, and 350,000 tons of supplies were shipped from Hungnam
to Pusan, and they would later rejoin the war effort in Korea.
Commanding Major-General Smith was credited for saving the U.S. 8th’s
X Corps from destruction, while the 1st Marine Division, the 41 Royal
Marines Commando and RCT-31 were awarded the Presidential Unit Citation
for their tenacity during the battle. Fourteen Marines, two other
soldiers and one Navy pilot received the Medal of Honor, and all of the
UN troops that served at Chosin were later honored with the nickname
"The Chosin Few."
The PVA 27th Corps entered Hungnam on the
morning of December 25th. A day later, Lieutenant-General Matthew B.
Ridgway assumed command of the U.S. 8th Army.
Although the PVA had been weakened from their
earlier battles, with nearly 40 percent of its forces rendered combat
ineffective, its unexpected victories over the UN forces had convinced
the Chinese leadership of the invincibility of the PVA. Immediately
after the PVA 13th Army's victory over the U.S. 8th Army at the
Ch'ongch'on River, the PRC's Chairman Mao Zedong started to contemplate
another offensive against the UN forces on the urging of North Korean
Premier Kim Il-sung. After learning of MacArthur's plans and the UN
ceasefire, Mao also believed that the UN evacuation of the Korean
Peninsula was imminent. Although the over-stretched Chinese logistics
prevented the PVA from launching a full-scale invasion against South
Korea, Mao still ordered the PVA 13th Army to launch an intrusion,
dubbed the "Third Phase Campaign the Third Battle of Seoul," to hasten the UN withdrawal and to
demonstrate China's desire for a total victory in Korea.
Because the ROKA forces had suffered nearly
45,000 casualties at the end of 1950 C.E., most of the ROKA units were
composed of raw recruits with little combat training. After inspecting
the front just days before the battle, General J. Lawton Collins, the
U.S. Army Chief of Staff, concluded that most of the ROKA formations
were only fit for outpost duties. At the same time, the U.S. 8th Army
was also suffering from low morale due to its earlier defeats, and most
of its soldiers were anticipating an evacuation from Korea. The U.S. 8th
Army's lack of will to fight and to maintain contact with PVA forces
resulted in a lack of information on PVA troop movements and intentions.
After inspecting the front on December 27th,
Lieutenant-General Ridgway ordered the U.S. 8th's I and IX Corps to
organize a new defensive line around Koyang to Uijeongbu, called the
Seoul Bridgehead line, to cover the Han River crossings in case the UN
forces were forced to evacuate Seoul.
Before the beginning of the battle, the ROKA
III Corps composed of four divisions, was located to the east of the
U.S. 24th Infantry Division of the U.S. 8th's IX Corps, defending the
38th parallel to the north of Gapyeong and Chuncheon. The cold winter
created great difficulties for the ROKA defenders, with the heavy snow
hindering construction and icy roads limiting food and ammunition
supplies. NKPA guerrillas were also active in the region, and had caused
serious disruption in the rear of the ROKA III Corps.
By December 31, 1950 C.E., with the evacuation
at Hungnam during the Battle of Chosin Reservoir completed, the PVA
order of battle in Korea was reduced to 18 infantry divisions, as
opposed to the 30 infantry divisions present on November 16, 1950 C.E.
Casualties
Chosin Reservoir
The U.S. 8th's X Corps and the ROKA I Corps
reported a total of 10,495 battle casualties. These were comprised of
4,385 U.S. Marines, 3,163 U.S. Army personnel, 2,812 South Koreans
attached to American formations, and 78 British Royal Marines. The U.S.
1st Marine Division also reported 7,338 non-battle casualties due to the
cold weather. Despite the losses, the U.S. 8th's X Corps preserved much
of its strength.
The PVA 9th Army officially reported 48,156
casualties during the course of the battle. This represented about one
third of its total strength. Of those casualties, 19,202 were attributed
to combat, while 28,954 were attributed to the harsh Korean winter and
lack of food. Outside of official channels, the estimation of PVA
casualties has been described as high as 60,000. The 9th Army was put
out of action for three months. With the absence of 9th Army, the PVA
order of battle in Korea was reduced to 18 infantry divisions.
For the PRC, Mao Zedong reported,
“...Casualties had reached a 40,000 high. The Central [Government]
expresses its deepest sorrow...”
By the end of December, PVA forces would
re-cross the parallel in an attempt to retake Seoul. Fighting resumed
when the PVA army began their Third Phase Offensive at the 38th parallel
which they launched on New Year’s Eve 1950 C.E.
Here it should be remembered that after the PRC
entered the Korean War, the conflict was in a new phase. It had done
this to prevent North Korea from falling under UN control. The PVA
entered Korea and launched a series of surprise attacks against the UN
forces near the Sino-Korean border. Later on the Korean western front,
the battles at the Ch'ongch'on River Valley and the Chosin Reservoir had
compelled the UN forces to retreat southward back to the 38th parallel
by December 1950 C.E. The PVA and NKPA forces then recaptured much of
North Korea.
General MacArthur had been planning a series of
withdrawals to the Pusan Perimeter under the assumption that UN forces
were about to be overwhelmed in Korea. After the U.S. 8th Army and U.S.
Marine Corps forces suffered disastrous defeats, the U.S. 8th Army
retreated back to the Imjin River. Next, UN defensive positions were set
up around the South Korean capital of Seoul. The intent was for the U.S.
8th Army to hold Seoul for as long as possible.
Third
Battle of Seoul from December 31, 1950 C.E.-January 7, 1951 C.E.
Prelude
Seoul is the capital city of South Korea, which
is roughly bisected into northern and southern halves by the Han River.
Seoul is located 35 miles south of the 38th parallel. The battle
was to be fought over the UN defenses at the 38th parallel, which
stretches horizontally from the Imjin River mouth on the Korean west
coast to the town of Chuncheon in central Korea. A road dubbed
"Route 33" runs south across the 38th parallel at the Hantan
River, passes through Uijeongbu and eventually arrives at Seoul.
Interestingly, it is an ancient invasion route towards Seoul. Another
road ran across the Imjin River, and it connects Seoul and Kaesong
through the town of Munsan and Koyang. Finally, a road runs through
Chuncheon and it connects to Seoul from the northeast. The harsh Korean
winter, with temperatures as low as −20 °C, had frozen the
Imjin and the Hantan River over most of the river crossings, eliminating
a major obstacle for the attacking PVA forces.
The
Third Battle of Seoul took place from December 31, 1950 C.E.
to January 7, 1951 C.E. around the South Korean capital of Seoul. On
December 31, 1950 C.E., the PVA 13th Army attacked the ROKA's 1st, 2nd,
5th, and 6th Infantry Divisions along the 38th parallel breaching UN
Forces' defenses at the Imjin River, Hantan River, Gapyeong, and
Chuncheon.
Action
- The Third Battle of Seoul
Acting on Lieutenant-General Ridgway's
prediction, the ROKA Army Headquarters ordered all units to full alert
at dusk on December 31st, but many of its soldiers were either drunk
from the New Year celebration or had abandoned their posts in order to
escape the cold.
The PVA artillery units began shelling ROKA
defenses at 16:30 on December 31st. The first blow fell on the ROKA 1st
Infantry Division’s 12th Infantry Regiment, due to the unit's
positioning as both the boundary between the ROKA 1st and 6th Infantry
Divisions and the boundary between U.S. 8th’s I and the X Corps.
Because the river banks on ROKA 12th Regiment's flanks were composed of
high cliffs difficult for the attackers to scale, most of the 12th
Regiment's strength was used to defend its center.
With intelligence on this development, the PVA
39th Corps decided that the ROKA 12th Regiment's flanks on either side
of the boundary between the ROKA 1st and 6th Infantry Divisions and the
boundary between U.S. 8th’s I and the X Corps would be the best main
points of attack on the ROKA 12th Regiment. This battle plan it was
thought would achieve maximum surprise. Following a feint attack on the
ROKA 12th Regiment's center, the PVA 38th Corps’ 116th and the 117th
Divisions struck both flanks of the ROKA 12th Regiment, catching it off
guard. The ROKA 12th Regiment was then unable to offer much resistance.
Within hours, the ROKA 12th Regiment was cut to pieces and the battery
of the U.S. 9th Field Artillery Battalion was seized by the PVA.
Under the cover of the fleeing ROKA soldiers,
the attacking PVA forces then penetrated the ROKA 15th Regiment's
defenses without firing a shot. Desperate to contain the PVA
breakthrough, Brigadier-General Paik Sun Yup of the ROKA 1st Infantry
Division used the division's rear service personnel to form an assault
battalion, but the battalion was unable to stop the PVA advance.
Battle
Action
- Imjin River and the Hantan River
By the evening of December 31, 1950 C.E., the
PVA 13th Army having launched a massive attack against ROKA forces along
the 38th parallel, also attacked along the Imjin River and the Hantan
River.
The PVA 38th, 39th, 40th and 50th Corps had
almost decimated the ROKA 1st Infantry Division and the U.S. 24th
Infantry Division's forces and penetrated their defenses. With the PVA
38th and the 40th Corps forces on both flanks of the ROKA 6th Infantry
Division, they then began their attacks against the ROKA 6th. It did not
go as the PVA commanders had planned.
The original plan had called for the PVA 38th
and the 40th Corps to attack the ROKA 19th Regiment on the 6th Infantry
Division's right flank. Fortunately for the UN forces, the bulk of the
PVA forces mistakenly attacked the U.S. 19th Infantry Regiment of the
U.S. 24th Infantry Division. The 24th was stationed to the east of the
ROKA 19th Regiment. Poor PVA intelligence had also made the Chinese
charge through several minefields, resulting in heavy casualties to the
attackers. Despite these setbacks and losses, the Chinese had pushed the
U.S. 19th Infantry Regiment back, exposing the right flank of the ROKA
6th Infantry Division in the process.
Action
- Gapyeong and Chuncheon
The PVA operational order for the Third Phase
Campaign called for the 42nd and the 66th Corps to protect the Chinese
left flank by eliminating the ROKA III Corps’ ROKA 2nd Infantry
Division placed on the Corps' left flank at the hills north of Gapyeong
and its ROKA 5th Infantry Division defended the corps' center at
Chuncheon. The PVA were also to cut the road between Chuncheon and
Seoul. Following instructions, the two PVA corps quickly struck after
midnight on New Year's Eve, on January 1, 1951 C.E.
The PVA 124th Division first penetrated the
flanks of the ROKA 2nd Infantry Division at Gapyeong. They then blocked
the Division's retreat route. The trapped ROKA 17th Infantry Division
and 32nd Regiments and the ROKA 2nd Infantry Division were forced to
retreat in disarray.
At the Chuncheon sector, the PVA 42nd and the
66th Corps forced the ROKA III Corps into full retreat.
While the PVA 66th Corps pressured the ROKA 5th
Infantry Division's front, the PVA 124th Division then advanced eastward
in the ROKA rear and blocked the ROKA 5th Infantry Division's retreat
route as well. The maneuver by the PVA 124th Division soon left the ROKA
5th Infantry Division’s 36th Regiment surrounded. The ROKA 36th
Regiment was then forced to make its escape by infiltrating the PVA
lines using mountain trails. At that point, the ROKA III Corps had lost
contact with its 2nd and 5th Infantry Divisions. In the meanwhile, the
remainder of the ROKA III Corps was retreating to the town of Wonju.
By now, the ROKA 6th Infantry Division was
forced into full retreat. The PVA then advanced southward in an attempt
to encircle the ROKA 6th Division and managed to intercept some of its
elements. Fortunately, most of the ROKA 6th Division escaped the trap by
infiltrating the PVA lines using the mountain trails. In any event, PVA
had given the ROKA 6th Division a routing and the ROKA 1st Infantry
Division out of action.
As Lieutenant-General Ridgway tried to inspect
the front on the morning of January 1st, he was greeted by the fleeing
and weaponless remnants of the ROKA 6th Infantry Division a few miles
north of Seoul. Despite Ridgway's efforts to stop the retreat, the
division continued to flee south. It was not until the personal
intervention of South Korean President Syngman Rhee that the division
finally stopped its retreat. Only the ROKA 11th Regiment remained
intact.
Action
- Evacuation of Seoul
With the collapse of the UN defenses at the
38th parallel, the evacuation/retreat from Seoul began on January 1st at
09:00. By the night of January 1st, the UN defenses at the Imjin River
and the Hantan River had also completely collapsed with the PVA
advancing 9 miles into UN territory.
By midnight on January 1st, U.S. IX Corps’
24th Infantry Division reached the Seoul Bridgehead line south of
Uijeongbu. The 27th Commonwealth Brigade was then moved into the IX.
Corps rear as reserves.
Donaciano Salazar was born 1929 C.E.
He was U.S. ARMY PFC and casualty of the Korean War. He died in Korea on
January 2, 1950 C.E. His home was in Mckinley,
New Mexico.
New Mexico U.S. Military Fatal
Hispano Casualties of the Korean War
|
Name
|
Service
|
Rank
|
Birthdate (YYYYMMDD)
|
Home of Record:
|
City County
|
Incident or Death Date (YYYYMMDD)
|
Remains Recovered
|
Salazar
Donaciano
|
ARMY
|
PFC
|
19290000
|
Unknown
|
Mckinley
|
19510102
|
Y
|
At 04:00 on January 3rd, the 1st Battalion,
Royal Ulster Rifles (1RUR) first made contact with the 149th Division of
the PVA 50th Corps. The PVA surprised and overran the B and D Company of
1RUR, but a counterattack by Major C. A. H. B. Blake of 1RUR restored
the battalion's position by the early morning.
While 1RUR was under attack, PVA forces had
infiltrated the 1st Battalion, Royal Northumberland Fusiliers' (1RNF)
positions by exploiting the unguarded valleys between hilltops occupied
by the British. The entire 1RNF soon came under sniper fire and the PVA
made repeated attempts to capture the Y Company of 1RNF. To restore
1RNF's position, Major-General Thomas Brodie of the British 29th
Infantry Brigade sent the W Company of 1RNF with four Churchill tanks as
reinforcements. The reinforcements were met with machine gun and mortar
fire. The PVA resistance immediately began crumbling under the Churchill
tanks' devastating assaults. The surviving PVA troops fled while under
the bombardment from 4.2 inch mortars and 25 pounder field guns.
Aftermath
After the fighting had ended, the British 29th
Infantry Brigade suffered at least 16 dead, 45 wounded, and 3 missing.
The PVA lost 200 dead, these found within 1RNF's position.
With the ROKA 1st Infantry Division in a forced
withdrawal and out of action, the PVA stopped its advance. At that
point, the Chinese forces lacked the ability to lay siege to the city.
On the morning of January 3rd, after conferring with Major-General’s
Frank W. Milburn and John B. Coulter the commanders of the U.S. I. and
IX. Corps respectively, Ridgway ordered the complete evacuation of
Seoul. Major-General Milburn then ordered retreat toward the Seoul
Bridgehead Line of his U.S. I. Corps to begin. Following his orders, the
U.S. 25th Infantry Division of I. Corps then took up position to the
west of Koyang, while the British 29th Independent Infantry Brigade of
I. Corps had dug in to the east.
PVA Commander General Peng Dehuai was surprised
to hear of the UN evacuation order for Seoul. That same morning, Peng
ordered the PVA 13th Army to pursue the retreating UN forces by
attacking towards Seoul. The U.S. 24th and 25th Infantry Divisions and
the British 29th Infantry Brigade soon bore the brunt of the Chinese
attacks. As the Americans in the U.S. IX Corps' Sector were attempting
to withdraw, the U.S. 24th Infantry Division was immediately attacked by
the PVA 38th Corps. In the fierce fighting that followed, the U.S. 19th
Infantry Regiment on the Division's left flank was involved in numerous
hand-to-hand struggles with the PVA around Uijeongbu. During their
attacks, the PVA soon overran E and G Companies of U.S. 19th Infantry
Regiment, but American artillery and air strikes soon inflicted 700
casualties in return.
At 14:00 Major-General Coulter also ordered a
withdrawal of his U.S. IX Corps which was at the time east of I Corps.
The Anglo-Australian 27th British Commonwealth Brigade was instructed to
cover the rear.
During their attacks against the ROKA 6th
Infantry Division some PVA forces managed to trap the 3rd Battalion,
Royal Australian Regiment (3RAR) of the 27th British Commonwealth
Brigade at Uijeongbu. The 3rd Battalion managed escape the trap with
only four wounded. The retreating U.S. IX Corps was by then under heavy
PVA pressure. The 27th Commonwealth Brigade was again called upon to
cover the retreat of IX Corps.
The British 29th Infantry Brigade of the U.S. I
Corps was on the left flank of the U.S. 24th Infantry Division when
ordered to defend the areas east of Koyang on the Seoul Bridgehead Line.
There, it became involved in some the hardest fighting of the entire
battle. This was the 29th Infantry Brigade's first action of the Korean
War. The 1RUR covered the 29th Brigade's left flank, while the 1RNF was
stationed on the Brigade's right flank. The 1st Battalion,
Gloucestershire Regiment and the 1st Battalion, 21st Royal Thai Regiment
covered the 29th Brigade's rear and provided artillery support.
While the British 29th Infantry Brigade and the
PVA 149th Division fought at the east of Koyang, the U.S. 25th Infantry
Division of the U.S. I Corps started to withdraw on the left flank of
29th Infantry Brigade. The evacuation plan called for a coordinated
withdrawal between the U.S. 25th Infantry Division and the British 29th
Infantry Brigade in order to prevent the PVA from infiltrating the UN
rear areas. Unfortunately, heavy fighting soon made the coordination
between American and British units impossible.
Following the U.S. 25th Infantry Division’s
27th Infantry Regiment forming the rear guard for the U.S. I Corps, the
25th Infantry Division and the British 29th Infantry Brigade were
ordered to evacuate at 15:00 on January 3rd. The 25th Infantry Division
and the British 29th Infantry Brigade were ordered to evacuate at 15:00
on January 3rd. The 25th Infantry Division then retreated with few
difficulties. The British 29th Infantry Brigade’s withdrawal did not
start until that night at 21:30.
The PVA’s 149th Division next infiltrated the
UN rear areas via the road which was by now completely open between the
American rear guards and the British units. The PVA troops soon set up
an ambush against 1RUR and the Cooper Force of the 8th King's Royal
Irish Hussars. Once in place, the PVA soon attacked and overran them. In
the desperate hand-on-hand combat that followed, they were also able to
attack the Cromwell tanks of the Cooper Force with bundle grenades and
Bangalore torpedoes, setting several on fire.
Of the 1RUR troops under the command of Major
J.K.H. Shaw, 100 soldiers managed to escape the trap. Major J.K.H. Shaw
and Major Blake of 1RUR and Captain D. Astley-Cooper of the Cooper Force
were killed in action. Another 208 British soldiers went missing in
action most of these were captured by the PVA. The U.S. 27th Infantry
Regiment would later request and attempt a rescue of the trapped British
troops. Major-General Thomas Brodie of the British 29th Infantry
Brigade ordered a stop the rescue in order to prevent more unnecessary
losses.
On that same night of January 3rd, the U.S.
24th Infantry Division evacuated Seoul. The 27th Commonwealth Brigade
did not start to cross the Han River until the morning of January 4th,
and by 07:40 the entire U.S. IX Corps had left Seoul. When at 08:00 the
British 29th Infantry Brigade left Seoul, the U.S. 27th Infantry
Regiment became the last UN tactical unit that remained in the city. The
ROK government in Seoul which had been reduced to essential personnel
before the battle also left the city.
By that afternoon, the NKPA I Corps, the PVA
38th Corps, and the PVA 50th Corps entered Seoul. They were greeted by
an empty city in flames. Most of the civilians had either fled south
through the frozen Han River or evacuated to the nearby countryside. A
PVA platoon reached the Seoul City Hall at about 13:00 and raised the
DPRK flag of the North. After fighting several holding engagements at
the outskirts of Seoul, the U.S. 27th Infantry Regiment finally crossed
the Han River at 14:00.
Aftermath
Although the UN casualties were moderate during
the battle, the Third Battle of Seoul was a significant success for the
PVA military in Korea. With the loss of Seoul, the morale of the UN
forces was at its lowest point during the war. The new commander of the
U.S. 8th Army, General Matthew Ridgway, was extremely displeased with
its performance. Ridgway then took immediate steps to restore morale and
the fighting spirit of the UN forces in Korea.
In the aftermath of the Chinese attacks along
the 38th parallel, Ridgway worried that the PVA would exploit the
breakthrough at Chuncheon. His immediate concern was the encirclement of
his entire U.S. 8th Army. His larger worry was that the UN troops lacked
the ability to hold against the PVA offensive.
On January 5th, the PVA 42nd and 66th Corps
were relieved by the NKPA II and V Corps, and the NKPA launched a
separate offensive towards Wonju. PVA Commander Peng also ordered the
PVA 50th Corps and the NKPA I Corps to seize Gimpo and Inchŏn while
instructing all other units to rest on the northern bank of the Han
River. That day, Ridgway ordered the U.S. 8th Army to withdraw from the
Han River and to form a new defensive line, dubbed "Line D,"
at the 37th parallel between Pyeongtaek and Changhown. The Inchŏn
port and the Kimpo Airfield were then demolished to deny their use to
the PVA and NKPA forces.
Seferino C. Lucero
was born 1930 C.E. He was U.S. ARMY PFC and casualty of the Korean
War. He died in Korea on January 1, 1951 C.E. His home was in Santa
Fé, New Mexico.
New Mexico U.S. Military Fatal
Hispano Casualties of the Korean War
|
Name
|
Service
|
Rank
|
Birthdate (YYYYMMDD)
|
Home of Record:
|
City County
|
Incident or Death Date (YYYYMMDD)
|
Remains Recovered
|
Lucero
Seferino C
|
ARMY
|
PVT
|
19300000
|
Unknown
|
Santa
Fé
|
19510107
|
Y
|
Despite its earlier victory, the PVA had become
completely exhausted after fighting nonstop since the start of the
Chinese intervention. PVA Deputy Commander Han Xianchu reported to Peng
that although combat casualties had been light with only 8,500 battle
casualties, the poor logistics and the exhaustion had cost the
"backbone" of the PVA forces during the Third Phase Campaign.
Earlier, the UN’s U.S. Far East Air Forces' "Interdiction
Campaign No.4," had been launched on December 15, 1950 C.E. against
PVA and NKPA supply lines. It was now causing the Chinese to be unable
to sustain any further offensives southward.
On January 7th, PVA Commander General Peng
Dehuai was forced to halt the Third Phase Campaign due to troop
exhaustion and to prevent a repeat of the Inchŏn landing. Believing
that the UN forces in Korea were thoroughly demoralized and unable to
counterattack, Mao finally permitted the PVA to rest for at least two to
three months, while having Peng and other PVA commanders were planning
for one last decisive battle in the spring of 1951 C.E.
Previous to the Communist Chinese victory at
the Third Battle of Seoul, UN members had been divided on how to respond
to PRC intervention in Korea. With the PVA forces having captured Seoul,
the Chinese invasion of South Korea galvanized the UN's support for
South Korea. The idea of the evacuation of the Peninsula was soon
abandoned by the UNC. Also during this time, General MacArthur started
to regain confidence with Ridgway leading the U.S. 8th Army and in UN
forces' ability to hold Korea.
Aftermath
In the aftermath of the longest protracted
retreat from the Ch'ongch'on River of American military forces in U.S.
history, the pursuing PVA forces appeared to have lost a lot of its
troop strength and was suffering from a lack adequate logistical
support. With the Chinese PVA exhausted after months of nonstop fighting
since the start of the Chinese intervention, it allowed the UN forces to
regain the initiative in Korea. General Ridgway now began preparing a
general counterattack to the Han, Seoul, and then to the 38th Parallel.
First, however, he needed some idea of the PVA forces below the Han
River.
Ridgway’s intent was to inflict as many
casualties as possible on the PVA while sustaining as few as possible UN
casualties. All of this to make the PVA forces hesitate if they in fact
intend an immediate further advancement southward. Once that was
accomplished the 8th Army could stage for the counter-attack without
interference. In effect, these were the objectives for Operation
Thunderbolt. On January 25, 1951 C.E., Ridgway launched his
counterattack. Operation Thunderbolt was a complete surprise to the
Chinese commanders. Ridgway’s U.S. 8th Army was now on the move again.
With Northern PVA forces unsuccessful in their response, by the end of
January 1951 C.E., U.N. forces were back on the Han River and every
indication had then soon at the 38th parallel.
The PRC having rejected the UN ceasefire offer
earlier on December 23, 1950 C.E. had damaged their international
prestige which had been built upon its earlier military successes. Under
the UN’s current understanding of the overall military conditions
at-hand, UN members rallied toward the U.S. A UN resolution would later
be passed on February 1, 1951 C.E. condemning the PRC as an aggressor in
the Korean War. The bloody war would now drag on for another two years
due to the PRC’s demand for all UN forces to be withdrawn from the
Korean Peninsula. Later, this would make it difficult for the PRC to
either join the UN or to deny U.S. support for Taiwan.
Bennie Sisneros
was born on
December 29, 1928 C.E. He was U.S. NAVY SA and casualty of the Korean
War. He died in Korea on February 2, 1951 C.E. His home was in Albuquerque Bernalillo,
New Mexico.
New Mexico U.S. Military Fatal
Hispano Casualties of the Korean War
|
Name
|
Service
|
Rank
|
Birthdate (YYYYMMDD)
|
Home of Record:
|
City County
|
Incident or Death Date (YYYYMMDD)
|
Remains Recovered
|
Sisneros
Bennie
|
Navy
|
SA
|
19281229
|
Albuquerque
|
Bernalillo
|
19510202
|
N
|
Félix Martínez was born 1931 C.E.
He was U.S. ARMY Corporal and casualty of the Korean War. He died in
Korea on February 5, 1951 C.E. His home was in Bernalillo,
New Mexico.
New Mexico U.S. Military Fatal
Hispano Casualties of the Korean War
|
Name
|
Service
|
Rank
|
Birthdate (YYYYMMDD)
|
Home of Record:
|
City County
|
Incident or Death Date (YYYYMMDD)
|
Remains Recovered
|
Martínez
Félix
|
ARMY
|
CPL
|
19310000
|
Unknown
|
Bernalillo
|
19510205
|
Y
|
George E. Chávira
was born
1931 C.E. He was U.S. ARMY Corporal With the 19th
Infantry Regiment: Company E and a casualty of
the Korean War KIA. He died in Korea on February 6, 1951 C.E. His home
was in València,
New Mexico.
New Mexico U.S. Military Fatal
Hispano Casualties of the Korean War
|
Name
|
Service
|
Rank
|
Birthdate (YYYYMMDD)
|
Home of Record:
|
City County
|
Incident or Death Date (YYYYMMDD)
|
Remains Recovered
|
Chávira
George E
|
ARMY
|
CPL
|
19310000
|
Unknown
|
València
|
19510206
|
Y
|
Manuel J.
Martínez was born 1927 C.E. He was U.S. ARMY Corporal
and casualty of the Korean War. He died in Korea on February 12, 1951
C.E. His home was in Cháves,
New Mexico.
