On July 9, 1896 C.E.,  the Democratic presidential nominee, William Jennings Bryan, gave his impassion ed and famous “Cross of Gold” speech at the Democratic National Convention in Chicago. The issue was whether to endorse the free coinage of silver at a r atio of silver to gold of 16 to 1. This inflationary measure would increase the amount of money in circulation and aid the cash-poor and debt-burdened Amer ican farmers. His intention was to support the populists in order to get the farmers’ vote. It resulted in the split of Democratic Party votes which led to McKinley’s win. Clearly, the Gilded Age had bypassed the farmers.

The U.S. Senate’s Cubano concerns sent España seeking diplomatic support from the gre at powers of Europe. On August 9th, G reat Britain prevented España’s attempt to organize European support for her policies in Cuba. España was now beginning to feel her isolati on and the abandonment by political friends.

By 1897 C.E., the United States was purcha sing 19.6 percent of Puerto Rico's exports, while supplying 18.5 percent of her imports. Puerto Rico had become important to Américano business. Amer ica’s economic and military plans for war with España in Puerto Rico were now beginning to unfol d.

On January 19 , 1897 C.E., both William Randolph Hearst's New York Journal, and Joseph Pulitzer's New York World helped strengthen anti-Spanish sentiment in  the United States through their sensational reporting on the Cubano Insurrection. On this date, the execution by a Spanish firing squad of  Cubano insurrectionist Adolfo Rodrígue z was reported in the in the New York Journal article "Death of Rodr íguez" by Richard Harding Davis. This latest S panish government action against the Cuban o insurrectionists would continue to rage into 1898 C.E., this despite the services of 220,285 men sent by Esp aña over the past three years to end the uprisings. It was the largest army eve r to cross the Atlantic until the Second World War.

Here, we must discuss  España’s foolish, panicked attempt to control the Cubano freedom figh ters. There had been over the course of several years, many failed attempts to control these insurgents. In response to the poor showing of its military,  the government of España reacted to by sending a new commander, Don V alèriano Weyler y Nicolau, 1st Duque de  Rubí, Marqués de Tenerife, Grandee de España, (September 17,  1838 C.E.-October 20, 1930 C.E.), and Ca ptain-General, to Cuba.

España had appointed as Weyler as commande r-in-chief to regain the initiative. For this, he was provided the support of substant ial reinforcements. His mission was to starve out the insurrectionists operatin g in the countryside. The plan was to herd the rural population into garrisoned towns, some 50,000 of which had been moved in the Provincia de Habana alone. Unfortunately, these holding locatio ns provided bad and inadequate food and lacked proper sanitation facilities. T his resulted in the death to thousands of Peónes. Nevertheless, these extreme measures failed to crush the insurrection.

A Spanish general and colonial administrator, Weyler had entered the military early in life. He fought against the Cubano insurgents for four  years, from 1868 C.E.-1872 C.E. He then returned to España to serve against the Carlistas, Borbón traditionalists. He was  later Capitán-General of the Islas Canarias from 1878 C.E.-1883 C.E., of the Illes Balears in 18 83 C.E., of Las Filipinas  in 1888 C.E., followed by Cuba. Eight years later, in 1888 C.E., Weyler had been sent to Cuba again to help suppress native uprisings and quell the insurgency.

On March 4th, U.S. President William McKinley was inaugurated. Also in March, Theodore Roosevelt was appointed Assistant Secretary of the U.S. Navy to serve  from 1897 C.E. through 1898 C.E. He would soon become an aggressive advocate of American naval expansion, power, and a war against España over Cuba. Doubtless, he had been kept informed by American officials about their plan for Cuba.

April 25th, General Fernándo Primo de Rivera y Sobremonte became governor-general of Las Filipinas, replacing General Camilo García de Polavieja< /i> y del Castillo; his adjutant was his nephew, Miguel Primo de Rivera y Orbaneja.

The Italian anarchist Miguel Angiolillo Lombardi (June 5, 1871 C.E.-August 20, 1897 C.E.) was born in Foggia,  Italy. On August 8th, he assassinated Spanish Prime Minister António Cánovas del Castillo at  Santa Agueda, España, who had b een responsible for the Montjuïc repression over a Barcelona anarchist bombing.

Notes on Miguel Angiolillo Lombardi: 

A bomb was thrown at the Corpus Christi procession in Barcelona, España, earlier on June 7, 1896< /span> C.E. There were at least twelve deat hs and 45 Españoles seriously injured. The police attributed the crime to an unidentified anarchist. It was this attack that precipitated an aggressive reprisal against Spanish anarchists, socialists, and republicans. Three hundred alleged revolutionaries were placed in jail at  ;Montjuïc Fortress. Confessions were extracted by torture. Reports of the prisoner abuse were circulat ed widely in the European press.

It was the Prime Minister António Cánovas del Castillo who ordered the repression. Of the 87 prisoners  tried at Montjuïc, eight received death sentences and five executions were carried out.< span style3D'font-size:8.0pt;mso-ascii-font-family:Calibri;mso-fareast-font-fam ily: "Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:Calibri;mso-bidi-font-family:Calibr i'> Angiolillo one of the detained, was also execut ed by Spanish authorities in the same year.

As a result of this assassination, Práxedes Mateo Sagasta y Esc olar (July 21, 1825 C.E.-January 5, 1903 C.E.) of the Liberal Party became prime minister of España. He < /span>was a by education a Spanish civil engi neer. As a politician he would serve between 1870 C.E. and 1902 C.E. on eight occasions as Prime Minister. As part of El Turno Pacífico , he alternated the chair with the Conservative leader Antónia Cánovas del Castillo. Supposedly a Freemason, Mateo-Sagasta was known as an excellent orator.

Notes on Práxedes Mateo Sagasta y Esc olar: 

He was born on July 21, 1825 C.E. at Torrecilla en Cameros, provincia of Logroño, España. in 1848 C.E., while a student at the Civil Engineering School of Madrid and member of the Progressive Party, Sagasta was the only one in the sc hool to refuse to sign a letter of support for Queen Is abel II (October 10, 1830 C.E.-April 9, 1904 C.E.).

After his studies, Mateo-Sagasta beca me active in government. He served in the Spanish Cortés between 1854 C.E.-1857 C.E. and again from 1858 C.E.-1863 C.E. In 1866 C.E., he went into exile in France after a failed coup. After the Spanish Revolution of 1868 C.E., Sagasta returned to España to take part in the newly created provisional government.

Importantly, he served as Prime Minister of Espa ña during the Guerra Hispano-Estadounidense of 1898 C.E., during which time España lost her remaining colonies. Mateo- Sagasta's political opponents saw his action as a betrayal of España when he agreed to an autonomous constitution for both&nb sp;Cuba and Puerto Rico. They also blamed him for the country's defeat in t he Guerra and the loss of its island territories in the Treaty of Paris of 1898 C.E. He remained active in politics f or another four years. Práxedes Mateo Sagasta y Esc olar died on January 5, 1903 C.E. in Madrid.

Españas ongoing political and military difficulties on the Ibero Peninsula and within her territories had become critical. As a result, American President McKinley wanted to put an end to the conflicts particularly in Cuba, on America’s doorstep. This he  wanted to do peacefully. On October 1897 C.E., the United States offered to negoti ate a resolution of the conflict. The unstable and panicked Spanish government  refused the United States’ offer. American political and military leadership saw th is as a major concern for their neighbors in the Caribe.

During that same month , the Cubano insurrectionist strategy wa s to retreat into the rural areas in the eastern provincias. From there, they carried on a guerr a de guerrillas. The new guerrilla < /i>war was to become a military war of attrition and destruction. It was clear to  all that the Españoles were unable  to successfully defeat the guerrillas. And the guerrillas lacked the neces sary military resources to drive the Esp añoles from their island. The military stalemate left no certain end-date to t he war. By now, General Weyler’s harsh and energetic polic ies in Cuba raised a storm of Américano protest, which would hel p lead to his recall later in October 1897 C.E. The Americans took notice and saw  this as another destabilizing move by the Españoles and further escalation of the military problems in Cuba.

On October 8, 1897 C.E., Karl Decker of the New York Journal reported on the rescue of Cubana Evángeli na Cosio y  Cisneros from a prison on the Isle of Pines< /i> where she was being held as an insurrectionist. She was the daughter of Augustín Cosio, an active participant in attempts to gain Cubano independence from España. Evángelina escaped from a Spanish jail in Cuba with the assistance of the reporter, Karl Decker. Decker worked for William Randolph Hearst's New York Journal. The story created wide interest in the United States press, as well as accusations of fraud and bribery.

In that year , < span style3D'font-size:8.0pt;mso-ascii-font-family:Calibri;mso-fareast-font-fam ily: "Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:Calibri;mso-bidi-font-family:Calibr i; mso-bidi-theme-font:minor-latin'>España began bowing to American pressure and attempted to improve its relationships with her colonies. On November 1, 1897 C.E., the Filipino revolutionary constitution was approved creating Biak-na-Bato Republic for  Las Filipinas. It continued in these efforts in an attempt to hold on to its last two possessions in her Spanis h Américas. That year, it granted Cuba and Puerto Rico a broad array of new rights. These included those u nder Title I of the Spanish Constitution, which bestowed all the rights of Spani sh citizens and gave universal suffrage to all males more than twenty-five yea rs old. The new government in España formed earlier Oc tober 4, 1897 C.E., under the President of the Council of Ministers Práxedes Mateo Sagasta y Escolar (1825 C.E.-1903 C.E. ) was aware of the need for reconciliation. In November 1897 C.E., it changed its policies related to Cuba and Puerto Rico. It was willing to offer a change the Reconcentration policies if the Cubano insurrectionists agreed to  end hostilities. The Freedom Fighters refused the Spanish offer. On November 25, 1897 C.E.< span style3D'font-size:8.0pt'>,  España approved the Carta Autonómica, also known as Constitución Autonómica, which gave Puerto Rico the right of self-government. It allowed the island to retain its representation in the Spanish Cortés and provided for a bicameral legislature. This legislature consisted of a Council of Administration with eight elected and seven appointed members, a nd a Chamber of Representatives with one member for every 25,000 inhabitants.

From December 14th-15th, España reacted quickl y to those committed to a Biak-na-Bato Republic. The Españoles sought negotiations to end the war. Pedro Paterno, a noted Filipino intellectual and lawyer acted as media tor. Emilio Aguinaldo the revoluti onary leader Emilio Aguinaldo was representing the insurgents and Gobernador-General Fernándo Primo de Rivera represented the Spanish colonial government. Andrés Bonifacio, the Katipuñero leader (Katipunan) was able to s ign the 1897 C.E. Pact of Biak-na-Beat by which the leaders of Las Filipinas insurgents committed to be exiled in Hong Kong on December 14, 1897 C.E.

It created a truce bet ween Spanish colonial Gobernador-General  Fernándo Primo de Rivera and the revolutionary leader Emilio Aguinaldo to end the Las Filipinas Revolution. The Pact also  provided Aguinaldo and his fellow revolutionaries’ amnesty and mone tary indemnity from the Spanish Government. In return for which the revolutionary government would go into exile in Hong Kong. Indemnities in t he amount of 800,000 pesos were paid to the revolutionists. Aguinald o and his entourage were then allowed voluntary exile in Hong Kong. Through a ll of their efforts the peaceful Pact of Biak-na-Bato was concluded, or so the Españoles thought. But Aguinaldo had other less peaceful intentions. He wanted to utilize the monies to purchase firea rms and return to the archipelago prepared for war.

In America, the Gilded Age continued on its merry way. Dredging technology had become economical in the late 1890s C.E. It is estimated that more than 20 million ounces were recovered by dredgi ng (worth approximately U.S. $12 billion at November 2006 prices). Also,  during the Gold Rush and in the decades that followed, hard-rock mining wound up b eing the single-largest source of gold produced in the Gold Country.

The change in Puerto Rico’s sovereignty, like the future occupation of Cuba, would bring about major chan ges in the economy. Prior to 1898 C.E., the sugar industry in Puerto Rico had been in decline for nearly half a century. Since the begining of the second half of the 19th-Century C.E., many changes had  been underway in the areas of agricultural production and processing. Technologi cal advances associated with these changes increased the capital requirements to remain competitive in the sugar industry. In addition, agriculture began to shift toward coffee production, which required less capital and land accumulation. With the growth of American hegemony in the region, these tre nds were soon reversed. Early United States monetary and legal policies made it both harder for local farmers to continue operations and easier for American businesses to accumulate land. This, along with the large capital rese rves of American businesses led to a comeback of the Puertorriqueño sugar industry, but now in the form of large Américano owned agro-industrial complexes.

Shortly before the out break of the Guerra  Hispano-Estadounidense of 1898 C.E., United States newspape rs inflamed American public opinion against Spanish rule in Cuba. They did this by citing and exploiting the Capitán-General Valè riano Weyler’s stern anti-insurgent methods used in Cuba. He had conducted a brutal crackdown on the Independencia movement there.  ;

Two of the most influe ntial names in yellow journalism were thrusting America toward war, William Rando lph Hearst and Joseph Pulitzer. These men's newspapers excelled at taking real events and sensationalizing them. They soon seized upon the Spanish general , General Valèriano Weyler. Attempti ng to isolate the insurrectionists from the population, Capitán-General Valèria no Weyler herded women, children, and old people from the countryside into detention camps and garrisoned towns. Unfortunately, this caused the death  of thousands of ciudádanos from starvation and disease. Capitán-Gen eral’s draconian methods provided American newspapers with ammunition for sensationalistic attacks on España’ s military policies. They colored the war in Cuba as a struggle between a powerful military "butcher," Weyler, and freedom loving, high-m inded Cubano patriots struggling bravely to remove Old World, Spanish authoritarianism.

His exploits had been  steady fare for a continuing example of Spanish cruelty the suffering she inflicted upon the Cubanos. Hearst publis hed many very graphic and biased stories about the General's brutality in  Cuba, referring to him as that, “Butcher Weyler,” after he had begun to relocate  insurrectionists to reconcentration camps. These, it would appear were sensationalized as cesspools, inhabited by starving and diseased Cubano “Freedom Fighters.”

A de Lôme Lette r, was to be another particularly effective piece for yellow journalism. The letter written by Enríque Dupuy de Lôme the Spanish Minister and Ambassador for España in the United States had been stolen. The text later resurfaced in Hearst's New York Journal. In t he letter, de Lôme stated that President McKinley was “weak and catering to the rabble and, besides, a low politician who desires to leave a door open to himself and to stand well with the jingos of his party.” The jingoist de Lôme referred to were considered by him, extremely Américanos patrioter a who likely favored an aggressive foreign policy against España.

De Lôme had been born Enríque  Dupuy  y de Lôme in València, < span style3D'font-size:8.0pt;mso-bidi-font-family:Calibri;mso-bidi-theme-font:m inor-latin'>España. Enríque came from a family of French ori gin who settled later in España. After completing his legal studies at the Unive rsity of Madrid in 1872 C.E., de Lôme entered diplomatic service. During the following years, he served in a variety of posts including Japan, Belgium, Uruguay, Argentina, the United States, Germ any, and Italy. In 1892 C.E., he was named Spanish Minister to the United States .

For de Lôme, the years of President Grover Cleveland's second term (1892 C.E.-1896 C.E.) were relatively peaceful for the Spanish Minister there was marked tension as Cleveland attempted to maintain a policy of neutrality toward the 1895 C.E. Cubano war of indepen dence. When President William McKinley took office in March 1897 C.E., he was determined to reverse his predecessor's policy. This was the genesis of de Lôme’s difficulties McKinley's policies. De Lôme would die five years later.

The greatest piece of  all would be the sensational sinking of the U.S.S. Maine which moved the United State s to war. The Maine would be sent to Cub a to protect Américanos in Habana. It would explode, be destr oyed, and sunk, killed 268 sailors. The tragedy would be effectively exploited by the newspapers. The Journal, would even offer $50,000 to anyone who could provi de information leading to the arrest of the perpetrator. The obvious culprit h ere was the government of España. American sentiment soon would become inflamed and ready for war.

On the world stage, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, and the United Kingdom had been dramatically expanding their overseas holdings in Africa, Asia, and the Pacific. Simultaneously, in the 1890s C.E., the Américanos were rapidly building a powerful naval fleet needed for possible protection of t he Americas against these expansionist powers. To efficiently project its naval power, America became interested in a canal either in Nicaragua, or in P anamá. It was the Panamá Canal which would eventually be built.

The worldwide empire building did not esca pe the notice of American political and business leaders to Cuba. Little was said, however, about the Spanish possessions o f Guam, Las Filipinas, and Puerto Rico. History records that there was very little public demand for an overseas American colonial empire at that time.

Prelude to the Guerra Hispano-Estadounidense

It was now 1898 C.E. O ver time the vast el Imperio Español in  the Américas had been disintegrating.  Cuba, however, had remained a colo nial appendage, with its government gradually turning more despotic. Cuba’s planter class and her intellectuals now began to show th eir dissatisfaction. Initially, they had opposed independence. Some, had favored reform over revolution and opted for demanding self-government within the framework of el Imperio. There  were those who sought annexation by the United States as a means of gaining political and economic freedom. These movements had made little headway. Annexation by the Américanos had become impractical since the end of the American Civil War.

Though members of the  general American Public had little interest in Cubano intervention, the spirit of conquest and readying for war were alive and we ll in its political and military leaders. American Manifest Destiny was once a gain rearing its majestic head. Theses righteous Américano leaders were only able to find one political force operating on the Cubano scene worthy for them to jo in in making things right. These were the partisans of the Independencia liberating army. Not surprisingly, when Washingto n finally did enter the Cubano struggle f or independence, it would eventually destroy the very insurgent military organization and the civilian institutions it created. Cubano political and military institutions were to be offered u p to the democratic traditions as required by American Manifest Destiny.

With the Guerra Hispano-Estadounidense, in 1898 C.E., Cuba would become independent, and Puert o Rico would fall under the United States’ administration. The Guerra would end 4 00 years of Spanish dominion in the Am éricas and mark the rise of the United States as a world power. The War Guerra would also secure the posit ion of the United States as a Pacific Ocean power and end España’s empire in the Western Hemisphere.