New Mexico U.S. Military Fatal
Hispano Casualties of the Korean War
|
Name
|
Service
|
Rank
|
Birthdate (YYYYMMDD)
|
Home of Record:
|
City County
|
Incident or Death Date (YYYYMMDD)
|
Remains Recovered
|
Martínez
Manuel J
|
ARMY
|
CPL
|
19270000
|
Unknown
|
Cháves
|
19510212
|
Y
|
Abie Lawrence Apodaca
was born
August 9, 1932 C.E. He was U.S. ARMY PFC and casualty of the Korean War.
He died in Korea on February 14, 1951 C.E. His home was in Bernalillo,
New Mexico.
New Mexico U.S. Military Fatal
Hispano Casualties of the Korean War
|
Name
|
Service
|
Rank
|
Birthdate (YYYYMMDD)
|
Home of Record:
|
City County
|
Incident or Death Date (YYYYMMDD)
|
Remains Recovered
|
Apodaca
Abie Lawrence
|
ARMY
|
PFC
|
19320809
|
Unknown
|
Bernalillo
|
19510214
|
N
|
Note: Defense POW/MIA Accounting Agency (DPAA)
Personnel Missing - Korea (PMKOR) (Reported for NEW MEXICO Accounted
For):
Total Accounted: 1
Remains ID Date Name Rank/Rate Location Branch
Date of Incident 9/3/2014
APODACA,
ABIE LAWERENCE Cpl SOUTH KOREA U.S. ARMY 2/14/1951
Juan María Barela was born 1926 C.E.
He was U.S. ARMY PFC and casualty of the Korean War. He died in Korea on
February 15, 1951 C.E. His
home was in Socorro,
New Mexico.
Alfred G.
Lucero Salgado was born 1932 C.E. He was U.S. ARMY PFC
and casualty of the Korean War. He died in Korea on February 15, 1951
C.E. His home was in Cháves,
New Mexico.
New Mexico U.S. Military Fatal
Hispano Casualties of the Korean War
|
Name
|
Service
|
Rank
|
Birthdate (YYYYMMDD)
|
Home of Record:
|
City County
|
Incident or Death Date (YYYYMMDD)
|
Remains Recovered
|
Barela
Juan María
|
ARMY
|
PFC
|
19260000
|
Unknown
|
Socorro
|
19510215
|
Y
|
Salgado
Lucero Alfred G
|
ARMY
|
PFC
|
19320000
|
Unknown
|
Cháves
|
19510215
|
Y
|
In response to the PRC rejection of the earlier
UN ceasefire offer, the UN had launched Operation Killer on February 18,
1951 C.E., an eight-day UN offensive to push PVA and NKPA forces north
of the Han River. It would be concluded on February 28th.
Alfonso González was born 1925 C.E.
He was U.S. ARMY PFC and casualty of the Korean War. He died in Korea on
March 2, 1951 C.E. His home was in Santa Fé,
New Mexico.
New Mexico U.S. Military Fatal
Hispano Casualties of the Korean War
|
Name
|
Service
|
Rank
|
Birthdate (YYYYMMDD)
|
Home of Record:
|
City County
|
Incident or Death Date (YYYYMMDD)
|
Remains Recovered
|
González
Alfonso
|
ARMY
|
PFC
|
19250000
|
Unknown
|
Santa
Fé
|
19510302
|
Y
|
Action
- 38th Parallel
General Ridgway’s gains of Operation Killer
which had ended earlier on February 28th, and Operation Ripper which
began on March 6, 1951 C.E. had been taken notice of in Washington D.C.
These successful U.S. geographic advances were influencing decisions in
Washington regarding which operations should be undertaken above the
38th Parallel. Washington’s politicians were also aware that there was
evidence that the NKPA were in the process of building offensive
preparations. Officials in the Departments of State and Defense believed
that Ridgway's recent successes might have convinced the PVA and NKPA
that they could not win a military victory. If this was the case, The
PRC and DPRK might agree to negotiate an end to hostilities. These
issues assumed new importance as a political question.
As Ridgway was about to open Operation
Courageous, the decision centered on how and when to approach the
desired Korean cease-fire. The current consensus in Washington was that
the PRC and DPRK would be more inclined to agree to a cease-fire if the
fighting could be ended in the vicinity of the 38th Parallel where the
war had begun and under conditions which restored the pre-war borders.
The UNC had no immediate intention of
forbidding all ground actions above the parallel. In the U.S., there was
some question in the mind of Secretary of State Dean Acheson and among
many members of the UN as to whether the U.S. 8th Army should make a
general advance into North Korea.
On the advice of these officials, President
Harry S. Truman planned to make a public statement suggesting the UN's
willingness to end the fighting. The statement was carefully worded to
avoid a threatening tone and so to encourage a favorable reply. Truman
intended to deliver the appeal as soon as his statement had been
approved by officials of all nations that had contributed forces to the
U.N. Command. On the advice of these officials, President Harry S.
Truman planned to make a public statement suggesting the UN's
willingness to end the fighting. The statement was carefully worded to
avoid a threatening tone and so to encourage a favorable reply. Truman
intended to deliver the appeal as soon as his statement had been
approved by officials of all nations that had contributed forces to the
U.N. Command.
In addition, there was the importance that the
timing of the presidential announcement of the UN's willingness to end
the fighting also be tied to the fact that General Ridgway's forces were
fast approaching the 38th Parallel.
The
Fourth Battle of Seoul
The Fourth Battle of Seoul, or UN Operation
Ripper, was a UN military operation conceived by the commander U.S. 8th
Army, General Matthew Ridgway. It had been launched earlier on March 6,
1951 C.E. The operation was intended to destroy PVA and the NKPA forces
around Seoul and the towns of Hongch'on, 50 miles east of Seoul, and
Chuncheon, 15 miles further south. The operation was also aimed at
bringing UN troops up to the 38th parallel. The UN Operation involving
the U.S. I Corps and IX Corps on the west near Seoul and Hoengsong and
U.S. X Corps and ROKA III Corps in the east was to reach "Line
Idaho." This was an arc with its apex just south of the 38th
Parallel in South Korea. Operation Ripper was to be preceded by the
largest artillery bombardment of the Korean War.
Arturo Vigil was born 1929 C.E.
He was U.S. ARMY PFC with the 19th Infantry
Regiment Company K and casualty of the Korean War KIA. He died in
Korea on March 10, 1951 C.E. His home was in San Miguel,
New Mexico.
New Mexico U.S. Military Fatal
Hispano Casualties of the Korean War
|
Name
|
Service
|
Rank
|
Birthdate (YYYYMMDD)
|
Home of Record:
|
City County
|
Incident or Death Date (YYYYMMDD)
|
Remains Recovered
|
Vigil
Arturo
|
ARMY
|
PFC
|
19290000
|
Unknown
|
San
Miguel
|
19510310
|
Y
|
During the Fourth Battle of Seoul, the U.S.
25th Infantry Division quickly crossed the Han and established a
bridgehead. Further to the east, IX Corps reached its “first phase
line” on March 11th. Three days later, the advance would proceed to
the next phase line.
In the greater world, on March 13, 1951 C.E. the
State of Israel demanded $1.5 billion in German war reparations to help
pay for the post-Holocaust refugee crisis. The Reparations
Agreement between Israel and the Federal Republic of Germany, or the
Wiedergutmachung Agreement, was signed on September 10, 1952 C.E. It
would later be entered in force on March 27, 1953 C.E. According to
the Agreement, West Germany was to pay Israel for
the costs of "resettling so great a number of uprooted and
destitute Jewish refugees" after the war. It was also to compensate
individual Jews, via the Conference on Jewish Material Claims
Against Germany, for losses in Jewish livelihood and property resulting
from Nazi persecution.
Action
- UN liberation of Seoul
During the night of March 14th-15th, elements
of the ROKA 1st Infantry Division and the U.S. 3rd Infantry Division
liberated Seoul. The PVA and NKPA forces were compelled to abandon it
when the UN approach to the east of the city threatened them with
encirclement. Following the recapture of Seoul, the PVA and NKPA forces
retreated northward, conducting skillful delaying actions that utilized
the rugged, muddy terrain to maximum advantage, particularly in the
mountainous U.S. X Corps sector.
This would mark the fourth and last time the
capital changed hands since June 1950 C.E. The ROK’s capital city had
been devastated by fighting. Its population was reduced to a fraction of
its prewar size. During this time, conditions in all of Korea were
desperate. Every city in both North and South Korea were in crisis.
Koreans had frantically fled their homes in search for refugee camps,
safety, shelter, and food. Chaos now existed in Seoul.
Even with such obstacles, Operation Ripper
pressed on throughout March. In the mountainous central region, the U.S.
IX and U.S. X Corps pushed forward methodically. The IX Corps found
itself up against light opposition. The X Corps, however, faced staunch
enemy defenses. As the U.N. troops trudged forward, they were subjected
to continually descending sharp slopes or ascending steep heights in
order to attack enemy positions. In some cases, these positions were
located above the clouds. Despite these harsh and inhospitable
conditions, UN forces had advanced north an average of 30 miles from
their start lines.
Action
- UN liberation of Seoul
On March 15th, Hongch'on was taken by UN
forces. Three days later on March 18th, General Ridgway issued an order
to have the U.S. X Corps, the ROKA III, and U.S. I Corps to reconnoiter
the areas between Hwach'on Reservoir on the northern border, and on the
east coast along the UN Army’s front.
As President Truman looked for a way to prevent
a wider war with the PRC, MacArthur did much to provoke it. He would
soon be sending a letter to Republican Congressman Joséph William
Martin, Jr. of Massachusetts, the-minority leader in the U.S. House of
Representatives on March 20, 1951 C.E. Martin shared MacArthur’s
support for declaring all-out war on China–and who could be counted
upon to leak the letter to the press. “There is,” MacArthur wrote,
“no substitute for victory” against international communism.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff notified General
MacArthur of the President's plan of a presidential announcement of the
UN's willingness to end the fighting via a message radioed from
Washington on March 20th. They informed him of the prevalent feeling in
the UN that the UNC should make no major advance above the 38th Parallel
before the presidential appeal was delivered and the reactions to it
determined. They also asked for his recommendations on how much freedom
of ground action UN forces should have in the vicinity of the parallel
during the diplomatic effort to provide for their security and to allow
them to maintain contact with the NKPA. MacArthur had been pressing
Washington for decisions favoring a military, not a diplomatic, solution
to the war.
March 20, 1951 C.E., on the Korean front there
were genuine differences of opinion between General MacArthur and the
President Truman’s administration over policy. One was MacArthur's
deep-seated belief that it was not possible to separate the struggle
against Communism in Europe from that going on in Asia. This was seen as
the result of being stationed for too many years in the Orient, and of
his perspective as a theater commander responsible only for part of the
Far East.
Another important policy difference was
MacArthur's belief that China was not, as Acheson maintained, "the
USSR's largest and most important satellite," but an
independent state with its own agenda that, in MacArthur's words,
"for its own purposes is (just temporarily) allied with Soviet
Russia." If MacArthur's thesis was accepted, then it followed
that expanding the war with the PRC would not provoke a conflict with
the USSR. The Joint Chiefs emphatically disagreed, although this
contradicted their position that it was Europe and not Asia that was the
prime concern of the USSR. Even among Republicans, there was little
support for MacArthur's position.
Shortly before he received the Joint Chiefs'
message MacArthur expressed his views in a letter to Republican
Congressman Joséph William Martin, Jr. of Massachusetts, the minority
leader in the U.S. House of Representatives. The congressman earlier had
written MacArthur asking for comment on Martin's thesis that Nationalist
Chinese forces "might be employed in the opening of a second
Asiatic front to relieve the pressure on our forces in Korea."
General MacArthur replied that his own view followed "the
conventional pattern of meeting force with maximum counterforce",
that Martin's suggestion on the use of Chiang Kai-shek's forces was in
consonance with this pattern, and that there was "no substitute for
victory."
Letter from Douglas MacArthur to Joséph W.
Martin (Tokyo, 20 March 1951 C.E.)
General Headquarters,
Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers,
Tokyo, Japan, March 20, 1951 C.E.
Hon. Joséph W. Martin, Jr.,
House of Representatives, Washington, D.C.
Dear Congressman Martin:
I am most grateful for your note of the 8th
forwarding me a copy of your address of February 12. The latter I have
read with much interest, and find that with the passage of years you
have certainly lost none of your old-time punch. My views and
recommendations with respect to the situation created by Red China’s
entry into war against us in Korea have been submitted to Washington in
most complete detail. Generally these views are well known and clearly
understood, as they follow the conventional pattern of meeting force
with maximum counterforce, as we have never failed to do in the past.
Your view with respect to the utilization of the Chinese forces on
Formosa is in conflict with neither logic nor this tradition. It seems
strangely difficult for some to realize that here in Asia is where the
Communist conspirators have elected to make their play for global
conquest, and that we have joined the issue thus raised on the
battlefield; that here we fight Europe’s war with arms while the
diplomatic there still fight it with words; that if we lose the war to
communism in Asia the fall of Europe is inevitable, win it and Europe
most probably would avoid war and yet preserve freedom. As you pointed
out, we must win. There is no substitute for victory. With renewed
thanks and expressions of most cordial regard, I am Faithfully yours,
Although MacArthur had been denied the
decisions that in his judgment favored a military solution, he
nevertheless wanted no further restrictions placed on the operations of
his command. In so advising the Joint Chiefs on March 21st, he pointed
out, as he had some time earlier, that under current conditions any
appreciable UN effort to clear North Korea already was out of the
question.
Action
- Operation Courageous
Operation Courageous a U.S. Army military
operation designed to trap large numbers of PVA and NKPA troops between
the Han and Imjin Rivers north of Seoul, opposite the ROKA I Corps. The
intent of the Operation was for U.S. I Corps, which was composed of the
U.S. 25th and 3rd Infantry Divisions and the ROKA 1st Infantry Division,
to advance quickly on the NKPA and PVA troops and reach the Imjin River
with all possible speed.
Action
- Maneuvering
As a first step in the attempt to block and
attack the NKPA I Corps, General Matthew Ridgway on March 21, 1951 C.E.,
ordered his own U.S. I Corps to move forward to Line Cairo, which he
extended southwestward across U.S. General Lincoln Milburn's zone
through Uijongbu on the Han River. At points generally along this line
six to ten miles to the north, General Milburn's patrols had made some
contact with the NKPA I Corps west of Uijongbu and the PVA 26th Army to
the east. As of that day, General Ridgway had not yet given the final
green light to the airborne landing Operation Tomahawk. This resulted in
General Milburn having to wait. Milburn was to occupy Line Cairo on
March 22nd, a day ahead of the airborne landing at Munsan-ni. There, he
was to wait for Ridgway's further order to continue north.
Action
- UN liberation of Seoul
Chuncheon, a major PVA and NKPA supply hub was
empty by the time UN forces finally occupied it. It was secured by March
the 22nd. The capture of Chuncheon was the last major ground objective
of Operation Ripper which was to end on April 4, 1951 C.E.
Action
- 38th Parallel
While awaiting a response from the Joint Chiefs
regarding his not wanting any further restrictions placed on the
operations of his command, MacArthur informed General Ridgway of the new
development on March 22nd.
MacArthur expected the Joint Chiefs’ response
from Washington to be a new directive for ground operations, possibly
one forbidding entry into North Korea in strength. In the meantime, it
was his intent to allow the U.S. 8th Army to advance north of the
Parallel as far as logistics could support major operations. The only
restriction was Ridgway’s obtaining MacArthur's specific authorization
before moving above the parallel in force.
Ridgway acknowledging these conditions and
notified General MacArthur that he currently was developing plans for an
advance that would carry U.S. 8th Army forces ten to twenty miles above
the Parallel. This was to be to a general line following the upstream
trace of the Yesong River as far as Sibyon-ni in the west, falling off
gently southeastward to the Hwach'on Reservoir, then running east to the
coast. As in past and current operations, the objective would be the
destruction of enemy troops and materiel. MacArthur approved Ridgway's
concept but also scheduled a visit to Korea for March 24th, when he
would have an opportunity to discuss the plans in more detail.
Action
- Operation Courageous
As of March 22nd, Operation Tomahawk could only
take place if General Ridgway received assurances that weather
conditions on March 23rd would favor a parachute drop, and that ground
troops could link up with the airborne force within twenty-four hours.
Operation Tomahawk was a critical part of Operation Courageous which
designed to trap large numbers of Chinese PVA and NKPA forces between
the Han and Imjin Rivers north of Seoul, opposite the ROKA I Corps. The
intent of the Operation was for I Corps, which was composed of the U.S.
25th Division and 3rd IDs and the ROKA 1st Division, to advance quickly
on the PVA and NKPA positions and reach the Imjin River with all
possible speed.
The three divisions of the I Corps finally
started toward Line Cairo at 08:00 on March 22nd.
The ROKA 1st Division, advancing astride Route
1 in the west, overcame very light resistance and had troops on the
phase line by noon. The ROKA 3rd Division astride Route 3 in the center
and the U.S. 25th Division on the right also met sporadic opposition but
moved slowly and ended the day considerably short of the line.
Meanwhile, General Milburn assembled an armored
task force in Seoul for a drive up Route 1 to make the initial contact
with the 187th Airborne Regimental Combat Team, if and after it dropped
on Munsan-ni. Building the force around the 6th Medium Tank Battalion,
which was borrowed from the 24th Division of the IX Corps, he added the
2nd Battalion, 7th Infantry Regiment; all but one battery of the 58th
Armored Field Artillery Battalion from the 3rd Division; and from corps
troops he supplied a battery of the 999th Armored Field Artillery
Battalion and Company A, 14th Engineer Combat Battalion. He also
included two bridgelaying Churchill tanks from the British 29th Brigade,
which had recently been attached to the I Corps. Lieutenant-Colonel John
S. Growdon, commander of the 6th Medium Tank Battalion, was to lead the
task force.
Action
- Operation Courageous
Ridgway made the final decision on the airborne
operation late in the afternoon of March 22nd during a conference at
U.S. 8th Army main headquarters in Taegu. The Fifth Air Force commander
assured him that the weather would be satisfactory on the next day. The
new U.S. 8th Army G-3 predicted that contact with the airborne unit
could be made within a day's time, as Ridgway required. He also believed
that the entire I Corps could be able to advance rapidly. Given these
reports, General Ridgway ordered the airborne landing to take place at
09:00 on the following day.
On hearing the final word on the Munsan-ni
drop, General Milburn directed Task Force Growdon to pass through the
ROKA 1st Division on Line Cairo early on March 23rd and proceed via
Route 1 to reach the airborne troops, while his three divisions were to
resume their advance with the objective of reaching line Aspen. The ROKA
1st Division, which would be following Task Force Growdon, was to
relieve the 187th Airborne Regimental Combat Team upon reaching
Munsan-ni, and the airborne unit then was to prepare to move south and
revert to U.S. 8th Army reserve.
Action
- Operation Tomahawk
Operation Tomahawk was a critical part of
Operation Courageous. The Operation was finally launched on March 23,
1951 C.E. The airborne military operation was designed to drop the 187th
Regimental Combat Team (RCT) with the 2nd and 4th Ranger Companies at
Munsan-ni, about 19 miles north of the then current front line.
They did so, parachuting from One hundred twenty C-119 and C-46 Flying
Boxcar transport aircraft near Munsan-ni in the second largest airborne
operation of the war. The 187th Regimental Combat Team’s 3,437
paratroopers and 12 officers and men of the 60th Indian Parachute Field
Ambulance landed with suffering only 4 fatalities, 3 KIA and 1 in an
accident.
At 10:00, the artillery was heavy dropped. In
the brief interval between the drops of the 1st and 2nd Battalions,
General Ridgway arrived by L-19, landing on a road between Munsan-ni and
the northern drop zone. En route, he had flown over Task Force Growdon
then held up at Sinwon-ni, a fact he passed to General Bowen.
Shortly after 10:00, Ridgway saw a single stick
of paratroops jump from a plane over the lower drop zone. The
replacement plane carrying the 1st Battalion commander and party had
finally reached Munsan-ni, and its passengers had jumped in the correct
zone not knowing that they would be the only troops in the area.
To the north, resistance from a few small
groups of NKPA in and immediately around the drop zone was minor and
sporadic. It amounted to a limited amount of fire from mortars located
somewhere to the north. The 1st Battalion's misdirected drop caused
overcrowding and was complicated the 3rd Battalion's assembly. The units
soon sorted themselves out and secured the borders of the drop zone. The
2nd Battalion proceeded to occupy heights northeast of the drop zone
against moderate but scattered opposition. The 1st Battalion, less
Company B, moved into the areas to the north and northwest, clearing
Munsan-ni itself in the process.
Action
- Operation Ripper Linkup
Operation Ripper, also known as the Fourth
Battle of Seoul, had been in progress since being launched on March
6, 1951 C.E. By March 23rd, General Ridgway had lengthened Line Benton
eastward through the U.S. 1st Cavalry Division's patrol base at
Ch'unch'on and as far as the 1st U.S. Marine Division's zone on the IX
Corps right, where it joined the last few miles of Line Cairo.
General Milburn was to establish physical
contact with the187th Airborne Regimental Combat Team and the 2nd and
4th Ranger Companies and assume control of the airborne force once it
was on the ground. The Airborne forces were to block Route 1 in the
Munsan-ni area. At the same time, Milburn was to open a general corps
advance toward Line Aspen, which traced the lower bank of the Imjin
River west and north of Munsan-ni, then sloped eastward across the corps
zone to cut Routes 33 and 3 eight miles north of Uijongbu. Once on
Aspen, Milburn was to expect General Ridgway's order to continue to Line
Benton. This was the final Operation Courageous objective line, located
some ten miles farther north. When reaching Line Benton the U.S. I Corps
would be in place at the 38th Parallel. In the west, the final line fell
off to the southwest along the Imjin.
Next, U.S. I. Corps was ordered to move to Line
Benton by General Ridgway. General William M. Hoge was to send his
western forces there to protect the U.S. I Corps’ exposed east flank.
When Hoge’s forces reached Line Benton, General Ridgway extended its
line southeastward virtually into the U.S. IX Corps zone. IX Corps was
then across the front of the 24th Division and about halfway across the
front of the ROKA 6th Division, to a juncture with Line Cairo.
Meanwhile, in coordination with General Milburn's drive to lines Cairo
and Aspen, General Hoge was to complete the occupation of his sector of
Line Cairo.
Elsewhere along the UN Army’s Front, as of
yet, neither General Almond's patrols nor those of the ROKA corps had
moved very deeply into North Korean territory. The U.S. X Corps and I
Corps, and ROKA III remained under General Ridgway's March 18th orders
to reconnoiter the area between the Hwach'on Reservoir and the east
coast.
Action
- First attack
The 5th Regimental Combat Team prepared to
launch an offensive against the PVA forces in their M4A3E8 Sherman tanks
which they had painted with a tiger scheme as a psychological effort to
undermine PVA morale. The UN force was to advance along the Han River
area, Korea.
Task Force Growdon, which was completely
motorized, passed through the ROKA 1st Division shortly after 07:00.
There had been no PVA forces opposing the armored column as it moved
ahead of the South Koreans. Within minutes, the third tank in column hit
a mine while bypassing a destroyed bridge at the small Changnung River.
The Task Force was held up while engineers removed a dozen other mines
from the bypass. It now proceeded slowly from that point with a mine
detector team leading the way. Colonel Growdon's column had moved only a
mile to the village of Sinwon-ni before it encountered more mines.
That day, Major-General Robert H.
"Shorty" Soule's forces would occupy the area of Uijongbu with
some difficulty. The 3rd Division came up against unusually strong PVA
positions. The first unit to enter the town was Task Force Hawkins. It
had been built around the bulk of the 64th Tank Battalion and two
platoons of tanks, one from each the 15th and 65th Infantry Regiments.
They reached Uijongbu about 09:00 and found it undefended. The Task
Force then reconnoitered on Route 33 northward for several miles before
returning to the division position. The Task Force made no contact with
the enemy, but mines disabled two tanks.
Company B went on a rescue mission to the
southern drop zone area to Hill 216 which overlooked the drop zone from
the northwest after the command group of the 1st Battalion came under
fire there. Company B soon forced PVA troops off the hill, allowing its
survivors to withdraw to the southwest, and reach the drop zone by
15:00. The rescue force and the battalion command group arrived at the
regimental position to the north about two hours later. By that time
Bowen's forces had secured all assigned objectives.
The point of Task Force Growdon’s column
reached Munsan-ni at 18:30 on March 23rd. The remainder of the extended
Task Force column would take several hours longer. These were made up of
armored elements from the U.S. 24th Infantry Division's 6th Medium Tank
Battalion and infantry elements from the U.S. 3rd Infantry Division.
The Task Force had encountered no PVA positions
along Route 1. Their progress had been kept to an intermittent crawl due
to having to lift or explode over 150 live mines. Some of had been
booby-trapped, and others were dummy mines. Casualties were few, but
four tanks were disabled by mines. As the last of these tanks hit a mine
a mile below Munsan-ni, the explosion attracted enemy artillery fire
which damaged two more.
When the 187th Regimental Combat Team (RCT)
with the 2nd and 4th Ranger Companies linked up with Task Force Growdon
the forces then advanced toward their goal, met with only weak
resistance, and minefields. By the time they arrived, the PVA and NKPA
had already retreated.
It now appeared that the 3rd Division could
continue to move forward with relative ease. But Major-General Soule's
forces came under heavy fire when they resumed their attack on the
morning of March 24th. The PVA forces had organized strong positions in
Hill 468 rising three miles northwest of Uijongbu and Hill 337 about a
mile north and slightly east of town. From these positions they were in
fair condition to block advance on the Route 33 axis to the north and
over Route 3 leading out of Uijongbu to the northeast. On the 3rd's
right, the 15th Infantry eventually managed to clear Hill 337 on the
24th, but the 65th Infantry on the left failed in an all-day attempt to
force the Chinese from the Hill 468.
General Milburn viewed the situation at corps
center as an opportunity to trap and destroy the PVA forces holding up
the 3rd Division. After General Soule's forces encountered the strong
PVA positions on the morning of March 24th, Milburn had ordered General
Bowen commander of the 1st Battalion of the 187th to pull in his patrols
and prepare the 187th Airborne Regimental Combat Team for an eastward
attack on the Route 2Y axis. The objective was high ground abutting
Route 33 about ten miles north of Uijongbu, just above the trace of line
Aspen. From this position Bowen was to prevent the PVA forces in front
of the 3rd Division from withdrawing over Route 33. The 3rd Division was
to continue its northward attack in the meantime and eventually drive
the PVA forces against Bowen's position.
The tail of Task Force Growdon finally arrived
at the airborne position at 07:00 on March 24th.
General Milburn's orders to the 187th for
operations on that day called only for patrolling. Having been given
control of Task Force Growdon by Milburn, General Bowen built his
principal patrols around Task Force Growdon's tanks and sent them to
investigate ferry sites on the Imjin and to check Route 2Y, an earthen
road running east from Munsan-ni, as far as the village of Sinch'ŏn,
ten miles away. One patrol made contact while checking an Imjin ferry
site and ford ten miles northeast of Munsan-ni. Six PVA were killed and
twenty-two captured. The patrol suffered no casualties, but a tank had
to be destroyed after it got bogged down at a stream crossing while
approaching the lmjin. A few rounds of artillery fire meanwhile fell in
the northern drop zone but caused no casualties.
The ROKA 1st Division had advanced steadily
toward Munsan-ni without enemy contact. Early on March 24th, Task Force
Boone, a division armored column stepped ahead of the ROKA 1st Division.