This was only one of many political and economic problems which had been visited upon España during the 19th-Century C.E. She had seen the Peninsular War (1807 C.E.-1814 C.E.) the military conflict between Napoleon's empire and the powers of España, Britain and Portugués allied ag ainst him for control of the Ibero Peninsula. This had been devastating for the Españoles. España’s weakened position also saw the loss of most of its territorial holding s in the Spanish Américas during the uprisings by Criollos for independence.

The coming victory by the United States ov er España would produce a peace treat y which compelled the Españoles to reli nquish all claims to Cuba. In addition , España would cede Guam, Puerto Rico,  and Las Filipinas to the United States. Winning the War would enable America to dominate the Caribe region and to pursue strate gic, military, and economic interests in areas of Asia. Interestingly, during the conflict America also annexed the independent state of Hawaii.

The Guerra would have other consequences. Thirty-three years after the American Civil War, the U.S. Army was no longer prepared for a wa r. During the preceding quarter of a century, until 1898 C.E., the Army averaged only about 26,000 officers and men combined. Of the roughly 2,100 officers and 26,000 enlisted men in the United States Army on April 1, 1898 C.E., almost 900 officers and 13,000 enlisted were infantry, and another 400 officers and 6, 000 enlisted were assigned to the cavalry. The majority of its artillery branch , which totaled nearly 300 officers and 4,500 enlisted were stationed at established fortifications along the nation's coastline. During this period, Army artil lery batteries served both field and coast defense guns. When called upon, they  were expected to serve as needed as infantry to defend fixed positions. The remaining 500 officers and 2,500 enlisted were on miscellaneous duty or comprised general officers and staff. The majority of its forces were stati oned widely across the nation in company and battalion-size organizations.

During the Americ an Civil War infantry brigades contained two to five regiments. These brigades  were designed to maintain a unit with the strength of 2,000 soldiers and we re usually commanded by a brigadier-general or a senior colonel. Company mil itary units were typically commanded by a major or a captain and consisted of 80-150 soldiers. Most companies were formed of three to six platoons, although the exact number may varied based on unit type  and structure. Usually several companies were grouped as a battalion or regiment, the latter of which is sometimes fo rmed by several battalions.

By 1898 C.E., with the expansion of the Army rifle company to three platoons under mobilization for the Guerra Hispano-Estadounide nse, the company gained two officers. One was a first lieutenant as executive officer and the other second lieutenant to command the third platoon. There was also an increase in the number of noncommissioned officers (NCOs) to serve  as section leaders (sergeants) and squad leaders (corporals) for a company’s 84 men.

The standing Army had  little training or experience in the operations requiring units larger than a regi ment. There existed no mobilization plan, it lacked a well-organized command staf f, and had no experience in joint operations with the U.S. Navy. None the less , war fever soon led the U.S. Congress to authorize a rapid increase in the size  of the American Army. By the war’s end, in August 1898 C.E., the Regular  Army would expand to a total of 275,000 men. Of these, Regular Army numbered 59, 000 men and the Volunteer forces numbered 216,000. Most of these men, regu lars and volunteers, had little or no prior military experience.

These deficiencies mat tered little to the American political and military elite. It was their intention to press on. The United States’ military strategy for Cuba would be a loosely conceived plan for a naval blockade onl y. The American planners believed that the Cubano insurrectionist forces would continue in their war against the Españoles to remove them from the  Island. The planners also felt that this approach would eventually lead to España’s surrender, at which point the American forces would go ashore and takeover without having a fired shot. Notwithstanding the U.S. naval blockade military strategy, by mid-April 1898 C.E., the American public demanded more aggressive action.

As the public demand b ecame too strong to ignore, Secretary of War Russell M. Alger ordered Regular Army in fantry regiments to be assigned to New Orleans, Tampa, and Mobile in preparation f or an immediate assault on Cuba.

Next, the United State s Navy would move quickly to engage the Spanish fleet in Las Filipinas. In less than two months, the Spanish fleet would be destroyed and Las Filipinas decla red independent of España.

España and the United States would later sign the Treaty of Paris on December 10, 1898 C.E.  According to the terms of the treaty, España would allow Cuba to become an independent state, cede Puerto Rico and Guam to the United States. For these conditions, Españ a was to accept $20 million in payment for Las Filipinas. As a result of America’s winning the Guerra Hispano-Estadounidense, the United States would enter the 20th-Century  C.E. as a global colonial empire.

The Guerra Hispano-Estadounidense

All the while, España was feverishly trying to appease  the American administration. On January 1, 1898 C.E., España granted limited autonomy to Cuba. For the Américano elite, this Spanish action had li ttle luster. It was not a heartfelt act of contrition, only the freeing of Cuba would meet this test. By now  tensions had increased. Popular American support for intervention in Cuba was growing. Many Américanos we re drawing parallels between the American Revolution and the Cubano revolution. Espa ña was increasingly being viewed as a cruel and unjust colonial oppressor.

By February 8 th, Ambassador of España in the United States Enríque Dupuy y de Lôme resigned under a cloud. It followed that  de Lôme’s recall was due to his having written a letter in which he mocked the American President William McKinl ey’s policies and his having stated that McKinley was a weak president.

The next day, February 9th, Pulitzer-own ed New York Journal published Enríque Dupuy de Lóme's stolen confidential< /span> letter in which he criticizing President McKinley. This letter's revelation was on e of the incidents which would contribute directly to pushing España and the United States towards war.

That same day , on February 9th, Gobernador-General Manuel Macías inaugurated the new government of Puerto Rico under the Carta Autonómica< span style3D'mso-bookmark:macias'>, or Constitución Autonómica, which gave town councils complete autonomy in local matters. Subsequently, the Go bernador had no authority to intervene in civil and political matters unless authori zed to do so by the Cabinet.

February 14th , Luís Polo de Bernabé y Pilón was named Minister of España in Washington and by March of 1898 C.E., Luís was accredited  as ambassador to Washington.

Notes on Luís Polo de Bernabé y Pilón:

His parents were Carolina Pilón Sterling and José Polo de Bernabé y Mordella. José Polo had bee n Spanish envoy to the United State s in 1873 C.E. His siblings were José and Carolina.

Luís Polo de Bernabé y Pilón joined the diplomatic service in 1874 C.E. When his father the Almirante r etired in 1875 C.E., Luís was promoted to counsellor third degree and was accredited to 1881 C.E. at the Spanish lega tion in Washington, D.C. By 1882 C.E., he was promoted to counsellor second degr ee and was employed in the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs from 1885 C.E. forward. Bernabé y Pilón’s firs t post was as consul general in Cairo, then a part of the Ottoman Empire. After th at posting, he became a Spanish envoy in Brasil. Luís later headed the commercial Department of the Spanish Foreign Ministry.

Clearly, España had every intention of placing one of its best in Washington. Luís Polo de Bernabé y Pilón met those qualifications.

The recently elected P resident William McKinley wanted to avoid war with España. But the situation in Cuba had worsened considerably. Soon after the next Gobernador-General, Ramón Blanco, arrived in Cuba, the Américano consul, Fitzhugh Lee sen t a request to the American State Department to send a U.S. warship to Cuba. McKinley sent the armored cruiser U.S.S. Maine  to Cuba in order to protect vuln erable Américano civilians.

While docked in Habana Harbor, in Habana Harbor from January 1898 C. E. until February 15th. On the evening of February 15, 1898 C.E., at 9:40 p.m. a large expl osion rocked the Maine, killing 266 of the 355 United States sailors on boa rd, and sending her to the bottom. Several Ame rican newspapers began stirring public opinion to a fevered pitch with sensational and wildly inaccurate reporting about the incident. 

Américano attention was now riveted on Cuba,< /i> as the Españoles were blamed for the sinking of the Maine. This accusation effectively put an end to ongoing Spanish/Américano negotiations. Though España was a European power, ma ny of the other major European powers especially Britain, France, and Russia supp orted the Américanos. These powers ur ged España to capitulate. With th e U.S.S. Maine incident fresh in American minds, the United States ran out of patience. España could no longer count on a  diplomatic solution in order to avoid war. The Guerra between America and España over Cuba was now inevitable.

On March 3rd, Gobernador-General of L as Filipinas Fernándo Primo de Rivera informed Segismundo Moret  y Prendergast, Spanish minister for the colonies, that Américano naval Commodore George Dewey had received orders to move against Manila.

By March 9th, the United States Congress approved a credit of $50,000,000 for national defense.

On March 10th, Dr. Julio J. Henna and Robert H. Todd, both prominent leaders of the Puertorriqueño section of the Cubano Revolutionary Party, began  to correspond with United States President McKinley and the U.S. Sen ate. It was their hope that America would consider including Puerto Rico in whatever intervention was being planned for Cuba. In addition, Henna and Todd provided the U.S. government with information ab out Spanish military assets facilities on the island. The War was imminent.

U.S. Senator Redfield Proctor of Vermont had traveled at his own expense in February 1898 C.E. to Cuba to investigate the effects of the reconcentration policy and returned to re port on his findings before the Senate. On March 17th, Senator Proctor pushed Congress and the American business community toward war with España.

Two days later, on Mar ch 19th, the battleship U.S.S. Oregon under the command of Captain Charles E. Clark left the port of San Francisco, California, on its famous voyage to the Caribe Sea and into Cubano waters. She would later take part in the Battle of  Santiago de Cuba on July 3, 1898 C .E. There, she and the cruiser Brooklyn, the only ships fast enough to chase down the Spanish cruiser Cristóbal Colón, forcing her surrender.

On March 28th, the U.S . Naval Court of Inquiry published its findings. It stated that the U.S.S. Maine had been destroyed by mine. The sound of angry American voices w as deafening. The following day, on March 29th, the United States Government issued an ultimatum to the Spanish Government. España was to leave Cuba.

In early April, Gobernador-General of Las Filipinas, Fernándo Primo de Rivera, was replaced by Gobernador-General Basi lo Augustín Dávila. It had been a surprise move. Upon his departure from Las Filipinas, the insurrectionist movement renewed its revolutionary activity. T his was due to the Spanish government's failure to abide by the terms of the Pa ct of Biak-na-Bato.

On April 1, 1898 C.E., in an act of bravado, España rejected the Amé ricano ultimatum. By April 4th, the New York Journal issued a million copy press run dedicated to the war in < /span>Cuba. The newspaper called for the immediate entry of the U.S. into war with Es paña.

On April 10th , the Spanish Gobernador-General Blanco in Cuba suspended all military hostilities in its fight against insurrectionists in Cuba. The next day, on April 11th, American President Wil liam McKinley requested authorization from the U.S. Congress to intervene in Cuba. The object of the intervention was to put an end to the war between Cubano insurrectionists and España, establish a stable government to maintain order, and to ensure the “peace and tranquility and the security”  of Cubano and Américano citizens on the island.

On April 13th,  the U.S. Congress agreed to President McKinley's request for intervention in Cuba. It was, however, to be without recognition of the Cubano Government. The Spanish government’s response was to d eclare that the sovereignty of España was being jeop ardized by U.S. policy. Further, España moved to prepare a special budget for war expenses. On April 19th,  the U.S. Congress adopted the Joint Resolu tion for war with España. It passed  by a vote of 311 to 6 in the House of Representatives and 42 to 35 in the Senate . The Resolution included the Teller Amendment, named after Senator Henry Moore Teller of Colorado. The Amendment disclaimed any intention of America exerc ising jurisdiction or control over Cuba. America was on ly there in a pacification role and promised to leave the island as soon as the war was over. President McKinley signed the resolution on April 20, 1898 C. E. and the ultimatum was forwarded to España.

April 20th brought with it much bad news.  The American Congress passed another joint resolution acknowledging Cubano independence. It also demanded that España relinquish control of the Island. The Resolution also authorized McKinley to use those military measures that he found necessary  to guarantee that Cubano independe nce. The Teller Amendment, which was enacted on that same day, promising the Cubano people that the United Stat es was not declaring war to annex Cuba , but to help it gain its independence from España. Also on that day, President Wil liam McKinley signed the Joint Resolution for war with España and the ultimatum was forwarded to España. In response, the Spanish Minis ter to the United States Luís Polo de Bernabé y Pilón demanded his passport. He then immediately left Washington for Ca nada along with the personnel of the Legation.

On April 21th,  the Spanish Government considered the U.S. Joint Resolution of April 20th. España saw the Resolution as a declaration of war. U.S. Minister in Madrid, General Stewar d L. Woodford, received his passport before presenting an Américano ultimatum. A state of war now existed between España and the United States and all diplomatic relations were suspended. As a state of war now existed between the U.S.  and España, that day, Sp anish forces in Santiago de Cuba mined Bahí a de Guantánamo or Guantánamo< /i> Bay.

The following day, on April 22nd, the Span ish government rejected the Américano ultimatum and declared war on the United States. President Willi am McKinley responded by ordering a naval blockade of Cuba and sending the American fleet at Key West, Florida, to Habana. It wa s to begin its Cubano blockade at the principal ports on the north coast and at Cienfuegos. The following day of April 23rd, President McKinley called for 125,000 military volunteers.

On April 24th, Spanish Minister of Defense Segismundo Berm ejo sent instructions to Spanish Contraalmirante Cerve ra to proceed with his fleet from Cape Verde to the Caribe, Cuba, and Puerto Rico. Before the outbreak of war, Contraalmirant e Pascual Cervera y Topete (February 18, 1839 C.E., Medina-Sidonia, Cádiz, España-April 3, 1909 C.E., Puerto Real, Cádiz, España) attemp ted in vain to inform Spanish officials of its weakness relative to the Américano navy. There were ot hers who disagreed with Cervera.

Notes on Contraalmirante Pascual Cervera y Tope te (February 18, 1839 C.E., Medina-Sidonia,  Cádiz, España-April 3, 1909 C.E., Puerto Real, Cádiz, España):

Contraalmirante Cervera was a prominent Spanish naval officer who served in a number of high positions within the Spanish Navy and had fought in several wars during the 19th-Century C.E. He served in Morocco, Las Filipinas, and Cuba. He returned to España's to become naval minister, chief of naval staff, naval attaché in London, the Capitán of several warships, and m ost notably, commander of the Cuba Squadron during the Guerra Hispano-Estadounidense.

Pascual was born in Medina-Sidonia in the provincia of Cádiz, the son of a Spanish Army officer who fought against French invasi on of España during the Napoleonic Wars. Cervera entered the naval college at the age of thirteen and was later made a midshipman during his first voyage to Habana in 1858 C.E. He later made Teniente Junior Grade (LTJG) at the age of 21. Next, the Teniente LTJG spent time serving in both Cuba, during the early part of the Ten Years' War, and also Morocco during the Spanish-Moroccan war. Later, in September 1864 C.E., Cervera was deployed to the Spanish Las Filipinas. There, under the command of Almirante Casto Méndez Núñez, he took part in the storming of Fort Pagalungan aga inst the Moro rebels. Duri ng that action, he was promoted to First Teniente for his service. Afterwards, First Teniente Cervera took part in expeditions mapping the hundreds of islands of  Las Filipinas archipelago. In 1865 C.E. he returned to the Spanish homeland and got married.

While in España, Cervera took part in quelling the Cantonales Rebellion during one of the Carlist Wars.  The First Teniente later commanded  the schooner Circe and th e corvette Santa Lucía back in Las Filipinas, where he again took part in operations against insurgents.

In 1876 C.E.  now a Spanish Capitán, Cervera was appointed as the Governor of Jolo. While there, he contracted malaria and barely survived. Shortly after that, Cervera returned to Madrid at the request of Prime Minister António Cánovas del Castillo to report on the conditions in Las Filipinas. The Prime Minister asked Cervera to take up the post of Minister of the Navy, but the re fused, saying that he preferred to be at sea. By 1879 C.E., he was given command of the training corvette Ferolana , where he remained until 1882 C.E., when Capitán Cervera was transferred to over see the Cartagena naval b ase. From 1885 C.E. to 1890 C.E., the Ca pitán served on the shipbuilding commission of the Battleship Pelayo and became its first commander.

In May 1891 C .E., the Queen Regent María Cristin a assigned Capitán Cervera to her court as her naval aide-de-camp. A year lat er, the Capitán was assigned to ove rsee the construction of several cruisers for the Spanish Navy at the request of the Queen Regent. In 1892 C.E., Prime Minister Práxedes Mateo Sagasta y Escolar asked the Queen Regent to compel him to accept the position of naval minister in  his government. She did, and Cervera accepted upon being promoted to Contraalmirante or rear admiral. Soon, the Prime Minister Práxedes lowered the naval budget and the Contraalmirante Cervera resigned from the position in 1892 C.E. The Contraalmirante&n bsp;was next appointed as the naval attaché in London, where he witnessed the technical innovations being made by the British Royal Navy, a post he  held until the situation in Cuba beg an escalating around 1896 C.E.-1897 C.E.

The Contraalmirante became alarmed at  the escalation of tensions between Espa ña and the United States because he believed España’s defeat would be inevitable in a war with them because España was unprepared and did not possess enough ships to defend her colonies. Contraalmirant e Cervera understood the United States Navy's advancements between 1892 C.E. and 1896 C.E., which made them a superior navy. Despite this, on October 20, 1897 C.E., Cervera accepted the posting of Contraalmirante commander of the Cubano Squadro n. He immediately began organizing training exercises to prepare the crews and so ught to correct the numerous deficiencies in the fleet, including lack of traini ng and inadequate supplies.

That same day, on Apri l 24th, the Presidente of the Cubano Republic in arms, General Bartolomé Masó, issued the  Manifiesto de Sebastopol and reiterated the mambí motto &quo t;Independencia o Muerte."

The Guerra Hispano-Estadounidense

On April 25th, the U.S. Congress voted to  go to war against España. That sam e day, a formal declaration of war was reco gnized between España and the United States.

On April 29th,  the Portugués government declared itself neutral in the conflict between España and the United States. That same day, Contraalmirante Cervera’s naval Spanish squadron steamed from  Cape Verde. Panic gripped the Americ an public, fearing what his ships might do. Would he attack a largely undefended East Coast? Would his fleet prey upon American shipping?  Perhaps Contraalmirante Cervera would sail up the Potomac and set fire to Washington, D.C., as the British had. Ultimately, Cervera did none of these. Instead, he managed to evade the U.S. fleet for several weeks, confounding his Américano counterparts. His fleet re-coaled before finally seeking refuge in Santiago de Cuba Harbor.