It consisted of Company C, 64th Tank Battalion on loan to General Paik
Sun-yup from the 3rd Division. It also had Paik's tank destroyer
battalion which had been organized as an infantry unit, and two of his
engineer platoons.
By day's end the remainder of the Major-General
Soule's division occupied a line extending from positions athwart Route
1 about three miles below Munsan-ni northeastward to Pobwon-ni, a
village on lateral Route 2Y six miles east of Munsan-ni area.
At 17:00 General Paik relieved General Frank S.
Bowen, commander of the 1st Battalion of the 187th of responsibility for
the Munsan-ni area. He then placed Task Force Boone which had reached
the 187th Airborne Regimental Combat Team at midmorning, in position
just above the town.
The lack of resistance to the wider sweep of
the ROKA 1st Division's advance confirmed that the bid to block and
attack the NKPA I Corps had been futile. To the east, the fact that the
PVA 26th Army still had forces deployed to delay the advance of the 3rd
and 25th Divisions had become equally clear. The U.S. 25th Division
located on the U.S. I Corps’ right had run into a large number of
minefields and small but well entrenched PVA groups employing small
arms, machine gun, and mortar fire.
General Bowen commander of the 1st Battalion of
the 187th started east at 18:00, intending to march as far as Sinch’ŏn
during the night and open his attack the following morning. Company C of
Task Force Growdon, was the only unit of the 6th Tank Battalion able to
move at 18:00. All other companies of the battalion had too little fuel
after patrolling and were to catch up with Bowen's column after being
resupplied from Seoul. By now, Task Force Growdon was also short the 2nd
Battalion, 7th Infantry, which had been sent back to the 3rd Division.
General Bowen’s force shaped around the tanks
of Company C led the way toward Sinch’ŏn. After making seven
miles, Bowen's column moved through a system of ridges. Landslides twice
trapped the leading tanks. In the second instance, no bypass could be
found. As engineers tried to open the road, rain began to fall and
became steadily heavier. As the heavy rains made the poor road even
worse, General Bowen ordered the tanks back to Munsan-ni.
At nightfall on March 24th, Assistant
Commanding General Joséph F. Bradley's 2nd Infantry Division forces
held positions almost due west of Uijongbu in the 3rd Division's zone at
corps center.
Aftermath
At this juncture, PVA casualties counted on the
field included 136 dead and 149 taken captive. Estimated losses of PVA
and NKPA forces killed and wounded during the month raised the total
considerably higher. Some 4,800 PVA and NKPA had been captured.
Nevertheless, the results in terms of troops and supplies destroyed were
considerably less than anticipated.
During prisoner interrogations it was concluded
that the majority of the remainder of the NKPA I Corps had apparently
withdrawn above the Imjin well before the airborne landing. As for the
NKPA forces who had been in the area, these were from the 36th Regiment
of the NKPA 19th Division and had numbered between three hundred and
five hundred.
UN Battle casualties among the airborne troops
were light, totaling 19. Jump casualties were higher at 84, but almost
half of these returned to duty immediately after treatment.
General
MacArthur’s winning of a Political Battle, But Losing the Political
War.
Elsewhere, while his troops were battling on
the ground, General MacArthur was creating a fight of his own. MacArthur
had belittled the PRC's military power, noting in particular that PVA
forces could not win in Korea. He also made statements that could be,
and were, interpreted as threatening that the UN would decide to attack
China if hostilities continued. These remarks prompted other governments
to ask whether there had been a change in U.S. policy. In President
Truman's judgment, MacArthur’s comments had so contradicted the tone
of his own planned statement that he decided not to issue it for fear of
creating more international confusion.
MacArthur had also issued a communique before
leaving Tokyo, in which he offered to confer with his enemy counterpart
on arranging a cease-fire. He specified that he was making the offer
"within the area of my authority as the military commander"
and that he would be in search of "any military means" for
achieving the desired result. He thus kept the bid within the military
sphere.
MacArthur's call for victory in Korea
thoroughly angered the President. It was, he wrote a few days later,
"not just a public disagreement over policy, but deliberate,
premeditated sabotage of U.S. and UN policy." Importantly,
MacArthur had not cleared his communique with Washington as the
President's directive of December 1950 C.E. required for all releases
touching on national policy. Truman considered MacArthur's violation of
this directive as "open defiance of my orders as President and as
Commander in Chief." His immediate action was to order the Joint
Chiefs of Staff to send MacArthur a reminder of that December directive.
Included in the President’s requested
reminder sent by the Joint Chiefs on March 24th were orders that
MacArthur report to them for instructions should his enemy counterpart
respond to his offer and "request an armistice in the field."
No such response was expected, however, and since Truman had canceled
his own cease-fire initiative, operations in strength above the 38th
Parallel again had become a tactical question for General MacArthur and
General Ridgway to answer. MacArthur, in fact, publicly revealed his
answer before he really knew that the diplomatic effort to achieve a
cease-fire had been canceled.
Late on March 24th, MacArthur returned to Tokyo
following his conference with Ridgway and a visit to the Korean Front.
He immediately announced that he had directed the U.S. 8th Army to cross
the Parallel "if and when its security makes it tactically
advisable.” More specifically than that, MacArthur had actually
approved Ridgway's concept of a general advance as deep as twenty miles
into North Korea. This was not simply a military act, it was political!
Privately, the President had now decided that MacArthur had to go!
MacArthur’s
Orders and the 38th Parallel
In Korea, during the day of March 24th, General
Ridgway extended Line Cairo from its original terminus in the U.S.
Marine zone. It now stretched northeastward across the remainder of the
U.S. Army front to the town of Chosan-ni on the east coast. The final
objective line of Operation Ripper had now become a combination of the
Benton and Cairo Lines. It followed the upstream trace of the Imjin
virtually to the 38th Parallel in the west, but just a few miles below
the Parallel for almost all of its remaining length to the east. It then
rose to an east coast anchor some eight miles above the parallel.
General Ridgway's forces having achieved the adjusted line, encountered
no more than the sporadic delaying action.
Aftermath
To clarify, since March 7th, the U.S. 8th
Army’s forces had made impressive territorial gains. They had
recaptured the ROK capital and moved between twenty-five and thirty
miles north to reach the 38th Parallel. Unfortunately for the UNC, the
PVA high command had been, and still was, marshalling its main forces
beyond the reach of UN forces. Also obvious, was that only UN advances
above the 38th parallel north would make possible an attack on the
PAV’s main forces.
UN
Forces North of the 38th Parallel
The following day of March 25th back in Korea,
General Bowen’s remaining forces proceeded to Sinch’ŏn after
the engineers had cleared the road sufficiently. Sinch'ŏn County is
in South Hwanghae province, North Korea. Sinch'ŏn is bordered to
the north by Anak, to the west by Samch'ŏn and T'aet'an, to the
south by Pyŏksŏng and Sinwŏn, and to the east by Chaeryŏng.
They arrived there at about 06:00. A half-hour
later, Bowen ordered the 2nd Battalion, with the 3rd Battalion following
in support, to seize Hill 228 rising on the west side of Route 33. The
units soon ran into small arms, machine gun, and mortar fire from
positions on several nearer hills. They were also being hampered by a
continuing driving rain. By day's end, the two battalions were some two
miles short of Hill 228. Route 33 remained available to the PVA forces
in front of the 3rd Division if they chose to withdraw over it.
Withdrawal seemed to be the PVA intention.
The next day on March 26th, the U.S. 3rd
Division resumed its attack from the south and advanced two miles beyond
the hills where strong PVA positions had delayed it the day before.
There, it met only light resistance. Meanwhile, the tank company of the
65th Infantry moved ahead on Route 3X, a secondary road angling
northwest off Route 33 to Sinch’ŏn. As they did, mines along the
road disabled four tanks and kept the company from reaching its
destination. Fortunately, it encountered no enemy positions. All of this
was in an attempt to contact the 187th Airborne RCT.
That same day, the withdrawal of the PVA
delaying forces was confirmed when the 3rd Division as well the 25th
Division could move forward against little or no opposition. To the
north, however, the PVA continued to oppose the efforts of the 187th
Airborne RCT to capture Hill 228. During the afternoon of March 26th,
two tank columns from the U.S. 3rd Division joined Bowen's forces using
Route 33 and a lesser road to the west. Late that day, it became obvious
that the PVA were backing away from the 3rd and 25th Divisions.
Next, General Ridgway ordered his U.S. I. Corps
and IX. Corps to Line Benton. It was originally conceived by the
General, that the advance by the U.S. IX. Corps to Line Benton was to be
limited to General Hoge's western forces. It was intended simply to
protect the U.S. I. Corps' right flank. But Ridgway had since modified
his plan of operations, widening the advance to include the entire U.S.
IX Corps and all other forces to the east.
Action
- Operations Rugged and Dauntless
General Ridgway assembled corps and division
commanders for a meeting at his Yoju headquarters on March 27th. This he
did in advance of issuing more orders for attacks above the 38th
Parallel. He discussed the courses of action that were now open to them
or that they might be obliged to follow. He informed them that the
possibility of Soviet intervention was had once again been raised.
According to a reputable foreign source, the USSR planned to launch a
large scale offensive in Korea near the end of April employing Soviet
regulars of Mongolian extraction under the guise of volunteers. Ridgway
doubted the accuracy of the report.
As a matter of prudence, however, since the
U.S. 8th Army might be ordered out of Korea in the event of Soviet
intervention, he intended to pass the evacuation plan as outlined in
January by the U.S. 8th Army staff to corps commanders for further
development. To ensure that U.S. 8th Army forces not start "looking
over the shoulder," no word of the course of action or preparations
for it was to go beyond those assigned to work on the plan.
Here, he advised that future governmental
decisions might compel the U.S. 8th Army to adopt a static defense.
These being immobile would operate only in a certain key areas and be
fortified positions which could not be easily abandoned without serious
consequences to UN forces. He also warned that UN forces might have to
engage a numerically superior enemy which might not be similarly
inhibited in the choice of tactics. This could mean defending from the
rush or pressure by these forces. Because of the inherent rigidity of
these static defenses, it would require strong leadership. Also, due to
the common tactics employed by the enemy to bypass these static defenses
which includes airborne drops and other means, imaginative tactical
thinking would be needed by the U.S. commanders who would have to deal
with PVA and NKPA units getting to UN targets without being attacked.
There was also the possibility of the enemy simply attacking UN targets
with specific offensive units that technically out-range them.
Ridgway told those gathered that he agreed with
General MacArthur's earlier prediction that a stalemate would ultimately
develop on the battlefront. He also explained that he did not know just
how far the U.S. 8th Army would drive into North Korea before the
stalemate occurred. The assembled commanders were informed that at the
moment, how far the U.S. 8th Army would drive into North Korea could not
be accurately assessed. In essence, the U.S. 8th Army would continue to
move forward and in the next advance would cross the 38th Parallel. In
short, these U.S. commanders were being prepared for the worst of
circumstances which might befall them and their troops.
Since his meeting with MacArthur on March 24th,
Ridgway had revised his concept for advancing above the parallel. His
originally intent was to direct a strong attack northwestward across the
Imjin, expecting that in moving as far as the Yesong River the attack
force would find the elusive NKPA I Corps. Later, his Intelligence staff
would discover that the bulk of the NKPA corps had withdrawn behind the
Yesong. Intelligence had also warned that the attack force would be
vulnerable to envelopment by a fresh PVA unit located off the right
flank of the advance. The unit which Intelligence had not yet fully
identified was the PVA XIX Army Group. As a result, Ridgway elected to
limit operations northwest of the Imjin to only reconnaissance and
combat patrols.
Preparation
for Operation Rugged
He planned his main attack toward the centrally
located major road and rail complex named the Iron Triangle of the towns
of P’yongyang in the north and Ch'orwon and Gimhwa-eup in the south.
It lay twenty to thirty miles above the 38th Parallel in the diagonal
corridor dividing the Taebaek Mountains into northern and southern
ranges between the port of Wonsan in the northeast and Seoul in the
southwest. Other routes emanating from the triangle of towns connected
with P'yongyang to the northwest and with the western and eastern halves
of the present front. The complex was obviously important to the ability
of the communist high command for its unique center of communications,
to move troops and supplies within the forward areas, and to coordinate
operations laterally.
Ridgway's first concern was to occupy ground
that could serve as a base both for continuing the advance toward the
major road and rail complex of the Iron Triangle. Secondly, in view of
the enemy's evident offensive preparations, he needed to develop a
defensive position. The base selected was Line Kansas, which traced the
lower bank of the Imjin in the west. From the Imjin eastward as far as
the Hwach'on Reservoir the Line lay two to six miles above the 38th
parallel across the approaches to the Iron Triangle. Following the lower
shoreline of the reservoir, it then turned slightly north to a depth of
ten miles above the parallel before falling off southeastward to the
Yangyang area on the coast.
The advance to Line Kansas was designated
Operation Rugged. The U.S.’s I and IX Corps were to seize the segment
of the line between the Imjin and the western edge of the Hwach'on
Reservoir. To the east, the X Corps was to occupy the portion tracing
the reservoir shore and reaching Route 24 in the Soyang River valley.
ROKA III and I Corps were to take the section between Route 24 and
Yangyang. Once in position, Ridgway planned to pull substantial forces
off Line Kansas immediately after reaching it in anticipation of enemy
offensive operations and prepare them for counterattacks. The IX Corps
was to release the 1st Cavalry Division to army control. The Division
was to assemble at Kyongan-ni, below the Han River southeast of Seoul.
When their, the Division was prepare to meet enemy attacks aimed at the
capital via Route 1 from the northwest, over Routes 33 and 3 from the
north, or through the Pukhan River valley from the northeast.
In the X Corps zone, the bulk of the 2nd
Division was to assemble at Hongch'on and make ready to counter an
attack following the Route 29 axis. A division yet to be selected from
one of the two ROKA corps in the east was to assemble at Yuch'on-ni on
Route 20. Once there, the ROKA unit was to prepare in either corps
sector for operations against enemy attacks. On March 29th, the 187th
Airborne RCT was to leave the I Corps zone for Taegu. Meanwhile, it was
to be ready to return north to reinforce operations wherever needed.
Planning
of Operation Dauntless
While these X Corps zone forces established
themselves in reserve, Ridgway planned to launch Operation Dauntless. It
was to be a limited advance by U.S.’s I and IX Corps toward the Iron
Triangle. The planned attacks by these two Corps on Lines Utah and
Wyoming, was to be in succession. Their objective was only to menace the
triangle, not to invest it. In effect, Ridgway’s plan was to have them
create a broad salient bulging above line Kansas between the Imjin River
and Hwach'on Reservoir. The two Corps, once in position, would take the
areas of the prominent heights commanding the Ch'orwon-Kumhwa base of
the communications complex. If struck by strong enemy attacks during or
after the advance, the two Corps would to return to the Kansas Line.
Even with armored support, the 187th Airborne
RCT was unable to captured Hill 228 until before 09:00. They used the
remainder of March 27th for reorganization and resupply.
Meanwhile, the 3rd Division’s 15th and 65th
Infantry Regiments were attempting to reach the 187th Airborne RCT
forces. The 1st Battalion of the 15th Infantry made first contact late
in the afternoon of March 27th. Despite General Milburn's hopes for the
operation, the two regiments drove no forces into the guns of the
airborne unit. The PVA forces resisting the 187th's eastward attack had
either kept Route 33 open long enough for the forces withdrawing before
the 3rd Division to pass north, or the withdrawing PVA units had used
another road, perhaps Route 3.
Early on March 28th, General Bowen’s 2nd
Battalion, with the 3rd Battalion following in support, attacked the
heights on the east side of Route 33. After an all-day battle to
eliminate stiff enemy resistance, once 2nd Battalion had prevailed it
occupied them. By nightfall of that day, the 25th Division on the right
had kept pace with the 3rd Division and moved through spotty resistance
until both units were on or above Line Aspen.
In the U.S., on March 29, 1951 C.E., the
Rosenbergs were convicted of espionage. Julius and Ethel Rosenberg had
been found guilty of conspiracy of wartime espionage and sentenced to
death. Morton Sobell was also convicted of the crime and sentenced to
thirty years in prison.
Louis Otero
was born
1932 C.E. He was U.S. ARMY PVT
and casualty of the Korean War. He died in Korea on March 30, 1951 C.E.
His home was in Lincoln,
New Mexico.
New Mexico U.S. Military Fatal
Hispano Casualties of the Korean War
|
Name
|
Service
|
Rank
|
Birthdate (YYYYMMDD)
|
Home of Record:
|
City County
|
Incident or Death Date (YYYYMMDD)
|
Remains Recovered
|
Otero
Louis
|
ARMY
|
PVT
|
19320000
|
Unknown
|
Lincoln
|
19510330
|
Y
|
Felipe T. Sedillo was born 1930 C.E. He was U.S. ARMY PFC
and casualty of the Korean War. He died in Korea on March 31, 1951 C.E.
His home was in Cháves,
New Mexico.
New Mexico U.S. Military Fatal
Hispano Casualties of the Korean War
|
Name
|
Service
|
Rank
|
Birthdate (YYYYMMDD)
|
Home of Record:
|
City County
|
Incident or Death Date (YYYYMMDD)
|
Remains Recovered
|
Sedillo
Felipe T
|
ARMY
|
PFC
|
19300000
|
Unknown
|
Cháves
|
19510331
|
Y
|
Despite the U.S. 8th Army’s having occupied
their principal geographic objectives of the UN liberation of Seoul
Operations, the goal of
destroying PVA and NKPA forces and equipment had again eluded them. The
communist were able to withdraw before suffering extensive damage.
By the end of March, UN forces at the 38th
parallel were preparing for a confrontation with PVA and NKPA forces. To
maintain, and in some areas regain, contact with enemy forces, General
Ridgway allowed each corps to start toward Line Kansas as it completed
preparations.
Action
- 38th Parallel
Between April 2nd and April 5th, Operation
Rugged staggered to a full start.
When General MacArthur made his customary
appearance on April 3rd, this time in the ROKA I Corps zone on the east
coast, Ridgway brought him up to date on plans. MacArthur agreed with
the Operation Rugged and Operation Dauntless concept, urging in
particular that Ridgway make a strong effort to hold the Kansas Line. At
the same time, MacArthur believed that the two operations would move the
battlefront to that "point of theoretical stalemate" he had
predicted in early-March. Once Ridgway's forces reached their Kansas and
Wyoming Lines objectives MacArthur intended to limit offensive
operations to reconnaissance and combat patrols, none larger than a
battalion.
In America, the Rosenbergs were sentenced to
death on April 5, 1951 C.E., by Judge Kaufman under Section 2 of the
Espionage Act of 1917, 50 U.S. Code 32 (now 18 U.S. Code 794), which
prohibits transmitting or attempting to transmit to a foreign government
information "relating to the national defense."
During the months of April and May of 1951
C.E., fighting along Korea’s thirty-eighth parallel had taken on was a
sort of "see-saw" motion. Neither the DPRK nor ROK was really
advancing beyond the parallel. Washington politicians were frustrated
that the UN forces could not win decisively. On April 5th, Congressman
Joséph W. Martin, Jr. read the text of a letter he had received from
MacArthur, dated March 20th, criticizing the Truman administration's
priorities on the floor of the House.
Abel García
was born
1931 C.E. He was U.S. ARMY PFC and casualty of the Korean War. He died
in Korea on April 8, 1951 C.E. His home was in Mckinley, New Mexico.
New Mexico U.S. Military Fatal
Hispano Casualties of the Korean War
|
Name
|
Service
|
Rank
|
Birthdate (YYYYMMDD)
|
Home of Record:
|
City County
|
Incident or Death Date (YYYYMMDD)
|
Remains Recovered
|
García
Abel
|
ARMY
|
PFC
|
19310000
|
Unknown
|
Mckinley
|
19510408
|
Y
|
For Truman, this letter was the last straw. On
April 11, 1951, C.E. General Douglas MacArthur was relieved of his
Korean command by U.S. President Harry S. Truman. MacArthur's
unauthorized threat to bring the war to China was in direct opposition
to Truman's wishes and a case of insubordination with his unwillingness
to prosecute a limited war. He was succeeded as UN commander by
Lieutenant-General Matthew Ridgway.
President Truman famously fired General Douglas
MacArthur and replaced him with General Ridgeway. MacArthur had
angered Truman with his handling of the war and for insubordination,
which means that MacArthur was going against the orders or wishes of the
president. Specifically, General MacArthur believed it was in the
best interest of the U.S. to begin a war with China and push the Korean
War onto the mainland of Asia. As well, MacArthur was in favor of
using atomic weapons in order to defeat the NKPA and the PVA. He
believed that any other approach was a form of appeasement and did not
want to give into the pressure of the communist nations. Truman
felt differently and generally wanted to avoid a war with China.
Truman did not want to overextend the U.S. in Asia and wanted to avoid
the possibility of an atomic war with the USSR. Ultimately, Truman
fired MacArthur for trying to start a war with China and refusing to
follow the orders of the president.
MacArthur later wrote that Congressman Martin
had released the letter "for some unexplained reason and without
consulting me," but it had not been marked as being
confidential or off the record.
Tony A. Montaño
was born
1928 C.E. He was U.S. ARMY PFC and casualty of the Korean War. He died
in Korea on April 14, 1951, C.E. His home was in Luna,
New Mexico.
New Mexico U.S. Military Fatal
Hispano Casualties of the Korean War
|
Name
|
Service
|
Rank
|
Birthdate (YYYYMMDD)
|
Home of Record:
|
City County
|
Incident or Death Date (YYYYMMDD)
|
Remains Recovered
|
Montaño
Tony A
|
ARMY
|
PFC
|
19280000
|
Unknown
|
Luna
|
19510414
|
Y
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Battle
of the Imjin River April 22nd through April 25, 1951 C.E.:
The Battle of the Imjin River, also known as
the Battle of Gloster Hill, took place from April 22nd through April 25,
1951 C.E. when troops from the Chinese PVA attacked UN positions on the
lower Imjin River in an attempt to achieve a breakthrough and recapture
the South Korean capital Seoul. The attack was part of the Chinese Fifth
Phase Campaign with the aim being to regain the initiative on the
battlefield after a successful UN counter-offensive in March 1951 C.E.
had allowed UN forces to establish themselves beyond the 38th parallel
at Line Kansas.
The section of the UN line where the battle
took place was defended primarily by British forces of the 29th Infantry
Brigade, consisting of four battalions, three British and one Belgian
infantry supported by tanks and artillery. Despite facing a greatly
numerically superior enemy, the brigade held its general positions for
three days. When the UN units were ultimately forced to fall back, their
actions in the Battle had blunted the Chinese offensive. This allowed UN
forces to retreat to defensive positions north of Seoul, where the
Chinese were halted.
Background
Following the North Korean invasion of South
Korea, a UN counter-offensive had reached the North Korean border with
China. China fearing for its own security and concerned about the loss
of the Communist North Korea, intervened with three offensives between
October 1950 C.E. and January 1951 C.E. These pushed UN forces south of
the original border between North and South Korea along the 38th
parallel allowing the capture of Seoul. A fourth offensive in
mid-February was blunted by the American IX Corps. At the end of
February, the UN launched a series of offensive operations, recapturing
Seoul on March 15th and pushing the front line back northwards. In
early-April, Operation Rugged established the front in a line that
followed the lower Imjin River, then eastwards to the Hwacheon Reservoir
and on to the Yangyang area on the east coast, known as Line Kansas. The
subsequent “Operation Dauntless” pushed out a salient located
between the Imjin River as it dog-legged north and the Hwacheon
Reservoir, known as Line Utah.
The
deployment of UN forces during the initial stages of the Chinese Spring
Offensive.
The British 29th Brigade's position as needed
to stop a direct advance on Seoul.
On April 22nd, the front line in the west along
Lines Kansas and Utah was held by the American I Corps comprising, from
west to east, the ROKA 1st Division, the American 3rd Division with the
British 29th Brigade under command the American 25th Division with the
Turkish Brigade under command, and the American 24th Division.
The 29th Infantry Brigade, commanded by
Brigadier Tom Brodie, consisted of the 1st Battalion Gloucestershire
Regiment (Glosters), under Lieutenant-Colonel James P. Carne; the 1st
Battalion Royal Northumberland Fusiliers (Fusiliers), under
Lieutenant-Colonel Kingsley Foster; the 1st Battalion Royal Ulster
Rifles (Rifles), under the temporary command of Major Gerald Rickord;
and the Belgian Battalion, under Lieutenant-Colonel Albert Crahay (700
men), to which Luxembourg's contribution to the UN forces was attached.
The brigade was supported by the 25 pounders of 45 Field Regiment Royal
Artillery (RA) commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel MT Young, the 4.2 inch
mortars of 170 Heavy Mortar Battery RA, the Centurion tanks of C
Squadron 8th King's Royal Irish Hussars under the command of Major Henry
Huth, and by 55 Squadron Royal Engineers.
The four battalions of 29th Brigade covered a
front of 12 miles. Gaps between units had to be accepted because there
was no possibility of forming a continuous line with the forces
available.
"Brigadier Brodie determined to deploy his
men in separate unit positions, centered upon key hill features" On
the left flank, the Glosters were guarding a ford over the Imjin 1 mile
east of the ROKA 1st Division; the Fusiliers were deployed near the
centre, around 2 miles northeast of the Glosters; the Belgians,
occupying a feature called Hill 194 on the right, were the only element
of the 29th Brigade north of the river.
Their connection with the rest of the brigade
depended on two pontoon bridges about half a mile apart. These bridges
connected the Belgians with Route 11, the 29th Brigade's main line of
supply and communication. The Rifles served as the brigade's reserve and
were deployed along Route 11. Extensive defensive preparations were not
completed because the British expected to hold the position for only a
short time. Minefields, deeply dug shelters, and extensive wire
obstacles had not been constructed. The British position on the Imjin
River "was deemed safe" but vulnerable in case of an attack.
Chinese
Spring Offensive of April of 1951 C.E.:
The commander-in-chief of the PVA and NKPA
forces in the Field, General Peng Dehuai, planned to "wipe
out...the American 3rd Division...the British 29th Brigade and the 1st
Division of the Puppet Army...after this we can wipe out the American
24th Division and 25th Division," and promised the capture of Seoul
as a May Day gift to Mao Zedong. To achieve the objective Peng planned
to converge on Seoul with three PVA army groups and a NKPA corps; a
total strength of some 305,000 men. The III and IX Army Groups were to
attack the right flank of the American 3rd Division and the 24th and
25th Divisions on Line Utah, east of the Imjin where it turned north.
The XIX Army Group on the PVA right flank, west of the Imjin River where
it turned north, were to attack the remainder of the 3rd Division and
the ROKA 1st Division. On the XIX Army Group front, the NKPA I Corps and
PVA 64th Army would attack the ROKA 1st Division, while the 63rd Army
would attack on their left, pitting it against 29th Brigade. The 63rd
Army comprised three divisions, the 187th, 188th and 189th, with each
division comprising three regiments, each of which comprised three
battalions. Some 27,000 men in 27 battalions would be attacking 29th
Brigade's four battalions, albeit in echelon, one division after the
other.