On April 30t h, the Spanish Gobernador-Gene ral Blanco ordered hostilities resumed with the Cuba no insurrectionists.

In May, 1898 C.E., Américano naval forces in Santiago Harbor spotted Spanish Contraalmira nte Pascual Cervera y Topete’s fleet. The Américanos sheltered from sea attack, began a two-month stand-off between U.S. and Spa nish naval forces.

In May 1898 C.E., Lieutenant Henry H. Whit ney of the United States Fourth Artillery was sent to Puerto Rico on a reconnaissance mission by the Army's Bureau of Military Intelligence. Through his considerable efforts, Whitney would prov ide maps and information to the U.S. government on the disposition of Spanish m ilitary forces prior to the invasion. Puert o Rico was about to become an Américano military target.

The first battle of the Guerra Hispano-Estadounidense was fought on May 1, 1898 C.E. at Manila Bay, Las Filipinas. It opened with the famous quote, "You may fire when you are ready. Gridley" U.S. Commodore George Dewey led his U.S. Asiatic Squadron which traveled from its base in Hong Kong to Manila Bay. Those battle fleet ships that made the trip included the cruisers U.S.S. Olympia, U.S.S. Raleigh, U.S.S. Boston, and U.S.S. Baltimore. The gunboats U.S.S. Concord and U.S.S. Petrel, the revenue cutter U.S.S. McCulloch and reinforcements from cruiser U.S. S. Charleston, and the monitors U.S.S. Monadnock and U.S.S . Monterey were also part of the Squadron. 

The Spanish squadron under the command of Contraalmirante Patricio Montojo y Pasarón consisted of the cruisers María Cris tina and Castilla, gunboats Don António de Ulloa, Don Juan de Aústria, I sla de Luzón, Isla de Cuba, Velásco, and Argos.

During the six hour battle, the entire Spanish squadron was sunk by Admiral Dewey's fleet . By defeating Contraalmirante Patricio Montojo y Pasarón’s squadron the Américanos received the capitul ation of Manila. The Spanish defeat at Manila Bay ignited impassioned nationalistic feeli ngs in España. As a result, Spanish Vicealmirante Manuel de la Cámara y Livermore’s squadron received orders to relieve the Spanish guarnición in Las Filipinas. His fleet consisted of the battleship Pelayo, the armored cruiser  Cárlos V, the cruisers Rápido and Patriota, the torpedo boats Audaz, Osado, and Proserpina,  and the transports Isla de Panay, San Francisco, Cristóbal Colón, Covadonga, and Buenos Aires.

That same day , U.S. Army Lieutenant Andrew S. Rowan, with the assistance of the U.S. government, the Cubano Delegation in New York, and the mambises (Cuban o guerrillas for independence in Cuba), made contact with Ge neral Calixto García Iñiguez in Bayam o, Cuba. Rowan carried with him a message from President William McKinley to the General. The General’s cooperation  was sought by McKinley to obtain a military and political assessment of Cuba. This contact benefitted both the Cubano Liberation Army and the Cubano Revolutionary Army. Yet it totally ignored the Government of the Republic in arms.

The next day, May 2nd, the U.S. Congress voted a war emergency credit increase of $34,625,725 . That same day in Cuba, General Má ximo Gómez Cuba's insurgent military commander for that country's War of Independence (1895 C.E.-1898 C.E.) opened communication with U.S. Acting Rear Admiral  William Thomas Sampson.< span style3D'font-size:8.0pt;mso-ascii-font-family:Calibri;mso-fareast-font-fam ily: "Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:Calibri;mso-bidi-font-family:Calibr i; mso-bidi-theme-font:minor-latin'> The Acting Rear Admiral had a squadron of 12 U.S. shi ps under his command. The formation of an alliance was in the win d.

With the supp ort of President William McKinley, on May 4th a joint resolution was introduced in the U.S. House of Representatives. It called for the annexation of Hawaii.< /span>

By May 10th,  Secretary of the Navy John D. Long issued orders to Captain Henry Glass, commander of the cruiser U.S.S. Charleston to capture Guam on his way to Mani la, Las Filipinas.

Also on May 1 0th, Spanish forces in the fortress of San Cristóbal in San Juan, Puerto Rico, exchanged fire with the U.S .S. Yale under the command of Captain William Clinton Wise. This was the < /span>first shot which marked Puerto Rico's entry into the Guerra Hispano-Estadounidense. It was ordered by Spanish Capitán Ángel Rivero (de Ribera) y Mén dez from Castillo San Cristóbal's cannon batteries. San Cristóbal's gunners duel with U.S. Navy warships during a day-long bombardment.

Notes on Spanish Capitán Ángel Rivero (de Ribera) y Méndez:

Capitán Ángel Rivero y Méndez was born in the Cacao district, Trujillo Bajo, Puerto Ric o, on October 2, 1856 C.E. His parents were Juan Rivero and Rosa Méndez, bot h Spaniards from the Islas Canarias. His first studies were at the Jesuit College in Santurce, San Juan Puerto Rico. He began his military career at the Infa ntry Academy of Puerto Rico (Insular Military Training School). On July 28th, he received an appointment as Alférez in the infantry in the inf antry battalion of Madrid Nº3 based i n San Juan. Capitán Ángel Rivero then married Manuela Boneta Babel, daughter of Don José and of Doña Cl otilde. On May 6, 1883 C.E., Capitán Rivero moved with his battalion to Ponce. He later returned to San Juan to serve i n the 6th Company of the Cádiz Battal ion 2nd Line.

After completing his studies in Segovia,< /i> Rivero was promoted to teniente of artillery and commissi oned in the 2nd Regiment of Mountain of  Vítoria, Álava, on March 1, 1889 C.E. In Vítoria he was in charge of the regimental academies. By January 1, 1891 C.E., he was transferred to Puerto Rico and remained there. In San Juan, Rivero entered the 12th Battalion of Plaza initiating his services in the company of Motaña. During the years 1891 C.E. -1896 C.E. he worked at the Secretary of the Office of Underinspection of the Artillery Corps, was professor of the Military Preparatory Academy, in char ge of the Academy of Corporals and students of the battalion, chief of the Det all of the square, member of the Brigade of Recognition of the existing war material in the park's Plaza and warehouses. On October 6, 1896 C.E., he became a capitán. During the period of 1896 C.E. through March 1, 1898 C .E., he became a professor at the Civil Institute of Second Education, the Chair s of chemistry, physics and mathematics. He also became active in the country's politics. The Capitán was invol ved in several duels with journalists over political issues.

Sometime after February 15, 1898 C.E., River o was arrested for being in the military and intervening in political matters. He was imprisoned in the castle Del Morro. Later, due to the possibility of war, the Capitán was completely pardoned by Governor Macías the 1st. March 1, 1898 C.E. Rivero was then asked to take charge of the 3rd. 12th Company, Artillery Battalion based in the Cas tillo de San Cristóbal.

On May 11th,  Charles H. Allen succeeded Theodore Roosevelt as assistant secretary of the navy, releasing him for war duty. Also on that day, President William McKinley and his cabinet approved a State Department memorandum calling for Spanish cess ion of a suitable "coaling station," presumably at Manila, Las Filipinas . This would suggest that the United States was confident of its war making abilities.

On May 12, 1898 C.E., the Américanos launched a naval offensive against Puerto Rico. A squadron of 12 U.S. ships commanded by Acting Rear Admirable William < span style3D'font-size:8.0pt;mso-ascii-font-family:Calibri;mso-fareast-font-fam ily: "Times New Roman";mso-hansi-font-family:Calibri;mso-bidi-font-family:Calibr i; mso-bidi-theme-font:minor-latin'>Thompson Sampson of the United States Navy attacked and bombarded the archipelago's capital,&nb sp;San Juan, resulting in minimal damage to the city.  Thereafter, the Américanos were able to est ablish a blockade in the City's harbor, San Juan Bay.

A beleaguered Spanish Prime Minister Sagasta formed his new cabinet on May 18th< /span>. On that same day, U.S. President McKinley ordered a military expedition, headed by Major-General Wesley Merritt (June 16, 1834 C.E.-December 3, 1910 C.E.), noted for his distinguished service in the cavalry. His mission was to complete the elimination of all Spanish forces  in Las Filipinas. Once there elimination was completed Merritt’s troops were to occupy the islands, and to provide security and order to the inhabitants. Soon, Major-General Merritt was placed in command of the U.S. VIII Corps being rai sed in California.

The U.S. Navy Commodore George Dewey had already defeated the Spanish navy at the Battle of Manila Bay, Las Filipinas, earlier on May 1, 1898 C.E. Soon after, the U.S. began to organize ground forces for the attack and capture of the City of Manila, Las Filipinas.

Notes on Major-General Wesley < span style3D'font-size:8.0pt;mso-bidi-font-family:Calibri;mso-bidi-theme-font:m inor-latin'>Merritt:

By June, 1898 C.E., Major-General Wesley Merritt and the last of the VIII Corps departed from San Francisco for Las Filipinas. Once Merritt arri ved on the island of Luzón, he and Commodore Dewey ma de preparations for the attack. The two Américanos intentionally excluded Emilio Aguinaldo from plans for the attack of Luzón, neither wanting Aguinaldo's insurgents to have any control over the City of Manila. It is widely believed that Major-General Merritt and Commodore Dewey made arrangements with the Spanish General Ferm ín Jáudenes y Álvarez (July  7, 1836 C.E.). The general was briefly a Spanish Gobernado r-General of Las Filipinas, from July 24th to August 13, 1898 C.E.

During the Guerra Hispano-Estadounidense and the second phase of Las Filipinas Revolution, the commander General Fermín Jáudenes y Álvarez of the Spanish guarnición surrende red the Manila to the U.S. forces o nly after putting up a token resistance. In any case the city fell on August 13 th and Major-General Merritt became the military governor of Man ila. He later advised the U.S. in the peace negotiations at the Treaty of Paris. He was promoted to major-general in the U.S. Army in 1895  C.E. Merritt retired from the Army in 1900 C.E. a nd died ten years later in Natural Bridge, Virginia. He is buried in Arlington National Cemetery.

After the explosion aboard the Américano battleship U.S.S.&n bsp;Maine in Habana harbor in February 1898  C.E., the Spanish Contraalmirante Cervera commander of the Cubano Squadro n had raced back to España to speak t o the government in person. While at Cape Verde to take several ships back to Cuba and prepare for war, despite the severe problems in the fleet, he received orde rs from the Admiralty.

Contraalmirante Cervera returned to the Caribe and slipped past Américano ships to enter the harbor Sant iago de Cuba on May 19th. The Spanish squadron included the cruisers&nb sp;Almirante Oquendo, Vizcaya,  Infanta María Teresa, and the Cris tóbal Colón. The structure of these ocean going cruisers displaced& nbsp;approximately 7,000 tons each, but were not heavily armored. Their armament wasn’t as pow erful and capable as that of the Américan os. The Américano fleet consisted m ainly of modern battleships. To put it succinctly, the armament capability of Contraalmirante Cervera's naval f orce was inferior and lightly armed. The cruisers’ main armaments consisted of t wo 11-inch guns each and a secondary armament of ten 5.5-inch guns. Many  of the Spanish guns’ breech mechanisms, however, were faulty, which caused jams and other problems. The vessel Cristóbal Colón was the most lightly armed of them all. On the other hand, she was the most well protected ship in Cervera's fleet. The second-generation armored cruiser, Cristóbal Colón, had not even had her main battery installed. Instead, she carried wooden dummy guns. The two Villaamil-class&n bsp;destroyers, Plutón and Furor, also suffered from these failings.

Notes on Capitán Fernándo Villaamil Fernán dez-Cueto:

Capitán Fernándo Villaamil Fernández-Cueto  (November 23, 1845 C.E. -July 3, 1898 C.E.< span style3D'font-size:8.0pt'>) was a Spanish naval officer, remember ed for his internationally recognized professionalism, for being the designer of t he first destroyer warship in history and for his heroic death aboard the Destroyer Furor in the naval Battle of Santiago de Cuba of the Guerra Hispano-Estadounidense, being the highest ranking Spanish officer to su ffer this fate in that event.

Fernándo Villaamil was born in Serantes less than a mile from the Bay of Vizcaya coastline, near Castropol in the Astúrias , in the north of España. He desc ended from a family of respected noblemen and landowners.

In 1861 C.E., he entered the Spanish Navy Colegio Naval de San Fernándo, and one year later he went, as midshipman, aboard the frigate Esperanza, the first of the long series of warships on which he would serve his nation until the final Furor at Santi ago de Cuba. He next served in Las Fil ipinas and Cuba, at the time the last remains of el Imperio Español. In 1873 C.E.,  Villaamil was back in España and was nominated as a teac her in the Naval School that the Spanish Navy held aboard a frigate anchored in the naval base of Ferrol. Over the following years, Villaamil took advantage of the studying and writing opportunities presented by his new job, becoming one of the best known and respected Spanish Navy officers.

By 1884 C.E., Villaamil was appoin ted Second Officer in the Ministry of the Navy. As such, he took the initiative of studying and designing a new class of warship intended to fight the, new torpedo boats. After studying the matter, he obtained the agreement of the Minister of the Spanish Navy, Manuel Pezuela, and selected a British firm to build the new vessel. By late 1 885 C.E., Villaamil was assigned to Great Britain to supervise the works and study British naval operating procedures and its new Engineers corps. On January 19, 1887 C.E., the Destructor, the first torpedo boat destroyer, was formally handed over to the Spanish Navy, with great expectations from the European naval community.

On January 24th, the ship weighed anchor in Falmouth, bounded for Vigo, with Villaamil in command. Twenty-four hours later, she reached the Spanish coast, making 18 knots through Bay of Vizcaya.

Cervera's crews lacked experience and practice in gunnery drills, and their training  had emphasized rapid fire at regular intervals in contrast to the Américanos who favored more delibe rate aimed fire. Additionally, Cervera's Marineros were poorly-trained in o ther areas of seamanship.

Contraalmirante Cervera's fleet was also at a further disadvantage relative to the Américanos beca use of the condition of its ships. Many of Cervera's ships had boilers in need of repair. Several ships, including&nbs p;Viscaya, desperately needed bottom-cleaning as they were suffering from extra drag due to fouling. Some of these deficiencies were in part a result of Spanish naval policy which had for many years favored the construction of light, swift ships to patrol their far-flung oceanic Imperio. In addition, there had been recent naval department bu dget cuts.

Contraalmirante Cervera knew as long he remained within Santiago Harbor, his fleet was relatively safe. The City’s guns were sufficient to make up for his fleet's deficiencies, and the area was well-defended with sea mines, torpedoes, and other obstructions. It was the lack of refitting facilities in Santiago to repair his vessels that made the situation desperate. The two fleets had on ly a few inconclusive skirmishes. Cerver a was hoping for bad weather which could scatter the Américanos, he could then make a run out to sea where he could position his ships more favorably to engage the enemy.

On May 19th,  Emilio Aguinaldo a Filipino revolutionary, politician, and military leader returned to  Manila, Las Filipinas, from exile in Ho ng Kong. The United States had invited him back from exile, hoping that Agu inaldo would rally the Filipinos against the Spanish colonial government.

By May24th, five days after his return to Las Filipinas, Emilio Aguinaldo replaced the revolutionary government. He th en established a dictatorial government with himself as the head. His reason, the chaotic conditions he found in Las Filipinas.

May 25th, the first Américano troops began their journey from San Francisco to the Las Filipinas. Thomas McArthur Anderson (1836 C.E. -1917 C.E.) commanded the vanguard of the Philippines E xpeditionary Force (Eighth Army Corps), which arrived at the Provincia de Cavite, Las Filipinas on June 1st.

May 27th, U.S. Navy, under Acting Rear  Admiral William Thompson Sampson and Commodore Winfield Scott Schley, formally blockaded the port of Santiago de Cuba, Cuba.

May 28th, Gen eral William Rufus Shafter, U.S. Army, received orders to mobilize his forces in Tampa, Florida for the attack on Cuba. Training in San António had been going extremely well when the Rough Riders were ordered to move out for Tampa. At every stop from Texas to Florida large crowds greeted the Rough Riders.

Earlier, Brigadier-Gen eral Leonard Wood in command of the newly-formed 1st United States Volunteer Cavalry appointed Lieutenant-Colonel Roosevelt. Roosevelt was asked by his superior to begin the task of recruiting members for the regiment. These first voluntee rs were to be part of a group of three regiments that were being assembled in  the Western states for duty against the Spanish.

Roosevelt began the ta sk of recruiting members for the regiment in the San António, Texas, area and other key cities throughout the West. The resp onse was so great that Roosevelt and Wood had to turn away many applicants. In addition, volunteers throughout the nation were assigned to the regiment. T he volunteers came from different backgrounds, educated men from Ivy League schools, Western gunfighters, former lawmen, Native Américano s, outlaws, farmers, shopkeepers, Mexican-Americans, and many other classes of men came together to form the regiment. The America public promptly christened them  the "Rough Riders."

 
Following the recruiting of the regiment, Roosevelt and Wood set up drills  and basic training at a camp in San Ant ónio. All believed that the war would be a short and violent one. Their chances of seeing any real action would depend on how fast the troops could become field-ready. A command made up of strictly volunteers, many of whom had no previous formal military training or experience, would be a daunting task.  How to build a solid command formation from the bottom up was also a pressing issue.

On the positive side,  Brigadier-General Wood had military experience and organizing ability. Lieutenant-Colonel Roosevelt had the right political contacts and enthusiasm for procuring sor ely needed equipment. Major Brodie's Regular army background was also of great value. The men of the Rough Riders also had many advantages high levels of  enthusiasm, great morale, and a willingness to learn. 