Battle
The battle opened on the night of April 22,
1951 C.E. A PVA patrol on the north bank of the river made its way
around the Belgians on Hill 194. It then continued to advance east
towards the two bridges on which the Belgians depended. Elements of the
29th Brigade's reserve, the 1st RUR, were deployed forward at about
22:00 to secure the crossing but were soon engaged by PVA forces trying
to cross the river. The Rifles were unable to secure the bridges. This
development meant that the Belgian battalion on the north bank of the
river was in danger of being isolated from the rest of the 29th Brigade.
PVA forces following the initial patrol either
attacked the Belgian positions on Hill 194 or continued their advance
towards the bridges. Those who were able to cross the Imjin attacked the
Fusiliers' right rear company, Z Company, on Hill 257, a position close
to the river and almost directly south of the crossings. Further
downstream, PVA forces managed to ford the Imjin and attacked the
Fusiliers' left forward company, X Company, on Hill 152. The retreat of
X Company from Hill 152 had serious consequences for Y Company, which
occupied the right forward position of what can be described as a
squarish fusilier position marked out by four widely spaced company
perimeters at the corners. Although Y Company was not attacked directly,
PVA forces threatened its flanks by forcing Z and X Companies from their
positions. After unsuccessful British attempts to regain those lost
positions on Hill 257 and 194, Y Company's position was abandoned, the
retreat being covered by C Squadron, 8th Hussars.
On the left of the 29th Brigade's line, a
patrol of 17 men from the Glosters' C Company lying in wait on the river
bank repulsed three attempts by a battalion of the PVA’s 559th
Regiment, 187th Division to cross the river. They eventually retired
without loss when their ammunition ran low and assaulting troops finally
gained the opposite bank.
During the night the Glosters' A and D
Companies were attacked, and by 07:30 A Company, outnumbered six to one,
had been forced from its position on Castle Hill. An attempt to retake
it failed, during which Lieutenant Philip Curtis single-handedly
destroyed an enemy machine-gun position, for which he was posthumously
awarded the Víctoria Cross.
The
Glosters' partial withdrawal to Hill 235
On April 23rd, attempts by the Fusiliers and
forces from the U.S. 3rd Infantry Division's reserve to regain control
of areas lost during the night failed. An attack by the U.S. 1st
Battalion, 7th Infantry, on PVA forces near Hill 257 was ordered to
support the Belgian withdrawal from the north bank of the Imjin River.
Despite losing seven vehicles, the Belgian battalion successfully
withdrew to the east and took up new positions south of the Glosters and
the Fusiliers before moving to the vicinity of the 29th Brigade's
command post.
On April 23rd, by around 2030 the Glosters' A
Company was now at less than half strength. All of its officers were
either killed or wounded. They fell back to Hill 235. A Company’s
withdrawal left D Company's position exposed. With one of its platoons
badly mauled in the overnight fighting, it too withdrew to Hill 235.
That same night of April 23rd and 24th,
Glosters' B Company was outnumbered by eighteen to one and endured six
assaults. It had been forced to call in artillery on their own position
to break up the last of them. Low on ammunition and having taken many
casualties, the seventh assault at 0810 forced them to abandon their
position, and just 20 survivors made it to Hill 235, to which battalion
HQ, the Support Company and C Company had already withdrawn.
As B Company fought for its life, the PVA 188th
Division crossed the Imjin River and attacked the Fusiliers and the
Rifles on the right of the 29th Brigade's line. The 187th Division also
engaged the Brigade's battalions on the right, while the 189th Division
kept up the pressure on the left. Most dangerous for the integrity of
the 29th Brigade was the PVA’s deep penetration of the line between
the Glosters and the Fusiliers, cutting off the Glosters.
To counter the PVA attack and protect the
Glosters from being completely surrounded, the Philippine 10th Battalion
Combat Team (BCT) was temporarily attached to the 29th Brigade. A
combined force of M-24 tanks of the 10th BCT and Centurions of the 8th
Hussars supported by infantry reached a point 2,000 yards from Hill 235.
The column, however, failed to make contact. The lead tank was hit by
PVA fire and knocked out, blocking the route and making any further
advance against heavy resistance impossible. At this point, the brigade
commander considered it unwise to continue the effort to relieve the
Gloucester Battalion and withdrew the relief force.
A planned UN attack by the Puertorriqueños
of the 1st and 3rd Battalions, 65th Infantry to relieve the Glosters
was prevented due to continued PVA pressure on the UN forces along the
Imjin. Two further attempts by a tank troop to link up with the Glosters
were attempted but failed. Brigadier Brodie now left the decision as to
whether to attempt a break-out or surrender to Lieutenant-Colonel Carne.
The
Glosters stand on Hill 235
Next, at 08:00 on April 25th, I Corps issued
the order to execute Plan Golden A, which called for a withdrawal of all
forces to a new defensive position further south. In accordance with
orders issued by I Corps, the Fusiliers, Rifles and Belgians, supported
by the tanks of the 8th Hussars and the Royal Engineers of 55 Squadron,
withdrew to the safety of the next UN position. The Belgians now
occupied blocking positions west and southwest of the 29th Brigade's
command post in order to allow the other units of the brigade to fall
back through the Battalion's positions.
After it had received the order to retreat, the
isolation of the 1st Battalion Gloucestershire Regiment on Hill 235 made
it impossible for them to join the rest of the 29th Brigade. Even before
the failed attempts to relieve the Battalion earlier, B and C Companies
had already suffered such heavy casualties that they were merged to form
one company.
By 09:00, on April 25th, the Glosters’
situation was one of being totally isolated on Hill 235 near Solma-ri,
west of Route 5Y. The brigade's main line of retreat is Route 11. The
Belgian battalion occupied blocking positions near the Brigade's command
post, while RNF, RUR, and 8th Hussars were still further north.
Additional support was provided by elements of the U.S. 65th Infantry.
Attempts to supply the Battalion by air drop had also failed. Despite
their difficult situation, the Glosters held their positions on Hill 235
throughout April 24th and the night of 24th and 25th. No further
attempts were undertaken to relieve the Glosters.
By 09:00, on April 25th, the Glosters’
situation was one of being totally isolated on Hill 235 near Solma-ri,
west of Route 5Y. The Brigade's main line of retreat is Route 11. The
Belgian battalion occupies blocking positions near the Brigade's command
post, while RNF, RUR and 8th Hussars are still further north. Additional
support was provided by elements of the U.S. 65th Infantry.
On that morning, the Glosters were informed
that the 45 Field Regiment could no longer provide artillery support. As
Brigadier Brodie had already left the final decision to
Lieutenant-Colonel Carne, the Glosters' CO "gave the order to his
company commanders to make for the British lines as best as they
could." Only the remains of D Company under the command of Major
Mike Harvey successfully escaped from Hill 235, by then called Gloster
Hill. They reached the safety of friendly lines after several days. The
rest of the battalion was taken prisoner, including Lieutenant-Colonel
Carne.
Aftermath
The withdrawal of the 29th Brigade had been
made under intense PVA pressure. The fact that PVA forces dominated
parts of the high ground along the line of retreat made the situation
even more difficult. The PVA were able not only to observe the 29th
Brigade’s movements, but also to inflict heavy casualties on the
retreating units. Among those killed was the commanding officer of the
Fusiliers, Lieutenant-Colonel Foster, who died when his jeep was hit by
PVA mortar fire. The retreat was "one long bloody ambush."
When B Company of the Ulsters which was the rear guard during the
retreat reached the safety of the next UN line, all elements of the 29th
Brigade except for the Glosters had completed the withdrawal.
Importance
of the battle
At the Battles of Kapyong and the
Imjin River the vastly outnumbered UN forces were able to check the PVA
advance on Seoul. Had the Chinese achieved a breakthrough in the initial
stages of their assault, they would have been able to outflank the ROKA
1st Division to the west and the U.S. 3rd Infantry Division to the east
of the 29th Brigade. A PVA success would have threatened the stability
of the UN line and increased the likelihood of a PVA advance on Seoul.
Two Commonwealth battalions, the 2nd
Battalion of the Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry Regiment
and the 3rd Battalion of the Royal Australian Regiment, repulsed an
entire PVA division at Kapyong.
The British 29th Brigade’s 4,000 men staged a
successful delaying action at the Imjin River against the PVA’s 63rd
Army nearly 30,000 troops. Although the PVA initially benefited from the
29th Brigade's scattered deployment and lack of defensive preparations,
they were nevertheless unable to take the positions before UN forces
could check further advances. That determined resistance by the 29th
Brigade severely disrupted the Chinese offensive, causing it to lose
momentum, and allowed UN forces in the area to withdraw to the No-Name
Line, a defensible position north of South Korean capital Seoul where
they could consolidate their lines.
History records that in three days of fighting,
the 1st Battalion, the Gloucestershire Regiment’s 650 men engaged in a Thermopylae-like
stand against more than 10,000 Chinese infantry. While it is true that
the overwhelming majority of the Glosters were either killed or
captured, their sacrifice will always be remembered. Of the 29th
Brigade’s 1,091 soldiers killed, wounded, or missing, 620 were from
the Gloucestershire Regiment. It was only able to muster 217 men on
April 27th. 522 soldiers of the Gloucestershire Regiment became
prisoners of war. Of those taken prisoner, 180 were wounded and a
further 34 died while in captivity. 59 soldiers of the Gloucestershire
Regiment were killed in action.
Casualties
The British cabinet later stated on June 26,
1951 C.E. stated that the 29th Brigade suffered 1,091 casualties,
including 34 officers and 808 other ranks missing. These casualties
represented 20 to 25 percent of the Brigade's strength on the eve of
battle.
Based on estimates, PVA casualties in the
Battle of the Imjin River have been put at around 10,000. As a result of
the casualties suffered during the battle, the PVA 63rd Army, which had
begun the offensive with three divisions and approximately 27,000 men,
had lost over a third of its strength and was pulled out of the front
line.
On May 1, 1951 C.E., The U.S.
government-sponsored Radio Free Europe began its broadcasts for the
first time, from Munich to Eastern Europe.
Phil Sandoval
was born
1933 C.E. He was U.S. ARMY PVT
and casualty of the Korean War. He died in Korea on May 15, 1951 C.E.
His home was in Bernalillo, New
Mexico.
New Mexico U.S. Military Fatal
Hispano Casualties of the Korean War
|
Name
|
Service
|
Rank
|
Birthdate (YYYYMMDD)
|
Home of Record:
|
City County
|
Incident or Death Date (YYYYMMDD)
|
Remains Recovered
|
Sandoval
Phil
|
ARMY
|
PVT
|
19330000
|
Unknown
|
Bernalillo
|
19510515
|
Y
|
On May 18, 1951 C.E., the UN moved to its
new headquarters in New York City, on Manhattan's East Side.
On May 23, 1951 C.E., one of the fighting
Hispanic American Puertorriqueños,
Demensio Rivera of Company G, 2nd Battalion, 7th Infantry Regiment,
3rd Infantry Division, won a Korean War Medal of Honor for services
rendered during the Fighting at Changyong-ni, South Korea. He was born
in Cabo Rojo, Puerto Rico
to Demensio Rivera Y Negrón
and Dolores Avilés de Rivera.
When just a child his parents moved to New York City, where he was
raised.
Alejandro Carrillo was born 1926 C.E.
He was U.S. ARMY PFC and casualty of the Korean War. He died in Korea on
May 24, 1951 C.E. His home was in Mckinley,
New Mexico.
New Mexico U.S. Military Fatal
Hispano Casualties of the Korean War
|
Name
|
Service
|
Rank
|
Birthdate (YYYYMMDD)
|
Home of Record:
|
City County
|
Incident or Death Date (YYYYMMDD)
|
Remains Recovered
|
Carrillo
Alejandro
|
ARMY
|
PFC
|
19260000
|
Unknown
|
Mckinley
|
19510524
|
Y
|
Steven A. Maese
García
was born 1931 C.E. He was U.S. ARMY PFC with the 21st Infantry
Regiment: C and casualty of the Korean War. He died in
Korea on May 26, 1951 C.E. KIA. His home was in Otero,
New Mexico.
New Mexico U.S. Military Fatal
Hispano Casualties of the Korean War
|
Name
|
Service
|
Rank
|
Birthdate (YYYYMMDD)
|
Home of Record:
|
City County
|
Incident or Death Date (YYYYMMDD)
|
Remains Recovered
|
García
Steven Maese A
|
ARMY
|
PFC
|
19310000
|
Unknown
|
Otero
|
19510526
|
Y
|
Eloy A. Chávez
was born 1924 C.E. He was U.S. ARMY CPL and casualty of
the Korean War. He died in Korea on May 28, 1951 C.E. His home was in Sierra,
New Mexico.
New Mexico U.S. Military Fatal
Hispano Casualties of the Korean War
|
Name
|
Service
|
Rank
|
Birthdate (YYYYMMDD)
|
Home of Record:
|
City County
|
Incident or Death Date (YYYYMMDD)
|
Remains Recovered
|
Chávez
Eloy A
|
ARMY
|
CPL
|
19240000
|
Unknown
|
Sierra
|
19510528
|
Y
|
4.0
The Last Phase of the Korean War
By summer of 1951 C.E., talks for a Korean
armistice began. Throughout mid-1951 C.E. through 1953 C.E., negotiation
for a peace treaty stalled and reopened. A major issue that stalled
negotiations was whether POWs should be repatriated on voluntary basis
or not. In addition, accusations about war crimes committed by U.S.
stalled negotiations.
Fighting continued with intensified guerilla
warfare during these armistice talks. "Operation Ratkiller"
was designed to counter these guerilla activities. Also, aerial bombing
in North Korea intensified as the negotiations continued to intimidate
her in order to end the war quickly. The use of nuclear weapons was also
considered.
José P. Ruíz
was born 1930 C.E. He was U.S. ARMY Corporal and casualty of
the Korean War. He died in Korea on June 2, 1951 C.E. His home was in Mora,
New Mexico.
New Mexico U.S. Military Fatal
Hispano Casualties of the Korean War
|
Name
|
Service
|
Rank
|
Birthdate (YYYYMMDD)
|
Home of Record:
|
City County
|
Incident or Death Date (YYYYMMDD)
|
Remains Recovered
|
Ruíz
José P
|
ARMY
|
CPL
|
19300000
|
Unknown
|
Mora
|
19510602
|
Y
|
Leo Cárlos
Sánchez was
born July 3, 1927 C.E. He was U.S. NAVY PO2 and casualty of
the Korean War. He died in Korea on June 9, 1951 C.E. His home was in Belen,
New Mexico.
Jacabo Luís Martínez
was born December 22, 1930 C.E. He was U.S. Marine Corps Corporal
and casualty of the Korean War. He died in Korea on June 9, 1951 C.E.
His home was in Santa Fé, New
Mexico.
New Mexico U.S. Military Fatal
Hispano Casualties of the Korean War
|
Name
|
Service
|
Rank
|
Birthdate (YYYYMMDD)
|
Home of Record:
|
City County
|
Incident or Death Date (YYYYMMDD)
|
Remains Recovered
|
Sánchez
Leo Cárlos
|
Navy
|
PO2
|
19270703
|
Belen
|
València
|
19510609
|
Y
|
Martínez
Jacabo Luís
|
Marine
Corps
|
CPL
|
19301222
|
Santa
Fé
|
Santa
Fé
|
19510609
|
Y
|
The
Korean War Reaches a Stalemate
In July 1951 C.E., U.S. President Truman and
his new military commanders started peace talks at Panmunjom, now
located in Kaesong, North Hwanghae Province, in the DPRK.
It was then a village just north of the de facto border
between the DPRK and the ROK. Fighting continued along the
38th Parallel as these negotiations stalled. Both sides were willing to
accept a ceasefire that maintained the 38th Parallel as the boundary
between the DPRK and the ROK. Unfortunately, the parties could not agree
on whether prisoners of war should be forcibly “repatriated.” The
PRC and the DPRK wanted forcible repatriation. The Americans did not.
On July 10, 1951 C.E., truce talks between the
UN and the Communists continued at Kaesŏng a city in North
Hwanghae Province in the southern part of the DPRK. The negotiations did
not mark an end to the war, as the fighting continued for two more
years.
Hilario A. Maes was born 1932 C.E. He was U.S. ARMY PFC
and casualty of the Korean War. He died in Korea on July 13, 1951 C.E.
His home was in Otero,
New Mexico.
New Mexico U.S. Military Fatal
Hispano Casualties of the Korean War
|
Name
|
Service
|
Rank
|
Birthdate (YYYYMMDD)
|
Home of Record:
|
City County
|
Incident or Death Date (YYYYMMDD)
|
Remains Recovered
|
Maes
Hilario A
|
ARMY
|
PFC
|
19320000
|
Unknown
|
Otero
|
19510713
|
Y
|
Richard López
was born
February 7, 1928 C.E. He was U.S. Marine
Corps Corporal and casualty of the Korean War. He
died in Korea on July 15, 1951 C.E. His
home was in Albuquerque Bernalillo,
New Mexico.
New Mexico U.S. Military Fatal
Hispano Casualties of the Korean War
|
Name
|
Service
|
Rank
|
Birthdate (YYYYMMDD)
|
Home of Record:
|
City County
|
Incident or Death Date (YYYYMMDD)
|
Remains Recovered
|
López
Richard
|
Marine
Corps
|
CPL
|
19280207
|
Albuquerque
|
Bernalillo
|
19510715
|
Y
|
Eloy E. López
was born 1929 C.E. He was U.S. ARMY PFC and casualty of the Korean
War. He died in Korea on July 20, 1951 C.E. His home was in Río
Arriba, New Mexico.
New Mexico U.S. Military Fatal
Hispano Casualties of the Korean War
|
Name
|
Service
|
Rank
|
Birthdate (YYYYMMDD)
|
Home of Record:
|
City County
|
Incident or Death Date (YYYYMMDD)
|
Remains Recovered
|
López
Eloy E
|
ARMY
|
PFC
|
19290000
|
Unknown
|
Río
Arriba
|
19510720
|
Y
|
The Battle of Bloody Ridge took place from
August 18th to September 5, 1951 C.E. It is located in the hills north
of the 38th parallel north in the central Korean mountain range. The
battle was fought between the Communist NKPA supported by PRC’s PVA
forces and the UN forces consisting of ROKA units and the U.S. 2nd
Infantry Division.
Background
During the summer of 1951 C.E., the Korean War
had reached a stalemate as peace negotiations were going on at Kaesŏng.
The two armies faced each other across a line a few miles north of the
38th Parallel. The Line ran from east to west through the middle of the
Korean Peninsula and had many twists and turns along the way. UN and
NKPA and PVA forces jockeyed for position along this line, clashing in
several relatively small but intense and bloody battles.
Manuel J. Romero was born 1927 C.E. He was U.S. ARMY Corporal with
the 5th Infantry Regiment: Company:
A RCT
and casualty of the Korean War KIA. He died in Korea on August 3, 1951
C.E. His home was in Quay, New
Mexico.
New Mexico U.S. Military Fatal
Hispano Casualties of the Korean War
|
Name
|
Service
|
Rank
|
Birthdate (YYYYMMDD)
|
Home of Record:
|
City County
|
Incident or Death Date (YYYYMMDD)
|
Remains Recovered
|
Romero
Manuel J
|
ARMY
|
CPL
|
19270000
|
Unknown
|
Quay
|
19510803
|
Y
|
The
Battle of Bloody Ridge
On August 18th, the Battle of Bloody Ridge
began as an attempt by UN forces to seize a ridge of hills which they
believed were being used as observation posts to call in artillery fire
on a UN supply road.
Action
- Battle
The initial attack was fierce. After a week of
fierce hand-to-hand fighting, the 36th ROKA Regiment captured most, but
not all, of the ridge. Their triumph was short-lived. On the following
day of August 19th, the NKPA and PRC forces recaptured the mountain in a
fierce counterattack.
The UN’s U.S. 9th Infantry Regiment of the
2nd Division made the next assault on Bloody Ridge. The battle raged for
ten days, as the NKPA and PVA forces repulsed one assault after another.
The increasingly exhausted U.S. forces were repeatedly being driven
back. Finally, after two days of heavy fighting the 9th succeeded in
capturing one of the hill objectives. Constant rain now came, making
operations almost impossible. The "rivers of mud" created
difficulties for bringing in supplies through and up steep, slippery
slopes. All of this greatly slowed the attacks.
Casualties mounted as fighting renewed. The
UN’s 2nd Division's 23rd Infantry Regiment joined in the attack on the
main ridge. The 38th Infantry Regiment, the 2nd's other infantry
regiment, occupied positions immediately behind the main ridge
threatening to cut off any NKPA and PVA retreat. The battle would
ultimately be decided by combination of incessant bombardment by
artillery, tanks and airstrikes, frontal attacks, and flanking
movements. In one 24-hour period alone, over 14,000 artillery rounds
were fired.
Outside of Korea, in San Francisco on September 1, 1951 C.E., the U.S., Australia, and
New Zealand signed a mutual security pact, the ANZUS Treaty. The ANZUS
is a collective security non-binding agreement between Australia and New
Zealand and, separately, Australia and the U.S. The parties are to
cooperate on military matters in the Pacific Ocean region. It provided
that an armed attack on any of the three parties would be dangerous to
the others, and that each should act to meet the common threat. A
committee of foreign ministers was established to meet for consultation.
Back in Korea, the Battle of Bloody Ridge which
had begun on August 18th was finally over. UN forces had succeeded in
outflanking NKPA and PVA forces. On September 5th, NKPA and PVA forces
abandoned Bloody Ridge. After their withdrawing from the Ridge, the
NKPA/PVA set up new positions just 1,500 yards away on a seven-mile long
hill mass that was soon to earn the name “Heartbreak Ridge.”
It was the American soldiers that named that
piece of terrain they had taken "Bloody Ridge." 2,700 UN and
perhaps as many as 15,000 NK and PVA soldiers were casualties. Almost
all were killed or wounded. Only a few prisoners were taken by either
side.
Outside of Korea in San Francisco, on September 8, 1951 C.E. forty-nine nations
signed the Japanese Peace Treaty. It officially ended World War II and
reestablished Japanese sovereignty.
John Jr. Montaño
was born
1928 C.E. He was U.S. ARMY PFC and casualty of the Korean War. He died
in Korea on September 13, 1951 C.E. His home was in Guadalupe,
New Mexico.
New Mexico U.S. Military Fatal
Hispano Casualties of the Korean War
|
Name
|
Service
|
Rank
|
Birthdate (YYYYMMDD)
|
Home of Record:
|
City County
|
Incident or Death Date (YYYYMMDD)
|
Remains Recovered
|
Montaño
John Jr.
|
ARMY
|
PFC
|
19280000
|
Unknown
|
Guadalupe
|
19510913
|
Y
|
Back in the Korean, October brought peace talks
between the UN and the Communists. They were relocated to the village of P'anmunjŏm.
Isaac Sandoval
was born
1928 C.E. He was U.S. ARMY Corporal and casualty of the Korean War. He
died in Korea on October 6, 1951 C.E. His home was in Sandoval,
New Mexico.
New Mexico U.S. Military Fatal
Hispano Casualties of the Korean War
|
Name
|
Service
|
Rank
|
Birthdate (YYYYMMDD)
|
Home of Record:
|
City County
|
Incident or Death Date (YYYYMMDD)
|
Remains Recovered
|
Sandoval
Isaac
|
ARMY
|
CPL
|
19280000
|
Unknown
|
Sandoval
|
19511006
|
N
|
Enríque Vega
Jr. was born 1933 C.E. He was U.S. ARMY PVT and casualty of
the Korean War. Vega died in Korea on
October 1, 1951 C.E. His home was in Doña Ana,
New Mexico.
New Mexico U.S. Military Fatal
Hispano Casualties of the Korean War
|
Name
|
Service
|
Rank
|
Birthdate (YYYYMMDD)
|
Home of Record:
|
City County
|
Incident or Death Date (YYYYMMDD)
|
Remains Recovered
|
Vega
Enríque Jr.
|
ARMY
|
PVT
|
19330000
|
Unknown
|
Doña
Ana
|
19511001
|
Y
|
Operation
Commando
The UN offensive, Operation Minden, had
been launched earlier between September 8th and September 12, 1951 C.E.,
as part of a general advance to extend the Wyoming Line. Unfortunately,
a few hills south of Wyoming remained in PVA hands, threatening supply
lines to Seoul.
From October 2nd through October 5, 1951 C.E.,
there would be a new UN offensive, Operation Commando. On October 3,
1951 C.E., the UN offensive began from the Wyoming Line which had been
extended during Operation Minden. Operation Minden was the UN
offensive which had occurred between September 8th and September 12,
1951 C.E. It was part of a general advance to extend the Wyoming Line.
The seizing of these hills would require a later follow-up operation.
Action
- Battle
During Operation Commando, the UN’s I Corps
consisting of four U.S. Divisions, the 1st Commonwealth Division, and
the 1st ROKA Division seized the Jamestown Line. It also destroyed the
PVA’s 42nd, 47th, 64th, and 65th armies.
Aftermath
This action prevented the Communist forces from
taking and blocking U.N. supply lines near Seoul.
Outside of Asia, the Mutual Security Act of
1951 launched a major American foreign aid program. Foreign aid grants
to numerous countries would be provided from 1951 C.E. through 1961 C.E.
It largely replaced the Marshall Plan. The main goal was to help poor
countries develop and to contain the spread of Communism. It was a
signed on October 10, 1951 C.E. by President Harry S. Truman. Annual
authorizations were about $7.5 billion, out of a GDP of $340bn in 1951
C.E., for military, economic, and technical foreign aid to American
allies. The aid was aimed primarily at shoring up Western Europe, as the
Cold War developed.
Marquis H Oracion
was born June 9, 1925 C.E. He was U.S. AIR FORCE
Second Lieutenant and
casualty of the Korean War. He died in Korea on October 14, 1951 C.E.
His home was in Roswell Cháves, New
Mexico.
New Mexico U.S. Military Fatal
Hispano Casualties of the Korean War
|
Name
|
Service
|
Rank
|
Birthdate (YYYYMMDD)
|
Home of Record:
|
City County
|
Incident or Death Date (YYYYMMDD)
|
Remains Recovered
|
Oracion
Marquis H
|
Air
Force
|
2nd
Lt.
|
19250609
|
Roswell
|
Cháves
|
19511014
|
Y
|
Operation
Polecharge
Background
Between September 8th and September 12, 1951
C.E., Operation Minden a UN offensive had been undertaken. It was
part of a general advance to extend the Wyoming Line. Unfortunately, a
few hills south of Wyoming remained in PVA hands, threatening supply
lines to Seoul. The seizing of these hills would require a later
follow-up
From October 2nd through October 5, 1951 C.E.,
there would be a second UN offensive, Operation Commando had been
launched. On October 3, 1951 C.E., the UN offensive began from the
Wyoming Line which had been extended during Operation Minden.
During the Operation, the UN’s I Corps seized
the Jamestown Line. It did not, however, take the hills south of
Wyoming, which remained in PVA hands
Operation Polecharge was the UN offensive
undertaken between October 15th and October 19, 1951 C.E., to form
a line of defense just north of the 38th Parallel. It was also
was intended to seize the hills south of Wyoming remain in PVA hands and
take control of the high positions located there.
The 1st Cavalry Division’s 1st Cavalry
Regiment and a Belgian battalion attached to the 3rd Infantry
Division were tasked with the capture of Hills 346, 272 and 230. The 8th
Cavalry Regiment would provide support if required.
Action
- Battle
The operation began on October 15, 1951 C.E.,
with the seizure of Hill 346 by the 5th Cavalry. By October 18th,
Hill 230 was captured with support from the 8th Cavalry after being
strongly rebuffed. Hill 272 was also strongly defended by the PVA.
It fell to UN forces on October 19th, marking the successful conclusion
of Operation Polecharge.
Aftermath
As a result of this 6 miles advance, the badly
mauled U.S. 1st Cavalry Division was withdrawn to Japan for refitting.
The hostilities ended on October 15, 1951 C.E.,
with the UN having successfully established the Jamestown Line.
The UN Korean offensive, Operation Commando
Operation Commando ended on October 15th, with a few hills south of the
line still in Communist hands. The Operation was the last action in the
war of maneuvre, which had lasted sixteen months. It was replaced by a
static war, characterised by fixed defenses, trench lines, bunkers,
patrols, and wiring parties and minefields. Australian involvement in
this operation is known by historians as the Battle of Maryang San.
On the world front, U.S. President Truman
signed an act formally ending World War II on October 19, 1951 C.E.
Rudolfo Jr. Delgado was born 1933 C.E. He was U.S. ARMY PVT and casualty of
the Korean War. He died in Korea on November 4, 1951 C.E. His home was
in Guadalupe,
New Mexico.
New Mexico U.S. Military Fatal
Hispano Casualties of the Korean War
|
Name
|
Service
|
Rank
|
Birthdate (YYYYMMDD)
|
Home of Record:
|
City County
|
Incident or Death Date (YYYYMMDD)
|
Remains Recovered
|
Delgado
Rudolfo Jr.
|
ARMY
|
PVT
|
19330000
|
Unknown
|
Guadalupe
|
19511004
|
Y
|
Lorenzo Olivas was born 1929 C.E.
He was U.S. ARMY PVT
and casualty of the Korean War. He died in Korea on November 19, 1951
C.E. His home was in Mora, New
Mexico.
New Mexico U.S. Military Fatal
Hispano Casualties of the Korean War
|
Name
|
Service
|
Rank
|
Birthdate (YYYYMMDD)
|
Home of Record:
|
City County
|
Incident or Death Date (YYYYMMDD)
|
Remains Recovered
|
Olivas
Lorenzo
|
ARMY
|
PVT
|
19290000
|
Unknown
|
Mora
|
19511119
|
Y
|
José C. Torres
was born 1929 C.E. He was U.S. ARMY PFC and casualty of the Korean
War. He died in Korea on April 10, 1952 C.E. His home was in Bernalillo,
New Mexico.
New Mexico U.S. Military Fatal
Hispano Casualties of the Korean War
|
Name
|
Service
|
Rank
|
Birthdate (YYYYMMDD)
|
Home of Record:
|
City County
|
Incident or Death Date (YYYYMMDD)
|
Remains Recovered
|
Torres
José C
|
ARMY
|
PFC
|
19290000
|
Unknown
|
Bernalillo
|
19520410
|
Y
|
The occupation of Japan formally ended on April
28, 1952 C.E., after Japan signed the Treaty of Peace with its wartime
antagonists (except for the USSR) on September 8, 1951 C.E. Firmly
aligned with the West, Japan began a long, sustained period of economic
growth.
The ANZUS Treaty entered into force on
April 29, 1952 C.E. The treaty bound the signatories to recognize that
an armed attack in the Pacific area on any of them would endanger the
peace and safety of the others. It stated 'The Parties will consult
together whenever in the opinion of any of them the territorial
integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is
threatened in the Pacific'. The three nations also pledged to maintain
and develop individual and collective capabilities to resist attack.
Louis Fernández
Griego
was born January 21, 1931 C.E. He was U.S. MARINE CORPS PFC and
casualty of the Korean War. He died in Korea on May 17, 1952 C.E. His
home was in Cíbola, New Mexico.
Leo Robert González
was born
June 30, 1932 C.E. He was U.S. MARINE
CORPS PFC and casualty of the Korean War. He died in
Korea on May 17, 1952 C.E. His home was in Santa Fé, Santa Fé, New Mexico.
New Mexico U.S. Military Fatal
Hispano Casualties of the Korean War
|
Name
|
Service
|
Rank
|
Birthdate (YYYYMMDD)
|
Home of Record:
|
City County
|
Incident or Death Date (YYYYMMDD)
|
Remains Recovered
|
Griego
Louis Fernández
|
Marine
Corps
|
PFC
|
19310121
|
grants
|
Cíbola
|
19520517
|
Y
|
González
Leo Robert
|
Marine
Corps
|
PFC
|
19320630
|
Santa
Fé
|
Santa
Fé
|
19520517
|
Y
|
Fred Ernest Luna
was born July 22,
1932 C.E. He was U.S. MARINE
CORPS Corporal and casualty of the Korean War. He
died in Korea on May 24, 1952 C.E. His
home was in Albuquerque, Bernalillo, New Mexico.
New Mexico U.S. Military Fatal
Hispano Casualties of the Korean War
|
Name
|
Service
|
Rank
|
Birthdate (YYYYMMDD)
|
Home of Record:
|
City County
|
Incident or Death Date (YYYYMMDD)
|
Remains Recovered
|
Luna
Fred Ernest
|
Marine
Corps
|
CPL
|
19320722
|
Albuquerque
|
Bernalillo
|
19520524
|
Y
|
The
Battle of Old Baldy
Background
In the Old Baldy area in early June 1952 C.E.,
Major General David L. Ruffner of the UN 45th Division holding the right
flank of the I Corps' line was frustrated that PVA observers were
emplaced to view of his Division's positions. One of the most prominent
hills in the area came to be called "Old Baldy." It earned its
nickname after artillery and mortar fire destroyed the trees on its
crest. It was also the highest point on a prominent east-west ridge and
it held strategic importance because it dominated terrain in three
directions.
In preparation, Major-General Ruffner laid
plans for Operation Counter. It was to be a two-phase operation. First,
UN forces were to capture 12 PVA outposts a few thousand yards in front
of the main line and then hold them.
Opposing the UN 45th Division from east to west
were elements of the PVA 338th and 339th Regiments (113th Division, 38th
Army), the 350th and 349th Regiments (117th Division, 39th Army), and
the 344th Regiment (115th Division, 39th Army). The other infantry
components of the 113th, 115th, and 117th Divisions were in reserve, as
was the 116th Division, 39th Army. In addition, the PVA had over ten
battalions of artillery positioned along the front in direct or general
support roles.
Battle
of Old Baldy
Action
- Opening attack
During the daylight hours of June 6, 1952 C.E.,
several UN air strikes on known enemy strong points close to the outpost
objectives took place. After dark, various UN units ranging from a squad
to almost a company, advanced to take possession of the PVA outposts.
The PVA were not anticipating the operation. UN attack units encountered
little opposition except at Outpost 10 on Hill 255 and Outpost 11 on
Hill 266. Outpost 10 on Hill 255, which was to become better known as
Pork Chop Hill, was taken by two UN platoons from I Company, 180th
Infantry Regiment. The UN platoons fought a 55-minute fire fight against
two PVA platoons.
On Old Baldy, two UN squads from A Company,
180th Infantry, exchanged small arms and automatic weapons fire with two
PVA squads. The UN troops then withdrew and directed artillery fire upon
the PVA forces. It was an American Hispanic, PFC James Ortega, a forward observer for the 171st Field Artillery Battalion,
jumped into a trench and directed the artillery concentration which
pounded the top of the hill with 500 rounds.
When the artillery had ceased, A Company again
probed the enemy's positions. They were met with intense fire. A UN
squad reinforced by a BAR and machine gun made a sweep to the rear of
the PVA, there they advanced to within 25-foot of the enemy before
attacking. As the PVA resistance crumbled, A Company pushed its way
toward the crest of Old Baldy. Once there, PVA artillery immediately
began to come in. Despite the PVA fire, the A Company squads held and
took possession of Old Baldy shortly after midnight.
With the Outposts were seized, the task of
organizing them defensively got under way.
The 279th and 180th Infantry Regiments aided by
Korean Service Corps personnel, brought up construction and
fortification materials. They worked through the night building bunkers
with overhead protection so that their own artillery could use proximity
fuze shells. The proximity fuzes were set to detonate the shells
automatically when the distance to the targeted the attacking PVA ground
forces as drew close to the Outpost up to a predetermined distance for
targeting.
They also ringed the Outposts with barbed wire
defensive obstacles to slow down the enemy’s approach. Mines were
placed along the ground routes which
the attacking PVA forces would take to access the UN
positions. Defending positions were also covered by automatic weapons.
Whenever possible, they sited their machine guns and recoilless rifles
in fighting positions concealed from enemy observation in holes, hastily
dug prone shelters, or a well-prepared positions with overhead cover.
These also provided fire support to adjacent outposts where possible.
Signal personnel were tasked to set up communications to the rear and
laterally to other outposts by radio and wire. Porters brought in
stockpiles of ammunition in preparation for the expected attacks.
On the main line of resistance (MLR) or
extended front, UN infantry, tank, and artillery support weapons had
drawn up fire plans to furnish the Outposts with protective fires.
Reinforcing element were being pre-briefed and making preparations to go
to the immediate assistance of each Outpost in the event of enemy
attack. The MLR was the most important defensive position of UN forces
facing the strong, well-armed, and experienced opposing PVA forces. This
was the life line for the staggered Outpost.
Battle
of Old Baldy
Action
- UN seized 24-hour Old Baldy outposts
By the morning of June 7th, the newly UN
seized, 24-hour, Old Baldy outposts were as prepared as possible to
withstand PVA counterattacks. Garrison forces of 18 to 44 men were left
behind. The bulk of the forces from the 279th and 180th Infantry
Regiments withdrew to the MLR.
The
Battle of Old Baldy, from June 26, 1952 C.E. to March 26, 1953 C.E.
Action
- First battle of
Old Baldy - Operation Counter
The two-phase plans for Operation Counter had
been laid earlier by U.S. Major-General Ruffner. First had been the
capture 12 Outposts a few thousand yards in front of the MLR on the most
prominent hills called "Old Baldy." The second phase was to
hold them against the PVA’s ten battalions of artillery positioned
along the front in direct or general support roles.
On June 26, 1952 C.E., the contest for Old
Baldy became very heated. Almost 1,000-foot west of the crest, PVA
forces had established firing positions which posed a constant threat to
the UN’s 45th Division Outpost and the 179th Infantry Regiment's
troops in the area. UNC and its U.S. forces had determined to destroy
these PVA positions.
Early in the morning, the 179th vacated its
Outpost on Old Baldy. This would allow for air strikes, artillery, and
mortar barrages on the PVA positions. Eight fighter-bombers from the 5th
Air Force dropped bombs and strafed the positions with rocket and
machine gun fire. Next, the UN 45th Division artillery and mortar units
began to bombard the PVA positions.
The UN 179th Infantry Regiment’s reinforced C
Company and the 180th Infantry Regiment’s F Company, attached to the
179th, attacked after the cessation of artillery and mortar fire. C
Company began moving in from the left and F Company, supported by a
tank, moved in from the right finger of Old Baldy. The UN assault forces
soon ran into heavy small arms and automatic weapons fire from the
defense force of two PVA companies. After an hour of fighting, the PVA
suddenly pulled back. The PVA then directed artillery and mortar fire on
the attacking UN units. When the fire ceased, the PVA quickly returned
to the area and closed with the men of C and F Companies holding the
trenches.
PVA machine guns had been making it difficult
for C and F Companies to move over the crest of the hill. The UN attack
force was now forces to regroup. F Company took over the holding of the
left and right fingers of Old Baldy. The old Outpost 11 position was now
held by C Company. During the afternoon, the 179th’s A Company came up
to reinforce the UN attack force. It soon worked its way around the
right flank of the PVA defenders and began its assault.
The battle continued for two hours, as PVA
forces repelled each UN attempt to drive them from their positions. They
were effectively using hand grenades and machine guns to do so. Late in
the day, two tanks made their way up the hill with difficulty to help
reduce PVA strong points. Once there, the tanks managed to inflict some
damage before they were both put out of action. One of the tanks turned
over. The second tank threw a track. Gradually the PVA forces evacuated
their positions. The UN 179th was now able to send engineers and several
more tanks up to the crest.
During the night of June 26th, and the
following day of June 27th, three UN companies, the 179th's A and C
companies and the 180th Infantry Regiment’s F Company, dug in. Their
defense positions on Old Baldy were consolidated and ready.
The
Battle of Old Baldy, from June 26, 1952 C.E. to March 26, 1953 C.E.
Action
- First battle of
Old Baldy
On the afternoon of June 27th, the 179th‘s L
Company took over defense of the crest from the 180th‘s F Company
which were then moved back to a supporting position. At this point, C
Company and elements of A Company held the ground northwest of the
crest. When night fell, PVA activity around Old Baldy had increased. The
179th‘s positions began taking mortar and artillery fire. Next, the
PVA flares went up. The Chinese were on the move. By 22:00, L
Company’s defense positions were struck from the northeast and
southwest by an estimated reinforced PVA battalion. They continued to
press toward the crest until it met a circle of UN defensive fire. From
the UN MLR, artillery, mortar, tank, and infantry weapons covered PVA
avenues of approach. L Company’s small arms, automatic weapons, and
hand grenades were added to the circle which helped keep the PVA at bay.
By midnight, the PVA battalion was still unable
to penetrate the UN forces defensive ring atop Old Baldy. The PVA forces
soon withdrew to regroup.
During the early morning of June 28th, the
second and third PVA attacks followed. Using their familiar pattern each
lasted over an hour. On each attempt, the PVA failed to break through
the wall of defensive fires.
Aftermath
After suffering casualties, the PVA broke off
the fight. PVA casualties were estimated at between 250 and 325 men. The
179th reported six men killed and sixty-one wounded during the three
engagements.
PVA artillery and mortar fire hit Old Baldy
late in the evening of June 28th. It signaled the approach of another
PVA attack. Next, four PVA squads reconnoitered the 179th’s positions
in order to gain information about their enemy's strength and locations.
At 22:00, UN and PVA forces exchanged automatic weapons and small arms
fire.
About an hour later, a very heavy artillery and
mortar barrage announced that the PVA’s main assault by a force
estimated at two reinforced battalions had begun. They were moving in
from the northeast and northwest. PVA forces soon penetrated Old
Baldy’s outpost and crest perimeter. It was now hand-to hand fighting.
Shortly after midnight, a UNC flare plane
arrived illuminating the battle area. Now, defensive fires from the MLR,
in addition to a steady stream of small arms and automatic weapons fire
from the 179th's three companies on the hill became more effective. By
0100 on June 29th, the PVA forces were forced to disengage and move
northward.
Aftermath
The PVA had suffered more losses, estimated at
close to 700 men. In return, they had fired over 4,000 rounds of
artillery and mortar fire. The UN’s 179th had suffered 43 casualties,
including 8 KIA.
UN’s 45th Division’s troops had lacked
combat experience before the engagement for Old Baldy. Despite this
handicap, it had acquitted itself well on the battlefield. As June
ended, in the fight for the “Outposts” the UN’s 45th Division’s
troops had withstood more than twenty PVA counterattacks. It had also
inflicted upon the Chinese an estimated 3,500 casualties. The unit was
also awarded a commendation from U.S. 8th Army commander General James
Van Fleet.
Action
- Second battle of Old Baldy
The scarred, crater marked, blood soaked,
barren Old Baldy was about to experience yet one more contest between UN
forces and a very determined PVA.
The Chinese were about to make one more attempt
to wrest control of Old Baldy from the UN’s 45th hard won possession.
On the night of July 3rd, three separate attacks were launched by the
PVA. The last desperate attempt was of battalion strength. Each met the
same fate as their predecessors. The concentration of UN defensive
firepower blunted all their efforts. Finally, the PVA were forced to
desist in their assaults.
The PVA would not attempted to take the hill
again until the U.S. 2nd Division relieved the 45th. During mid-July,
all of the U.S. 8th Army's corps followed a policy of periodically
rotating their divisions on the line. The 45th Division had already
spent over six months at the front. It was time for a change.
The Chinese would soon take advantage of the
45th's relief and challenge the U.S. 2nd Division’s fighting ability.
On the night of July 17th, the PVA mounted two attacks. These were both
in strengths exceeding a reinforced battalion. Understanding what was
about to occur, the Old Baldy Outpost was quickly reinforcement. The
23rd Infantry Regiment’s E and F Companies who were defending the hill
were prepared and waiting. With heavy close defensive fires they managed
to repel the first PVA assault. On the second PVA assault, the 23rd was
as fortunate. The PVA forces won a foothold on Old Baldy’s slopes. The
PVA were quick to reinforce their positions. They would next exploit
them.
Soon, PVA artillery and mortar fire became very
intense, pounding the 23rd's defensive positions. Next, the Chinese
infantry followed up swiftly making their way up Old Baldy’s slopes.
They seized the crest and held it. The UN’s
23rd counterattacked with support for MLR air strikes and artillery and
mortar fire. Their efforts did not succeed in driving the PVA from the
hard won positions.
By July 20th, the 2nd Division elements had
only been able to regain a portion of the east finger of Old Baldy. With
the onset of the rainy season, operations were made exceedingly
difficult to carry out. The torrential downpours had converted the
Korean battleground into a morass of soft, wet, slippery ground. In the
last week of July, the UNC counted its losses for the month on Old
Baldy.
Aftermath
Through July 21st, the tally showed 39 killed,
234 wounded, and 84 missing for the UNC. An estimated 1,093 PVA were
killed or wounded.
Third
battle of Old Baldy
During the Battle of Old Baldy, 38th Infantry
Regiment, 2nd U.S. Infantry Division would engage the PVA. Hispanic
American Private Eulogio
Santiago-Figueroa, 38th Infantry Regiment, 2nd U.S. Infantry
Division, was wounded by fragments from a PVA artillery shell and
evacuated.
By the end of July, the rain had eased and the
23rd Infantry Regiment again sought to secure complete control of Old
Baldy. The PVA forces located on the crest were thought to have an
estimated defensive force of two platoons. The MLR began the assault
with artillery and mortar preparatory fires on the PVA positions. Next,
the UN’s 23rd Infantry Regiment sent two reinforced companies up the
slopes for the assault. As the 2nd Division forces edged toward the PVA
defenses, they used small arms fire and hand grenades as closed on the
trenches. After bitter hand-to-hand combat, the two companies finally
gained the crest of Old Baldy.
Early on August 1st, they dug in. In
preparation for the customary PVA counterattack, 200 flares were
distributed around the UNC positions. 42 UN air sorties were flown
during the day in support of the UN defensive positions. That night, the
PVA sent it first mortar onto Old Baldy. Next, their artillery fire was
hitting the crest. The PVA forces dropped an estimated 2,500 rounds on
the 23rd Regiment’s elements. PVA counterattacks on Old Baldy were
driven off.
On August 2nd, UN forces buried mines, built
bunkers, and placed additional barbed wire. The UN forces’ defensive
positions were now strengthened to hold Old Baldy. By August 4th,
extremely heavy and effective UN MLR artillery fire broke up another PVA
assault on Old Baldy.
The
Fourth battle of Old Baldy – October 5th-7th
The Fourth battle of Old Baldy fought from
October 5th-through October 7th, was more of the same. Fighting,
killing, and dying remained a constant.
Fifth
battle of Old Baldy – March 23–26, 1953
The Colombiano
Batallón or Battalion
insignia used during the Korean War
Colombia
was the only Latino Américano country
that participated in the UN forces in Korea. A frigate, the ARC Almirante
Padilla and an infantry batallón
with 1080 men were sent to join the UN Forces in August 1951 C.E. The Colombiano
ground forces had been awarded for their exemplary performance in
previous fighting and combat, Operations Nomad, Thunderbolt, Climber
(Hill 400) and Bárbula (Hill
180) with Presidential Unit Citations from the U.S. and South Korea and
U.S. Legion of Merit, Silver Stars and Bronze Stars awarded to the men.
At the time of Old Baldy, the Colombiano
Batallón was part of the 7th Division under Major-General Wayne C.
Smith. The Colombiano unit was
the fourth battalion in the 31st Regiment commanded by Colonel William
Kern who had ordered Teniente-Coronel
Alberto Ruíz Novoa, the Colombiano
commander to relieve the Regiment's 1st Battalion on Old Baldy.
The Colombiano
Batallón had just been
engaged in the Battle of Yeoncheon Hill (Bárbula)
in which its troops attacked the PVA’s outpost, 500m from the enemy's
main defense line, while carrying out preliminary duties at Mageo-ri,
northwest of Yeoncheon.
Action
- Hill 180
At dawn the Colombiano Batallón Compañía
C initiated an operation to capture Hill 180. The PVA outpost was
strongly built and Compañía C faced stiff resistance. Regimental Intelligence had
failed. The attack should have been carried out by at least one full
battalion, not just one company.
Aftermath
Intercepted PVA communications had confirmed
the struggle and hand-to-hand combat.
Compañía C had been hit hard and suffered 11 men killed, 43
wounded, and 10 missing in action (MIA). After capturing Hill 180, Compañía C destroyed the PVA's defense facilities. The casualties
had been too high for Compañía C.
They could not hold the position and were ordered to retreat.
Two days later on August the 6th, the Batallón
received orders for Old Baldy.
On their new defensive positions post, Compañía
A was placed with Compañía D
and Compañía B, going west to east. Compañía
C was placed behind both, in an area located between them. The
fourth Compañía of the Colombiano Batallón was
used to fill in the missing men in the other three Compañías. This meant that the entire Batallón was deployed in the frontline. A concerned Teniente-Coronel
Ruíz Novoa asked Colonel Kern for reserve troops. A U.S. Company
from the Regiment was soon assigned to the Batallón
as a reserve unit.
Teniente
Alfredo Forero Parra, Compañía
B on Old Baldy recounted what
a U.S. soldier had told him. "Lieutenant, we've been here for five
days and the troops we replaced lasted here just about the same. This is
a real cemetery. It's been taken and recovered by us about a hundred
times. Our men are rotated about every five to eight days because it's
hit hard by enemy fire causing innumerable casualties, demoralization
and sheer tiredness."
Yes, it was to be more of the same. The order
of the day, every day on Old Baldy, would be fighting, killing, and
dying.
Battle
of Heartbreak Ridge
On August 10, 1952
C.E., the U.S. Army’s 27th Infantry Regiment near Heartbreak Ridge
took advantage of the cover and concealment in tunnel positions located
about 40 yards from the NKPA.
Oliver G. Martínez
was born
March 23, 1931 C.E. He was U.S. MARINE
CORPS PFC and casualty of the Korean War. He died in
Korea on August 13, 1952 C.E. His home was in Santa Fé, Santa Fé,
New Mexico.
New Mexico U.S. Military Fatal
Hispano Casualties of the Korean War
|
Name
|
Service
|
Rank
|
Birthdate (YYYYMMDD)
|
Home of Record:
|
City County
|
Incident or Death Date (YYYYMMDD)
|
Remains Recovered
|
Martínez
Oliver G
|
Marine
Corps
|
PFC
|
19310323
|
Santa
Fé
|
Santa
Fé
|
19520813
|
Y
|
Ismael A. Acosta
was born
1927 C.E. He was U.S. ARMY Corporal and casualty of the Korean War. He
died in Korea on August 14, 1952 C.E. His home was in Grant, New Mexico.
New Mexico U.S. Military Fatal
Hispano Casualties of the Korean War
|
Name
|
Service
|
Rank
|
Birthdate (YYYYMMDD)
|
Home of Record:
|
City County
|
Incident or Death Date (YYYYMMDD)
|
Remains Recovered
|
Acosta
Ismael A
|
ARMY
|
CPL
|
19270000
|
Unknown
|
Grant
|
19520814
|
N
|
Eutiquio
J. Luján was born 1926 C.E.
He was U.S. ARMY Sergeant First Class and casualty of the Korean War
MIA. He died in Korea on August 29, 1952 C.E. Declared Dead-12/31/53.
His home was in Mora,
New Mexico.
He enlisted in the Army and served during the
Korean War. Luján held the rank of Sergeant First Class. Occupation or
specialty was Light Weapons Assault Crewman. Service number was
38579608. He served with Company A, 1st Battalion, 5th Infantry RCT.
CASUALTY CIRCUMSTANCES: Luján was declared missing and ultimately declared dead on August
29, 1952. Incident location was North Korea. Recorded circumstances
attributed to: "MIA Missing in Action Declared Dead."
REMEMBERED and MEMORIALS: Buried or
memorialized at Courts of the Missing at the Honolulu Memorial.
AWARDS and COMMENDATIONS: Listed are some of
the awards, medals and commendations that Sergeant First Class Luján
either received or may have been qualified for: ★ Purple
Heart ★ Combat
Infantryman Badge ★Korean Service
Medal ★ National
Defense Service Medal ★ Republic
of Korea Presidential Unit Citation★ Republic of Korea War Service Medal ★ UN
Service Medal ★ Distinguished
Unit Citation★ Good
Conduct Medal
New Mexico U.S. Military Fatal
Hispano Casualties of the Korean War
|
Name
|
Service
|
Rank
|
Birthdate (YYYYMMDD)
|
Home of Record:
|
City County
|
Incident or Death Date (YYYYMMDD)
|
Remains Recovered
|
Luján
Eutiquio J
|
ARMY
|
SFC
|
19260000
|
Unknown
|
Mora
|
19520829
|
N
|
Juan Benito Córdova was born February
11, 1931 C.E. He was U.S. MARINE
CORPS PFC and casualty of the Korean War. He died in
Korea on September 5, 1952 C.E. His home was in Llano,
Taos, New Mexico.
New Mexico U.S. Military Fatal
Hispano Casualties of the Korean War
|
Name
|
Service
|
Rank
|
Birthdate (YYYYMMDD)
|
Home of Record:
|
City County
|
Incident or Death Date (YYYYMMDD)
|
Remains Recovered
|
Córdova
Juan Benito
|
Marine
Corps
|
PFC
|
19310211
|
Llano
|
Taos
|
19520905
|
Y
|
José González was born August 9,
1931 C.E. He was U.S. MARINE
CORPS Sergeant and casualty of the Korean War. He
died in Korea on September 10, 1952 C.E. His home was in Raton, Colfax, New
Mexico.
Dennis Sisneros
was born
January 11, 1934 C.E. He was U.S. MARINE CORPS Corporal
and casualty of the Korean War. He died in Korea on September 10, 1952
C.E. His home was in Bernalillo, Sandoval,
New Mexico.
New Mexico U.S. Military Fatal
Hispano Casualties of the Korean War
|
Name
|
Service
|
Rank
|
Birthdate (YYYYMMDD)
|
Home of Record:
|
City County
|
Incident or Death Date (YYYYMMDD)
|
Remains Recovered
|
González
José
|
Marine
Corps
|
SGT
|
19310809
|
Raton
|
Colfax
|
19520910
|
Y
|
Sisneros
Dennis
|
Marine
Corps
|
CPL
|
19340111
|
Bernalillo
|
Sandoval
|
19520910
|
Y
|
Battle
of Heartbreak Ridge September 13th-October 15, 1951 C.E.
The Battle of Heartbreak Ridge was fought from
September 13th through October 15, 1951 C.E. It was to be one of several
major engagements in the hills of North Korea. It took place a few miles
north of the 38th parallel, near Chorwon. It was to be a month-long
ordeal.
Background
After withdrawing
from Bloody Ridge, NKPA forces had set up new positions just 1,500 yards
away on a seven-mile long hill mass. NKPA defenses were even more
formidable at this locale than they had been on Bloody Ridge.