On the naval front, the Améric anos remained unaware of Contraalmirante Cervera’s Caribe Cuba Spani sh Squadron's location, prior to it being discovered by the Flying Squadron under Commodore Rear Admiral Winfield Scott Schley on May 29, 1898 C.E. An Américano naval squadron sighted Contraalmirante Cervera's newest ship, the cruiser Cristóbal Colón, and immediately established a blockade around the mouth of the Santiago de Cuba Harbor. The Spanish soon found themselves "blockaded closely by Américan o ships about six miles from the Morr o by day, and moving closer at night. The Rear Admiral also placed a blo ckade semi-circle at the opening of the harbor. An auxiliary ship stood at the ed ges waiting to be used in case a forced entrance was necessary. A torpedo boat  was stationed further off the front line. This newly developed torpedo boat with its three 1-pounder 1.46 i nch guns and three 18 inch torpedo tubes for armaments was charged with guarding Sampson's flagship when he broke the blockade to perf orm frequent inspections, attacks, and pursuits. Still, for the Améric anos blockade duty was tedious. During the day, the blockade stationed constant lookouts. During the night, a battleship used searchlights at the entrance  of the harbor in the event the Spanish fleet attempted an escape under the cov er of darkness.

The Américano naval forces in Cubano waters w ere initially divided into two commands, that of Acting Rear Admiral William T. Sampson of the North Atlantic Squadron and Commodore Rear Admiral Winfield Scott Schley’s Flying Squadron. The Américano fl eet was composed of many different types of vessels. At the head of the fleet w ere Sampson's armored cruiser U.S.S. New York and Schley's  flagship the cruiser U.S.S. Brooklyn were well-armed. The Américano fleet’s primary firepowe r, the battleships U.S.S. Indiana, U.S.S. Massachusetts,  U.S.S. Iowa, and the U.S.S. Texas. Each was armed with 13-inch guns. These bat tleships all built within the decade, were modern, steam-powered, and steel-hulled c oast defense battleships. These ships were and could steam at speeds up to 17 knots. The oldest and least powerful of these was Texas.  Off Santiago de Cuba, Cuba, Commodore& nbsp;Schley's Flying Squadron was merged into the larger fleet under Acting Rear Admiral< /span> Sampson's overall command.

Secretary of the American Navy John D. Long also ordered the battleship U.S.S. Oregon to sail from Mare Island, California, to join the fleet in the Caribe to strengthen the attack fo rce. The ship’s armament included four 13-inch guns, eight 8-inch/30 caliber guns. She was protected by 18-inch-thick steel armor. With its 11,000-horsepower engines, the U.S.S. Oregon could make upwards of 17 knots. It had joined Sampson's fleet in early May. < /o:p>

Acting Rear Admiral William Thompson Sampson’s combined fleet of battleships and cruisers were not his only forces in this conflict. The Américanos deployed other v essels as well. These included torpedo boats like U.S.S. Porter.&nb sp;It also had light cruisers such as the U.S.S. New Orleans and a collier ship the U.S.S. Merrimac.

On May 31st, the Américanos and Españoles exchanged naval fire. The fight was between the Cristóbal Colón a&n bsp;Giuseppe Garibaldi-class armored cruiser and three Américano vessels. The U.S.S.  ;Iowa was the very newest American battleship in the  Guerra Hispano-Estadounidense. Like the Indiana-class battleships, the Iowa w as classified as a "Seagoing Coastline Battleship." The  U.S.S. Massachusetts was the second United States Navy&nbs p;ship comparable to foreign battleships of the time and the U.S.S. New Orleans was a ship of the New Orleans-class.

After some time, Contraalmirante Cervera ordered his squadron's cruiser to retur n to the harbor, with neither side having taken any damage. Cervera was aware that soon U.S. land forces would arrive in strength and begin their drive on S antiago de Cuba. The Españoles woul d be surrounded at Santiago de Cuba. The Américano naval fleet was already outside the Harbor and to the south. Soon, a large Américano army would most probably land in the east and begin i ts advance in concert with the Cubano< /i> insurgents from the west. When they were at the gates, it would leave Contraalmirante Cervera's fleet un able to remain safely in the harbor.

By June, Amer ican Anti-Imperialist League was organized in opposition to the annexation  of the Las Filipinas. Among its members were Andrew Carnegie, Mark Twain, William James, David Starr Jordan, and Samuel Gompers. George S. Boutwell, former secretary of the treasury and Massachusetts senator, served as president of the League. That same month, U.S. business and government circles were united around a polic y of retaining all or part of Las Filipinas.

On June 1st, the remainder of under Acting Rear Admiral William Thompson Sampson’s North Atlantic Squadron arrived to begin operating in Cubano water s. Together now the entire U.S. naval force continued blockading Contraalmirante Cervera's squadron in Santiago de Cuba Ha rbor.

The Rough Riders comma nd arrived in Tampa, Florida, on J une 1st. There, while waiting for further orders the unit began another series  of training exercises.

On June 2nd-3rd, an Américano naval commander decided to attempt to blockade and to clear the narrow passage of any mines at Santiago de Cuba Ha rbor’s entrance by sinking the U.S.S. Merrimac, a collier bulk cargo ship designed to carry coal for naval use by coal-fired warships. As it was being positioned it came under fire f rom the defenders and was forced aground. Once boarded, the Spanish Contraalmirante Cervera boarded personally met with its Américano crewmen, who were taken prisoner. Later, Cervera sent his chief of staff under a flag of truce to give a note to Acting Rear Admiral Sampson informing him that the collier's crew was alive and well. The act impressed his Américano opponen ts.

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As the Spanish fleet had remained inactive in the Harbor, on July 2nd, Ramón Blanco , the military gobernador of Cuba, gave orders for a sortie aga inst the Américano blockade. Earlier , Contraalmirante Cervera had discus sed the matter with the authorities in  Madrid advising against taking such an action. Blanco’s order had to be carried out.

June 3rd, fir st contact of the commanders of the U.S. Marines and leaders of the Cubano< /i> Liberation Army, aboard the armored cruiser U.S.S. New York at wh ich the revolutionary forces provided detailed information for the campaign.

Then on the June 6th,  the Rough Riders received final orders from headquarters to assemble and begin preparations for their departure to Cuba. They were to be a part of an invasion force consisted of 17,000 troops. Sev eral problems followed. Poor planning by military headquarters placed the Rough Riders in a difficult position. The unit was only allowed to take two-third s of their original force. They were also ordered to leave horses, pack trains,  and support troops behind. To make matters worse, the Regiment was forced to commandeer a train, this in order to preserve a spot on the transport ships by arriving at the harbor before another regiment. All were relieved when the train pul led into the harbor. Upon arrival, Colonel Roosevelt was given the command the loading of the troops into the transports. Everything was going well and the troops were in high spirits. But sailing was delayed of a full week, result ed when an unfounded rumor that a Spanish naval armada was off the coast of Key West, Florida.

One of the main targets of naval operations during the war was to be the major port of Santiago de Cuba. Due to then summer hurricane season, the Américano fleet assigned to attack Santiago would need shelter. The h arbor at Bahía de Guantánamo was selected. The the first A méricano naval attack and invasion would occur between June 6th and 10th at Bahía de Guantánamo . The subsequent successful landing of U.S. Marines was due to that naval support.

Aided in Cuba by the pro-independence insurgents led by General Calixto García, the Américano forces planned to capture the city of Sant iago de Cuba to destroy Spanish army and fleet. To do so, they had to make t heir way through Spanish defenses in the San Juan Hills and the small town in El Caney.

June 9th, U.S . Acting Rear Admiral William Thompson Sampson sailed to Cuba’s Bahía de Guantánamo . The next day, American troops were landed there.

June 11th,&nb sp;McKinley administration reactivated debate in Congress on Hawaiian annexation, using the argument that "we must have Hawaii to help U.S. get our share of China." Clearly, American intentions involved a string of strategic na val locations in the Caribe and far into the Pacific Ocean. With work having start ed on the Panamá Canal  in 1881 C.E., though the Panamá Canal would not be a reality until its opening in August 15, 1914 C.E., the die was cast. The Hawaiian Islands would become the first stop for the Pacific Fleet as it made its way deeper into the Pacific Ocean. Later, it could be joined by the Atlantic Fleet from the Atlantic Oc ean into the Pacific via the Panamá Canal.

June 12th, Las Filipinas proclaimed independence. On that same day, a German squadron under Admiral Diederichs arrived at Manila.

By June 13th, with sailing orders in-hand, the transports fill ed with Américano tr oopers, including the Rough Riders, ships finally set off from Tampa, Florida, for Santiago de C uba, Cuba< /span>. 

June 14th, McKinley administration decided not to return Las Filipinas to España . It appears to   be a part of a prop osed string of future American naval locations that would eventually stretch from the Caribe further into the Pacific Oc ean.

The next day, June 15th, Anti-war American Anti-Imperialist League assembled to discuss t heir opposition to the annexation of the Las Filipinas and to strategize about how to stop it.

On June 15th,  Almirante Cámara's squadron received orders to relieve Spanish guarnición in Las Filipinas.

On that same  day, of June 15th, U.S. Congress passed the Hawaii annexation resolution, 209-91. Three weeks later, on July 6th, the U.S. Senate would affirm the measure. H ere we once again see a part of that proposed string of American naval locations which was to stretch from the Carib e, in Cuba and Puerto Rico, far into the Pacific Ocean.

June 18th, U. S. Secretary of the Navy John D. Long ordered Acting Rear William Thompson Sampson to create a new squadron, the Eas tern Squadron, for possible raiding and bombardment missions along the coasts of España. This enlarged American military strategy from battling the Españoles in the Caribe and Pacific to t he Atlantic and Mediterranean. The creation of a third theater of operations w as a drastic move. 