The U.S. 2nd
Infantry Division's acting commander, Brigadier-General Thomas deShazo,
and his immediate superior, Major-General Clovis E. Byers, the X Corps
commander, seriously underestimated the strength of the NKPA position.
Brigadier-General deShazo had ordered a single infantry regiment, the
23rd Infantry Regiment, and its attached French Battalion, to make what
would prove to be an ill-conceived assault straight up Heartbreak's
heavily fortified slopes.
Actions
- Initial attempts to take the ridge
All three of the 2nd Division's, the 9th, 23rd
and 38th infantry regiments would participate. They would take the brunt
of the combat, along with the attached French Battalion.
The attack began on September 13th and quickly
deteriorated into a familiar pattern. First, American aircraft, tanks,
and artillery pummeled the ridge for hours on end, turning the already
barren hillside into a cratered moonscape. This was followed by the 23rd
Infantry Regiment's infantrymen scrambling up the mountain's rocky
slopes, attacking one enemy bunker after another by direct assault.
Those lucky enough to have survived to reach the crest arrived exhausted
and low on ammunition. Tired, hungry, and exhausted they waited for the
next PVA onslaught.
Not long after, the inevitable NKPA
counterattack would come. The UN forces would be hit by wave after wave
of NKPA determined to recapture the lost ground at any cost. Many of
these counterattacks were conducted at night. The NKPA were able to
bring up fresh troops from under the shelter of neighboring hills.
Battles were begun by bombings, shelling, and machinegun fire, were
inevitably followed with grenades, rifles. Trench knives and fists were
the final touch as the formal military engagements degenerated into
desperate hand-to-hand combat. As the dawn broke, it revealed whether
the defenders or attackers were in possession of the mountaintop.
The Battle of Heartbreak Ridge progressed for
two weeks. UN units could only be committed piecemeal. Because of the
constricting terrain and the narrow confines of the objectives, UN
forces were sent in one platoon, a company, or a battalion at a time.
Once a unit could no longer stand the strain, replacement units would
take its place. This pace continued until, the 23rd Infantry Regiment as
a whole, was fairly well shattered and just a shell of its former self.
Aftermath
Several units up to company size, consisting of
100-200 men, were completely wiped out. The UN employed massive
artillery barrages, airstrikes, and tank shelling in attempts to drive
the NKPA off the ridge. The NKPA proved extremely difficult to dislodge.
Luís Tapia Orlando
was born 1931 C.E. He was U.S. ARMY PFC and
casualty of the Korean War. He died in Korea on September 16, 1952 C.E.
His home was in Guadalupe,
New Mexico.
New Mexico U.S. Military Fatal
Hispano Casualties of the Korean War
|
Name
|
Service
|
Rank
|
Birthdate (YYYYMMDD)
|
Home of Record:
|
City County
|
Incident or Death Date (YYYYMMDD)
|
Remains Recovered
|
Orlando
Tapia Luís
|
ARMY
|
PFC
|
19310000
|
Unknown
|
Guadalupe
|
19520916
|
Y
|
Benito V. Valdéz was born 1929 C.E. He was U.S. ARMY PFC
and casualty of the Korean War. He died in Korea on September 20, 1952
C.E. His home was in Santa Fé,
New Mexico.
Alejandro González was born March 17,
1931 C.E. He was U.S. MARINE
CORPS PFC and casualty of the Korean War. He died in
Korea on September 20, 1952 C.E. His home was in Roy,
Harding,
New Mexico.
New Mexico U.S. Military Fatal
Hispano Casualties of the Korean War
|
Name
|
Service
|
Rank
|
Birthdate (YYYYMMDD)
|
Home of Record:
|
City County
|
Incident or Death Date (YYYYMMDD)
|
Remains Recovered
|
Valdéz
Benito V
|
ARMY
|
PFC
|
19290000
|
Unknown
|
Santa
Fé
|
19520920
|
Y
|
González
Alejandro
|
Marine
Corps
|
PFC
|
19310317
|
Roy
|
Harding
|
19520920
|
Y
|
Willie N. Estrada
was born
1929 C.E. He was U.S. ARMY Sergeant and casualty of the Korean War. He
died in Korea on September 22, 1952 C.E. His home was in Otero,
New Mexico.
New Mexico U.S. Military Fatal
Hispano Casualties of the Korean War
|
Name
|
Service
|
Rank
|
Birthdate (YYYYMMDD)
|
Home of Record:
|
City County
|
Incident or Death Date (YYYYMMDD)
|
Remains Recovered
|
Estrada
Willie N
|
ARMY
|
SGT
|
19290000
|
Unknown
|
Otero
|
19520922
|
Y
|
Actions
- Regroup and re-plan
Preliminaries
A new commander of 2nd Division called a halt
to the failures of Heartbreak Ridge.
On September 27th, U.S. Major-General Robert
Nicholas Young insisted that American planners reconsidered their
strategy. Simply put, as long as the NKPA could continue to reinforce
and resupply their garrison on the ridge, it would be nearly impossible
for the Americans to take the mountain. The 2nd Division after
recognizing its failures crafted a new plan. It called for a full
division assault on the valleys and hills adjacent to Heartbreak. This
was necessary to cut the ridge off from further reinforcement.
The 2nd Division's 72nd Tank Battalion was to
spearhead the new offensive. Its mission was to push up the Mundung-ni
Valley west of Heartbreak and destroy enemy supply dumps in the vicinity
of the town of Mundung-ni.
The bold plan could not be accomplished until a
way was found to get the 72nd's M4A3E8 Sherman tanks into the valley.
The problem was with the only existing road. It was little more than a
track which could not bear the weight of the tanks. In addition, it was
heavily mined and blocked by a six-foot high rock barrier built by the
NKPA. The 2nd Division's 2nd Engineer Combat Battalion were employed on
the road project using explosives, shovels, and forced to brave NKPA
fire while clearing the obstacles and building an improved roadway.
While the2nd Engineer Combat Battalion did its
job, the 2nd Division's three infantry regiments, the 9th, 23rd, and
38th, launched coordinated assaults on Heartbreak Ridge and the adjacent
hills.
Enríque Vigil was born January
5, 1931 C.E. He was U.S. MARINE
CORPS PFC and casualty of the Korean War. He died in
Korea on October 7, 1952 C.E. His home was in Española,
New Mexico.
New Mexico U.S. Military Fatal
Hispano Casualties of the Korean War
|
Name
|
Service
|
Rank
|
Birthdate (YYYYMMDD)
|
Home of Record:
|
City County
|
Incident or Death Date (YYYYMMDD)
|
Remains Recovered
|
Vigil
Enríque
|
Marine
Corps
|
PFC
|
19310105
|
Española
|
Multiple
|
19521007
|
N
|
Main
thrust
By October 10th, all preparations had been made
for the main operation. By October 11th, the U.S. 2nd Division’s
convoy started advancing into the valley. It was led by more than 30
tanks and supported by artillery and UN aircraft. The NKPA forces were
taken by surprise at the sudden onslaught of a battalion of UN tanks
racing up the valley. By coincidence, this came just as the PVA’s
204th Division was moving up to relieve the NKPA on Heartbreak.
The PVA unit dispatched by the 68th Army’s
Commander Niansheng Wen was the 610th Regiment of the 204th Division. It
was to prevent the Americans from reaching the town of Mundung-ni at all
costs. The regiment's mission included reinforcement of NKPA defense
along the valley against a possible American armored offensive.
The U.S. 2nd Division began its attack before
the PVA could dig in. They were caught in the open.
Aftermath
The PVA division suffered heavy casualties from
the American tanks which caused great damage. This, as the armored
vehicles penetrated to a depth of 6 km of the PVA defense lines.
The PVA’s 610th Regiment did manage to damage five Sherman tanks
before the UN forces halted their offensive.
Action
- Battles for Hill 635.8 and Hill 709.6
On October 12th, the U.S. 2nd Division began an
airborne and artillery bombardment of Hill 635.8 and Hill 709.6 which
lasted for two hours. Next, the UN 23rd Infantry Regiment led by 48
tanks, assaulted PVA defensive positions. The PVA’s 610th Regiment had
learned American battle tactics from the previous day. Previous to the
battle, they had reinforced the anti-tank trenches flanking the road
that runs through the Mundung-ni Valley. In addition, a battalion of
anti-tank guns was assigned to the regiment. Other hardware including 49
infantry guns, recoilless guns, and rocket launchers were also
distributed among the front-line soldiers. Soon, the PVA forces fired on
the advancing American tanks at point-blank-range.
Aftermath
By 1600hrs, before the 23rd was able to halt
the assault it had paid a high cost. PVA forces had destroyed or damaged
18 tanks. The 23rd Infantry Regiment did not assault the hills on the
next day.
Action
- Attack on hills 97, 742.8, 650, 932.8 and 922
Starting from October 13th, the ROKA 8th
Division launched its attack on hills 97, 742.8, 650, 932.8 and 922.
These battles were subsequently known to be brutal and costly. One
example was a company of the PVA 610th Regiment defending hill 932.8.
Under the attack of four ROKA battalions, the company resisted for four
days to the last man before the ROKA took the hill on its 11th assault.
Aftermath
ROKA took hill 932.8.
The UN French forces had been fighting hard
before they captured the last communist bastion on the ridge on October
13th.
Action
– Battles in Mundung-ni Valley
On October 14th, eight Sherman tanks in arrow
formation attacked the NKPA positions along Mundung-ni Valley. The
crossfire of PVA anti-tank guns knocked out all of the UN tanks.
Isidro E. Trujillo was born 1927 C.E. He was U.S. ARMY
Sergeant and casualty of the Korean War. He died in Korea on October 14,
1952 C.E. His home was in Guadalupe,
New Mexico.
New Mexico U.S. Military Fatal
Hispano Casualties of the Korean War
|
Name
|
Service
|
Rank
|
Birthdate (YYYYMMDD)
|
Home of Record:
|
City County
|
Incident or Death Date (YYYYMMDD)
|
Remains Recovered
|
Trujillo
Isidro E
|
ARMY
|
SGT
|
19270000
|
Unknown
|
Guadalupe
|
19521014
|
N
|
Lee R. Martínez
was born
1930 C.E. He was U.S. ARMY PFC and casualty of the Korean War. He died
in Korea on October 16, 1952 C.E. His home was in Curry, New Mexico.
New Mexico U.S. Military Fatal
Hispano Casualties of the Korean War
|
Name
|
Service
|
Rank
|
Birthdate (YYYYMMDD)
|
Home of Record:
|
City County
|
Incident or Death Date (YYYYMMDD)
|
Remains Recovered
|
Martínez
Lee R
|
ARMY
|
PFC
|
19300000
|
Unknown
|
Curry
|
19521016
|
Y
|
Juan B. Vigil
was born 1931 C.E. He was U.S. ARMY Corporal and casualty of the
Korean War. He died in Korea on October 17, 1952 C.E. His home was in Río
Arriba, New Mexico.
New Mexico U.S. Military Fatal
Hispano Casualties of the Korean War
|
Name
|
Service
|
Rank
|
Birthdate (YYYYMMDD)
|
Home of Record:
|
City County
|
Incident or Death Date (YYYYMMDD)
|
Remains Recovered
|
Vigil
Juan B
|
ARMY
|
CPL
|
19310000
|
Unknown
|
Río
Arriba
|
19521017
|
Y
|
On October 19th, two more Sherman tanks were
lost due to mines.
During these five days of action, the UN tanks
made their way up and down the Mundung-ni Valley. They over-ran supply
dumps and pounded PVA troop concentrations. The UN tanks also destroyed
approximately 350 bunkers on Heartbreak and in the surrounding hills and
valleys. A smaller tank-infantry team scoured the Sat'ae-ri Valley to
the east of the ridge completed an encirclement, eliminating any hope of
reinforcement for the beleaguered NKPA on Heartbreak.
Aftermath
After 30 days of combat, the Americans and
French eventually gained the upper hand and secured Heartbreak Ridge.
These armored tank thrusts had turned the tide of the battle, though 38
of the armored vehicles were destroyed and nine were damaged. The
Sherman tanks had been unable to penetrate through the Mundung-ni Valley
and reach the town of Mundung-ni. In reality, the failure of the Allied
UN offensive inside the valley and on the heights above gave to the NKPA
one of the few victorious actions during the last phase of the war.
The defense of the Mundung-ni Valley is known
today in the DPRK as the Battle of Height 1211. It is celebrated today
as a great DPRK victory which claims an inflated total of 29,000 enemy
casualties, 60 tanks destroyed, and 40 airplanes shot down. In
actuality, both sides suffered high casualties. There were more than
3,700 American and French casualties and an estimated 25,000 NKPA and
PVA casualties.
These losses made a deep impression on the UN
and U.S. commands and they came to a decision. Battles like Heartbreak
Ridge were not worth the high cost for the relatively small amount of
terrain captured.
The UN offensives, however, were to continue
with equally high casualty rates for the 1st Cavalry in Operation
Commando, and the 24th Division in Operation Nomad-Polar, which was the
last major offensive conducted by UN forces in the Korean War.
Joe F. González was born
1930 C.E. He was U.S. ARMY PFC and casualty of the Korean War. He died
in Korea on October 28, 1952 C.E. His home was in Mckinley, New Mexico.
Jenaro R. Calderon was born 1930 C.E. He was U.S. ARMY PFC
and casualty of the Korean War. He died in Korea on October 28, 1952
C.E. His home was in Grant,
New Mexico.
New Mexico U.S. Military Fatal
Hispano Casualties of the Korean War
|
Name
|
Service
|
Rank
|
Birthdate (YYYYMMDD)
|
Home of Record:
|
City County
|
Incident or Death Date (YYYYMMDD)
|
Remains Recovered
|
González
Joe F
|
ARMY
|
PFC
|
19300000
|
Unknown
|
Mckinley
|
19521028
|
Y
|
Calderon
Jenaro R
|
ARMY
|
PFC
|
19300000
|
Unknown
|
Grant
|
19521028
|
Y
|
At Eniwetok Atoll in the Pacific Ocean, the
first hydrogen bomb, named Mike, is exploded on November 1, 1952 C.E.
On November 4, 1952 C.E., the popular newcomer
to American politics, General Dwight D. Eisenhower the former WWII
European commander, gained an easy victory over his Democratic
challenger for President of the U.S. Adlai E. Stevenson. The Electoral
College vote was 442 to 89. Many believed that he won due to his role in
winning World War II.
Manuel Mendoza was born June 26,
1933 C.E. He was U.S. MARINE
CORPS PFC and casualty of the Korean War. He died in
Korea on November 18, 1952 C.E. His home was in Silver City,
Grant,
New Mexico.
New Mexico U.S. Military Fatal
Hispano Casualties of the Korean War
|
Name
|
Service
|
Rank
|
Birthdate (YYYYMMDD)
|
Home of Record:
|
City County
|
Incident or Death Date (YYYYMMDD)
|
Remains Recovered
|
Mendoza
Manuel
|
Marine
Corps
|
PFC
|
19330626
|
Silver
City
|
Grant
|
19521118
|
Y
|
Abel Baca
was born 1931 C.E.
He was U.S. ARMY PFC and casualty of the Korean War. He died in Korea on
November 19, 1952 C.E. His home was in Santa Fé,
New Mexico.
New Mexico U.S. Military Fatal
Hispano Casualties of the Korean War
|
Name
|
Service
|
Rank
|
Birthdate (YYYYMMDD)
|
Home of Record:
|
City County
|
Incident or Death Date (YYYYMMDD)
|
Remains Recovered
|
Baca
Abel
|
ARMY
|
PFC
|
19310000
|
Unknown
|
Santa
Fé
|
19521119
|
Y
|
Herman Chávira
was born
April 13, 1931 C.E. He was U.S. MARINE
CORPS Corporal and casualty of the Korean War. He
died in Korea on November 22, 1952 C.E. His home was in Albuquerque, Bernalillo,
New Mexico.
New Mexico U.S. Military Fatal
Hispano Casualties of the Korean War
|
Name
|
Service
|
Rank
|
Birthdate (YYYYMMDD)
|
Home of Record:
|
City County
|
Incident or Death Date (YYYYMMDD)
|
Remains Recovered
|
Chávira
Herman
|
Marine
Corps
|
CPL
|
19310413
|
Albuquerque
|
Bernalillo
|
19521122
|
N
|
President-elect Dwight D. Eisenhower traveled
to Korea to try and end the conflict on November 29, 1952 C.E.
Alfredo B. Olguín was born 1931 C.E. He was U.S. ARMY PFC
and casualty of the Korean War. He died in Korea on January 6, 1953 C.E.
His home was in València,
New Mexico.
New Mexico U.S. Military Fatal
Hispano Casualties of the Korean War
|
Name
|
Service
|
Rank
|
Birthdate (YYYYMMDD)
|
Home of Record:
|
City County
|
Incident or Death Date (YYYYMMDD)
|
Remains Recovered
|
Olguín
Alfredo B
|
ARMY
|
PFC
|
19310000
|
Unknown
|
València
|
19530106
|
Y
|
Pablo Torres was born December
24, 1929 C.E. He was U.S. MARINE
CORPS PFC and casualty of the Korean War. He died in
Korea on February 3, 1953 C.E. His home was in Mountainair,
Torrance,
New Mexico.
New Mexico U.S. Military Fatal
Hispano Casualties of the Korean War
|
Name
|
Service
|
Rank
|
Birthdate (YYYYMMDD)
|
Home of Record:
|
City County
|
Incident or Death Date (YYYYMMDD)
|
Remains Recovered
|
Torres
Pablo
|
Marine
Corps
|
PFC
|
19291224
|
Mountainair
|
Torrance
|
19530203
|
Y
|
Eppie J Ortega
was born
1931 C.E. He was U.S. ARMY PFC and casualty of the Korean War. He died
in Korea on February 8, 1953 C.E. His home was in Bernalillo,
New Mexico.
New Mexico U.S. Military Fatal
Hispano Casualties of the Korean War
|
Name
|
Service
|
Rank
|
Birthdate (YYYYMMDD)
|
Home of Record:
|
City County
|
Incident or Death Date (YYYYMMDD)
|
Remains Recovered
|
Ortega
Eppie J
|
ARMY
|
PFC
|
19310000
|
Unknown
|
Bernalillo
|
19530208
|
Y
|
Gilberto Montoya was born 1931 C.E.
He was U.S. ARMY PVT
and casualty of the Korean War. He died in Korea on February 22, 1953
C.E. His home was in Bernalillo,
New Mexico.
New Mexico U.S. Military Fatal
Hispano Casualties of the Korean War
|
Name
|
Service
|
Rank
|
Birthdate (YYYYMMDD)
|
Home of Record:
|
City County
|
Incident or Death Date (YYYYMMDD)
|
Remains Recovered
|
Montoya
Gilberto
|
ARMY
|
PVT
|
19310000
|
Unknown
|
Bernalillo
|
19530222
|
Y
|
The
Colombiano Battalion on Old
Baldy
On March 20th, artillery fire was felt all over
the 31st Regiment. The Colombiano
Batallón was on Old Baldy in
the middle with 2nd Battalion to its left and 3rd Battalion was on Pork
Chop Hill. Intercepted communications from the PVA command and deserters
confirmed the imminence of the attack, Colonel William Kern remained
skeptical of the Colombianos’ fighting
ability.
On March the 21st, five bodies, four Colombianos
and an American, were exposed by the PVA on the crest of Hill 180. The
PVA wanted to tempt the Colombianos
in trying to recover them. The Colombiano
Comandante ordered a rescue mission by volunteers from Compañía
C. Privado Alejandro Martínez
Roa reached the crest, deactivated a mine under one of the bodies,
descended with one of the corpses, escaped enemy fire and when he
encountered other Colombiano tropas, returned to the crest with Cabo Pedro Limas Medina and the patrol and rescued the others. The
heroic action was rewarded with four Silver Stars.
On the 22nd the undermining of the Colombiano
position on Old Baldy was increased by the PVA. More than 2000 rounds of
cannon fire was dropped over the area.
Action
- Fifth battle of Old Baldy – March 23rd-March 26, 1953 C.E.
Hiliberto García was born 1930 C.E.
He was U.S. ARMY Corporal and casualty of the Korean War. He died in
Korea on March 23, 1953 C.E. His
home was in Mora,
New Mexico.
New Mexico U.S. Military Fatal
Hispano Casualties of the Korean War
|
Name
|
Service
|
Rank
|
Birthdate (YYYYMMDD)
|
Home of Record:
|
City County
|
Incident or Death Date (YYYYMMDD)
|
Remains Recovered
|
García
Hiliberto
|
ARMY
|
CPL
|
19300000
|
Unknown
|
Mora
|
19530323
|
Y
|
Louis Martínez
was born
1930 C.E. He was U.S. ARMY PFC and casualty of the Korean War. He died
in Korea on March 25, 1953 C.E. His home was in Colfax, New Mexico.
New Mexico U.S. Military Fatal
Hispano Casualties of the Korean War
|
Name
|
Service
|
Rank
|
Birthdate (YYYYMMDD)
|
Home of Record:
|
City County
|
Incident or Death Date (YYYYMMDD)
|
Remains Recovered
|
Martínez
Louis
|
ARMY
|
PFC
|
19300000
|
Unknown
|
Colfax
|
19530325
|
N
|
By March the 23rd, Compañía B had been on
the line of fire for 11 days. Due to this, Colonel Kern ordered a
rotation of Compañía B with Compañía C.
Teniente-Coronel Ruíz
objected to the order citing his concern that with a PVA attack expected
on Old Baldy he considered it a mistake to move his tropas.
Ruíz also knew that Compañía C had earlier
been hit very hard on Hill 180 and he did not want to expose them yet,
to more heavy fire. But Kern kept the order and the Companies started
rotation. At about 15:00, the rotation movement began. Men were eager to
rotate as soon as they heard the new orders. Heavy enemy fire made it
difficult for Compañía C to advance toward its new position. Once again, Compañía
C began receiving heavy losses.
Meanwhile, Compañía
B was completely demoralized.
It had been under constant artillery fire since its arrival. Teniente Alfredo Forero Parra reported that "By that day our
positions were seriously weakened by the enemy artillery fire. The
position for my men was on the crest of Old Baldy. We were the Second Pelotón or Platoon in Compañía
B.
Past noon, I received orders to prepare my men
to be relieved by Compañía C,
next to us. All of us, from our combat positions were anxious to be
relieved, but Compañía C did not
arrive. I was convinced we were in for a major attack so I went and
spoke with American tank commander which supported our position, and I
convinced him to give us a .30 machine gun in order to enhance our
defense. We had everything ready, including the flamethrower assigned to
us."
The PVA 141st Division, 423rd Regiment’s 1st
Battalion was selected to assault Old Baldy. Commanded by Hou Yung-chun,
The Unit's 3rd Company would lead the attack. The PVA Unit was situated
directly facing the battered Colombian
Compañía B. At 20:30, Compañía A
on Dale was under attack from heavy fire. With support from Compañías
B and C, after a tenacious resistance Compañía
A had to give up its position.
Action
- Pork Chop Hill
PVA
Attack
Using the same heavy fire power, the PVA hit
Pork Chop Hill hard. Soon, the U.S. 3rd Battalion could not hold its
position and lost Pork Chop. Now, thinking that the main objective of
the PVA’s attack had been Pork Chop Hill, Colonel Kern sent in two
companies to reinforce the men of the 3rd Battalion. Two hours later,
the fighting at Pork Chop diminished.
Aftermath
With the reinforcements received from the
Regiment Command the 3rd Battalion had retaken its position on the Hill.
Action
- Old Baldy
"Forty minutes after the attack on Dale
and Pork Chop Hill, tremendously heavy artillery and mortar fire fell on
Old Baldy. The earth shook as if in an earthquake accompanied by
flashing and deafening explosions all around Compañía
B's position. The fleeting
silhouettes of men, weapons and weakened fortifications seemed ghosts
within the enemy bursts. Cries of anguish and agony mingled with our own
and enemy machine gun rattle. The battle raged at every moment. We could
hear at a short distance the firing of 60 and 82 mm. mortars from
the enemy. Communications were lost, no one answered, not even the escuadrón comandantes.
Suddenly, I was reported the death of my Pelotón
Sargento or Sergeant replacement, Azael Salazar Osorio, then the commander of the third escuadrilla
or squad, Cabo José
Narváez Moncayo, who had been severed by the waist and shouted near
death, to be lifted by the feet to relieve his suffering. Nothing could
be done for him. At my battle station the death of Cabo
Ernesto González Varela, Comandante
of the second escuadrón, was
atrocious. We were almost touching elbows. He fired his machine gun on
an onslaught of Chinese who came upon us when a bazooka shell hit him on
the face, leaving his head tangling on his back. I thought I was living
a nightmare or horror movie until new explosions on my bunker brought me
back to reality. I encouraged my men and I continued to communicate with
machine guns and gave instructions for a Cabo
to take out the flamethrower and prepare himself to shoot the enemy when
they appeared."
The attack was unsuccessful.
The PVA were attacking again. "A few
minutes later, two soldados
came running to my trench shouting, the Chinese are coming, the Chinese
are coming! The enemy was trying to overcome our position shouting and
shooting their machine guns and throwing grenades." They began
breaking through the defense and heading for Compañía
B’s trenches. At that
moment, Compañía C was arriving to relieve Compañía
B with no knowledge of the
ammo deposits, trench and foxhole distribution, and defense sectors. Compañía
B still had command over the position on the crest of the hill, but
half of the men were now Compañía
C. The men of Compañía C been hit hard
earlier on Hill 180. These men remained under the influence of that
nightmare. Now, on Old Baldy they were unable to fully come to occupy
their combat positions.
Teniente-Coronel
Ruíz had been right. The main
attack was not Pork Chop Hill, but Old Baldy, as Colonel Kern had
believed.
Action
- PVA Moves Against Hill
Dale and Old Baldy
Meanwhile, a PVA regiment had launched an
attack on Hill Dale. Regimental command was still distracted by a
previous attack that touched the U.S. battalion adjacent to the Colombiano
Compañía. Soon, in the
darkness, another PVA regiment began its move toward Old Baldy.
Action
- PVA Attack on Old Baldy
The previous days’ bombings of Old Baldy had
weakened the Colombiano
positions there. It had destroyed much of the defensive positions’
barbed wire barrier and mines. In short, the defenses were now open to a
direct attack. The situation for the Colombiano
units’ defense positions could not be weaker. The battle began as the Colombianos
were taking their assault positions. A new rain of artillery shells fell
upon Compañía B's position on
the crest of the hill. The attack was being conducted by a full PVA
Battalion, reinforced by two additional companies. Only three Compañías of the Colombiano
Battalion stood against them, A, B, and C.
All night, these UN forces fought fiercely
against too great a PVA force. They did so in the midst of
confusion brought on by darkness and of two recently combined Colombiano
units, half of Compañía B and half of Compañía C,
unfamiliar with one another. Understanding his battle conditions, Teniente-Coronel
Ruíz advised his superiors of
his intention to use the U.S. reserve company assigned to the Batallón in order to counterattack. This he felt would protect the tropas
engaged in combat and allow him to retake the lost positions. The U.S.
liaison officer advised that the reserves had been used to contain a PVA
penetration on Pork Chop Hill. With no reserves with which to
counterattack and fight back, the Colombiano Batallón was
now on its own.
With the ferocity of the attack which had
preceded this one on Old Baldy, Compañía
A had been earlier forced to
retreat. Yet, it remained determined to recover their lost defensive
positions from the PVA. This they would attempt despite the lack of any
backup or reinforcements. Compañías
B and C, having been
caught in the middle of the confusion of the rotation, could do nothing
but try to survive.
Despite all of this adversity, the Colombiano
tropas almost broke the force of the PVA’s assault. This was
proven later by a communication intercepted by Division Intelligence.
The PVA battalion commander, Hou Yung-chun, stated that the assault was
unsuccessful and the capture of Hill 266, Old Baldy, was impossible. The
PVA high command responded with orders to Hou Yung-chun to take the Hill
or suffer the consequences. Moments later, they announced the dispatch
of reinforcements.
As the number of PVA attackers increased, the
defenders’ numbers were being reduced by casualties. Yet, the Colombianos
fought on. The tremendous PVA numerical superiority’s advantages took
hold it eventually wore down the efforts of the defending Colombiano
tropas’. Their positions
were depleted dramatically. But still, the PVA had to conquer the
defensive positions’ trench-by-trench in fierce hand-to-hand combat.
At midnight, only one platoon had managed to
reach the West View. It tried to help contain part of the ongoing
attack. There the surviving Colombianos
awaited reinforcements to retake the lost position, reinforcements which
would never arrive.
By about 01:00, both parties believed that the
other had captured the Hill and began bombing with heavy artillery fire.
Both armies’ men were stranded on the battleground locked in
hand-to-hand combat trying to maintain their positions. Despite the
reality of having troops continuing to fight there the armies downloaded
shells on them. Both friendly and enemy fire alike brought more
casualties.
Alfredo
Forero stated that "At 4:30 AM, we were only six
men left in Compañía B's
Second rifle Pelotón, with exhausted ammunition and harassed by the enemy. We
made our way towards the tank path, losing three more men due to the
continuous artillery fire."
"Before midnight, PVA tanks in the valley
were removed, leaving free entrance to the enemy. A truck with our
ammunition stopped at the entrance of the position on road in the
valley. From it descended Tenientes
Leónidas Parra and Miguel Ospina Rodríguez, the sappers and transmission officers, as
a heavy fog covered the morning and we could hear sporadic gunshots and
screams." Teniente Ospina
had arrived with orders to try to restore communications with Batallón
Command. The stark reality of Old Baldy’s condition nothing could
be done.
At 8:00 a.m., the Colombianos asked a U.S. platoon which had just arrived for fire
support in order to retake the lost hill, but after a short
reconnaissance they withdrew. It was at this point, that the command of
the Division ordered the hill abandoned and soon bombardment began on
Old Baldy.
Aftermath
The Colombiano
Batallón had been unable to
get back its men behind lines, stranded, wounded or dead. The Batallón casualties were 95 killed, 97 wounded, and 30 missing.
This constituted over 20% of the Batallón.
The 7th Division estimated that the U.S. forces lost there were 307
killed. Its estimate of Chinese killed on Old Baldy was 750. Chinese
forces claimed to have suffered 311 dead. The PVA 3rd company, 423rd
regiment, 141st division were awarded the title "Hero Company of
Old Bald Mountain."
In the end, both sides lost many men. From a
strategic perspective, the battle lines ended up back to where they were
in May 1952 C.E., before the first battle.
Lorenzo Baca was born November
26, 1928 C.E. He was U.S. MARINE
CORPS PFC and casualty of the Korean War. He died in
Korea on April 6, 1953 C.E. His home was in Albuquerque, Bernalillo, New Mexico.
New Mexico U.S. Military Fatal
Hispano Casualties of the Korean War
|
Name
|
Service
|
Rank
|
Birthdate (YYYYMMDD)
|
Home of Record:
|
City County
|
Incident or Death Date (YYYYMMDD)
|
Remains Recovered
|
Baca
Lorenzo
|
Marine
Corps
|
PFC
|
19281126
|
Albuquerque
|
Bernalillo
|
19530406
|
Y
|
Charlie D. Quintana
was born 1930 C.E. He was U.S. ARMY PFC and casualty of the Korean War.
He died in Korea on April 16, 1953 C.E. His home was in Curry, New
Mexico.
New Mexico U.S. Military Fatal
Hispano Casualties of the Korean War
|
Name
|
Service
|
Rank
|
Birthdate (YYYYMMDD)
|
Home of Record:
|
City County
|
Incident or Death Date (YYYYMMDD)
|
Remains Recovered
|
Quintana
Charlie D
|
ARMY
|
SGT
|
19300000
|
Unknown
|
Curry
|
19530416
|
Y
|
Action
- Outpost Harry
Background
Outpost Harry was a remote station located in
an area approximately 60 miles north of Seoul. It was the most direct
route to the ROK’s capital. Harry also blocked the PVA’s observation
down the Kumwha Valley. More importantly, the Outpost’s position
ensured the shielding of that portion of the MLR located in the Kumwha
Valley from enemy direct fire. This made Harry a strategic
"military Hot Spot." As a result, the PVA high command dearly
desired it. The UNC viewed its defense and preservation as critical. If
the UN forces were to lose the Outpost, the U.S. 8th Army would have had
to withdraw to the next defensible line which was approximately 6 miles
away
Politically speaking, should there be a PVA
victory at Outpost Harry the Chinese appetite for more war might be
whetted. At this point in time, the Korean War had disheartened the
American public. It was at a place where it might accept an armistice on
term less favorable to the Americans than would eventually the case.
Outpost Harry was located east of the Chorwon
Valley in what was commonly referred to as the "Iron
Triangle." Harry, which was over 400 yards from the MLR, was also
higher than the MLR and located atop a tiny hill at an elevation of
approximately 1,280 feet. This made supplying it much more difficult. A
service road wound up to it from the MLR along an intermittent stream
which led to the rear of the Outpost. There, a medical aid station and a
supply point were located. From the supply point forward, some 400 yards
to the top Harry, was the communication trench line. This communication
line was joined to another trench which made a complete loop or circle
around the Outpost. The line had a finger running along the Kumwha
Valley’s eastern ridge, above the floor for about 100 yards. The
trench line was deep enough for infantrymen to walk unseen by the enemy
around the perimeter. It was also fortified with reinforced fighting
bunkers, a command post, and a forward observation bunker. The Trench
could accommodate approximately 150 infantrymen.
Harry’s sister outposts, Dick and Tom, were
to the west. Outpost Dick was situated about 100 yards in front of the
MLR. Tom was situated about 250-300 yards in front and below the MLR.
There below the MLR was the floor of the valley. It was positioned some
320 yards south of a larger landmass occupied by the Chinese PVA called
"Star Hill." It was also some 425 yards northeast of UNC
positions.
The access route from the MLR to Harry was
under constant enemy observation and fire. Harry received less close
supporting fire from the MLR. Company 60mm mortars and the heavy machine
guns did not have enough range to assist Harry. It was forced to rely
more on artillery and heavy mortar companies. Dick and Tom could be
provided with supporting MLR fire.
Each night, Outpost Harry was defended by only
a single company of American or Greek soldiers. The Greek Expeditionary
Force soldiers of the Sparta Battalion adapted the name Harry and called
it Outpost "Haros." This is the modern day Greek equivalent of
Charon Greek mythology's ferryman to the underworld of Hades. Five UNC
companies, four U.S. and one Greek, took turns in defending the Outpost.
Harry was seen by the PVA command as an easy capture, or so it was
anticipated. It was on this terrain, under these battle conditions, and
with these armaments and men that Harry was to be defended.
UN aerial reconnaissance of June 1st through
June 8, 1953 C.E. indicated that the Chinese were building up PVA forces
for a major offensive. These units were identified as the 74th
Division’s 22nd and 221st Regiments.
During the 4 to 5 days before the initial
Chinese attack of June 10, 1953 C.E. on Harry, PVA artillery and mortar
fire increased on the Outpost during daylight hours. By the 5th day,
artillery and mortar fire was up to an average 670 rounds from 275 five
days earlier.
Rudolph R. Orozco
was born
1932 C.E. He was U.S. ARMY PFC and casualty of the Korean War. He died
in Korea on June 8, 1953 C.E. His home was in Bernalillo,
New Mexico.
New Mexico U.S. Military Fatal
Hispano Casualties of the Korean War
|
Name
|
Service
|
Rank
|
Birthdate (YYYYMMDD)
|
Home of Record:
|
City County
|
Incident or Death Date (YYYYMMDD)
|
Remains Recovered
|
Orozco
Rudolph R
|
ARMY
|
PVT
|
19320000
|
Unknown
|
Bernalillo
|
19530608
|
Y
|
Also by June 8, 1953 C.E., the basic agreement
over the Korean War POW issue was settled. Both sides in the Korean
conflict agreed on the principle of voluntary repatriation.
Action
- Initial Chinese Attack on Outpost Harry
When the PVA attack began there was fierce
fighting over a period of eight days through June 18th. Most of this
fighting occurred at night, under heavy mortar fire. More than 88,000
rounds of PVA artillery eventually fell on Harry. Waves of PVA forces,
some 13,000 soldiers, moved into the Outpost's trench lines.
During the daylight hours, the UNC forces
usually spent its time evacuating the dead and wounded, replacing the
defending company’s forces, sending up resupplies, and repairing the
fortified defensive positions. The daylight hours also brought PVA
artillery, mortar, and sniper fire making repairs and reinforcement of
defensive positions a dangerous task.
Early on June 10th, commander of the 15th
Infantry Regiment’s K Company, Captain Martin A. Markley, had been
briefed on an imminent attack. Ammo and communications were checked.
Particular attention was paid to final protective fires
("FPF"). The MLR’s tactical plan for Unit was to set up FPF
to be used in support of the infantry defensive positions at
Outpost Harry, to protect it against the presumed oncoming, overwhelming
PVA attack by the 74th Division’s 22nd and 221st Regiments.
The FPF "fire mission" request for
artillery support was planned for the possibility of the Unit being
overrun. All understood that this type of FPF was of absolute priority
over any other kind of request. Given the size of the attacking force
and its fighting capabilities, the MLR insisted upon a FPF as an
immediately available preplanned barrier of direct and indirect fire. It
was designed to provide Harry with close protection to its defensive
positions and installations. The FPF was intended to impede the PVA 74th
Division from movement into the UN defensive areas.
When the first attack occurred during that
night, the Chinese reinforced PVA regiment of approximately 3,600 troops
outnumbered Harry's defenders by 30 to 1 as they stormed the slopes of
the Outpost. Soon, the PVA forces were penetrating its trenches, this
despite an intense barrage of UN defensive firepower and the detonation
of napalm. Now, K Company was forced undercover in bunkers. As agreed to
earlier, Variable Time (VT) UN artillery was called in to stop the
attacking PVA force.
Harry’s commander had set up the Final
Protective Line. Pre-registered final protective fire coordinates were
given so as to impede the assaulting force which at that point was about
to overrun Harry’s defensive positions. All available artillery was to
conduct Flash Fires directly onto the Outpost Hill using VT fuze
shells. Once the barrage started, the artillery fuze munition
would initiate an explosive function to detonate or release its
contents, when its activation conditions were met. These artillery
rounds exploded in the air rather than on impact. Once within proximity
to Outpost Harry’s defensive positions, the PVA would take the brunt
of it. Flash Fires and fierce hand-to-hand combat finally drove the
PVA Chinese from Harry for the remainder of that night.
By the next morning of the 11th, only a dozen
of Harry’s defenders were left that could still fight. All the other K
Company troops had been severely wounded or killed. At this point, K
Company was so depleted that they were immediately reinforced by a
reserve platoon. Soon, they were replaced by another company of the 3rd
Battalion. In addition to the 3rd battalion composite reserve, the 15th
Infantry’s Companies "E" and "C" were committed to
reinforce. A diversionary force, consisting of one platoon of tanks from
Heavy Tank Company, 15th Infantry, and one platoon of infantry were also
committed to the valley east of Harry to confuse the enemy. This
tank-infantry team would later prove to be of great value in channeling
the enemy attack.
During the battle, Company C exceeded the 2nd
Chemical Mortar Battalion's record for the number of rounds fired in a
single engagement, with a total of 6,082 rounds.
On the night of the 11th, the PVA began with
another massive artillery and mortar barrage, this time on the 15th's
Baker (B) Company and of the 5th RCT’s Baker (B) Company defended
Harry. It continued through most of the night as PVA infantry crept in
close through the artillery fire. They soon gained the trenches on the
rear of the Outpost, bringing on bitter hand-to-hand fighting. The 5th
RCT’s Company B was used to reinforce the defenders, as the PVA
attempted to reinforce the initial successful assault through the night.
By daybreak, at approximately 05:45, the Chinese again called off their
assault and withdrew.
On the night of June 12 at 22:00, PVA artillery
and mortar fire preceded an attack on the Outpost with the 5th RCT’s
Able (A) Company and the 15th Infantry Regiment’s Love (L) Company
defended Harry. A detachment from the 10th Combat Engineer Battalion was
trapped on the Outpost while on a mine laying detail, acted in supported
of these forces. The PVA finally made it into the Outpost trench, but
could only remain there for a short time. They were eventually broken up
by UNC defensive fires. The PVA were then forced to withdraw. Fighting
ceased at 22:47.
At 02:08, PVA forces attacked again, but this
time from the north, hitting northeast and northwest of the Outpost.
Bitter hand-to-hand combat began fighting as the PVA gained the trench
on the northern slope of the Outpost. Love Company soon reinforced the
Outpost.
A platoon of tanks from the 64th Tank Battalion
and one platoon of infantry which had been dispatched to the valley east
of Outpost Harry operated successfully as a diversionary force. By 04:50
hours, the PVA were driven from the Outpost trenches and forced to
withdraw. All action ceased with the exception of UNC counter battery
and counter mortar fire.
The next day, the 5th RCT’s Charlie (C)
Company took responsibility for Harry. On June 14th, very early that
morning at approximately 02:55, PVA artillery and mortar fire open up on
the Outpost. It preceded a PVA screening action against the Outpost from
the east and west to provide a security operation to screen as an
early warning to protect the assaulting force. This security operation failed
to provide early and accurate warning of UN operations against the PVA
troops assigned to recovery of their dead. The screening force was
broken up by UNC defensive fires. Action became sporadic, with light PVA
artillery and mortar fire falling on the Outpost and MLR. By 04:40 the
PVA withdrew and all action ceased.
On June 15th, the 15th infantry’s Company G
had their opportunity to defend Outpost Harry. It was about 01:25 when
the PVA moved through friendly artillery and defensive fires and gained
the trenches on the rear of the Outpost. Intense hand-to-hand fighting
followed. By 02:22, UNC forces were still holding the Outpost, though
the PVA had been further reinforced while a bitter hand-to-hand action
was underway. The 15th Infantry’s Company E was then committed to
reinforce Company G. One platoon from Heavy Tank Company and one platoon
of Infantry were again dispatched as diversionary force. By 03:45 the
PVA withdrew and action ceased. That same day, 15th Infantry’s Company
A was committed to the defense of the Outpost. Fortunately, for them it
turned out to be a quiet night.
The morning of the 16th, the regimental
commander placed the Greek Expeditionary Forces "Spartan"
Battalion in the area of the Outpost Harry sector. He did this in order
to allow his U.S. battalions to refit and reorganize, as they had all
suffered heavy casualties. During the night of June 16th, there was no
significant action. This permitted much-needed engineer work on the
outpost to be accomplished by Company P, Sparta Battalion.
During the day of the 17th, with assistance
from 10th Combat Engineer Battalion’s Company B, engineering work
continued on the Outpost. The engineers did not remain on the outpost
overnight.
On June the 17th, agreement on the final Korean
truce-demarcation line was finalized. Everyone but Syngman Rhee was
pleased with the negotiations.
As a result, Syngman Rhee was pleased with the
Korean truce negotiations and jeopardized them when he allowed the
release and escape of twenty-seven thousand Korean POWs on June 18th.
This angered North Koreans who wanted U.S. to take the responsibility to
ensure that the negotiations would be carried out by Rhee. In one final
offensive attack where seven thousand four hundred South Koreans were
killed and U.S. forces endangered, the U.S. agreed to take
responsibility in enforcing the agreement of the armistice.
Action
- Outpost Harry
At around midnight on the morning of June 18th,
the PVA returned. This time, they attacked Outpost Harry from the
northeast and northwest. Once again, they moved through their own and
UNC artillery and mortar fire. Soon, they were repelled and forced to
withdraw, but they stayed in the area.
In the United States, the Rosenbergs were about
to get their just rewards. The U.S. Federal Bureau of Prisons did not
operate an execution chamber when the Rosenbergs were sentenced to
death. They had to be transferred to New York State's Sing Sing
Correctional Facility in Ossining, New York, for execution. Julius and
Ethel Rosenberg were executed by electrocution by executioner Joséph
Francel at sundown on June 19, 1953 C.E.
Julius and Ethel Rosenberg the parents of two
young boys were executed for espionage. Their crime was conspiracy to
commit espionage. Julius, a leader in the Young Communist League in the
1930s C.E., was first recruited by Russian agents in 1943 C.E. He
recruited a number of other Americans, including Ethel's brother, David
Greenglass. Julius and Greenglass provided the Russians with top-secret
information, including details about the Manhattan Project. Greenglass,
who was arrested in 1950 C.E., implicated Julius and Ethel. The couple's
conviction was based largely on his testimony. Years later, Greenglass
confessed that he had lied about his sister's involvement to save the
lives of his wife and himself.
Marcus Tullius Cicero put it nicely when he
said, “A nation can survive its fools, and even the ambitious. But it
cannot survive treason from within. An enemy at the gates is less
formidable, for he is known and carries his banner openly. But the
traitor moves amongst those within the gate freely, his sly whispers
rustling through all the alleys, heard in the very halls of government
itself.” The Rosenbergs would whisper no more treason!
Action
- Outpost Harry
At 02:40 the CPV attacked again from the north,
once again under intense UN artillery and mortar fire. By 03:13, the PVA
had made their way into the Outpost’s trenches on the northern slope.
Soon, bitter hand-to-hand fighting began. The PVA continued making
numerous attempts to reinforce through the protective artillery ring.
The Sparta Battalion’s Company N was then committed to reinforce. The
15th Infantry Regiment’s Heavy Tank Company’s one platoon of tanks
and Spartan Infantry’s one platoon were dispatched to the valley east
of Outpost Harry as a diversionary force. By 04:02 the PVA were forced
out of the Outpost’s trenches and all action ceased. The PVA then
withdrew after having fired 22,000 rounds in support of this attack.
Aftermath
The Chinese PVA forces employed against Outpost
Harry were tabulated by U.S. Intelligence Sections:
·
June
10 and June 11: one reinforced regiment (approximately 3,600 troops)
·
June
11 and June 12: one regiment (approximately 2,850 troops)
·
June
12 and June 13: one reinforced regiment
·
June
13 and June 14: an estimated 100 troops
·
June
14 and June 15: an estimated 120 troops
·
June
17 and June 18: one reorganized and reinforced regiment (approximately
3,000 troops)
During this period the entire PVA 74th Division
had been committed against Outpost Harry. By the end of the engagement,
it was considered combat ineffective. Rounds fired in support of their
attack amounted to 88,810 rounds over 81mm in size. UNC mortar and
artillery units in conjunction with friendly tank fires expended 368,185
rounds over 81mm in size.
Casualties
The 15th Infantry Regiment had 68 KIA, 343 WIA,
35 MIA. The KATUSA had 8 KIA, 51 WIA, 7 MIA. The Greek Expeditionary
Force Sparta Battalion lost 15 KIA, 36 WIA, 1 MIA. Attached and
supporting units of the 5th RCT suffered 13 KIA, 67 WIA, 1 MIA. The 10th
Engineer Battalion lost 5 KIA, 23 WIA and the 39th FA lost 5 KIA, 13
WIA.
According to Chinese sources, the PVA 74th
Division and other two divisions of 24 corps suffered total 2,038
casualties from May 27th through June 23rd.
Eladio
M. Ortega was born 1932 C.E.
He was U.S. ARMY Corporal and casualty of the Korean War. He died in
Korea on June 24, 1953 C.E. His home was in Taos,
New Mexico.
José
A. Archuleta was born 1931
C.E. He was U.S. ARMY PFC and casualty of the Korean War. He died in
Korea on June 24, 1953 C.E. His home was in Mora,
New Mexico.
New Mexico U.S. Military Fatal
Hispano Casualties of the Korean War
|
Name
|
Service
|
Rank
|
Birthdate (YYYYMMDD)
|
Home of Record:
|
City County
|
Incident or Death Date (YYYYMMDD)
|
Remains Recovered
|
Ortega
Eladio M
|
ARMY
|
CPL
|
19320000
|
Unknown
|
Taos
|
19530624
|
Y
|
Archuleta
José A
|
ARMY
|
PFC
|
19310000
|
Unknown
|
Mora
|
19530624
|
Y
|
Manuel Torrio Romero was born 1932 C.E.
He was U.S. ARMY PFC and casualty of the Korean War. He died in Korea on
July 10, 1953 C.E. His home was in Eddy,
New Mexico.
New Mexico U.S. Military Fatal
Hispano Casualties of the Korean War
|
Name
|
Service
|
Rank
|
Birthdate (YYYYMMDD)
|
Home of Record:
|
City County
|
Incident or Death Date (YYYYMMDD)
|
Remains Recovered
|
Romero
Manuel Torrio
|
ARMY
|
PFC
|
19320000
|
Unknown
|
Eddy
|
19530710
|
N
|
A Hispanic American Colonel Jonathan de
Sola Méndes, and also a Sephardim, was an exemplary member of Congregation
Shearith Israel, the Spanish and Portuguese Synagogue, for the
Sephardim community. De Sola Méndes had become a combat pilot during World War II (100
missions; two Air Medals). He flew again for his country during the Korean
War (70 missions; 8 Air Medals, including the Distinguished
Flying Cross), where he flew the last U.S. Marine Corps mission
on July 27, 1953 C.E., on the last day of the war.
Korean War fighting ceased when on July 27,
1953 C.E., the UNC, including the U.S., and the combatants DPRK and the
PRC sign an armistice agreement. Mark W. Clark for the UNC, General
Peng Dehuai for the Chinese, and Kim Il-Sung for DPRK were among those
who concluded the armistice. Finally, after more than two years of
negotiations, the adversaries signed an armistice. President Syngman
Rhee of the ROK announced his acceptance of the agreement, but no
representative of ROK ever signed the document. The agreement allowed
the POWs to stay where they liked, it drew a new boundary near the 38th
parallel which allowed South Korea an extra 1,500 square miles of
territory, and it created a 2-mile-wide “demilitarized zone” that
still exists today.
The remaining years of the battle saw the two
sides develop a stalemate along the 38th Parallel. Neither side captured
much territory from the other. While fighting still occurred from
1951 C.E. to 1953 C.E., commanders on both sides sought to reach a
ceasefire. The war in Korea was finally over on July 27th, 1953
C.E. with the signing of the armistice.
V.
The Korean War Armistice
With the armistice, the two sides agreed to
several things, including the creation of a demilitarized zone between
DPRK and ROK near the 38th Parallel, and how to handle the exchange of
prisoners of war.
Following the signing of the Korean War
Armistice in July 27, 1953 C.E., PRC, along with members of the Eastern
Bloc led by the USSR, provided extensive economic assistance
to P’yŏngyang to
support the reconstruction and economic development of DPRK.
Operation
Glory
Operation Glory took place from July through
November 1954 C.E. during which the dead of each side were exchanged.
The remains of 4,167 U.S. soldiers were exchanged for 13,528 DPRK and
PRC dead. In addition, 546 civilians who died in UN prisoner-of-war
camps were turned over to the South Korean government. After Operation
Glory, 416 Korean War "unknowns" were buried in the National
Memorial Cemetery of the Pacific (the "Punchbowl Cemetery" in
Honolulu, Hawaii).
According to a Defense Prisoner of War/Missing
Personnel Office (DPMO) white paper, 1,394 names were also transmitted
from the PRC and DPRK during the operation, of which 858 proved to be
correct. The 4,167 returned remains were found to be 4,219 individuals,
of whom 2,944 were found to be Americans, with all but 416 identified by
name. Of the 239 Korean War unaccounted for, 186 are not associated with
the Punchbowl Cemetery unknowns. From 1990 to 1994, DPRK excavated and
returned more than 208 sets of remains, which possibly include 200 to
400 U.S. servicemen, but very few have been identified due to the
comingling of remains. From 2001 to 2005, more remains were recovered
from the Chosin Battle site, and around 220 were recovered near the PRC
border between 1996 and 2006.
Korean
War Outcome assessment
The Korean War was an important world event for
several key reasons. Firstly, it was a focal point for the expanding
tensions between the U.S. and USSR during the larger “Cold War.” When
the two superpowers finally faced off against each other through the
conflict in Korea War it was done as a proxy war.
Second, with the Korean War’s end, the two
sides remained a divided country which still exists in our day. The
DPRK and ROK are still very much separated along the ideological lines
of communism and democracy and face conflict with each other
intermittently.
For political reasons, both sides claim
victory. Ultimately though, the PRC’s PVA 9th Army held the
battlefield after having achieved a "geographic victory" which
ejected X Corps from the DPRK. These it accomplished at some expense.
Official PRC history states that despite the heavy casualties the PVA
9th Army earned its victory. This it did by successfully protecting the
PVA force’s eastern flank in Korea and inflicting over 10,000
casualties on UN forces.
In all fairness, the U.S.’ X Corps did defeat
the 9th Army in a series of battles. These successes enabled the UN to
withdraw most of its forces as an effective tactical unit of some battle
capability. It should also be noted that the UN forces possessed a
determined, capable leadership and good soldier morale. From a larger
perspective, the campaign gave the UN confidence that it had the ability
defeat the PVA’s forces despite their superior numbers.
Here, it should be offered that the PVA failed
to achieve its main stated objective that of destroying the U.S. 1st
Marine Division during its Dunkirk-like evacuation and retreat from
Chosin. To place the retreat in its proper perspective, it did follow a
"massive strategic victory" by the PRC. For some, however, it
represents a moment of heroic history for the UN forces. The PRC would
argue that the Battle of Chosin was still a retreat, not a victory. A
harsher evaluation would suggest that the battle was a terrible defeat
for the Americans.
The fact of the matter is that the retreat from
Chosin was a UN victory, inflicting such heavy losses upon the PVA 9th
Army Group that it was put out of action for some three months, until
March 1951 C.E. It has been said that ultimately, the PVA 9th Army Group
became a giant hospital after failing to destroy the numerically
inferior UN forces at Chosin.
The U.S. Marines who had evacuated from the
DPRK spent January and most of February 1951 C.E. rebuilding and
pursuing communist guerrillas in Pohang. When they returned to regular
duty they saw heavy action on February 21st in Operation Killer.
Wider
effect on the war
The PRC's intervention in the Korean War ended
the UN force's expectation of total victory. This meant that the UN
could not liberate the DPRK nor reunify the Peninsula. By the end of
1950 C.E., communist forces recaptured the DPRK. It next pushed UN
forces southward below the 38th Parallel. At this point in time, serious
consideration was given to the evacuation of all U.S. forces from the
Korean Peninsula.