June 20th,&nb sp;in the Pacific, Spanish authorities surrendered Guam to Captain Henry G lass and his forces on the cruiser U.S.S. Charleston. Interestingly, the American Navy had sent only a single cruiser to capture the Island then under Spanish control. When the Américanos arrived, they found tha t the Spanish guarnición on the islan d had no knowledge of the Guerra. The last message received by the authorities there from España was dated April 14, 1898 C.E., a month before wa r was declared. Guam by the time of the Guerra, had been neglected  and had no real defenses, only light weapons. As a result, the capturing of Guam was a bloodless event. P ut simply, the Spanish surrendered without resistance and the island passed in to Américano control. The event was t he only conflict of the Guerra Hispano-Estadounidense on  Guam.

With the capture of Guam, the Amér icanos now had the Pacific Fleet’s naval stop-off point between Hawaii and the Philippines.

That same day , of June 20th, the main U.S. military force began appearing off Santiag o de Cuba. Santiago de Cuba is the second-largest city of Cuba  and the capital city of the Provincia of Santiago de Cuba. It li es in the southeastern area of the island, some 540 miles southeast of the Cubano capital of Habana. A total of 153 American ships assembled of f of the harbor carrying more than 16,200 soldiers. Materiel alone was carried b y 42 of the ships.

Teniente-General Calixto García of the Cubano insurrection forces, U.S. Acting Rear Admiral Sampson, and U.S. U.S. Commander of the  Fifth Army Corps Major-Genera l William Rufus Shafter met in El Aserradero on th e south coast of the Provincia de Oriente, Cuba to complete the general strategy of the campaign. At that time, the Cubano< /i> forces occupied positions west, northwest, and east of Santiago de Cuba< /i>.

From June 22nd through the 24th, Major-General Shafter’s Fifth Army Corps began landed at Dai quirí and Siboney, east of the City of Santiago de Cuba. There they estab lished an Américano base of operations . Brigadier-General Jacob Ford Kent commanded  the Corps' 1st Infantry Division, while Major-General of Volunteers Major-General Henry Ware Lawton commanded the 2nd Infantry Division.  Major-General of Volunteers < span style3D'font-size:8.0pt'>Joseph Wheeler, commanded the dismounted Cavalry Division, but was suffering from fever and had to turn over command to Brigadier-General Samuel Storrow Sumner. 

By June 22 nd, all of Major-General Shafter's 15,000 troops in three divisions had arrived at Daiquirí, Cuba. At the time, the U.S. Navy was engaged in bombin g the Spanish and Cubanos at the drop -off point of Daiquirí, Cuba. This it did in order to ensu re a safe landing for the troopers. On that morning, the Fifth Army Corps including Brigadier-Gener al Sumner’s troopers the “Rough Riders” received the welcomed landing order. Colonel Ro osevelt immediately sent a small detachment ahead of the main departure group to ra ise the Rough Rider flag over the town, this to encouragement to the rest of the Regiment as they disembarked. The task of unloading the troops began to tak e a toll, as some troopers in other regiments lost their lives by being caught  up in the current. Fortunately, there had been no formal military resista nce from Spanish forces to their landing. By that afternoon, all of Brigadier-General Leonard Wood's men were successfully on the shore and the re was still no sign of any enemy activity. This allowed the Regiment to prepa re for their first combat action.

In that same period, from June 22nd through the 24th, an additional military ground force was deployed near the harbor  city of Santiago de Cuba. On June 22 nd, a Spanish naval counterattack was launched by the Spanish cruiser Isabel II and the destroyer Terror against American naval forces. During the ac tion the destroyer Terror was damaged. The counterattack failed to break the ongoing Américano blo ckade of Santiago de Cuba which had b egun almost a month before.

On June 23rd, after skirmishing with the Américano troops near Siboney, Cuba, a villa  located by the Caribe Sea,  a contingent of Spanish soldados retired to entrenched positions at Las Guásimas. Major-General < span style3D'font-size:8.0pt;mso-bidi-font-family:Calibri;mso-bidi-theme-font:m inor-latin'>Joseph Wheeler’s advance guard of Amé ricano forces unconcerned with Cubano scouting parties, followed orders and proceeded with caution. Siboney is near the road linking Sa ntiago de Cuba to Baconao, through the eastern coastal area of Santiago de Cuba municipality.

Daiquirí, a small village, 14 miles east of Santiago de Cuba would soon become a focal point of the United States invasion of Cuba. The first Américano troopers would hit the beaches there east of Santiago on June 23rd. They would  then move towards the City and the surrounding ridges. The heat, humidity, and tropical diseases would soon take their toll when the Américano soldiers finally began attacking against strong defen sive entrenchments of the Españoles.  

In the Battle of Las Guásimas on June 24th, Américanos attempting to close on General  ;Antero Rubín’s (y Homent) (February 15, 1851 C.E.-May 1, 1935 C.E.) < /span>rearguard of about 2,000 soldados were ambushed. The battle ended indecisively, but in favor of the Españoles. They soon left Las Guásimas on a planned retreat  to the city of Santiago de Cuba. < /o:p>

The Rough Riders depar ted Daiquirí on the morning of June 24 th, through a narrow steep trail on top of a long ridge. Their destination was  the sleepy town of Las Guásimas. Their objective was to a rrive at Las Guásimas at the same tim e as Brigade-General of Volunteers Samuel Baldwin Marks (SMB) Young’s (January 9, 1840 C.E.-September 1, 1924 C.E.) column that was to arrive from a less ste ep trail. He commanded one of two cavalry brigades which were part of the Cava lry Division (Dismounted) under Major-General of Volunteers Joseph Wheeler .

Brigadier-General Wood ’s advance scouts from L Company had just reported that an enemy outpost had b een located. Wood quickly ordered Roosevelt to deploy the troops and locate the Spanish.

William Owen "Buc ky" O'Neill Captain of Troop A, under Colonel Theodore Roosevelt

1st U.S. Volunteer Cav alry Regiment, were ordered to deploy into a skirmish line on the right flank. Suddenly, the Américanos came u nder fire from Spanish soldados hidd en in heavy brush. With their ability to blend in with the surroundings, the Span ish were a difficult target as the jungle covered everything. And there wasn’t  the faintest trace of smoke from their weapons in any direction to indicate whe re the bullets were coming from. As the Arizona brigade under the command of Captain O'Neill began working their way through the thick underbrush, fire  from the Españoles began to take effect on them. A couple of troope rs were hit and fell. Spanish soldados firing a steady stream of bullets had pinned down the rest of the brigade.  It was not until reinforcements came up the ravine that O'Neill's brigade was  able to advance from the thick undergrowth out into the open terrain. The Spanis h soldados began their retreat when  they saw the advancing Arizona brigade with fresh reinforcements. At that point, the Españoles could see the full force of the Américanos.

On the left flank, the Américano troopers, including Brig adier-General Wood’s regiment, were having their own difficulties. A new wave of < i>Españoles retreating from the fight on the right flank sudd enly rejoined the firefight attacking the Rough Riders. A detachment of Rough Ri ders was now under very heavy fire and were suffering several causalities. Seeing this detachment being blocked from movement by the Españoles, Colonel “Teddy” Roosevelt took it upon himself  to issue his first combat order, a rescue attempt. Troops under the command of Captain Allyn Capron obeying Roosevelt's orders advanced despite suffering heavy losses and rescued the pinned down detachment. 

Soon after the successful relief mission, Colonel Roosevelt and senior regimental officer at the rank of Major Alexander Oswald Brodie conferred on battle plans. It was decided to attack a line of Españoles’ entrenched on higher ground near a fortified house. Due to continued fighting in the area, Roosevelt was unable to locate Brigadier-General Wood to ask for his formal permission to attack. With time of the essence, Roosevelt decided to temporarily take personal command of G Troop for the attack. Roosevelt fearlessly led the assault on the entrenchments and the house. Wi th his detachment of Rough Riders, in his first actual military attack, Roosevelt  was able to push the Españoles away from the locations. The defeated  Españoles retired to the San Juan Heights guarding the important city of Santiago de Cuba. The entrenchment w as now secured.
When Brigadier-General Wood arrived on then scene, he surveyed the field. He found it littered with enemy casualties and tired Rough Riders. Fighting th eir way up the steep trail to get to the entrenchments in the extreme Cubano heat had left his men exhau sted. Wood’s assessment was that his Rough Riders were incapable of further pursu it of the retreating Españoles. With his exhausted men now in possession of the Spanish entrenchments, Brigadier-General Wood decided to camp there and awa it further orders. His Battalion had won its first engagement in the skirmish  at Las Guásimas.

June 25th, The U.S.S. Yosemite, an auxiliary cruiser arrived off&n bsp;San Juan Harbor, Puerto Rico, and began the blockade of the por t. The strategy was similar to that employed at the harbor of Santiago de Cuba, Cuba. It would be one of enclosing any anchor ed Spanish naval vessels and keeping them out of action.

June 27th, Teniente-General Calixto García requested that Tomás Estrada Palma and the Cub ano Committee ask President McKinley to recognize the Cubano Council of Government.

Planning for the Battle of  Santiago de Cuba, July 1st through July 3rd