On the other hand, the intervention affected
the PRC in two ways. Both of which would ultimately have the result of
helping the UNC secure its position in ROK, though losing DPRK. The
heavy losses suffered by the PRC’s PVA ultimately enabled the UN
forces to maintain its foothold in Korea.
Casualties
of the Korean War
The Korean War was a brutal and deadly war that
saw many people die or be wounded. It has been estimated that nearly 3
million Korean civilians died in the war, making it a particularly
bloody war. In all, some 5 million soldiers and civilians were
reportedly lost during the war.
American Korean War Casualties
|
War/Conflict
|
Branch of Service
|
Number Serving
|
Total Deaths
|
Battle Deaths
|
Other Deaths
|
Wounds Not Mortalb
|
Korean War
|
Total
|
5,720,000
|
36,574
|
33,741
|
2,833
|
103,284
|
1950-1953k
|
Army
|
2,834,000
|
29,856
|
27,731
|
2,125
|
77,596
|
|
Navy
|
1,177,000
|
658
|
506
|
152
|
1,576
|
|
Marines
|
424,000
|
4,508
|
4,266
|
242
|
23,744
|
|
Air Force
|
1,285,000
|
1,552
|
1,238
|
314
|
368
|
After the Korean
War, the Cold War would continue in earnest, with President Dwight D.
Eisenhower approving a top secret document stating that the U.S. nuclear
arsenal was to be expanded to combat the communist threat around the
world. In 1954 C.E., with the detonation of "Bravo," a 15
megaton Hydrogen bomb on Bikini Atoll an announcement was made. The U.S.
military was getting bigger and better. The bomb was 1,000 times more
powerful than the Hiroshima and Nagasaki weapons.
Here, I must state that for Hispanic Americans,
1954 C.E. became an ugly reminder of the racial and ethnic prejudices of
past, and in some cases of the present. How and why this is, can only be
explained by those who hold these feelings. For some Operation Wetback
was such a reminder.
In early 1954 C.E., the planning for Operation
Wetback began. The Operation was a system of tactical control and
cooperation within the U.S. Border Patrol in concert with the Mexican
government for immigration law enforcement. President Eisenhower
and the Mexican government implemented it in May 1954 C.E. using special
tactics to deal with illegal border crossings into the United States by
Mexican nationals. The program would become a contentious issue in Mexico-United
States relations.
Before leaving this discussion of Operation
Wetback, it is worth noting that sovereignty is the power by which an independent state is governed.
For that power remain it must be seen as supreme, absolute, uncontrollable
for from all of these its specific political powers are derived.
The intentional independence of a state is
maintained through the right and power of regulating its own
internal affairs without foreign interference. Thus,
the sovereignty of a state is the power to do everything necessary to govern itself.
This includes but is not limited to, the making, executing, applying laws, imposing and collecting taxes, making war and peace, the
forming of treaties, and engaging in commerce with foreign nations.
In order to protect this sovereignty, a nation
must establish borders. These are the geographic boundaries of these
political entities or legal jurisdictions. Borders are established
through agreements between political entities that control those areas.
The creation of these agreements is called boundary delimitation. When
these borders are violated by a nation, group, or individual the matter
must be dealt with.
In Southeast Asia, the Cold War was rearing its
ugly head. A multinational military venture on behalf of the Viet Minh
forces under Võ Nguyên Giáp, with the support and assistance of the
PRC and the USSR. The Battle of Diên Biên Phủ was to be the
climactic confrontation of that communist, multinational military, Cold
War intervention. That First Indochina War between the French
and Viet Minh communist-nationalist revolutionaries was
about to begin. It would last from March 13th-May 7, 1954 C.E. and
culminate in a comprehensive French defeat.
The French Union's French Far East
Expeditionary Corps with support from U.S. financing and
Indochinese allies would make decisions ending in blunders. The initial
French strategy was for a set piece battle to draw out the
Vietnamese and destroy them with superior firepower. It was to begin
with an operation for the insertion of a French force into a hostile
area at Điện Biên Phủ, a small village, far from
everything deep in the hills of northwestern Vietnam. Its location
is about 10 miles north of the Lao border and 175 miles west of Hanoi. Unfortunately,
for the French the plan was based on the misguided belief that the Viet
Minh had no anti-aircraft capability.
The Viet Minh battle strategy under General Võ
Nguyên Giáp was to surround and besiege the French. The Viet
Minh also brought in vast amounts of heavy artillery and antiaircraft
guns. The artillery pieces were moved through difficult terrain up the
rear slopes of the mountains surrounding the French positions and placed
overlooking the French encampment. With the Viet Minh now occupying the
highlands around Điện Biên Phủ, they soon began
bombarding the French positions with massive artillery. After several
days, the French artillery commander, unable to respond with any
effective counterbattery fire, committed suicide.
The Viet Minh then assaulted the French
defensive positions repeatedly and were repulsed. Soon, the key French
positions were overrun and the French perimeter contracted. Fewer and
fewer of supplies reached the French. The garrison was overrun in May
after a two-month siege, and most of the French forces surrendered. A
few of them escaped into Laos. The French government in Paris then
resigned, and the new Prime Minister, the left-of-centre Pierre
Mendès France, supported French withdrawal from Indochina.
Unfortunately, for France, this catastrophic failure would negatively
influence negotiations underway at Geneva among several
nations over the future of Indochina.
The war ended shortly after the Battle of
Điện Biên Phủ. With the signing of the 1954 C.E.
Geneva Accords, France agreed to withdraw its forces from all its
colonies in French Indochina. It was also stipulated that Vietnam
would be temporarily divided at the 17th Parallel. Control of the
north would be given to the Viet Minh as the Democratic Republic of
Vietnam under Ho Chi Minh. The south was to become
the State of Vietnam, nominally under Emperor Bảo Đại.
The agreement prevented Ho Chi Minh from gaining control of the entire
country.
Casualties and losses for the French were
1,571-2,293 dead, 5,195-6,650 wounded, 1,729 missing, and 11,721
captured of which 4,436 wounded. Sixty-two aircraft and ten tanks lost
and 167 aircraft damaged. Vietnamese figures were 4,020 dead, 9,118
wounded, 792 missing. The French estimate Vietnamese of losses was
8,000 dead and 15,000 wounded.
May 17, 1954 C.E., racial segregation in U.S.
public schools was declared unconstitutional by the U.S. Supreme Court
in Brown vs. the Board of Education. The ruling of the court stated that
racial segregation violated the 14th Amendment's clause that guaranteed
equal protection. The Monroe School in Topeka, Kansas had segregated
Linda Brown in its classes. What this represented the “Better
Angels” of America’s nature. Step-by-step the government improved
the lives of its people. This was one of those!
The Operation Wetback Program was formally
announced in May 1954 C.E. By May 17th, command teams of 12 Border
Patrol agents, using buses, planes, and temporary processing stations
began their efforts. The Program stated locating, processing, and
deporting Mexicans who had entered the U.S. illegally. Those deported
were handed off to Mexican officials, who in turn moved them into
central Mexico where there were many labor opportunities. The
Operation included the cities of Los
Ángeles, San Francisco, and Chicago. But its main targets were the
border areas of Texas and California. Overall, there were
1,074,277 "returns," in the first year of Operation Wetback.
This process was defined as the "confirmed movement of an
inadmissible or deportable alien out of the U.S. not based on an order
of removal." This included many illegal immigrants who fled to
Mexico for fear of arrest. Over half a million left from Texas alone.
Aristotle once said, “At his best, man is the
noblest of all animals; separated from law and justice he is the
worst." In the case of Operation Wetback, the law was used and
justice served. I don’t at this time have a concrete answer as to how
these activities were conducted and whether their outcomes were
appropriate for all parties involved.
Suffice it to say, these American laws and
actions were among a long line of activities found necessary over a
protracted period of time. This was due in the main because of the
inadequacy of past efforts to maintain the integrity of the border. The
rights and privileges granted to those who enter the United States
remain the lawful responsibility of its government and people, and to no
other. Thus, those who choose to break these laws, still remain subject
to them despite their reasons for doing so.
Sovereignty is the power by which an independent state is governed.
That power is seen as supreme, absolute, and uncontrollable
and from which all specific political powers are derived.
The intentional independence of a state is
maintained through the right and power of regulating its own
internal affairs without foreign interference. Thus,
the sovereignty of a state is the power to do everything necessary to govern itself.
This includes but is not limited to, the making, executing, applying laws, imposing and collecting taxes, making war and peace, the
forming of treaties, and engaging in commerce with foreign nations.
In order to protect this sovereignty, nations
establish borders. These are the geographic boundaries of these
political entities or legal jurisdictions. Borders are established
through agreements between political entities that control those areas.
The creation of these agreements is called boundary delimitation. On
these matters of sovereignty, a nations borders, and its laws I agree
with Robert Kennedy when he said, “The glory of justice and the
majesty of law are created not just by the Constitution - nor by the
courts - nor by the officers of the law - nor by the lawyers - but by
the men and women who constitute our society - who are the protectors of
the law as they are themselves protected by the law.”
The Cold War remained in effect in September 8,
1954 C.E., when in Bangkok, Thailand, the Southeast Asia Treaty
Organization was formed by the U.S., GB, Australia, New Zealand, France,
the Philippines, Pakistan, and Thailand creating a mutual defense pact.
As this is the last chapter of the Family
History of the de Riberas, I will not be covering the Vietnam Period or
further. I will, however, provide a brief summary and the names of the
Hispano American fallen.
It would not be long before America’s
involvement in Vietnam would begin. Due to the Cold War which some date
as begining in 1947 C.E., America defined its position as one of
resisting communism wherever it might be found to be destabilizing
sovereign governments. By the 1950’s C.E. John Foster Dulles the U.S.
Secretary of State had already formulated the Domino Theory. In it he
stated that if one country fell to communism, then its neighbor would,
and then the neighbor to that country would also fall. This ongoing
expansion of communist influence throughout the world and in Southeast
Asia in particular, was unacceptable to the American government.
Earlier, in 1950 C.E., the first shipment of
American military aid was sent to the French colonial administration in
Vietnam in an effort to prop it up against communist subversion. This
was not to be! That First Indochina War was fought between the French
and Viet Minh communist-nationalist revolutionaries was
to last from March 13th-May 7, 1954 C.E. It culminated in a
comprehensive French defeat.
With the signing of the 1954 C.E. Geneva
Accords, France withdrew its forces. Vietnam was then temporarily
divided at the 17th Parallel. The Viet Minh as the Democratic
Republic of Vietnam under Ho Chi Minh now had control of the
north. The south was now the State of Vietnam, nominally under
Emperor Bảo Đại. The agreement had prevented Ho
Chi Minh from immediately gaining control of the entire country.
One year later, in 1955 C.E., President
Eisenhower sent the first U.S. military advisors to South Vietnam to
train the South Vietnamese Army. From its begining on November 1, 1955
C.E. through its end on April 30, 1975 C.E., the Vietnam War America
would sustain a total of 58,220 casualties of all races, ethnicity, and
gender. As for Hispanic-American casualties, the U.S. Department of
Defense (DOD) contains no information on them. This is due to the fact
that Hispanic Americans can be of any race. In a massive sampling of the
DOD database researchers were able to establish that between 5.0 and 6.0
of the casualties had Hispanic surnames. These represented military
members which were Méjicanos,
Puertorriqueños, Cubanos, and other Latino-Américanos
with ancestries based in Central and South America. Using the 1970
C.E., U.S. Census as a Vietnam era population base, it has been
estimated that Hispanic-Americans were then 4.5% of the U.S. population.
Thus, one can safely say that
Hispanic-Americans were over-represented among Vietnam War casualties,
at an estimated rate of 5.5% of the total number of casualties, this
against 4.5% of the total population in 1970 C.E. The studies suggest
Hispanic-American casualties came largely from California and Texas.
Lesser numbers are attributed to Colorado, New Mexico, Arizona, Florida,
New York, with some from many states across the nation.
As this is a family history of a New Mexico
family, the de Riberas, I list
a member of the de Ribera Clan
who died in Vietnam. Private First Class António
Ribera served in the Army of the United States in the HHC, 1ST BN,
2ND INFANTRY, 1ST INF DIV, USARV. He was born in Raton, New Mexico, on May 07, 1937 C.E. and died António
died while helping his comrades in arms on to July 18, 1967 C.E.
"PFC Ribera was killed in
action while serving with 1st Bn 2 Inf First Infantry Division... He was
treating a wounded soldier during a battle on 07/18/67 and was
posthumously awarded the Silver Star. I was there. I have never met a
man who could smile when facing adversity like he could." He is
remembered by those he served.
In addition, I’m providing a listing of only
the Hispano Vietnam War
casualties from New Mexico. This I do in remembrance of these, the
fallen Hispano-Americans who died in Vietnam.
Vietnam
War casualties
|
ALAMOGORDO,
NEW MEXICO:
|
LCPL
IGNACIO BARELA
|
PO3
HOWARD MICHAEL MEUTE
|
PFC
JUAN FEDERICO GUTIÉRREZ
|
ALBUQUERQUE,
NEW MEXICO:
|
CPL
ANTHONY WILLIAM ARELLANO
|
PFC
FRANK CHARLES ARMIJO
|
SP4
ISIDRO SIGFREDO BAZAN
|
PFC
PAUL BUSTAMANTE
|
PFC
DANIEL JOSEPH CHÁVEZ
|
SGT
CHARLES DOMINIC CASERIO
|
LCPL
FREDDIE PAUL CHÁVEZ
|
CPL
LOUIS MAGIN GARCÍA
|
SP4
ISIDRO GARCÍA
|
SSG
RAMÓN GARCÍA
|
SP4
RICHARD ALBERT GURULÉ
|
SFC
FREDERICK DANIEL HERRERA
|
PO3
RAMÓN LEYBA
|
PFC
ROBERT CHARLES LÓPEZ
|
SP4
RUDOLPH DANIEL LOVATO
|
PFC
ENRÍQUE LUJÁN
|
SP4
JULIAN ERNEST MÁRQUEZ
|
PFC
JUAN HENRY MARTÍNEZ
|
SP4
BILLY RICHARD MARTÍNEZ
|
SGT
PEDRO PADILLA
|
SP6
JUANITO PERÉA
|
SP5
CHARLES ANTHONY ROMERO
|
PO3
CRES PADILLA SALAZAR
|
2LT
MEL ERNEST SALAZAR
|
LCPL
UVALDO SÁNCHEZ
|
PFC
JUAN DIEGO SÁNCHEZ
|
SP4
CAMILO JAMES SÁNCHEZ
|
PFC
BENNY SENA
|
SP4
JOHN OLIVIO TAFOYA
|
SGT
FLORENTINO TAFOYA Jr
|
SP4
GREGORIO TRUJILLO Jr
|
PFC
FRANK VALDÉZ
|
ALCALDE,
NEW MEXICO:
|
LCPL
NARCISO FRANCIS HERRERA
|
ANTHONY,
NEW MEXICO:
|
SSGT
SALOME HERNÁNDEZ
|
ANTÓN
CHICO, NEW MEXICO:
|
PFC
ROMÁN SISNEROS
|
ARTESIA,
NEW MEXICO:
|
PFC
SAMUEL MEDINA RAMÍREZ
|
AZTEC,
NEW MEXICO:
|
BELEN,
NEW MEXICO:
|
PVT
EDDIE LEÓNARD GARCÍA
|
LCPL
LUPERTO GARCÍA
|
PFC
MICHAEL LEÓN LOVATO
|
PFC
EDDIE ANTHONY MARTÍNEZ Jr
|
PFC
HILARIO MORENO
|
SGT
MARK ALVAN TAFOYA
|
BERNALILLO,
NEW MEXICO:
|
PFC
EUSEBIO MONTOYA
|
SP4
FRED ROMÁN SAIZ
|
BLOOMFIELD,
NEW MEXICO:
|
CANONCITO,
NEW MEXICO:
|
PFC
RAYMOND PLATERO
|
CAPITAN,
NEW MEXICO:
|
CARLSBAD,
NEW MEXICO:
|
LCPL
ANDRÉS GARCÍA
|
SFC
RICARDO GONZÁLEZ DAVIS
|
SP5
MIGUEL F MONTAÑEZ
|
CARRIZOZO,
NEW MEXICO:
|
SP5
CÁRLOS ZAMORA Jr
|
CEDAR
CREST, NEW MEXICO:
|
PFC
JOE CECILIO GARCÍA
|
CERRO,
NEW MEXICO:
|
PFC
CHARLES CASTULO CISNEROS
|
CHAMISAL,
NEW MEXICO:
|
SP4
JIM DANIEL MARTÍNEZ
|
CHURCH
ROCK, NEW MEXICO:
|
CLAYTON,
NEW MEXICO:
|
CLOVIS,
NEW MEXICO:
|
SGT
DANIEL TIOFILIO MARTÍNEZ
|
SGT
RUBÉN RUBÍO
|
CONTINENTAL
DIVIDE, NEW MEXICO:
|
CROWN
POINT, NEW MEXICO:
|
LCPL
JOHNNIE ANTÓNIO Jr
|
CUBERO,
NEW MEXICO:
|
SP4
GERALD GREGORY CHINO
|
DEMING,
NEW MEXICO:
|
HN
STEVE GONZÁLES DURÁN
|
SP4
VÍCTOR MUÑOZ ROMÁN
|
PFC
RICHARD SAENZ
|
GYSGT
JOSEPH FÉLIX TRUJILLO
|
DEXTER,
NEW MEXICO:
|
SP4
JOSÉ L SÁNCHEZ
|
CPL
ARTURO SYLVESTER SISNEROS
|
DIXON,
NEW MEXICO:
|
HN
PHIL ISADORE VALDÉZ
|
DULCE,
NEW MEXICO:
|
SGT
FLOYD SAMUEL ATOLE
|
PVT
DANIEL HAROLD MUÑÍZ
|
ENCINO,
NEW MEXICO:
|
SGT
SAM TENORIO
|
ESPAÑOLA,
NEW MEXICO:
|
ESTANCIA,
NEW MEXICO:
|
EUNICE,
NEW MEXICO:
|
FAIRACRES,
NEW MEXICO:
|
FAIRVIEW,
NEW MEXICO:
|
FARMINGTON,
NEW MEXICO:
|
SGT
HERBERT ARVISO
|
PFC
FILEMON SERRANO
|
FORT
WINGATE, NEW MEXICO:
|
SGT
BOBBY JOE MARTÍNEZ
|
FRUITLAND,
NEW MEXICO:
|
GALISTEO,
NEW MEXICO:
|
CPL
GEORGE MICHAEL ANAYA
|
GALLUP,
NEW MEXICO:
|
CPL
JERRY DELBERT ABEYTA
|
CPL
EDWARD ALBERT CABRERA
|
SGT
JOSEPH DANIEL HURTA
|
GLENCOE,
NEW MEXICO:
|
PFC
GLEN ALEX CHÁVEZ
|
GRANTS,
NEW MEXICO:
|
SGT
JOSÉ AUDINO MONTOYA
|
LCPL
PATRICK SALAZAR
|
HIDALGO
LOOP, NEW MEXICO:
|
HOBBS,
NEW MEXICO:
|
SP4
JAIME PACHÉCO
|
HN
JIMMIE LEÓN PLATO
|
HOLLOMAN
AFB, NEW MEXICO:
|
SP5
PETER KALANI MIRANDA
|
HOLLYWOOD,
NEW MEXICO:
|
HURLEY,
NEW MEXICO:
|
JAL,
NEW MEXICO:
|
JARALES,
NEW MEXICO:
|
TSGT
SECUNDINO BALDONADO
|
JÉMEZ
PUEBLO, NEW MEXICO:
|
PFC
GEORGE LEÓNARD FRAGUA
|
PFC
FRANK TAFOYA
|
SP4
THOMAS AMBROSE TOLEDO
|
PVT
ANTÓNIO TONY TOSA
|
LA
JOYA, NEW MEXICO:
|
PFC
GEORGE ELOY TAFOYA
|
LAKE
ARTHUR, NEW MEXICO:
|
PFC
ABELARDO ARAUJO
|
LAS
CRUCES, NEW MEXICO:
|
PFC
WALTER CLIFFORD BUNYEA Jr
|
CPL
ANDY ANASTACIO CABRERA
|
SSG
DAVID CRUZ CHÁVEZ
|
SGT
RICHARD LOSOYA DURÁN
|
SP5
CHARLES CÓRDOVA FLÓREZ
|
SGT
GABRIEL HERNÁNDEZ MADRID
|
PVT
ANDRÉS MORENO Jr
|
CPL
JUAN MANUEL ALBA ZAMORA
|
LAS
VEGAS, NEW MEXICO:
|
SP4
JOSEPH MICHAEL ARCHULETA
|
SP5
JERRY FLÓREZ
|
SP4
JOSÉ BENJAMIN HERRERA
|
PFC
HENRY LEROY TEJADA
|
LITTLE
WATER, NEW MEXICO:
|
PFC
FÉLIX DOHALTAHE BEGAYE
|
LORDSBURG,
NEW MEXICO:
|
LCPL
MAGDALENO TARANGO
|
LOS
ALAMOS, NEW MEXICO:
|
LOS
CÓRDOVAS, NEW MEXICO:
|
PFC
VÍCTOR HIPOLITO MONTOYA Jr
|
LOS
LUNAS, NEW MEXICO:
|
SP4
DANIEL FERNÁNDEZ
|
PFC
JOSÉ BERNARDINO GONZÁLES
|
LOVINGTON,
NEW MEXICO:
|
LCPL
REYNALDO GUZMÁN
|
MAYHILL,
NEW MEXICO:
|
MELROSE,
NEW MEXICO:
|
MESILLA
PARK, NEW MEXICO:
|
MEXICAN
SPRINGS, NEW MEXICO:
|
MONTEZUMA,
NEW MEXICO:
|
SFC
BENJAMIN JOHN BENAVIDEZ
|
SP4
JOHN PEÑA
|
MORA,
NEW MEXICO:
|
CPL
CHARLES ANTHONY SÁNCHEZ
|
SP4
LEROY FRANK VALDÉZ
|
MORIARTY,
NEW MEXICO:
|
MOSQUERO,
NEW MEXICO:
|
SP4
CHRIS B CÓRDOVA
|
MOUNTAINAIR,
NEW MEXICO:
|
SP4
RAYMOND SERNA
|
OCATE,
NEW MEXICO:
|
PFC
LAURENCIO VIGIL
|
ORGAN,
NEW MEXICO:
|
PEÑASCO,
NEW MEXICO:
|
PVT
JOSÉ SCOTTY SIMBOLA
|
PICACHO,
NEW MEXICO:
|
SP4
GEORGE HENRY NÚÑEZ
|
PORTALES,
NEW MEXICO:
|
PUERTO
DE LUNA, NEW MEXICO:
|
SP4
FRANK DODGE MADRID
|
RAMAH,
NEW MEXICO:
|
CPL
EDDIE CHARLES BEGAYE
|
RANCHOS
DE TAOS, NEW MEXICO:
|
PVT
ALEX EZEQUIEL MARTÍNEZ
|
SP4
MANUEL ANTÓNIO TORREZ
|
RATON,
NEW MEXICO:
|
SP4
SAM CRUZ
|
PFC
ANTÓNIO RIBERA
|
SGT
GABRIEL TRUJILLO
|
PVT
PAUL TRUJILLO
|
RIBERA,
NEW MEXICO:
|
LCPL
JESUS GRIEGO
|
ROSWELL,
NEW MEXICO:
|
SP4
LARRY PAUL CAMPOS
|
PFC
MELVIN CARRILLO
|
SP4
SAMMY CHACON ROMERO
|
PFC
TRINE ROMERO Jr
|
PFC
HECTOR MARIO SAENZ
|
PFC
CRESENCIO PAUL SÁNCHEZ
|
ROY,
NEW MEXICO:
|
RUIDOSO,
NEW MEXICO:
|
PFC
ROBERT GONZÁLES MONTOYA
|
SAN
JUAN PUEBLO, NEW MEXICO:
|
CPL
JOE NED MONTOYA
|
SANTA
CRUZ, NEW MEXICO:
|
PFC
GABRIEL BACA
|
SANTA
FE, NEW MEXICO:
|
PFC
PEDRO ASCENSIÓN DELORA
|
SGT
DAVID JOSÉ GARCÍA
|
SP4
RICHARD EDWARD GRIEGO
|
CPL
JOHN FRANK RAY GRIEGO
|
PFC
JOSEPH ARTHUR JACQUES
|
CPL
WILLIE DANIEN MARTÍNEZ
|
1LT
JOE HERMAN MONTOYA
|
SFC
GILBERT MORALES
|
CPL
FRANCIS XAVIER NAVA
|
PFC
SANTIAGO V E QUINTANA
|
CPL
PHILLIP JAMES SANDOVAL
|
PFC
MANUEL TIODORO SEGURA
|
SSG
ROBERT STEVEN TRUJILLO
|
GYSGT
ENRÍQUE VALDÉZ
|
SANTA
RITA, NEW MEXICO:
|
SP4
ANTÓNIO ÁLVARADO ESQUEDA
|
LCPL
DAVID CENTENO GRIJALVA
|
PFC
OCTAVIANO MARTÍNEZ HARVEY
|
PFC
ÁNGEL ALARID QUEVEDO
|
SANTA
ROSA, NEW MEXICO:
|
SP4
RAFAEL GABRIEL TENORIO
|
SANTO
DOMÍNGO PUEBLO, NEW MEXICO:
|
SP4
ARTHUR CRESPÍN
|
SAPELLO,
NEW MEXICO:
|
LCPL
ALCADIO NORBERTO MASCARENAS
|
SERAFINA,
NEW MEXICO:
|
SP4
SAMUEL MORALES
|
SHIPROCK,
NEW MEXICO:
|
SP4
CALVIN DAVID LARGO
|
SILVER
CITY, NEW MEXICO:
|
LCPL
CÁRLOS CRUZ AGUIRRE
|
SOCORRO,
NEW MEXICO:
|
PFC
ISIDRO BACA
|
TAOS,
NEW MEXICO:
|
PFC
JOHNNY LAWRENCE BACA Jr
|
LCPL
ANDREW COCA
|
SGT
TIMOTEO FRED ROMERO
|
TAOS
PUEBLO, NEW MEXICO:
|
PO1
MANUEL MARTÍNEZ
|
TATUM,
NEW MEXICO:
|
TEXICO,
NEW MEXICO:
|
THOREAU,
NEW MEXICO:
|
TIJERAS,
NEW MEXICO:
|
PFC
BILLY MC CALL REA
|
TINNIE,
NEW MEXICO:
|
TOHATCHI,
NEW MEXICO:
|
TRUTH
OR CONSEQUENCES, NEW MEXICO:
|
TUCUMCARI,
NEW MEXICO:
|
SP4
FRANCISCO M GARCÍA Jr
|
PFC
ANDREW JOSÉ PACHÉCO
|
SSG
RAMÓN FÉLIX ORTEGA Jr
|
TULAROSA,
NEW MEXICO:
|
PFC
STEPHEN OROSCO
|
VAUGHN,
NEW MEXICO:
|
PFC
FRANK JESSE LEE MADRID
|
WHITE
SANDS MISSILE RANGE, NEW MEXICO:
|
WILLARD,
NEW MEXICO:
|
SGT
JULIAN VÍCTOR VELÁZQUEZ
|
ZUNI,
NEW MEXICO:
|
SP4
ERNEST DELBERT PEINA
|
12/04/2018 08:54 PM
|